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ABSTRACT
This thesis attempts to trace the history of the politics, rhetoric and practice of British
central government planning in the 1960s. As such, it attempts to answer a number of
questions: why did 'planning' come back into fashion in the early 1960s? What
meanings did it take on for those who espoused it? Did different groups have very
different ideas about what it meant? Why was it adopted as such an all-encompassing
reformist banner in this decade? Did it fail to achieve its ends, and if so, why?
'Planning' is therefore treated both as an idea and a practice in its own right, but also
as a tool to answer wider questions about post-war British government and politics.
How important were interest groups, for instance the 'social partners' of employers
and trade unions, in the management of the economy? How central were provider and
consumer interest groups in the planning and development of the Welfare State? How
close together were the ideas and actions of the political parties? How powerfiui was
the central government, and what were the limits to its power? This thesis will use
unpublished manuscript sources from the archives of the central government and the
two main political parties, along with some personal papers, to attempt to answer
these questions. It will conclude that planning failed because of a basic lack of
agreement between the different 'planners', as well as the inability of the central
government machinery to conduct such complex and testing work. It will also argue
that the influence of political ideology and party-political conflict was much greater
than has previously been thought.
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IPLANNING AND THE STATE IN THE BRITISH 1960s
The community must equip itself to take charge of its own destiny and no longer be ruled by
market forces beyond its control.
-Labour Party manifesto, Let's go with Labour for the New Britain (1964)'
The resources of democratic planning'. hopingfor a breakthrough.
If there was one concept at the heart of the raised expectations and dashed hopes of
British politics in the 1960s, it was 'planning'. This was not only a matter of
economic policy, since governments also issued plans in the field of social welfare:
the NHS Plan of 1962, the Local Health and Welfare Plan of 1963, and the Housing
Plan of 1965, are good examples. Planning was also evident throughout the 1960s in a
host of lesser initiatives and projects that were the product of a remarkable
confidence, for each was supposed to provide a comprehensive framework for Britain
in the 1 970s. These plans bore three unmistakable hallmarks. The first was that they
were supposed to look ahead over the 'long term', perhaps five, ten or fifteen years;
the second was that they were intended to be comprehensive, providing for the
population's needs in both the private and the public sector. The final characteristic of
British government plans in the I 960s was the confidence with which their aims were
pronounced. 2
 The ideology of planning therefore included a long time-span, universal
coverage and a large degree of optimism concerning delivery.
It is difficult now to recall the hopes invested in such techniques, evident in
Harold Wilson's appeal to the 'white heat of the technological revolution'. 'For the
first time not only the Labour Party... but also the high priests of industry and fmance
are coming to realise that.., laissez-faire economics provide no answer', he wrote in
1961: 'steady industrial expansion and a strong currency... can be achieved only by...
F.W.S. Craig, British general election ,nan(festos 1959-1 987 (3 edn., Dartmouth Publishing, Aldershot, 1990),
p.46
2 For a definition of 'planning' see The New Pa/grave dictiona,y of economics (Macmillan, London, 1987), vol.
III, pp. 879-80
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purposive economic planning'. 3 Such thinking was behind his 1963 Conference
speech as leader, in which he argued:
Because we are democrats, we reject the methods which communist countries are
deploying in applying the results of scientific research to industrial life. But
because we care deeply about the future of Britain, we must use all the resources
of democratic planning, all the latent and undeveloped.., skills of our people, to
ensure Britain's standing in the world.4
Thus Wilson combined the appeal of government intervention, harnessing science and
technology in the pursuit of a breakthrough in productivity.
Conservatives were not without answers. For two years they had been pursuing
their own 'planning' experiment in the National Economic Development Council.
Chancellor Selwyn Lloyd had grasped this as a counterpoint to the deflation involved
in his 'little Budget' of July 1961. He undertook to 'discuss... with both sides of
industry procedures for pulling together... better co-ordination of ideas and plans', and
professed himself 'not frightened' of the term 'planning'. 5 Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan spent the early 1960s searching for a way to secure 'a deliberate shift of
effort and resources from stagnation or decline to growth', since he believed that the
'forces at work [werel now too complicated, [thel risks of setback too great, to leave
to market forces'. 6 The Conservatives established a new independent planning
authority, responsible for tripartite discussions on the control of wages, setting growth
targets, and for sectoral industrial efficiency through the Economic Development
Councils, or 'Little Neddys'. 7 This was a formidable break with the relatively
orthodox policies pursued in the 1950s.
H. Wilson, 'Four Year Plan for Britain', New Statesman, 24 March 1961
Wilson, Purpose in politics: selected speeches (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1964), p. 28
J. Leruez, Economic Planning and Politics in Britain (London, 1975), pp. 92-3
6 PRO PREM 11/4296: Macmillan brief for Cabinet, 'Modernisation of Britain', 29 October 1962
M. Shanks, Planning and politics: the British experience 1 960-76 (Allen & Unwin, London, 1977), pp. 22-8
2
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'Contribution to civilisation '. apre-history ofplanning.
The idea of planning was not a sudden invention of the 1 960s, for it had been also
been very fashionable in the 1930s. 8 However, although the Labour Party did place
increased rhetorical emphasis on planning following the collapse of the second
Labour Government in 1931, the word was often used without making clear what it
meant.9 There were at least three distinct varieties of Labour planning alone. One
school of thought was Herbert Morrison's argument that Labour must nationalise key
industries to re-organise them along more efficient lines, while another was G.D.H.
Cole's view that Whitehall should have direct control over most of the economy,
supervised by an Economic Planning Authority under the direction of the Cabinet
(incorporating his earlier Guild Socialist views, he included participation of the
workforce in Works Councils).' 0 There was also the developing 'proto-Keynesian'
circle around Hugh Dalton, Evan Durbin and Hugh Gaitskell - without mentioning
the very different ideas of industrial self-government and capitalist reconstruction
identified with the small but influential group of 'Tory Planners' around Harold
Macmillan.
Labour's planning efforts during its first majority government in 1945-5 1 were
stymied by these logical and political fissures. Socialist enthusiasm for planning
remained: Morrison, Lord President and de facto head of Economic Affairs between
1945 and 1947, had declared that 'planning as it is now taking shape in this country...
will be regarded in times to come as a contribution to civilisation as vital and
A. Marwick, 'Middle opinion in the 'thirties: planning, progress, and political "agreement", English historical
review 79 (1964), passim; P. Addison (2 edn.), The road to 1945: British politics and the Second World War
(Pimlico, London, 1994), pp. 3 8-9, 48-51
A. Booth, 'How long are light years in British politics? The Labour Party's economic ideas in the 1930s', TCBH
7, 1 (1996), pp. 14-22; P. Clarke, 'The Keynesian consensus and its enemies' in D. Marquand & A. Seldon, The
ideas that shaped post-war Britain (Fontana, London, 1996), p. 74
'° 0. Foote (3 edn.), The Labour Party's political thought (Macmillan, London, 1997), pp. 171-6
D. Ritschel, The politics ofplanning: the debate on economic planning in Britain in the 1930s (Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1997), pp. 105-6, 112-5, 126-34, 191-6, 202-9
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distinctly British as parliamentary democracy and the rule of law'.' 2 There was an
explicit reference to a 'national plan' in Labour's 1945 General Election manifesto.
However, the intellectual confusion about what planning actually meant, so evident in
the 1930s, remained: for Morrison, it seemed to mean nationalisation, without much
thought about how the newly-nationalised industries might concert their efforts.' 3 The
appropriate boundary between the use of short-term economic controls, held over
from wartime to prevent the inflation that would accompany shortages of raw
materials, and long-term economic planning, was never clear.'4
The Labour Government did publish a series of Economic surveys from 1947,
the forerunners of which had been submitted to Ministers during the War, and had
their roots in Keynes' first survey of national income and manpower budget of 1940-
41.15 However, these were designed to balance rationed materiel and demand, so as
not to ignite inflation, or invite unemployment. There was little in them to do with
detailed industrial change, nor was there intended to be. There were no output targets
even for the 'key industries' identified in the 1947 Survey, and there was a reliance on
exhortation and persuasion that was to become familiar in the coming years.' 6 The
Surveys were therefore increasingly seen as superfluous to Keynesian macro-
economic management, and were gradually reduced to a survey of recent
developments, with a series of rather vague forecasts for the future.'7
New institutions and even departments were established to foster long-term
plans for the economy, especially after the debacle of the coal crisis and Sterling's
brief convertibility in 1947. This year saw the creation of the Economic Planning
Board, to bring officials (though not Ministers) into regular consultation with the trade
12 Addison, Road, p. 274
H. Pelling, The Labour Governments 1945-51 (Macmillan, London, 1984), pp. 75-9, 92, 96
' A. Cairncross, Years of recove?y: British economic policy 1945-51 (Methuen, London, 1985), pp. 299-30 1
Addison, Road, pp. 170-1
' 6 K 0. Morgan, Labour in power 1945-51 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984), pp. 367-8; K. Middlemas, Power,
competition and the state, vol. I: Britain in search of balance 1945-61 (Macmillan, London, 1986), p. 151
Cairncross, Years, p. 323; D. Howell, British social democracy: a study in development and decay (Croom
Helm, London, 1976), pp. 156-7
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unions and employers, and the Central Economic Planning Staff to report on the
progress of the Surveys. 18 The role of the CEPS was unclear right up to Labour's
electoral defeat in 1951.19 It did have some influence when its members were experts
on a particular field, for instance when Edwin Plowden and Robert Hall, with their
intimate knowledge of Britain's international trade, advised devaluation in 1949.
However, the CEPS remained essentially a 'think tank', able to press reports and
opinions on Ministers only on an ad hoc basis. It was not equipped to judge between
competing claims, or between different yardsticks for measuring policy, for instance
in the perennial puzzle of how manpower and cash forecasts could be fitted together.2°
There was no mechanism for centrally directing either the means or the ends
of the Economic surveys. The idea of a central Ministry of Economic Affairs, skilfully
offered by Attlee to Cripps to divide the latter from the other plotters against Attlee's
leadership, was very short-lived: it was in fact limited to six weeks, at the end of
which period Dalton was forced to resign by a Budget leak and Cripps was given the
Treasury.2 ' By 1951, therefore, the Treasury had retained its traditional central place
in economic policy-making, a result entirely welcomed by the Head of the Civil
Service, Sir Edward Bridges. 22 What Jim Tomlinson has termed the 'iron
quadrilateral' - Morrisonian nationalisation, free collective bargaining, Parliamentary
sovereignty, and cross-party agreement on Keynesian budgetary management - had
defeated the planning effort.23
A number of short-term controls were retained, though the public image
deliberately fostered by Harold Wilson at the Board of Trade in 1948-49 was of a
Morgan, Power, pp. 332-4; Leruez, Planning, pp. 45-6
' P. Hennessy, The Prime Minister (Allen Lane, London, 2000), p. 165
20 K. Thorpe, 'The missing pillar: economic planning and the machinery of government during the Labour
administration of 1945-51', London University PhD thesis(1999), pp. 333-4; P. Hennessy, Whitehall (Secker&
Warburg, London, 1989), p. 153
21 Hennessy, Never again: Britain, /945-195! (Cape, London, 1992), pp. 335-6
22 E. Bridges, Treasury control (Athlone Press, 1950), pp. 28-9; J. Tomlinson, Public policy and the economy since
1900 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990), p. 216; Middlemas, Power, I, p. 151
23 Tomlinson, 'Planning: debate and policy in the 1940s', TCBH3, 2(1992), p. 173
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'bonfire of controls'.24 The trend was towards relaxation, but only slowly: for
instance, the war-time Control of Engagement Order, allowing Ministers to direct
workers to certain industries, was reactivated in 1947.25 Building licensing and
exchange control remained down to 1951; 10% of consumer expenditure remained
rationed; some basic raw materials such as coal remained subject to government
control. Import controls, though following US pressure down to only 10% of private
goods from the Organisation for European Economic Co-Operation area, also
remained, particularly on the 20% of goods that were bulk purchased by the
Government from OEEC countries.26
Ideologically, Labour politicians perceived these controls as the main
• difference between them and their Conservative opponents, and the Full Employment
Bill they introduced in 1951 would have made permanent many of the wartime
powers that were only being annually renewed. 27 Even so, those measures never came
close to matching the more radical planning prescriptions: only 300 workers had
actually been directed to relocate by the re-activated Control of Engagement Order:
sections of the proposed Full Employment Bill was merged into the Supplies and
Services (Defence Purposes) Act as a temporary aid to Korean re-armament, rather
than becoming a permanent element of a planned economy, while the rest does not
seem to have been high among of the Government's priorities. 28 Nor were controls
necessarily the same thing as long-term planning: they were never operated against
the background of long-term thinking about economic needs. They were rather
concerned, like the Surveys, to balance demand and supply over the short-term.
24 B. Pimlott, Harold Wilson (HarperCollins, London, 1992), pp. 124-8; P. Ziegler, Wilson: the authorised
biography (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1993), pp. 67-9
25 Cairncross, Years, p. 303
26 A.S. Milward & G. Brennan, Britain's place in the world: a historical enquiry into import controls 1945-60
(Routledge, London, 1996), pp. 58-9; Tomlinson, Policy, pp. 204-5, 208
27 N Rollings, "Poor Mr Butskell: a short life, wrecked by schizophrenia?", TCBH 5, 2 (1994), pp. 191-3
Thorpe, 'Pillar', pp. 103, 121-2; M. Chick, Industrial policy in Britain 1945-51 (Cambridge UP, Cambridge,
1998), pp. 202-5; Tomlinson, Employment policy: the crucialyears 1939-55 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987), p.
137
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The legacy was one of men, rather than measures: a number of personnel from
the Economic Section and CEPS who would stay within Whitehall, or leave and come
back during the 1 960s experiment, who at an official level would try to bring the
promise of 'planning' to fruition. Eric Roll, later Permanent Under-Secretary at the
Department of Economic Affairs, served in the CEPS, as did Kenneth Berrill, who
along with Richard Kahn advised the Government on incomes policy in the 1 960s,
and later became Chief Economic Adviser to the Treasury. Plowden chaired the
inquiry that led to long-term public expenditure planning. Douglas Allen was Roll's
successor as head of DEA, while Douglas Henley was put in charge of DEA's Public
Expenditure division. From the Economic Section, Russell Bretherton was a Treasury
Under-Secretary between 1961 and 1968; John Jukes eventually became Donald
MacDougall's second-in-command in the Economic Planning section of DEA, while
John Grieve-Smith was in turn Jukes' deputy. 29
 For most of these men, there was a
continuity of outlook between the 1 940s and 1 960s, and this time, key officials were
determined not to fail through lack of effort.
However, in the meantime, the Conservatives embarked on a limited but
significant re-orientation of economic policy, away from direct controls and planning,
and towards macro-economic management through a crude type of 'steam
Keynesianism'. 3° After initially re-imposing some import quotas and controls to meet
the financial crisis of 1951-52, from 1953 controls over imports were gradually
relaxed. The new government's deep ideological commitment to free trade and
payments was at the heart of this policy. 3 ' An even greater degree of ideological
change was apparent in Conservative fiscal policy, which combined large reductions
in income tax and surtax in 1953, 1955 and 1957 with increases in more regressive
indirect taxation. Although public expenditure after 1953 was on an upwards trend,
indirect taxes were used as the favoured weapon of restrictive budgetary management,
29 Who's who (various); imperial calendar (various); Thorpe, 'Pillar', p. 332; Cairncross & N. Watts, The
economic section 1939-61: a study in economic advising (Routledge, London, 1989), appendix, pp. 3 52-7
° Clarke, 'Enemies', p. 84
' Milward & Brennan, Place, pp. 75, 78-9, 95, 108, table 5, P. 126; B.W.E. Alford, Britain in the world economy
since 1880 (Longman, London, 1996), table 7.9, p. 234; A.D. Morgan & D. Martin, 'Tariff reductions and UK
imports of manufactures: 1955-71', NIER 77(1976), pp. 39-43
7
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along first with deferments of public sector capital investment, and then in the
September 1957 package a series of actual public expenditure reductions. 32
 There was
also an increased reliance on monetary policy, which rose to a crisis level of 7 per cent
in 1957. Where Labour had abjured the Bank Rate weapon, the Conservatives were
less sparing with monetary restraint.33
32 A.E. Holmans, Demand management in Britain 1 953-58 (ICBH, London, 1999), pp. 61, 80-1, 83, 104-5, 123,
128, 131, 140-1, 164-5; K. Jefferys, Retreat from New Jerusalem: British politics 1951-1 964 (Macmillan,
Basingstoke, 1997), pp. 19, 24
B S. Brittan, Steering the economy (Secker & Warburg, London, 1969), pp. 123, 130; Holmans, Demand, pp. 42-5,
105, 118, 186
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'Specialised knowledge '. economists and the new mood.
At the level of high theory, the 1950s witnessed a gathering challenge to mainstream
Keynesianism, from heterogeneous but influential ideas dubbed 'fundamentalist' or
'new' Keynesianism, bearing fruit in Labour's 1964 programme. Whereas the
Keynesianism of the Neo-Classical Synthesis (NCS) had combined Keynesian macro-
economics with a more traditional, competitive micro-economics, some Oxbridge
economists held much more radical views, most famously (though usually disagreeing
with one another) Thomas Balogh, Nicholas Kaldor, and Joan Robinson. Mainstream
growth economics was partly derived from the writings of Roy Harrod and Evsey
Domar, which examined the endogenous role of savings in achieving enough
investment to hold to a steady state of full employment. 34 However, what became
known as the 'Cambridge school', Robinson especially, took this 'dynamic
economics' further, arguing that profit levels and investment themselves, dependent on
the overall growth rate, were the vital element.35
This was in contrast to the NCS, upheld by such influential American
economists as Robert Solow and Paul Samuelson: their opposition to Kaldor-Robinson
growth economics was at the heart of the so-called 'Cambridge controversies', pitting
MIT in Cambridge, USA, against Cambridge in the UK.36 The British side were
basically objecting to supposedly ahistorical, timeless and static neo-classical views of
e.g. R. Harrod, 'An essay in dynamic theory', Economic journal 49(1939), pp. 16-18, 22-6; F. Hahn & R.C.O.
Matthews, 'The theory of economic growth: a survey', in American Economic Association/ Royal Economic
Society, Surveys of economic theory: growth and development, vol. II (Macmillan, London, 1969), pp. 5-8; R.E.
Backhouse, A history of modern economic analysis (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985), pp. 318-9
See e.g. I. Robinson, Collected economic papers vol. III (Blackwell, Oxford, 1965), pp. 17-22; N. Kaldor,
'Alternative theories of distribution', Review of economic studies 23 (1956), pp. 97-9; idem, 'Capital accumulation
and economic growth', in F. Targetti & A.P. Thiriwall (eds.), The essential Kaldor (Duckworth, London, 1989),
pp. 229-281
M. Blaug, Great economists since Keynes (Wheatsheaf, Sussex, 1985), pp. 213-6, 232-3; R. Middleton,
Charlatans or saviours? Economists and the British economy from Marshall to Meade (Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham, 1998), pp. 206-8, 227-8; N. Crafts, 'The golden age of economic growth in Western Europe, 1950-
73', Economic history review 48, 3 (1995), pp. 430-1
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the return to capital, which was supposed to decline over time, making actual
investment of little importance to economic performance. For neo-classicists,
exogenous technological change would perform this role. 37
 Other economists' debates
would also have a crucial impact on policy: evidence was emerging that a positive
incomes policy might be helpful to check full employment's upwards pressure on
wages and prices. Again, there were opponents of this idea: F.W Paish, LSE Professor
of Economics, argued that slightly higher unemployment would suffice.38
These academic arguments were highly significant, though in terms of
government policy less interesting for the specifics of the contest than for what it tells
us about the interests of the time. Whether it was to be achieved through technology or
capital investment, both theory and practice in the late 1 950s and early 1 960s were
dominated by the pursuit of economic growth. The NCS approach itself stood behind
'growth accounting', which relied on quantifying both inputs and outputs, to find the
'x-efficiency' elements of productivity growth and therefore economic progress itself.
The exemplar of this school was the work of E.F. Denison, whose work on
comparative growth rates focussed on physical inputs such as total hours worked,
advances in knowledge, and increasing efficiencies of scale, downplaying physical
capital investment. 39 Government would obviously have a role if supply-side reforms
were adopted to boost, for instance, education or better use of labour. 4° On the other
hand, the scope for radical action under Fundamentalist Keynesianism seemed almost
unlimited, to raise investment through incentives and growth targets, and shift it from
'undesirable' to 'desirable' activities - which at least in Kaldor's case came to mean
from services to manufacturing, and from small scale to large scale production.4'
37 M. Blaug, The methodology of economics (Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1980), PP. 203-8
F.W. Paish, Studies in an inflationary economy (Macmillan, London, 1962), esp. pp. 316-17, 223, 332
E.F. Denison, Why growth rates differ: post-war experience in nine western countries (Brookings Institute,
Washington DC, 1967), Pp. 121, 298-30 1, and on the UK, pp. 314-5; see Royal Economic Society/ SSRC, Surveys
of applied economics, vol. II (Macmillan, London, 1977), vol. II, pp. 241-55
40 See below, chapt. HI, on the SET, designed to save labour, and chapt. LV, on the economics of education
' R. Cross, Economic theory and policy in the United Kingdom (Robertson, Oxford, 1982), PP. 34-5; N. Kaldor,
Causes of the slow rate of economic growth of the UK (Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1966), pp. 9-18
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The emphasis on investment, scientific progress and structural change emerged
at a time when British politics was overtaken by a sense of uncertainty and self-doubt,
fostered by relative economic decline. The early 1960s were marked by the publication
of a series of jeremiads on the 'state of Britain', attacking the morals and priorities of
what the financial journalist Michael Shanks termed 'the semi-affluent society, with its
cars and washing machines on the "never-never".., its feverish pursuit of a prosperity
it can never bring itself to believe in'. 42
 Britain was constantly portrayed as a
backward, declining power, obsessed with class and increasingly inefficient. 43
 This
sense of retreat was fostered by the new growth accounting, with the OEEC and the
UN both publishing annual tables of growth performance, in which the UK usually
came near the bottom. Taking the 195 1-64 period as a whole, it is clear that, despite
growth performance being very good by historical standards, it was lagging badly by
the yardstick of international comparison (see chart I. 1). This allowed Labour while in
Opposition to develop a powerful and persuasive rhetoric of national decline, showing
'how costly it was to get along without planning'.45
This was part of a wider 'growth fever', as economists throughout the West
considered how to raise the already very impressive post-1945 growth rates even
higher. Encouraged by this apparent success, economists such as Harrod began to
speak of 50% to 100% better living standards within a generation; growth was held to
be 'the best thing that can happen in economics', more important even than full
employment or the best allocation of resources. 46 The OECD set a 50% target for
42 M. Shanks, The stagnant society (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1961), pp. 174, 139
e.g. G. Rees, 'Amateurs and gentlemen', in A. Koestler (ed.), Britain: suicide of a nation? (Hutchinson, London,
1963), pp. 39-51; J. Mander, 'The logic of survival', in ibid, pp. 147-60
' Tomlinson, 'Inventing "decline": the falling behind of the British economy in the post-war years', Economic
history review 49, 4 (1996), p. 744
Labour Party, Twelve wasted years (1963), p. 20; T. Balogh, Planning for progress: a strategy/or Labour
(Fabian Society tract 346, London, 1963), pp. 1-3; see I. Budge, 'Relative decline as a political issue: ideological
motivations of the politico-economic debate in post-war Britain', Contemporary record 7, 1(1993), pp. 1-23
H.W. Arndt, The rise and fall of economic growth (Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1978), pp. 42-3; C. Clark,
Grow:hmanship (LEA, London, 1961), pp. 7-9
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economic growth over the next decade in 1 96O. Though never keen on widespread
intervention, even the Economist by 1961 wanted to see 'a budget-briefcase full of
measures that will give a special incentive to investment in the most progressive and
competitive industries'. When NEDO promised to draw up a growth target, the
Economist's leader-writer raised 'loud cheers for Ned!' 48 Economists themselves had
played a key role in encouraging such enthusiasm.
The combination of the 'growth fever' with frustration at Britain's relatively
poor economic performance issued in a number of influential attacks on British
economic policy, popularising the growth and investment theories of the new
economics. The attack on 'stop-go', which was supposed to hold Britain back by
lowering expectations and stifling investment, was led by J.C.R. Dow of the National
Institute (who had himself served in the Economic Section in the 1940s and 1950s),
and Andrew Shonfield, who until 1961 was Economics Editor of the Observer. Both
men condemned policy based on short-term concerns for the currency, rather than
long-term expansion: the gyrations of recurrent expansion and deflation were
supposed to restrain growth itself. 49 A smoother growth path would aid in 'avoiding
the losses arising from uncertainty'.50
' OECD, Policies for faster growth (OECD, Paris, 1962), passim
' Economist, April 1, 1961, P. 13, May 12, 1962, p. 537
49 J.C.R. Dow, The management of the British economy 1 945-1960 (Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1964), pp. 211,
391, 3 94-7; A. Shonfield, British economic policy since the war (Penguin, Harmondswoth, 1958), pp. 30-5, 49-50;
see N. Macrae, Sunshades in October (Allen & Unwin, London, 1963), esp. pp. 18, 66-71, 108-9, 112
5°J. Mitchell, Grounthvork to economic planning (Secker & Warburg, London, 1966), p. 19; Kaldor, ESSayS, II,
pp. 26-8
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Chart 1.1. Total economic growth in six developed economies, 1951-64 (%)
Source: A. Maddison, Dynamic forces in capitalist development (Oxford UP, Oxford, 1991), table A8, pp. 216-19
At the same time, the more pro-active monetary policy of the 1 950s had been
thrown into doubt by the publication of the Radcliffe Committee's report in August
1959, that interest rates only had a limited effect on investment and demand. 5 ' This
made the 'confidence trick' espoused by Dow and Shonfield, expanding demand to
encourage investment and re-equipment, even more attractive. They praised France as
avoiding 'stop-go' through planned expansion. 52
 However, British enthusiasts for the
French example always overlooked the fact that the government in Paris had powers to
deny finance to companies who did not co-operate with the Plan, as well as more
powers over their nationalised industries than did Whitehall. 53
 Furthermore, the
Cmnd. 827, Report of the committee on the working of the monetary system (August 1959), pp. 158, 162-4, 172-
4; Robert Hall diary, 1 September 1959: Cairncross (ed.), The Robert Hall diaries 1954-61 (Unwin Hyman,
London, 1991), pp.208-9
52 Shonfield, Modern capitalism: the changing balance ofpublic and private power (Oxford UP, Oxford, 1965),
pp. 7 1-3, 158-9
" Macrae, Sunshades, p. 140; 1. Wilson, Planning and growth (Macmillan, London, 1964), p. 35
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famous French Planning Commissariat had deliberately been kept as a small advisoiy
body, rather than the central planning authority of the British imagination.54
Socialist theorists such as Balogh linked planning to administrative reform,
condemning the general administrators of the civil service as lacking 'specialised
knowledge or training', and prone to 'jejune meditations based on a set of simple
theology and beliefs'. The 'Establishment' was presented as an out-of-date, immobile,
incompetent elite, adequate for the 19th century watchman government, but not for the
detailed management of the welfare state. 55 Other Labour thinkers, such as Crossman,
linked the need for civil service reform to the need for increased democratic
participation and the involvement of 'outsiders' not fully dependent on the Whitehall
machine. 56 The attack on the effete aristocracy was not limited to Socialists, with
Anthony Sampson's Anatomy of Britain condemning a situation in which a Ministiy
such as Aviation was 'run by Latin and History scholars'. 57 The prevailing discourse
was of rational 'econocracy', with an overarching appeal to a planned and scientific
economic policy.58
' Y. UlImo, 'France', in J. Hayward & M. Watson (eds.), Planning, politics and public policy: the British, French
and Italian experience (Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1975), pp. 31-4; J. Hackett & A-M. Hackett, Economic
planning in France (Allen & Unwin, London, 1963), pp. 38-42
Balogli, 'The apotheosis of the dilettante', in H. Thomas (ed.), Crisis in the civil service (Anthony Blond,
London, 1968), pp. 17-20, 35
56 R. Crossman, Planmng for freedom (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1965), pp. 75-7
"A. Sampson, The anatomy of Britain (Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1962), pp. 221, 225
P. Se1f Econocrats and the policy process: the politics and philosophy of cost-benefit analysis (Macmillan,
London, 1975), pp. 4-5
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'Bread and circuses '. political ideas and historical challenges.
Planning has been relatively overlooked in discussions about the British 1 960s, partly
overshadowed by ongoing arguments over 'consensus'. Commentators at the time
argued that little divided the political parties, and that the public seemed quiescent and
content. 'The 'sixties were years of consensus', David MeKie argued in 1972: 'the
contest was less, now, between competing philosophies; much more about which set
of managers was likely to get better results' Too many writers to list have argued
that party government and electoral choice in post-war Britain was 'often a sham, for
the parties are not real adversaries and the choices they offer the electorate are
imaginary'. 60 The idea is found in a reductive form in textbooks. For example, the
Oxford popular history of Britain describes 'a mixed economy and a welfare state
which took Britain well enough through the difficult post-war transformations, and
endured in its essence for another generation or more'.61
There are a number of specific explanations for this. One is the shared
sacrifice of the Second World War, forging a more united nation from the realities of
total war. 62 More prosaically, the economic impact of the war was profound.
Government spending ran at about a quarter of GNP in the inter-war period: it rose to
over three-quarters in 1943, and never fell back to its previous levels. The share of the
national product spent by the government remained at about 40 per cent throughout
the 1950s and early 1960s. 63 Although mediated by differences in national
institutions, and by particular national economic interests, similar trends were evident
D. McKie, 'Introduction', in C. Cook & idem (eds.), The decade of disillusion: British politics in the sixties
(Macmillan, London, 1972), p. 2
60 A.M. Gamble and S.A. Walkiand, The British party system and economic policy, 1 945-1983: studies in
adversary politics (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985), p. 177; also D. Kavanagh & P. Morris, Consensus politics
from Attlee to Thatcher (Blackwell, Oxford, 1989), pp8-12
6! K.O. Morgan, (ed., 2 edn.), The Oxford popular history of Britain (Oxford UP, Oxford, 1988), p. 643
62 e.g. Addison, Road, passim; A. Calder, The people's war 1939-45 (Cape, London, 1969), pp. 583-5; N.
Timmins, The five giants: a biography of the welfare state (1-larpercollins, London, 1995), pp. 31-2, 34
63 J.E. Cronin, The politics of state expansion: war, state and society in twentieth century Britain (Routledge,
London, 1991), pp. 2-3
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across the Western world . M The national unity required to fight the Cold War has also
been seen as crucial in forging a centrist consensus around full employment,
government intervention in the economy, and the maintenance of Labour's post-war
Welfare State.65
There are narrower political and ideological explanations for the emphasis on
'consensus', for both Left and Right have come to see compromise at the centre as a
betrayal of their deepest convictions. Attention has often been focussed on the
'failure' to initiate wholly new and radical policies, rather than on the actual course of
decision-making and policy. The New Left of the 1 960s, in particular, came to see the
era as a missed opportunity, true Socialism having been betrayed by its party political
leaders. 66 The collapse in Wilson's reputation, partly due to the highly critical diaries
published by his erstwhile Cabinet colleagues in the 1 970s, was a more specific cause
of this sense of disillusion. Richard Crossman was particularly withering about
Wilson personally. His real aim was to stay in power, Crossman believed: 'that's the
real thing and for that purpose he will use any trick or gimmick' 67 Memoirists have
usually concurred, Deals Healey concluding that Wilson 'had no sense of direction'
and was driven by 'short-term opportunism'.68
J. Klausen, War and welfare: Europe and the United States, 1945 to the present (Macmillan, Basingstoke,
1998), passim, esp. 243-6, 261, 266, 278-81
65 H. Jones, 'The cold war and the Santa Claus syndrome: dilemmas in Conservative social policy making, 1945-
1957', in M. Francis & I. Zweiniger-Bargielowska (eds.), The Conservatives and British society 1880-1990 (Wales
UP, Cardiff, 1996), PP. 242-3; D. Dutton, British politics since 1945: the rise andfall of consensus (Oxford, 1991),
pp. 42-3
E.P. Thompson, 'The segregation of dissent', in idem (ed.), Writing by candlelight (Merlin, London, 1980), P. 2;
T. Benn, 'Fifty years of consensus rule', in idem, Fighting back speaking out for socialism in the eighties
(Hutchinson, London, 1988), PP. 2, 8; R. Milliband, The state in capitalist society (Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
London, 1969), P. 69; D. Coates, The Labour Party and the struggle for socialism (Cambridge UP, Cambridge,
1975), pp. 100, 144-6, 121
67 Richard Crossman diary, 16 November 1967: Crossman, The Crossman diaries (Mandarin, London, 1991 1 vol.
edn.), P. 406
' D. Healey, The time of my 41e (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1989), p. 339
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A similar effect is evident on the Right of the political spectrum, Norman
Tebbit for instance condemning the 1960s as 'insufferable, smug, sanctimonious,
naïve, guilt-ridden and wet', a 'sunset home' for 'third rate minds'. 69 Andrew Roberts
has singled out the 'appeasement' of trade union leaders as particularly
unforgivable. 70 Enoch Powell always dismissed the Churchill and Macmillan years as
merely a show of 'bread and circuses (provided they were held at a decent distance
from the ducal estate)' •71 Margaret Thatcher herself summed up the Right's views in
1981: 'for me, consensus seems to be the process of abandoning all beliefs, principles
values and policies'. 72 This sense of frustration adds a special edge and urgency to the
criticisms from the Right, regretful that Conservatives aspired 'to offer little more...
than a "new" team, fresher and more amiable, who would maintain continuity but
administer more competently' . There is a Bismarckian variant of such analyses,
espoused by Correlli Bamett, which blames 'small "I" liberals' and Utopian 'New
Jerusalemites' for their ignorance of trade and commerce, and their stewardship of a
'greedy' and 'corrupting' welfare state. 74 Political and economic disillusionment has
therefore been central to the hegemony of 'consensus' ideas.
Actual historical research, however, has for a decade or more been
disassembling the presumption of political agreement. A landmark article by Ben
Pimlott in 1988 began the process. In it he argued that consensus 'may be a mirage...
that rapidly fades the closer one gets to it'. 'There is little sign', he argued, 'of the
main political parties regarding themselves as part of a "consensus" at the time': to
J. Davies, To build a new Jerusalem: the Labour movement from the 1880s to the 1990s (Michael Joseph,
London, 1992), p. 208
70 A. Roberts, Eminent Churchillians (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1997), P. 259
' R. Shepherd, Enoch Powell (Pimlico, London, 1997), p. 153
A. Seldon, 'Consensus: a debate too long?', Parliamentary affairs 47 (1994), p. 502
A. Clark, The Tories: Conservatives and the nation state 1922-9 7 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1998), p.
268
Most recently C. Barnett, The verdict ofpeace (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2001), e.g. p. 515; though see J. Harris,
'Enterprise and welfare states: a comparative perspective', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society Vth series,
40(1990), pp. 175-95; D. Edgerton, 'The prophet military and industrial: the peculiarities of Correlli Bamett',
TCBH2, 3 (1991), pp. 360-79
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impose such ideas commits 'the error of anachronism'. 75 As archives have been
opened, and the passing of time has encouraged a more detached attitude, Pimlott's
approach has become increasingly influential. From employment policy to the
ideology of industrial ownership, it has become commonplace to write about the myth
of consensus, or at least its limits - how fundamental differences remained, both in
political philosophy and governmental practice. 76 For instance, it has only rarely been
admitted just how much post-war Conservatives owed to the ideology of their 193 Os
forebears. The steel, coal and airways policies of that decade had all been conducted
in ways very similar to Tory practice in the 1950s, encouraging rationalisation,
centralisation of ownership, and state intervention where necessary. No one seems to
argue that Depression-era Conservatives were proponents of 'consensus' .
The assumption of a single 'Keynesian revolution', prompting an inevitable
expansion in the size and scope of state activity, is another highly questionable
element of the old historiography. For all the attacks on Keynes, mounted by Correlli
Barnett among others, he never argued that government should engage in indefinite
deficit financing: rather, he would have preferred a maintenance of the insurance
principle and a gradated scheme of national insurance contributions. 78 This is a crucial
point, since it is clear that, far from launching out onto deficits after 1945, British
government maintained 'above the line' surpluses every year until the inflationary
shocks of the mid-1970s. The public sector borrowing requirement remained stable or
75 Pimlott, 'The myth of consensus', in L.M. Smith (ed.), The making of Britain: echoes ofgreatness (Macmillan,
London, 1988), p. 135
76 N. Ellison, 'Consensus here, consensus there... but not consensus everywhere: the Labour Party, equality and
social policy in the 1950s', in H. Jones & M. Kandiah (eds.), The myth of consensus: new views on British history,
1945-64 (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1996), pp. 20-1, 33; M. Kandiah, 'Conservative leaders, strategy - and
"consensus"?' in ibid, pp. 66, 69, 72-3; R. Lowe, 'The re-planning of the Welfare State 1957-1964', in M. Francis
& I. Zweiniger-Bargielowska (eds.), The Conservatives and British society 1 880-1990 (Wales UP, Cardiff, 1996),
p. 270
77 Kandiah, 'Leaders', pp. 59-60; J. Ramsden, 'A party for earners or a party for owners? How far did the British
Conservative Party really change after 1945?', TRJ-IS Vth series, 37 (1987), pp. 54-55
Clarke, 'Keynes, New Jerusalem and British decline', in idem & C. Trebilcock (eds.), Understanding decline:
perceptions and realities of British economic pe,formance (Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1997), p. 154
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actually fell as a proportion of national product as a whole until the late 1960s, given
the rapid expansion of the economy.79
It seems that argument over consensus has now run its logical course, for by
defmition whether there was a 'consensus' depends on what is meant by that word.
This debate has therefore to some extent been 'a matter of quibbling over the meaning
of the word': if by 'consensus' is meant complete agreement, especially ideological or
rhetorical, then clearly there was no such thing. However, at a less specific level, the
commitment to much higher levels of employment than before 1945, and increased
state welfare provision, have not been seriously questioned. 8° Though the 'consensus
debate' certainly helps delineate the parameters of ideology and practicality in the
post-war era - and although it continues to be very important to track agreement and
disagreement this debate seems somewhat otiose when the more concrete, and more
relevant, specific policy choices of the 1 960s can now be analysed.
79 Tomlinson, 'Why was there never a Keynesian revolution in economic policy?', Economy and society 10, 1
(1981), pp. 74, 76; idem, 'The "economics of politics" and public expenditure: a critique', Economy and society
10, 4 (1981), PP. 389-90; R. Middleton, Government versus the market (Edward Elgar, London, 1996), pp. 578-82
° J. Charmley, A history of Conservative politics 1900-1996 (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1996), p. 126
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'The age of organisation '. corporatism and the planned society.
Contemporaiy ideas, in the form of corporatist theory and systems analysis, helped
foster the idea of consensus, and have also helped distract from individual policy
choices. The large corporation was perceived to be the dominant power of the age:
governments had to bargain with them, and their equivalents among the trade unions,
as equals. This has been thought to limit the ability of governments to make real
choices between discrete policies. 81
 Furthermore, 'systems analysts' were interested
'' power and influence, rather than the rhetoric of politics. Such theories gave rise to
a concept of politics as essentially technocratic. Mass parties and pressure groups
could now take advantage of their own 'research and development', mobilising
support through predicting voters' desires. This analysis of politics as a whole system
based on interests and power, rather than ideas, gave rise to an essentially fuctionalist
and deterministic view of the period.
This acted to truncate the importance of party politics itself. In corporatist
analysis 'a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically
ordered' organisations would be 'recognised and licensed.., by the state and granted a
deliberate representational monopoly... in exchange for observing certain controls on
their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports'. 82
 Obviously
'tripartism', the co-ordination of economic activity between government, big business
and trade unions, seemed good evidence of the existence of such a system. Shonfield,
for one, saw the Conservatives' creation of NEDC in this light. It was 'an essentially
corporatist device', he argued, 'shifting the locus of decision in national economic
policy from Parliament to another body in which the country's major economic
organisations deliberate in secret and bargain with one another'.83
'Today', Sheldon Wolin wrote in 1961, 'the individual moves in a world
dominated by large and complex organisations. The citizen faces "big government":
W. Grant, Pressure groups, politics and democracy in Britain (Philip Allan, London, 1989), pp. 33-5
$2 P.C. Schmitter, 'Still the century of corporatism?', in idem & G. Lehmbruch (eds.), Trends towards corporatis:
intermediation (SAGE, London, 1979), pp. 40, 13
Shonfield, Capitalism, p. 161
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the labourer, a large trade union, the white-collar worker, a giant corporation...
Everywhere there is orga.nisation, everywhere bureaucratisation: like the world of
feudalism, the modem world is broken up into areas dominated by cast1es'. In this
new world of organised man, many thought that group conflicts would stand in for
real choice at the ballot box, and fragmentation into competing interests would replace
objective choices between ideas. J.K. Gaibraith's celebrated 'technostructure' - the
system by which industrial organisation was presumed to have 'passed irrevocably'
from individual to group responsibility - purported to show how this worked inside
the large corporate business, and was one more variety of such ideas.85
Although sceptical of what he saw as 'a romantic - and somewhat false -
notion of the past, which sees society as once having been made up of small,
"organic", close-knit conmiunities', Daniel Bell also heralded the 'age of
organisation', which would force governments to work through large pressure groups
if they were to achieve any meaningful change. 86
 Such ideas were also inherent in
'pluralism', the idea of society as an arena in which conflicting group interests are
played out, and in which government would increasingly play the role of referee. The
problem with this was that 'pluralism' struggled to explain the continued existence of
an independent State apparatus, separate from the competing interests attempting to
influence it: one answer to this was that governments had to rest on fundamental
consensus between competing interest groups, and that the State should remain in
being to support those values they held in common.87
Others, such as the systems analyst David Easton, refused to treat the State and
competing interest groups as discrete entities at all. Individuals were thus subsumed
S. Wolin, Politics and vision: continuity and innovation in western political thought (Allen & Unwin, London,
1961), p. 354
S5 J.K. Gaibraith, The new industrial state (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1967), p. 69; idem, The affluent society
(Andre Deutsch, London, 1958), p. lOt
D. Bell, The end of ideolo. on the exhaustion ofpolitical ideas in the fifties (Free Press, Glencoc, III., 1960),
pp. 27, 63
87 J. Lively, 'Pluralism and consensus', in idem, P. Bimbaum & G. Parry (eds.), Democracy, consensus and social
contract (SAGE, London, 1978), p. 190
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into an entire system, subject to 'disturbances' and 'stresses' but still fundamentally a
single analytical unit. 88 This structural interest - in why politics should in fact exist at
all - was reflected in the work of Talcott Parsons, who was primarily concerned in
how different political communities decide on 'prescribed, permitted and prohibited
behaviour'. He found his answer in a network of institutionalised norms, which could
act as mutually supporting props for existing social systems and authority. 89
 Others,
for instance Karl Deutsch, utilised 'systems' models with less caution. Deutsch drew a
parallel between these hidden networks and the new science of cybernetics, thinking
of them as 'servo-mechanisms' within 'learning nets' that were adapted to react to,
and learn from, their external environment. 90 The end result was that politics was
conceived as a whole system, reacting more or less automatically to various stimuli:
the role of individuals, independent groups, and even the contingency of history itself,
was thus called into question.
The most influential proponent of structuralist views has been the American
political theorist Samuel Beer. He attempted to show how the 'heightened group
politics' of a 'new pluralism' underlay Britain's post-war 'failure'. This issued from
'competition for the votes of the emerging groups of beneficiaries of the developing
social programmes'. 9 ' Furthermore, governments, when intervening in the economy,
would give away more and more of their powers to secure consent for their policies.
The 'corporatist' bias of both Labour and Tory governments, both parties perceiving
society as a set of groups to satisfy, would reinforce this process. 92 Although their
value systems remained very different, electoral necessity and the demands of mighty
subjects forced them together.93 Beer put this case as early as 1961: 'issues between
the parties have become marginal, statistical, quantitative, questions of "more" or
88 D. Easton, A systems analysis ofpolitical lkfe (Chicago UP, Chicago, 1965), PP. 14-15, 21-5
T. Parsons, 'Authority, legitimation and political action', in idem (ed.), Structure and process in modern
societies (Free Press, Glencoe, III., 1960), Pp. 182-3, 198
° K.W. Deutsch, The nerves of government (Free Press, Glencoe, III., 1963), pp. 80, 82, 89-90
91 S. Beer, Brttain against itself the political contradictions of collectivism (London, 1982), pp. 4, 7
See also A.G. Jordan, 'Iron triangles, woolly corporatism and elastic nets: images of the policy process', Journal
ofpublic policy 1, 1(1981), esp. p. 96
Beer, Modern British politics: parties and pressure groups in the collectivist age (London, 1982), pp. 69-70
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"less" rather than great moral conceptions in conflict' .' The neo-liberal economists of
the 1970s analysed government in terms of the governors' self-interested desire to be
re-elected, and their attempts to placate powerful, well-informed and close-knit
pressure groups with increasingly desperate concessions.95
Our view of post-war Britain has been heavily influenced by these ideas. For
one thing, some historians began to treat British politics as if it proceeded according
to the pluralist theory that functional consensus was vital to the workings of any
society. Numerous studies have shared Wolin's assumption of 'the absorption of the
political into non-political institutions and activities' •96 Ronald Manzer, for instance,
analysed the workings of the post-war education system as a 'sub-government'
subject to the rationale of 'pluralisation'. His work on the NUT is essentially a case
study of how 'stable relationships usually develop among the interests clustering
about a decision making centre'. 97
 Indeed, the entire education system, based around
the 'cornerstone' of the 1944 Education Act, has been summarised as a system in
which professional 'checks and balances' ensured that 'educational and institutional
policies remained largely unchanged'. 98
 The NHS, and indeed Western medicine as a
whole, has been subject to similar investigations, with expert providers assumed to be
idem, 'One-party government for Britain?', Political quarterly 32 (1961), p. 114
W. Mitchell, 'Inflation and politics: six theories in search of reality', in 1. Willet (ed.), Political business cycles:
the political economy of money, inflation and unemployment (London, 1988), pp. 77-86; M. Olson, The rise and
decline of nations (Yale UP, New Haven, 1982), pp. 37-41
Wolin, Vision, p. 353
R.A. Manzer, Teachers and politics: the role of the National Union of Teachers in the making of national
educational policy in England and Wales since 1944 (Manchester UP, Manchester, 1970), p. 1
' M. Locke, Power and politics in the school system (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1974), p. 4; M. Kogan,
Educational pci icy-making: a study of interest groups and Parliament (Allen & Unwin, London, 1975), p. 24; S.J.
Ball, Politics and policy-making in education: explorations in policy sociology (Routledge, London, 1990), pp. 11-
12
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increasingly powerful given their privileged knowledge, and the extent to which
governments had to rely on them.
Though there is in this literature usually an awareness that corporatism and
interest group politics were never totally dominant, or agreement universal,
ideological contests have been isolated from one of the core businesses of government
- planning for objective future needs and choosing priorities. The role of expert
advice, and the role of expertise as a 'societal guidance mechanism', is universally
emphasised.'°° The choices before decision-makers have frequently been reduced to
the more obvious philosophical disputations of the times - over the supposedly
'liberal' school curriculum, for instance - often conducted as part of a specifically
ideological debate)°' Social science analysis of the process of government has
undoubtedly been extremely salutary in generalising about overall trends in the
developed world, demonstrating the limits complexity places on choice, and rectifying
any simple-minded tendency to think that Prime Minister and Cabinet were the only
independent policy actors)°2
 However, this literature is only just beginning to equip
itself with a sense of specificity and contingency, which should be central to the actual
historical record.
e.g. H. Eckstein, Pressure group politics: the case of the BMA (Allen & Unwin, London, 1960), p. 48; R. Klein,
The politics of the NHS (Longman, London, 1989), pp. 56-7; F. Hon igsbaum, The division in British medicine
(Kogan Page, London, 1979), pp. 30 1-305, 308-10
'°°P. Healey, Local plans in British land use planning (Perganion Press, Oxford, 1983), p. 7; J.B. Cullingworth &
V. Nadin, Town and country planning in the United Kingdom (1 2th edn., Routledge, London, 1997), p. 141; G.E.
Cherry, Town planning in Britain since 1900 (Blackwell, Oxford, 1996), p. 133
e.g. A. Adonis & S. Pollard, A class act: the myth of Britain 's classless society (Hamish Hamilton, London,
1997), pp. 43, 61
102 
e.g. R.A. W. Rhodes, Understanding governance: policy nerw or/cs, governance, reflexivity and accountability
(Open UP, Buckinham, 1997), pp. 9-13; idem, 'From Prime Ministerial power to core executive', in idem & P.
Dunleavy (eds.), Prime Mimster, Cabinet and core executive (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1995), pp. 11-13; ideas
best applied in Lowe & Rollings, 'Modernising Britain 1957-64: a classic case of centralisation and
fragmentation?', in R.A.W. Rhodes, Transforming British government vol. 1: changing institutions (Macmillan!
ESRC, Basingstoke, 2000), pp.1 13-6
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'Possibilities of action '. towards a history ofplanning.
Political polemic and social science theories have therefore often dominated the
historiographical landscape of the I 960s, to the detriment of actual empirical
investigation. This has been partly facilitated by the emphasis on the cultural and
social changes of the times: among Arthur Marwick's 'fourteen characteristics' of this
decade, not a single one refers to the attractions of the planning idea, a perverse
decision since his study is supposed to encompass France, the main exporter of such
ideas.'°3
 These ideas, along with Wilson, their chief technocratic exemplar and
advocate, also became discredited. It was all too easy, after the economic setbacks of
the period, to deride the experiment as 'more of an embarrassment than a guide to
action', 'swiftly relegated into a very agreeable form of adult education'.'° 4
 This, of
course, has been the prevalent approach, but the politics and policies of planning
deserve to be properly uncovered, and historically explained, rather than simply
dismissed.
The field is indeed now attracting historical research. General industrial
policy, as well as the creation of NEDC and the DEA, has come under scrutiny, and
welfare and economic policies are increasingly seen as interlocking elements within a
single planning strategy, rather than as discrete analytical subjects.'° 5
 Such studies
103 A. Marwick, The 'sixties: cultural revolution in Britain, France, Italy and the United States c. 1958—c. 1974
(Oxford UP, Oxford, 1998), pp. 17-20; idem, British society since 1945 (3 edn., Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1996),
pp. 125, 174; see B. Levin, The pendulum years: Britain and the sixties (Cape, London, 1970); C. Booker, The
neophiliacs: a study of the revolution in English life in the fifties and 'sixties (Collins, London, 1969); J. Green,
All dressed up: the sixties and the counterculture (Pimlico, London, 1999)
'° Cairncross, Managing the British economy in the 1960s (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1996), p. 137; Lord Lever, in
Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 169
105 e.g. N. Tiratsoo & Tomlinson, The Conservatives and industrial efficiency 1951-64 (Routledge, London, 1998);
A. Ringe, 'Background to Neddy: economic planning in the 1960s', Contemporary British history 12, 1(1998), pp.
82-95; C. Clifford, 'The rise and fall of the Department of Economic Affairs, 1964-69: British Government and
indicative planning', Contemporary British history 11, 2 (1997), pp. 94-116; P. Brigden & Lowe, Welfare policy
under the Conservatives 1951-64 (PRO publications, Kew, 1998), pp. 11-16, 18-26; Bridgden, 'The state,
redundancy pay, and economic policy-making in the early 1960s', TCBH II, 3(2000), pp. 233-58
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have been very sceptical about the amount of continuity between governments,
echoing earlier theorists such as S.E. Finer, who emphasized just how contradictory
party programmes were, and the damage the structures of political confrontation did
to the effectiveness of both main parties' policies when in power.'° 6
 The task
attempted here is to contribute to this expanding literature, the next stage in the new,
post-'consensus' generation of historical writing. Thus it is hoped to follow the
analytical approach recommended by Sir Alec Cairncross, revealing 'the techniques
that were being developed, the possibilities of action that were canvassed, the thinking
and differences of opinion that underlay the ministerial pronouncements'.107
Though the main emphasis throughout is on central government, utilising
• newly (and in some cases very recently) available public records, this is not because
Whitehall is herein to be treated as the sole repository of power in post-war Britain,
but because it was to central government that the most important pressure-groups
looked, and where the most important planning decisions and most persistent planning
rhetoric originated. Given the methodological problems of relying on the highly-
selective Cabinet minutes and Prime Ministers' correspondence, a consistent effort
has been made to use lower-level departmental documents, as well as the papers of
trade unions, employers, and political parties.'° 8
 The undertaking is therefore to
uncover some of the real choices before governments and parties, for the first time
utilising official and political documents covering the whole of this decade. This
should help to reveal why planning came to seem important again, in which policy
fields ideology was most important in its adoption, and where and how it was defeated
by practical constraints, political opposition, or official resistance.
'° S.E. Finer, 'Adversary politics and electoral reform', in idem (ed.), Adversary politics and electoral reform
(Anthony Wigram, London, 1975); most recently, H. Pernberton, 'A taxing task: combating Britain's relative
decline in the 1960s', TCBH 12, 3 (2001), pp. 372-5
107 Cairncross, Years, xiii
'° Recommended in Lowe, 'Plumbing new depths: contemporary historians and the Public Record Office', TCBH
8, 2 (1997), pp. 24 1-2, 249
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II
CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC PLANNING 1959-64
The trouble is that Economics is not a Science - hardly even an Art. It's a Gamble.
-Harold Macmillan, diary, 4 October 1958'
Searching for solutions: the political economy of growth and planning.
Having won the 1959 General Election by a greater margin than those of 1951 and
1955, the Conservatives seemed set for a confident, prolonged period of centre-Right
government. In three successive elections they had increased their standing in the
House of Commons, securing overall majorities of 17, 58 and 100.2 The Labour Party
was divided internally and, more importantly, had little to say to a new, 'affluent'
electorate. In 1960 the authors of Must Labour lose? showed how 35% of the working
class, traditionally Labour voters, now saw themselves as 'middle class'. Their
'unconsidered identification' with the Labour Party was ebbing with their class
identity, as none of the respondents in this group saw Labour as allowing 'a man to
better himself. 3 Labour politicians agreed, Anthony Crosland conceding that voters
enjoying a 'reasonable standard of living' might see no need for change, and the
Party's General Secretary arguing that 'the rapid development of new industries' had
left the Party behind, identified as it was with heavy industry and its workers.4
However, within two years the Conservatives' confidence had collapsed. By
1961, they were in flight from their ideological commitment to economic
liberalisation, and the Party - officially at least - was committed to an experiment in
state planning. This project, in the words of William Armstrong, Joint Permanent
Secretary at the Treasury, would involve 'a great increase in positive action by
Government - action that is intended to influence positively the way in which the
G.C. Peden, The Treasury and British public policy 1906-59 (OUP, Oxford, 2000), p. 510
2 D. Butler & G. Butler, British political facts 1900-1994 (Routledge, London, 1994), pp. 216-17
' M. Abrams, R. Rose, & R. Hinden, Must Labour lose? (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1960), pp. 14-15
A. Crosland, The Conservative enemy (Jonathan Cape, London, 1962), p. 148; idem. 'The future of the Left',
Encounter 14, 3 (1960), p. 3; Harvester Archives of the British Labour Party, 11682: Morgan Phillips, NEC
minutes, 13 July 1960
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economy as a whole develops, including the deliberate building up of selected
industries while allowing others to decline'. 5
 What was it that caused this shift away
from liberal economic management, and prompted the burst of planning rhetoric?
At least part of the reason is to be found in Harold Macmillan's own
personality and philosophy. Here, after all, was the man who had advocated a 'middle
way' in the 1930s, in which industrial re-organisation would be achieved through the
means of Industry Councils in each sector, charged with rationalisation and
centralisation, and monitored by an Industrial Reorganisation Advisory Council
appointed by Parliament. With Britain's abandonment of free trade and the gold
standard in the early 1930s, he believed, 'the idea of an unplanned self-adjusting
economic system had been finally and irrevocably destroyed'. 6
 'Planning is forced
upon us', he wrote in 1933, believing the discipline of the market 'no longer
adequate' in modern conditions. 7
 Given that Macmillan was to a great extent his own
Chancellor, installing a series of weak subordinates to the post to strengthen his own
political position, perhaps it was with Macmillan that the planning experiment
originated.8 He was certainly often contemptuous about Treasury officials, with their
'narrow and jealous minds'.9
However, Macmillan was a much more complicated figure than this suggests.
He was, for instance, quite capable of implementing deflationary policies, especially
following the 'humiliation' of Suez and the economic boom which had coincided with
the 1955 General Election. Many of the spending cuts that Thorneycroft was to resign
over in 1958 were in fact Macmillan's, proposed just before he left the Treasury in
1957. As Chancellor, he had secured better relations with the Bank of England, used
monetary policy more than Butler, and initiated a public spending review of defence
PRO T 320/70: Armstrong to Hubback, 'Modernising Britain', 25 October 1962
6 H. Macmillan, The middle way: a study of the problem of economic and social progress in afree and democratic
society (Macmillan, London, 1938), pp. 202-203, 198
7 Marwick, 'Opinion', p. 287
e.g. E. Dell, The Chancellors: a history of the Chancellors of the Exchequer 1945-1990 (HarperCollins, London,
1996), pp. 243, 258, on Heathcoat Amory and Selwyn Lloyd
P. Hennessy, The Prime Minister: the office and its holders since 1945 (AlIen Lane, London, 2000), p. 251
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spending which was entirely focussed on reducing Britain's commitments abroad.'°
He was also clear-eyed about 'the Churchill - Monckton regime', in his view
characterised by 'industrial appeasement, with continual inflation'."
One key to the shifi in thinking can be found in Macmillan's political, even
cultural, pessimism. He had no sense of any Conservative right to indefinite power.
On a visit to Norway in 1961 he confided to his diary: '[Norway's] "applied
Socialism" is of a fairly moderate kind and the Government is, in many respects, not
unlike our Progressive Conservative Government here. I think both Sweden and
Norway present the policies which Mr Gaitskell seeks vainly to impose on the British
Labour Party. If he were to succeed, they too would win power and hold it for a long
time'.' 2 As stimulus and disincentive followed each other with weary repetition, this
pessimism only grew. An appeal to his political opponents' methods, in order to keep
himself in power, was not so out of character from this perspective.
The economic gyrations of the period spurred a new 'search for solutions', as
the seemingly irreconcilable objectives of British economic policy came repeatedly
into conflict. Economic management came to seem increasingly unsatisfactory, for the
inverse relationships between inflation and unemployment, growth and the balance of
payments, defied efforts to smooth them out. The course of policy can be followed in
Charts II. 1-11.2, in which the repeated attempts to secure growth and reduce
unemployment, followed by balance of payments difficulties and retrenchments, are
obvious. Even leaving aside the sharp deflation of late 1955 to 1957, and the
'reflation' exercise of 1958-59, the Government switched economic policy
continuously during the course of the 1959-64 Parliament, as can be seen from Table
II.). First there was the deflation of 1959-60, then the crisis measures of July 1961, a
'growth solution' in 1962/63, and then a return to restraint in 1964. Macmillan
'°A. Booth, 'Inflation, expectations and the political economy of Conservative Britain 1951-64', Historical
journal 43, 3 (2000), p. 834
Macmillan diary, 15 March 1957: Jeffrys, Retreat, p. 66
2 Bodleian Library, Oxford, Western MSS dep. d. 21/1: Macmillan diary, 10 June 1960
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became less and less enamoured of this economic switchback, attempting to delay or
forestall, for instance, the interest rate rises of 1960.13
Policy instability was only exacerbated by the 'economic regulators'
announced in the 1961 Budget. These gave the Chancellor powers, between Budgets,
to vary NI contributions and customs duties, in order to help regulate the economy.'4
However, by giving the Government discretionary powers to alter taxation at any
point, these also added to the sense of uncertainty over immediate policy, as
Macmillan for instance attempted to restrain the Treasury from adopting fiscal
deflation in l960-61.' Cabinet opposition did prevent the Chancellor from using the
NI regulator in his July 1961 package.' 6 The strain of reacting to every economic
change caused a reaction against constant intervention. It was 'baffling', Macmillan
conceded: 'like.., one of those puzzles we had as children - you can get three into the
holes and when you get the fourth in, out pops one of the others'.' 7
 He felt 'like those
young ladies who oscillate.., between the stimulant and the tranquilizer'.'8
PRO PREM 11/4772: Macmillan to Heathcoat Amory, 8 December 1959, Heathcoat Amory to Macmillan,
'Interest rates', 31 December 1959, 19 Januaiy 1960; Bodleian, dep. d. 21/1: Macmillan diary, 7 February 1960,
21 June 1960; PRO CAB 128/34: Cabinet minutes, 21 June 1960
' 4 House of Commons debates, vol. 638, col. 806; Selwyn Lloyd Budget statement, 17 April 1961; Brittan,
Steering, pp. 154-7; F. T. Blackaby, British economic policy, 1960-1974 (Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1978), p. 17
PRO PREM 11/3291: Macmillan/ Selwyn Lloyd meeting, minutes, 14 June 1961, Selwyn Lloyd to Macmillan,
15 June 1961
16	 CAB 129/106: Selwyn Lloyd memorandum to Cabinet, 'Surcharge on employers', 21 July 1961; PRO
CAB 128/35: Cabinet minutes, 24 July 1961
diary, 30 November 1960: A. Home, Macmillan 195 7-86 (Macmillan, London, 1989), vol. II, p. 246
Macmillan to Heathcoat Aniory, 27 February 1960: Home, Macmillan, p. 238
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Charts IL], 1L2. Economic indicators 1959-64 (contemporary non-revised data)
Sources: UK balance ofpayments, AAS, Economic trends (various)
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Table 11.1. Macro-economic management, 1959-64
- -
	 Bank rate	 Notable Budgetary/fiscal changes	 Other measures
1960	 Jan. - from 4.5% to	 Profits tax, tobacco duty increases	 April - 1% Special Deposit call
5%	 Net tax rise of774m	 from the Banks (0.5% in
June - to 6%	 Scotland)
Oct. - to 5.5%	 Re-imposition of Hire Purchase
Dec. - to 5%	 controls
June- increase in Special
Deposits to 2%
1961	 July - 7%	 Earned incomes relief for surtax
Oct. - 6.5%	 payers, 'economic regulators'
announced but not used in April
Budget.
Net tax rise of65m
1962	 Jan. - 5.5%	 'Neutral' Budget with rises in
Feb. - 5%	 confectionary taxes.
April - 4.5%	 Net tax reduction ofl44m
July - increase in Special
Deposits to 3%. Use of 10%
Customs Regulator.
Six month delay in selected
public capital projects.
May - reduction of Special
Deposits down to 2%.
October - £60m short-term
increase in public expenditure,
LiOm 'winter works' announced
November - Car purchase tax
reduced, machine and building
investment allowances
increased
November - Special Deposits
reduced to zero
1963
	
Jan. —4%	 Abolition of Schedule A Income
Tax on home owners, Income Tax
allowances raised, Stamp and
Estates Duty lowered.
Net tax reduction of £546m
1964	 Feb. —5%	 Drink, tobacco and TV contract tax
rises.
Net tax increase ofll0m
Sources: R.F. Bretherton, Demand management 1 958-64 (ICBH, London, 1999), pp. 13, 19-22, 28-9, 31, 34-5, 41,
44-5; Brittan, Steering, p. 158; Blackaby, Policy, pp. 22, 156-7, 226
The French example was highly influential in Whitehall, as well as among
popular economics writers. A conference on the French plan, organised by the
National Institute after an initiative from the British officials at OEEC, and attended
by French planning officials as well as representatives of the Federation of British
Industries, helped to spread these ideas.' 9 Treasury visits to the Commissariat du Plan
in September and October 1961, on the latter occasion accompanied by members of
the Economic Planning Board from both sides of industry, reinforced this impression.
PEP, 'Economic planning in France', Planning 27, 454 (August 1961), PP . 208, 211-13; J. Leruez, Economic
planning and politics in Britain (Martin Robertson, London, 1975), pp. 87-8
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Officials remained deeply sceptical about the degree of co-operation in French
industry, which would run contrary to anti-monopoly policy in Britain, and
emphasised the fact that the Commissariat had no executive powers, rather acting as
'an instrument to concert the collective action of all concerned'. 20
 However, it was at
least conceded that 'the French experience should give us a much clearer appreciation
of the need to establish a more effective relationship between Government and
industry, to provide the 'community of outlook and mutual sympathy"...'2'
Ministers and officials also took the Soviet challenge seriously. Conservative
politicians, along with most observers in the early 1960s, felt the 'very formidable
Soviet challenge' acutely, since 'the rate of Soviet scientific and technological
challenge is almost certainly much faster than that in the West' 22 Although the
Economic Section was too cautious to accept Soviet statistics at face value, their
surveys of the USSR's 1958 Seven Year Plan conceded that, with a surplus of cheap
labour, and apparently very fast increases in productivity, it would be 'unwise to
denigrate' the Soviet Union's prospects. 23
 These papers were called up again in 1961,
when the Foreign Office noted that the USSR was no where near meeting its targets,
though it had still registered a 20% increase in industrial production in under 3
years.24
 Throughout this period, a faster rate of economic growth appeared a vital and
'indispensable defence against the Soviet threat'.25
20 PRO T 325/72: 'Economic planning in France, discussion at the Commissariat du Plan, Paris', 22 September
1961, Clarke memorandum, 'Planning: the lessons of French experience, 2 November 1961; PRO CAB 134/1817:
Economic Planning Board, minutes, 6 November 1961
21 PRO T 325/72: Clarke note, 'French and British economic planning', May 1961
A. Jones, 'The Soviet Challenge', in Conservative Political Centre, Science and Society: Eight Oxford Lectures
(CPC, London, no. 240), p. 32
PRO CAB 134/1813: Secretaries' memorandum to EPB, 'The Soviet seven year-plan', 28 February 1959,
Economic planning board minutes, 6 July 1959
24 PRO CAB 129/106: Home memorandum to Cabinet, 'The third programme of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union', 18 September 1961
25 PRO T 325/64: Clarke to Armstrong, Fraser, Padmore, 'The position of the UK in world affairs', 5 August 1958
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'Planning' might also help create the image of a modern, up-to-date Party that
was also becoming socially more tolerant, with liberal changes to gambling laws,
penal practice, and the regulation of sexual morality. 26
 It was with such policies that
Macmillan, in his words, hoped to 'do something about [the] technical and scientific
classes'. 27 'Progressive' Conservativism would therefore make economic growth, and
the wider opportunities that went with it, its overriding objective. The Government
had hitherto been lucky, in that Sterling Area reserves became less liquid, and
therefore less susceptible to destabilising short-term movement, during the 195 Os. The
level of foreign holdings of Sterling, which might expose Britain to a loss of
confidence on the part of foreign governments, also fell during the 1950s.28
Macmillan was keen that the Government stimulate faster growth, even though this
effect would probably not last: he therefore ordered preparations for a possible
balance of payments crisis, should the growth experiment run into such constaints.
Influenced in this as in so much else by his correspondent Roy Harrod, he insisted on
the preparation of contingency plans for import quotas and surcharges, against the
advice of both the Treasury and BUT.29
In pursuit of the 'growth objective', twin policy committees, one of
Conservative politicians, and the other of civil servants, were set up in 1961. The first,
headed by Paul Chambers, Chairman of IC!, was set up by Butler to look into the
'problem of economic growth', including the 'limitations of the techniques' so far
26 M.C. Jarvis, 'The Conservative party and the adaptation to modernity, c. 1957-c. 1964', London University Ph.D.
thesis (1998), 1998, pp. 10-11, 23, 45-7
27 CPA CRD 2/5219: Chairman's Committee, rough minutes, 4 February, 1963
28 C. Schenk, Britain and the sterling area .• from devaluation to convertibility in the 1950s (Routledge, London,
1994), pp. 22-5, 28-9, tables 2.4-2.5, p. 30, Pp. 129-30; though for the continued weakness in Britain's exchange
position, S. Strange, Sterling and British policy: apolitical study of an international currency in decline (OUP,
Oxford, 1971),passim, esp. table 3.!, pp. 78-9, p. 300
29	 PREM 11/2962: Harrod to Macmillan, 2 March 1960; PRO PREM 11/4209: Macmillan to Maudling,
'Import control', 4 March 1963; PRO T 3121650: Rickett to Armonstrong, 'Emergency measures to deal with
balance of payments difficulties', 8 March 1963, Treasury! BOT meeting, minutes, 15 March 1963; PRO I
3121650: Caincross to Armstrong, 4 February 1963, Goldman to Rickett, 22 February 1963; PRO T 312/651:
Nowell to Goldman, 'Tariff surcharges, notes on possible systems', 9 April 1963
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employed to deal with it. 3° However, the conclusions of this Committee, although
focussed on growth, were very different to those of the radical economists urging the
Government to 'plan'. Chambers blamed 'Over-full employment' for making the
'lazy and incompetent worker... secure in his livelihood'. Lower taxes and
government expenditure, not planning, were seen as the answer. 31
 If action was not
taken on restrictive practices throughout industry, other members argued, planning on
the French model would be 'worse than useless'. Rather than industrial consultation, a
rise in unemployment to 2 per cent would help to right over-full employment;
intervention might 'simply further soften conditions for the inefficient firms'.32
The final report of the committee was therefore sceptical about planning.
• However, it did admit that indicative encouragement on the French model might play
a role, though partly in stabilising government expenditure in order 'to make room for
growth without running into balance of payments difficulties'. The emphasis was still
on eliminating 'lax financial and fiscal policies '33
 An official inter-departmental
Working Party on Economic Growth worked along similar lines, with many members
regretting that full employment had been 'harmful to efficiency', especially as
regional policy prevented re-allocation of labour.34
 The BOT opposed a definite
'growth target', fearing that this would 'be.. .regarded as a commitment', and would
probably be set too high for political reasons. 35
 Just like the Conservative inquiry, this
Working Party emphasised supply-side reform, rather than direct action on the
balance of payments or a growth objective.36
3° CPA CR1) 2/9/47: Butler to Chambers, 29 April 1961
CPA CRD 2/9/47: Chambers notes, 21 June 1961
32 CPA CRD 2/9/47: Policy Committee on Economic Growth, minutes, 3 July 1961, 14 July 1961, 26 July 1961
" CPA CRD 2/9/47: Policy Committee on Economic Growth Report, March 1962
PRO T 230/523: Working Party on Economic Growth, minutes, 27 March 1961; PRO T 230/525: brief for
members, 23 March 1961
" PRO 1230/523: Working Party on Economic Growth, minutes, 5 April 1961, Ii April 1961
36 PRO T 230/525: Working Party on Economic Growth, draft Report, 27 April 1961; PRO 1230/586: 'Economic
Growth and National Efficiency', July 1961
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However, senior Conservatives concluded from the 1961-62 collapse in their
popularity that they must have a 'progressive' and pro-growth mentality. Indeed,
Macmillan himself argued that 'the state of the economy is what the people worry
about most'. 37 This decade did indeed witness the peak of the correlation between
economic success and political popularity, which saw the governing party's fortunes
in the polls vary more in less in line with rises in unemployment and inflation. 38
 The
Conservatives were therefore well aware of the electoral effects of high
unemployment; but they also understood the effect rising inflation might have on their
'target voters'. They had been the first British party to make use of the new
techniques of opinion polling, advertising and television propaganda; they had taken
on their first professional PR agency in 1948, filmed the first TV question and answer
session for Ministers in 1951, and reformed their Research Department so that it
became an all-purpose 'research and development' unit. 39 They began a monthly
series of public opinion surveys in 1955.40 Their figures included sophisticated
analyses by region, voter class and age, and previous Party identification.41
In order to continue their electoral success, Conservative leaders knew they
had to appeal to those whom Macleod called the '5OO-1OOOp.a. men', which
included most of the lower middle class, along with the wealthier C2s - the newly
identified skilled working classes many sociologists and commentators argued were
PRO PREM 11/4765: Macmillan circular to Ministers, 'Tasks ahead', 26 December 1962
G. O'Hara, 'The political economies of British economic growth and planning 1959-64', M.Sc. thesis, Oxford
University (1997), pp. 6-16; N. Ferguson & G. O'Hara, 'The myth of the feelgood factor', in N. Ferguson, The
cash nexus: money and power in the modern world (Allen Lane, London, 2001), pp. 224-52
39 M. Rosenbaum, From soapbox to soundbite: party political campaigning in Britain since 1945 (Macmillan,
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turning away from Labour. 42
 It was known that these voters were the most likely to
defect to the Liberals, or to abstain: these were the people who lost the Conservatives
by-elections such as Orpington, as they had Rochdale in l958. The Research
Department was highly sceptical of what they condemned as 'determinist' theories,
that postulated that such voters' conversion to middle-class conservatism was
inevitable, and emphasised instead the ineptitude and division of the Labour
Opposition. The Party's Psephology Group concluded in 1960 that the Party had to
continue appealing to this group - especially the crucial 'young marrieds' within it -
if it was to overcome Labour's 'latent majority'. 45
 These groups seemed equally
hostile to economic management which increased inflation and unemployment.46
This meant that the Government would have to continue securing growth
without inflation, to attract voters that were perceived as increasingly mobile and
fickle in their electoral choices: even short periods of economic failure could threaten
Conservative electoral hegemony. Short-term electoral choice in each region, Party
polling revealed, could be affected by even small changes in the level of local
unemployment. 47
 Once again, Macmillan put the Government's dilemma most
succinctly: 'What were now called the "Orpingtonians"... felt themselves crushed
between the upper and nether millstones of power and influence... Without exercising
too strict a control, we must somehow achieve simultaneously the maintenance of the
balance of payments, a strong pound, steady prices and full employment'.48
Otherwise, they faced electoral defeat.
42 R. Shepherd, lain Macleod (Pimlico, London, 1994), p. 99
CPA CRD 2/21/5: NOP, 'Analysis of voting in the Rochdale by-election', 15 February 1958; CPA CRD 2/52/7:
Maurice Macmillan to Fraser, 21 March 1962
4' CPA CRD 2/21/6: Douglas memoranda to Psephology Group, 9 May 1960, 17 May 1960
CPA CRD 2/52/8: Psephology Group, report to Party Chairman, 15 October 1960; CPA CRD 2/52/7: Dean,
Sewill, White, Newton report, 'Young marrieds', 26 February 1962
CPA CCO 4/7/3 75: Monthly summary, reports on public opinion, March 1956; R. Lamb, The Macmillan years:
the emerging truth (John Murray, London, 1995), pp. 52-3
CPA CCO 4/7/375: 'Monthly survey of public opinion', January 1959
CPA CRD 2/52/8: Chairman's meeting, minutes, 17 July 1962
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It was this political insecurity, above all, that prompted the turn to planning,
for Ministers were determined to find a way of breaking the 'stop go' cycle, while
posing as efficient, 'scientific', and above all modern exponents of the art of
government. If as most believed 'a more austere policy would have been met with
hostility, and would have led the Conservative Party to political disaster', they would
have to search for a growth strategy which did not lead to widespread economic
dislocation and high unemployment, and an efficiency agenda which did not threaten
wages.49 This could only conceivably be achieved through agreements with
employers and trade unions, and it was indeed to this type of consultation that the
Conservatives turned.
CPA CRD 2/9/47: Chambers notes, 21 June [961
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'Psychological value': a planning council for the nation?
The planning machinery that remained from Labour's experiments - for instance the
Economic Planning Board, which met only seven times in 1959 - had fallen into
neglect by 1960.50 This situation was not to last, as the Government cast around for
some means to stabilise the growth in wages and prices. The initiative came first from
the Ministry of Labour under Heath, who suggested to Cabinet in May 1960 that the
Government might launch a 'review of the human and industrial problems for the next
five years', including industrial relations law and 'the need for a steady expansion of
our economy based on stable prices and increasing productivity'. From the beginning
of their attempts at 'planning', therefore, the Government was preoccupied with
relating wage rises more directly to productivity increases, and with restraining the
general rise in incomes. Cabinet Ministers in favour of such an approach to industry
wanted to 'ensure.., that account was taken of the general economic situation in wage
negotiation and arbitration'.5'
This possibility was also in Macmillan's mind throughout later 1959 and
1960.52 By the spring of 1960, the Government's Council on Pay, Productivity and
Incomes had been moribund for a year or more. In Macmillan's eyes, believing his
design for a tripartite wages agreement had been thwarted by the Sterling crisis and
Cabinet divisions of 1957, the Government needed to find some other mechanism for
controlling wage increases. 53
 He therefore arranged for Alan Birch, the General
Secretary of USDAW, the shopworkers' union, to meet with Selwyn Lloyd, the new
Chancellor. 54
 This meeting, which took place in September 1960, remained concerned
5°PRO CAB 134/18 13: EPB index, 1959
PRO CAB 129/101: Heath memorandum to Cabinet, 'Talks with employers and trade unions', 22 May 1960;
PRO CAB 128/34: Cabinet minutes, 26 May 1960
52 PRO PREM 11/2973: Harrod to Macmillan, 12 October 1959
Middlemas, Power, competition and the state, vol. II, pp. 289, 290-1 on the 1957 creation of CPPI; Heathcoat
Amory wanted to abolish CPPI in 1960, but was rebuffed by the Cabinet: PRO CAB 128/34: Cabinet minutes, 10
March 1960
' PRO PREM 11/3018: Heathcoat Amory to Macmillan, 2 June 1960, Birch to Macmillan, 14 June 1960, Tewson
to Lloyd, 2 August 1960; PRO CAB 128/34: Cabinet minutes, 26 July 1960
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only with general expressions of goodwill on both sides - though the TUC
representatives revealed their own views when they argued 'planning' would achieve
'a steady and constant rate of growth assured by a continuing prospect of high
demand for increasing production'. 55 However, Macmillan remained enthusiastic for
tripartite industrial consultation, believing that 'if the Government and the employers
and the Trade Unions... could agree upon a common objective both for home and
overseas trade, it would be something to spur interest and enthusiasm'.56
Meanwhile, employers' view of economic planning was undergoing rapid
change. The 'Next Five Years' Conference of the Federation of British Industries,
held in Brighton in November 1960, marked a fundamental re-evaluation of the role
of government in industry. This was due to the conversion of a small group of
industrialists, including the FBI's Director General, Sir Norman Kipping, to the case
for 'indicative planning' on the French model. The contribution of Study Group III -
on economic growth - was especially important. This group, chaired by the
enthusiastic 'planner' Sir Hugh Beaver, Managing Director of Guinness, highlighted
the need 'not [for] targets or plans but assessments of possibilities and expectations....
Government and industry together... might see whether it would be possible to agree
on an assessment of expectations and intentions which should be before the country
for the next five years'.57
In the wake of the Brighton Conference, Beaver set up a Committee on
Economic Programmes and Targets to study these ideas further. 58 The Committee
launched an industrial inquiry, calling on representatives of large companies - among
them ICI, Unilever, Courtaulds and Cadbury's - to discuss how they planned and
forecasted ahead. The results of this consultation were disappointing for the
'planners': most of the industrialists called to give evidence attacked the level of
" PRO PREM 11/3018: Lloyd! TUC meeting, minutes, 13 September 1960
' PRO PREM 11/3291: Macmillan to Selwyn Lloyd, 8 May 1961
" UWMRC MSS 200/D3/5/8: FBI guide, The next five years, November 1960, FBI, The next five years: report to
delegates on the conference, 26 November 1960
5' UWMRC MSS 200/F/l/1/2 18: Committee on economic programmes and targets (Beaver Committee), minutes,
20 January 1961
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government spending, and emphasised the difficulties of planning. 59
 Beaver had to
struggle to re-gain control of his investigation, which he managed in May 1961 with a
long discussion about 'directing the economy' on the basis of the co-ordination of
strategic investment. All the same, even members of this Committee knew that it
would be difficult to carry detailed proposals through the FBI's Grand Council.60
Even the Beaver Committee saw TUC co-operation as a way of securing agreement to
attack restrictive practices, rather than settle wages or production levels.6'
FBI and TUC ideas began to coalesce in January and February 1961, with
meetings of both the EPB and an 'interim' meeting of the National Production
Advisory Council on Industry at which representatives from both bodies (but
especially Beaver and Hugh Weeks, chairman of the FBI's Economic Committee)
'argued strongly for a "more positive" economic policy directed towards growth and
against a largely negative policy of protecting the £.62 The obsession with growth
was once more at the core of their discussions, with Weeks demanding a 'general
conviction that the rate of Growth will be such that there is no risk that the acceptance
of labour-saving changes will lead to unemployment'. 'Stop and go methods', so
wearisome for Macmillan, were decried by most concerned - though Treasury
officials, for instance its Permanent Secretary Sir Frank Lee, cautioned that 'simply to
stimulate domestic demand was not a sure way to foster economic growth'63
The TUC had been much more sceptical than the FBI about the idea of a
planning council, with its Economic Office warning of the possible dangers to
'personal or organisational freedoms' if any tripartite body were given executive
powers. 'The Labour Government had the advantage of starting off with a
" UWMRC MSS 200/F/1/1/218: ibid, 27 March, 19 April 1961
60 UWMRC MSS 200/F/1/1/218: ibid, minutes, 26 May, 18 June 1961
61 Ringe & Rollings, 'Responding to relative decline: the creation of the National Economic Development
Council', Economic history review 53, 2 (2000), p. 337
62 PRO BT 177/1243: Stafford memorandum on 20 February NPACI interim meeting, 21 February 1961; PRO
CAB 134/1817: EPB minutes, 31 January 1961
63 PRO CAB 134/1817: Weeks memorandum to EPB, 'Notes on growth', 22 February 1961, EPB, minutes, 27
February, 20 March 1961; PRO BT 177/1243: Barber to Selwyn Lloyd, 22 February 1961
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considerable amount of acquiescence', the Office noted: before discussions took
place, the Government would need 'to indicate with some precision how more
definite Government intervention would work.M Here the fact that the Conservatives'
recent planning enthusiasm was clearly linked to wage restraint was vital, for the TUC
concluded that a condition of their co-operation would be a government commitment
to a higher rate of growth. The TUC's Economic Committee doubted that a
Conservative Government would go as far as the TUC wanted. 65
 This ambivalence
was to be crucial in the negotiations that followed.
For their part, many Treasury officials remained dubious about a 'growth
experiment': Peter Vinter, though conceding that the publication of forecasts might
• have some 'psychological value', told the Working Party on Economic Growth that
'discussions with industry were of limited value in helping the Government to
influence the rate of growth, and those who advocated them, such as Mr Weeks, did
not seem to have thought out the implications'. 66
 The Treasury was certainly not
universally hostile to the idea. Other officials, especially Richard 'Otto' Clarke, Third
Secretary in charge of public expenditure, were more positive, arguing that in 'a really
powerful tripartite body... we could seriously discuss the problems of economic
growth, wage policy, price policy.., commercial policy, training, etc. etc.' 67
 However,
both Vinter and Clarke shared a common assumption about what a national planning
council would be for: accelerating growth through encouraging productivity and,
ideally, wage restraint.
It was only as a counterpart to the deflation of 1961 that Selwyn Lloyd
resolved to once more seek agreement on planning. Here again was the emphasis on
an embryonic incomes policy, as Lloyd told the Cabinet when they faced the
64 UWMRC MSS 292B/560.6/1: TUC Economic Committee paper, Economic planning, 11 January 1961
65 IJWMRC MSS 292B1560.1I1: TUC Economic Committee, minutes, 11 January 1961, TUC Economic
Committee paper, 'Economic expansion and planning, 26 May 1961; Composite Motion 6, Trade Union Congress
report (TUC, September 1961), p. 502
PRO T 230/523: Working party on economic growth, minutes, 12 April 1961
67 PRO T 325/72: Clarke memorandum, 'French and British economic planning', [May?] 1961, Vinter to Clarke,
'French and British economic planning', 30 May 1961
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economic crisis of June - July 1961: 'in the long run we must try to link consideration
of wages with the problem of economic growth'. 68
 This was the context in which
Lloyd announced the most famous 'stop' phase of the stop-go cycle, along with its
attendant 'pay pause'.
Just in case the link between planning and the search for a break from the
stop-go cycle had not been made clear enough, it was also at this point that the
Cabinet agreed to abolish CPPI, in order to find some better way of negotiating
national wages policy. 69
 Although talks on replacement structures were difficult, as he
told the Cabinet, at least the TUC had not rejected his proposals 'out of hand'. 7° He
therefore proceeded to write to both sides of industry, putting forward his detailed
plans for a 'National Economic Development Council', which would secure 'new and
more effective procedures for the preparation and co-ordination of plans and forecasts
for the main sectors of our economy'. This would be,4wo-tier body, with the TUC and
employers equally represented on the 'top tier' Council, and an Office that would
conduct research for the NEDC, which 'although under the aegis of Government,
would not be part of the ordinary Government machinery'.7'
Unfortunately for Lloyd's design, this was bitterly opposed in the Economic
Policy Committee, not only by Peter Thorneycroft (whose opposition might have been
expected), but by Maudling, Lord Mills and Charles Hill, all of whom feared 'the
creation of a new monster which would embarrass us in the future'. The opponents of
'planning' wanted to take out all reference to a second tier, which they feared could
become too independent-minded. 72
 Though Lloyd re-drafted his proposal so that it
emphasised the role of the Council, he and Macmillan resolved to push the proposal
PRO CAB 129/105: Selwyn Lloyd memorandum to Cabinet, 'Economic situation', 29 June 1961; Middlemas,
Power, II, pp. 32 1-3
PRO CAB 128/35: Cabinet minutes, 30 July 1961
70 PRO CAB 128/35: Cabinet minutes, 5 September 1961
' PRO T 230/68 1: Sir Frank Lee's group, draft letter to the FBI and TUC on planning, 5 September 1961, PRO
CAB 134/1692: Secretaries' memorandum to EPC, 'Planning', 6 September 1961
PRO PREM 11/4207: Selwyn Lloyd to Macmillan, 8 September 1961; PRO CAB 134/1689: EPC minutes, 7
September 1961
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through the Cabinet. They drafted two proposals, in the name of the Prime Minister,
to put to Cabinet, designed to display their opponents' ideas as 'yet another talking
shop', and their own determination to 'fashion effective instruments'. 73 Even this,
however, did not suffice to still the 'considerable doubts' held by the majority of the
Cabinet.74
Maudling was an especially committed opponent of the idea, arguing that
there was enough planning machinery in government as it was: 'do we really wish to
have an independent body to undertake these functions?' he asked. 75
 After this 'little
tussle', in Macmillan's words, which stretched over two Cabinet meetings in
September 1961, a draft finally emerged which emphasised that whatever NEDC
debated, government would make the final decisions, as well as the subordinate role
of the Office in simply conducting research on how NEDC's decisions were to be
implemented. 76
 What had been demonstrated, however, was the ideological and
practical objections that many Conservative politicians believed were inherent in this
enterprise; if it were to fail, Macmillan and Lloyd could be expected to pay a heavy
political price.
Securing co-operation from industry and unions thus became vital. The FBI's
response was mildly positive, though its President, Cyril Harrison, expressed some
disappointment at the downgrading of NEDO. 77
 The FBI secretly feared that the
Office would be 'too much under the control of the Government'. 78 Beaver and
PRO CAB 134/1692: Selwyn Lloyd memorandum to EPC, 'Economic planning', 8 September 1961; PRO
PREM 11/4207: Macmillan/ Lee and Bishop meeting, minutes, 14 September 1961
' PRO CAB 129/106: Macmillan memorandum to Cabinet, 'Economic planning', 15 September 1961; PRO CAB
128/35: Cabinet minutes, 19 September 1961
" PRO CAB 129/106: Maudling memorandum to Cabinet, 'Economic planning', 20 September 1961
76 
PRO CAB 128/35: Cabinet minutes, 21 September 1961; PRO PREM 11/4207: Macmillan to Selwyn Lloyd, 22
September 1961, Selwyn Lloyd to TUC, FBI, BEC, 23 September 1961
" UWMRC MSS 200/31P7/9/1: Harrison to Selwyn Lloyd, 28 September 1961
FBI meeting with BEC, ABCC, National Union of Manufactures, 9 October 1961: S. Wood, 'Why "indicative
planning" failed: British industry and the formation of the National Economic Development Council 1960-64',
TCBI-I 11,4(2000), p. 445
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Weeks had already had enough problems simply getting the FBI Economic
Committee to agree to the principle of participation, and throughout these
negotiations, individual doubts multiplied. Maurice Laing, for one, pointed Out the
danger of a Labour Government using NEDC 'to impose on the country a full
"planned economy" which could include full scale Socialism'. He thought that
planning might limit competition, and dismissed the French example as that of a
country that did not have to worry about the value of its currency.79
The unions' response was even less forthcoming. 8° After the TUC's Economic
Committee had met on II October, they made quite clear (through Cairncross, who
had been delegated to(,&_ with them) that if they were to take part, NEDC would
have to consider not only wage restraint, but also price and dividend control. 8 ' Lloyd
reassured the Economic Committee, in a meeting on 25 October, that 'no subjects,
including taxation, direct controls and personal incomes, would be barred from
discussion by the Council'. He explicitly promised that NEDC would be able to
discuss the distribution of personal incomes, as well as wage restraint. He also
reassured them that NEDC would not simply be a 'rubber stamp' for the
Government's own decisions.82
However, despite Lloyd also writing to them in conciliatory fashion in
November, the TUC's General Council declined to accept the Economic Committee's
recommendation that the TUC should join NEDC. The pay pause had destroyed the
TUC's political ability to convince their more radical member unions of the
advantages of planning: one member of the General Council summed up the TUC's
feeling by saying 'the pay pause must go' before they would join NEDC. Others
warned that, given the pay pause, 'the situation had gravely deteriorated' since the
UWMRC MSS 2001F/31P7/2/2: Laing to Harrison, 24 November 1961; Wood, 'Indicative planning', pp. 446-7
80 See Ringe & Rollings, 'Decline', pp. 340-41
81 UWMRC MSS 292B/567.22/1: TUC Economic Committee paper, 'The National Economic Development
Council', 11 October 1961; UWMRC MSS 292B/560.1/1: TUC Economic Committee, minutes, 11 October 1961;
PRO 1230/681: Cairncross to Lee, 11 October 1961
82 UWMRC MSS 292B/567.22/1: TUC/ Selwyn Lloyd meeting, 'Economic planning', 25 October 1961; PRO I
230/68 1: Treasury meeting, 'Planning', minutes, 26 October 1961
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original proposal was made, and another feared being 'hog tied by a Conservative
Government'. 83 Macmillan attempted to placate them with a re-affirmation that the
Government wanted to construct a long-term wage policy after the 'pause' had
ended. 84 This only allowed those hostile to co-operation, especially Frank Cousins of
the TGWU, to delay entry into NEDC until it was clear what the Government's
policies were.85
Once again the Government manoeuvred to secure TUC co-operation, both
Hare and Lloyd referring approvingly in the Commons to the Swedish and Dutch
central wage bargaining systems, which included the consideration of the distribution
of incomes, profits and dividends. 86 Even this did not persuade the TUC to enter
NEDC, for when the Economic Committee met Lloyd again in January 1962 they told
him they 'hated' the pay pause, and would only agree to talks once it was clear that
the pause was ending. 87 It was at this stage that Lloyd made two crucial changes to his
incomes policy: the first was to reveal to the TUC that his long-term plan was to relate
incomes to productivity, which held out at least the possibility that if a higher
productivity gains and faster economic growth could be attained through 'planning',
wages could rise quickly too. The second pledge was that if profits and dividends
were shown to rise unduly because of the operation of an incomes policy, then the
Government 'would not hesitate' to correct this. 88 It was only after this pledge was
given - and partly because the TUC did not relish the public opprobrium that might
UWMRC MSS 292B/2012: TUC General Council, minutes, 22 November 1961; Leruez, Politics, p. 95
Macmillan, At the end of the day, 1961-1963 (Macmillan, London, 1973), p. 47
85 PRO CAB 128/35: Cabinet minutes, 23 November 1961
House of Commons debates, vol. 651, cols. 980, 1072: Selwyn Lloyd, Hare speeches, Supply Day debate,
incomes and productivity, 18 December 1961
87 PRO T 298/215: Selwyn Lloyd' TUC Economic Committee meeting, minutes, 5 January 1962; PRO CAB
128/36: Cabinet minutes, 8 January 1962
PRO PREM 11/4069: Selwyn Loyd to TUC Economic Committee, 10 January 1961. The TUC had just delayed
a decision on whether to join NEDC again: UWMRC MSS 292B/1 10.44/1: TUC Economic Committee paper,
'Wages restraint and a national incomes policy', 10 January 1962; UWMRC MSS 292B/567.221l: TUC Economic
Committee, minutes, 10 January 1962
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attach to a refusal to serve 'the national interest' - that the General Council voted 21
to 8 to join NEDC.89
In fact, the 'partners' always had conflicting ambitions. As Clarke had noted
before NEDC even met, 'there is a great gulf between the FBI position... and that of
the Cabinet'. Furthermore, he had told his colleagues, 'It is most unlikely that the
TUC want "planning" in the FBI sense - or indeed anything more than an opportunity
to get closer consultation with, and pressure on, the Government' 90 The overriding
priority of the TUC was wages; and they believed that there was 'no evidence' for the
Chancellor's argument that high wage costs were reducing British productivity. They
preferred to place their hopes in boosting exports through stimulating growth and
reducing unit costs. 91 They made their bitter opposition to Lloyd's pay policy clear
even as they agreed to join NEDC, and in private they saw participation as 'an
instrument for modifying the Government's economic policies'.92
Nor did the Government's 'pay norm', announced in February 1962 and set at
2.5% per annum, or its setting up of a National Incomes Commission to take
references on special cases and advise on how better to relate wages to productivity,
prove a basis for agreement. 93 The Economic Committee adopted a policy of refusing
to comment on government proposals, so as not to lend them legitimacy; the 1962
Congress passed a motion calling for 'the immediate reversal of all the Government's
policies'.94 A 'package deal', under which the Government would set up an
89 UWMRC MSS 292B/20/2: TUC General Council, minutes, 24 January 1962; A. Ringe, 'Background to Neddy:
economic planning in the 1960s', TCBH 12, 1(1998), pp. 88-9
° PRO T 230/681: Clarke to Trend, Cairncross, Vinter, 2 October 1961
UWMRC MSS 292B/567.22/1: TUC Economic Committee paper, The Government's economic policy', 17
January 1962
92 PRO PREM 11/4207: TUC General Council to Selwyn Lloyd, 24 January 1962; UWMRC MSS 292B/567.22/l:
TUC Economic Committee paper, 14 February 1962
Cmnd. 1626, Incomes policy: the next step (February 1962), pp. 4-5; PRO LAB 10/1731: Macmillan speech at
Luton Hoo, 23 June 1962; Cmnd. 1844, National incomes commission (November 1962), passim
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investigating authority on profits and prices to help mollify TUC objections to
controls on wages, was frustrated by the complexity of the subject itself, and
implacable opposition from BOT and its Permanent Secretary, Richard Wilson, who
wanted to see the Monopolies Commission strengthened instead.95
The last attempt to conclude such a deal, in the winter of 1963-64, also failed,
with the management members of NEDC concluding that they could never secure
agreement to such an agreement within the FBI's Grand Council. 96
 The TUC put the
onus on government, refusing to put forward its own ideas, and when NEDC turned to
details in December 1963 both sides of industry attacked the Government for having
no long-time ideas on manpower and efficiency, and conceding a series of above-
'norm' wage settlements in the public sector. 97
 NEDC's members were already
looking to a General Election, and reserving their positions until they could be sure
who they would be bargaining with in the future: though the Cabinet decided to
announce a National Conference on prices, productivity on incomes to try to force an
agreement, this was put off until during the election given the opposition of (among
others) Heath and Deedes, worried that this would seem an empty and desperate
gesture.98
 But in fact, the divisions about what planning was for bedevilled the whole
experiment from the start, and were not due to short-term political considerations, but
rather to that more fundamental disagreement.99
PRO CAB 130/186: Erroll memorandum to GEN 766, 'Efficiency and economic growth', 5 June 1962; PRO T
298/226: ES memorandum to Permanent Secretaries' Group on Incomes and Prices, 'A price investigation
authority', 6 June 1962; Permanent Secretaries' Group, minutes, 17 May, 15 June 1962; PRO PREM 11/5205:
Macmillan to Maudling, 'Incomes policy', 6 March 1963
UWMRC MSS 2001D3/5/20: NEDC management members meeting, minutes, 8 January 1964
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1964; PRO CAB 128/38: Cabinet minutes, 10 September 1964
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'Ambitious figure '. a plan for industiy?
Having at least secured agreement to the formation of a planning organisation, there
was, to begin with, considerable confusion as to what NEDC was for. While
considering different ideas about this in August 1961, Cairncross spelt out the
dilemmas: 'I am not very clear what is to be done by either of the new bodies', he
wrote. How independent were they to be? What status would their reconmiendations
have? Would Ministers have to respond to its criticisms, and would they have to
change policy if they were criticised? None of these questions were ever adequately
resolved.' 00 Given their disagreements about macroeconomic policy, in fact the
participants turned to the solvent of growth to bind their disparate ideas together. The
Council adopted the FBI's 1961 strategy, that is, an industrial inquiry, this time aimed
at discovering how large industries might cope with a 4% growth rate.
This target was embodied in the so-called 'green book', The growth of the UK
economy to 1966, published in February 1963.'°' However, the intellectual
foundations of this document were tenuous at best. NEDO had asked seventeen
industries, covering two-fifths of national employment, two-fifths of visible exports
and nearly half of all total fixed investment, whether they could grow at 4% per
annum, and if so, the conditions this would require.'° 2 Although choosing large
industries meant that NEDC was dealing directly with industries that could plan
ahead, this rather begged the question of whether smaller concerns would be able to
keep up. The document contained a number of assumptions about the future: that the
terms of trade would not change, that world growth would not slow, and that Britain
would enter the EEC.'° 3 Furthermore, these industries were being asked to speculate
j°° PRO 1230/681: Cairncross to Lee, 31 August 1961
'°' Shanks, Planning and politics: the British experience. 1960-1976 (PEP, London, 1977), p. 25; Leruez, Politics,
p. 104; F. Catherwood, 'NEDC: a view from industry', TCBH 12, 1(1998), pp.78-9
102 NEDC, Growth of the United Kingdom economy to 1966 (HMSO, 1963), p. 1. The inquiry covered coal, gas,
electricity, the Post Office, agriculture, chemicals, sugar and chocolate, building, civil engineering, heavy
electrical machinery, electronics, iron and steel, machine tools, motor vehicles, paper and board, petrol, wool
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about what might be achieved, given favourable conditions. Again, this was begging
the question: no-one could guarantee, for instance, an adequate supply of skilled
labour, or investment in energy or transport, for instance.'04
The task of explaining how these conditions would be created fell to the
'orange book', Conditions favourable to faster growth. Growth in wage incomes
would have to slow, from the recent 5-6% increases per annum to something much
closer to the projected 3.25% per annum increase in productivity. If a balance of
payments crisis threatened to de-stabilise the initial growth phase, government might
have to consider import controls, short-term support of Sterling from the world
financial community, or tax rebates for exporters. But, although various ways of
increasing industrial productivity were discussed in the document, no mechanisms for
abating the growth of wages were even mentioned)° 5
 Given these conditions, it was
felt that most of the seventeen surveyed industries could keep up with 4% p.a. growth
- though there was some doubt in the mind of Sir Robert Shone, NEDO's first
Director General, about whether electricity generation and chemical production could
build enough plant in time to keep up. Nevertheless, Maudling was obliged to concur
with the target as an 'ambitious figure but not an impossible one'.'° 6 Having invested
so much political capital in NEDC, the Government had very little choice.
It was not just 'growthmanship' which caused the target to be so easily
adopted: in fact, economic growth was just about all the NEDC parties agreed to, in
their 'mutual vagueness'.' 07
 The TUC's ambivalence over incomes policy was clear.
The FBI's position was more subtle, but there was certainly a widespread fear both of
revealing sensitive industrial information to possible competitors, and unions who
might use the information to demand higher wages.'° 8
 Many civil servants continued
to be deeply sceptical, especially Lee, who had always doubted the whole project. In a
' °4 The FBI was well aware of these shortcomings: Wood, 'Indicative planning', p. 450
105 NEDC, Conditionsfavourable to faster growth (HMSO, 1963), pp. 10-12, 24-5, 31-3,45,47
'° FG 1/4: Shone memorandum to NEDC, 'Conditions favourable to faster growth', 11 January 1963
'° ACD, 11 December 1963: Cairncross, The diaries of Sir Alec Cairncross: the Radcljffe Committee and
Economic Advisor to HMG (ICBH, London, 1999), pp. 76-7
108 Wood, 'Indicative planning', pp. 450-1
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long paper submitted in June 1962, he argued that there was 'no reason' to believe
that NEDC could answer the question as to how the growth target was to be achieved.
Furthermore, he argued that 'there are great dangers in becoming committed to
expectations of growth or targets for growth without appreciation of the magnitude of
the task or of the radical changes of Government policy which would be involved'.'09
These divergent interests were reflected in the work of the Council.
Increasingly it became, not a locus for decision, but for discussion. Although a
number of topics directly relevant to British competitiveness and growth were
considered - science policy, the supply of skilled manpower, exports, taxation -
actual policies were made elsewhere. The first half of 1963 was spent deciding how
far to extend the seventeen-industry survey, and monitoring the progress of those
industries they had already studied."° Only in October 1963 did Maudling propose
the creation of Economic Development Councils that could actually pilot changes in
separate industries. Even so, these would only be established where there was full
agreement to do so: and all reference to the 'implementation' of Council decisions
was effaced from Maudling's draft, in order to guarantee EDCs' voluntary nature."1
EDCs were now only to 'to collect information about and to assess the prospects of
their industry', and 'consider matters relevant to the efficiency of the industry'.' 12 The
development also came too late to have much effect on Conservative policy-making,
for only ten EDCs had been established by the time of the General Election in
October 1964."
109 PRO CAB 134/1696: Selwyn Lloyd memorandum to EPC, 'Economic growth', 28 June 1962. Lee loyally did
his best to make NEDC work; Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 180
H PRO FG 1/4: Shone memorandum to NEDC, 'Future Council business', 24 March 1963, memorandum to
NEDC, 'Future industrial work', 24 April 1963; NEDC minutes, 1 May 1963
' PRO FG 1/5: Maudling memorandum to NEDC, 'Economic Development Committees', 8 October 1963; PRO
FG 1/4: NEDC minutes, 16 October 1963
112 PRO FG 1/5: Maudling memorandum to NEDC, 'Economic Development Committees', 22 November 1963
" UWMRC MSS 292B/560. 1/8: TUC Economic Committee papers, 'NEDC: Economic Development
Committees', 13 May 1964, 10 June 1964
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Almost as soon as the 'plan' had been issued it was clear that it would be very
difficult to meet any of the targets. As Shone told NEDC in January 1963, the 5% p.a.
increase in exports was imperilled by Britain's ongoing export problems, which in
1962 had increased not by the planned 5%, but by 2-3%." By March 1964 most
members of NEDC realised that the economy was growing too quickly, as the level of
imports climbed: indeed, it was outstripping their own growth targets, and would have
to be reined back." 5 Nor did NEDC have any economic models for working out
industry-by-industry export targets, even if macro-economic policy could in some
way allow an increase in exports." 6 In fact, it was dawning on most involved that the
'Maudling boom' was another classic credit expansion, since as Shone reported,
'There is not yet any clear evidence that the rates of growth of production and
productivity postulated in the current programme are being achieved'." 7
 Given the
worsening external situation, and the situation of only partly revealed hostility and
rancour on NEDC, the 'new approach' had failed. NEDC had become simply another
high-level consultative committee, with no power to direct events.
114 PRO FGI/4: NEDC minutes, 24 January 1963
115 PRO FG 1/6: ibid, 4 March 1964
116 PRO FG 1/7: Shone memorandum to NEDC, Progress report', 28 April 1964
117 PRO FG 1/7: Shone memorandum to NEDC, 'The next growth programme', 19 June 1964; PRO FG 1/6: NEDC
minutes, 1 July 1964
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'As simple as it is difficult '. a plan for public expenditure."8
As charts 11.3-11.4 show, the British state had grown beyond all recognition since
1914. The pressures of total war, latterly joined by increased pressure for social
expenditure, had combined to increase the total amount of government spending in
relation to GNP. The numbers employed by the state also rose sharply, mainly due to
Labour's post-War nationalisation programme." 9
 The result of this expansion was
that even slight policy changes by central government could have very large effects
on the economy. However, the structure of central government had not kept up with
these changes. Year-by-year budgeting, with the Treasury totalling up 2,000 sub-
headings of spending at the end of the financial year, had left little place for
considering the total burden of public expenditure on the economy, its implication for
taxes, or relative priorities both between and within departments.'2°
Concern that government might not be able to handle efficiently this level of
spending grew in the late 195 Os, culminating in a Report from the House of Commons
Select Committee on Estimates that registered 'disquiet' about this subject. 'The
Treasury are in danger of falling between two stools', the Committee argued: 'The old
theory of "candle ends" economy has not wholly been abandoned... [but]
Departmental responsibility and partnership may not have been whole-heartedly
accepted'. The Committee recommended many more forecasts of long-term need, so
that spending could be judged in relation to economic and social requirements, not
just balanced in reaction to short-term fluctuations in tax revenues.'2'
118 PRO PREM 11/3757: Butler to Macmillan, 14 February 1962
R. Middleton, 'The size and scope of the public sector', in S.J.D. Green & R.C. Whiting (eds.), The boundaries
of the state in modern Britain (CUP, Cambridge, 1996), fig. 6.1, p. 91, fig. 6.2, p. 93; B.W. Hogwood, Trends in
British public policy (Open University Press, Buckingham, 1992), figs. 2.1-2.2, p. 39, figs. 6.1-6.3, pp. 129-31; R.
Rose, 'The significance of public employment', in idem et al (eds.), Public employment in western nations (CUP,
Cambridge, 1985), tables 1.2-1.6, pp.9, 11, 16-17
120 R. Clarke, Public expenditure, management and control (Macmillan, London, 1978), pp. 2-5
121 Sixth report of the House of Commons select committee on estimates, 1958, xxxvi-xxxvii, xi-xiii: Committee
Report, 23 July 1958; R. Lowe, 'Millstone or milestone? The 1959-61 Plowden committee and its impact on
British welfare policy', Historical Journal 40, 2 (1997), p. 469
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Charts 113, 114. Public sector expenditure and employment, GB, 1891-1971
Sources: R. Pariy, 'Britain: stable aggregates, changing composition', in R. Rose eta! (eds.), Public employment,
tables 2.1, 2.3, pp. 57, 59; A.T. Peacock & J. Wiseman, The growth ofpublic expenditure in the United Kingdom
(London, 1967), appendix table A-6, p. 166; R. Middleton, Government versus the market (Edward Elgar, London,
1996), table 3.6, p. 98; British labour statistics historical abstract 1886-1968 (HMSO, London, 1971), table 109,
pp. 206-7; British labour statistics (1973), table 54, p. 118
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It was in the light of this Report that the Chancellor, Derrick Heathcoat
Amory, proposed to set up an investigation into how government worked out its
expenditure priorities.' 22
 In this manner the Treasury intended to keep control of the
reform process, rather than have change imposed from outside: and indeed, the final
Report owed much to the input of its official members, such as the Chief Economic
Advisor Sir Robert Hall, Dame Evelyn Sharp from MHLG, and Clarke. In fact
Clarke, a long-time advocate of more forward planning (though throughout he
protested that he would not 'necessarily cast myself in the role of stout Cortes'), was
the guiding mind behind the whole exercise. 123
 Hall, for one, became 'suspicious of
the whole affair' because Clarke proceeded to write 'all the papers as if no one had
ever thought of reviews of investment or expenditure before his time'. 124
 Although
Lord Plowden, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Authority, was asked to be the
Chairman of the Inquiry, the exercise remained a Treasury affair.
This became even clearer when the Plowden Committee began to report in
summer 1960. The second interim report, on public expenditure decisions, declared
that 'the first and central problem... is to bring the growth of public expenditure under
greater control and to contain it within such limits as the Government may think
desirable'. Although the Report did not make any recommendations about what those
limits should be, it did recommend a much greater degree of central direction for
public expenditure decisions, perhaps under a small Cabinet Committee chaired by
the Chancellor. It also took the opportunity to deprecate short-term reflationary
spending in the language of the time, disapproving of the 'indirect losses of "stop and
go"...' and recommending a 'smoother' spending path.' 25
 Selwyn Lloyd approvingly
circulated this Report to the Cabinet.' 26
 It eventually formed Part I of the published
122 Heathcoat Amory memoranda to Cabinet, 16 March, 20 April 1959: Lowe, 'Millstone', pp. 469-70
123 CCAC CLRK 1/3/1/2: Clarke to Padmore, 8 November 1960
124 Hall diary, 31 May 1960: Cairncross (ed.), The Robert Hall diaries 1954-61 (Unwin Hyman, London, 1991),
pp. 235-6; Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 179; Lowe, 'Millstone', p. 475; ; L. Pliatzky, Getting and spending: public
expenditure, employment and inflation (rev. edn., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1984), pp. 42-4
12$ PRO T 325/8 1: Committee on the Control of Public Expenditure, Second Interim Report, 3 June 1960
126 PRO CAB 129/104: Selwyn Lloyd memorandum to Cabinet, 'Second report of the Plowden Committee on the
control of government expenditure', 22 March 1961
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Report, also recommended management reform in government, increased
Parliamentary accountability, and new forms for the presentation of Estimates.'27
Part I was issued as a White Paper in July 1961, shorn of the explicit
recommendation for a Public Expenditure Committee under the Chancellor but still
urging 'improvement in the arrangements to enable Ministers to discharge their
collective responsibility for the oversight of public expenditure as a whole' The main
thrust of the Report, that 'regular surveys should be made of public expenditure as a
whole, over a period of years ahead, and in relation to prospective resources',
remained ifltact. 128
 'Plowden' gained a generally appreciative and positive response
from Whitehall's major spending departments, with most of them hastening to stress
their commitment to forward planning.' 29 Significantly, however, Mary Smieton,
Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Education, had already made quite clear that
under such a system departments would fight all the harder to resist budget
adjustments for the purpose of short-term economic management: The corollary.., is
that the absence of forward commitment... is also uneconomical'.'3°
Long-term stability was exactly the situation that the Treasury desired: as
Heathcoat Amory put it, 'over most of the field we have to take pretty firm decisions
as far ahead as possible and stick to them, without chopping and changing to meet
transient changes in the direction of the economic wind'.' 3 ' It was not simply
economy that the Treasury wanted to promote, but efficiency. As Clarke put it, 'our
failure to apply economic and financial ideas to social service problems is highly
expensive for the Exchequer'. Clarke wanted to develop economic questions about
spending. For instance, he wanted to know the true extent of the claimed savings if
elderly patients were moved from long-stay wards to new old people's homes, and the
127 
e.g. PRO T 325/81: Committee on Control of Public Expenditure, Eighth report, 'Establishments Control and
Management Services', June 1961
128 Cmnd 1432, Control ofpublic expenditure (HMSO, London, July 1961), pp. 6-7, 12
129 PRO T 298/115: Hare, Watkinson, Hill to Selwyn Lloyd, 31 August, 5 September, 26 September 1961
'o PRO T 29 1/73: Smieton to Plowden, 26 May 1960
' PRO CAB 129/98: Heathcoat Amory memorandum to Cabinet, 'Public sector investment 1958-63', 18 July
1959
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costs and benefits of an extra year of compulsory training after the existing school
leaving age)32
Long-term expenditure planning was not wholly novel. It had been conceived
during Clarke's time in the Social Services Division of the Treasury in the mid-1950s,
when Butler had asked the Treasury to prepare a five-year 'forward look' on the
social services. This early survey had the intention of developing 'areas of choice', by
which public expenditure could be more effectively directed at areas of most pressing
need - exactly the emphasis Clarke and his colleagues insisted on in the early
1960s.' 33 There were other forerunners, for instance the long-term capital plans of the
Atomic Energy Authority under Plowden, the strategic role of the Iron and Steel
Board in controlling investment in the privatised steel industry, and the British
Transport Commission's Railway Plan of 1955. Most importantly in terms of central
government investment, the roads programme had been planned on a five year, inter-
departmental basis from the mid-1950s.'34
Defence policy was also central to this re-evaluation. Derek Serpell, head of
materiel procurement at the Treasury, was one highly influential witness during the
Select Committee inquiry.' 35
 Britain's post-Suez policy was to reduce her worldwide
defence commitments, to bring them more into line with her economic power.
Macmillan had explicitly included this in his brief to Duncan Sandys when he
appointed him Minister of Defence in 1957. Though most of Britain's commitments
in the Middle East and Far East were to remain, her armed manpower was to be cut in
half, and reduced even on NATO's German frontier. This, it was hoped, would
substantially reduce total defence expenditure.' 36 Though the financial savings hoped
for in the switch from a conventional army to defence based on nuclear deterrence
were not as great as hoped, re-orientation in this direction involved a great deal of
t32 CCAC CLRK 1/3/1/3: Clarke to Cairncross, Economics in social expenditure, 15 November 1961
133 Clarke, Expenditure, xx-xxi; Peden, Treasury, p. 442
Clarke, Expenditure, pp. 12-13. On the Roads Programme Committee, PRO PREM 11/3759: Heathcoat Ainory
to Macmillan, Committee on control of public expenditure', 16 June 1960
Sixth report of the select committee on estimates, 1958, pp. 338-9: Serpell evidence, 13 May 1958
136 Cmnd 124, Defence: outline offuture policy (HMSO, London, April 1957), pp. 1-2, 6-8, 10
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tong-term thinking about strategic priorities.' 37
 Defence provided a powerful spur to
long-term thinking, for the run-up to amalgamating the Service Departments into one
Ministry of Defence in 1963 required machinery for judging which Services should
take priority in expenditure, and the needs of a smaller, more integrated, fighting
force. Sir Richard Powell, the Permanent Secretary at Defence, developed a series of
ten year 'forward looks' in the late 1950s.'38
Given that the exercise was aimed at saving money, the Treasury was
unsurprisingly enthusiastic about this strategic re-evaluation. But that department's
approval was also based on the method of re-evaluation, for it was based on exactly
the principles Clarke wanted to promote: long term plans, related to clearly set-out
priorities. Macmillan was told in 1960 that since five-year forecasts and reviews had
been going on in Defence since Duncan Sandys had been installed as Minister, 'the
techniques and tricks learned with these will be useful in the civil sphere'.' 39
 The
integration of the Service departments into one new Defence Department strengthened
the decision-making centre, allowing economic analysis, especially of costs, to take
centre stage. The Third Interim Report of the Plowden Committee noted this fact
approvingly.' 40
 By 1962 the planning rhetoric of the Ministry of Defence was at its
height. 'A long-term plan is essential', argued the Defence White Paper of that year,
'if the best use is to be made of manpower and resources. No settled weapons policy
is possible in a short time-scale'."4'
There was one last stimulus to long-term thinking, namely the expected rise in
the total population by the 1980s. During 1962 it became clear that the rising
137 D. Greenwood, 'Defence and national priorities since 1945', in J. Baylis (ed.), British defence policy in a
changing world (Croom Helm, London, 1977), PP. 190-2, 198; M. Dockrill, British defence since 1945 (Basil
Blackwell, Oxford, 1988), pp. 66, 68, 75-7
138 Clarke, Expenditure, pp. 8-10
139 PRO T 325/64: Bligh to Macmillan, 'Government expenditure', 6 April 1960
° PRO 1325/75: Treasury memorandum, 'The control of defence expenditure', [March?] 1960; PRO T 291/74:
Plowden sub-committee 4, defence expenditure, drafi report, 2 March 1960; PRO PREM 11/3759: Third interim
Report of Plowden Committee, 24 October 1960
141 Cmnd 1639, Defence 1962: the nextfive years (HMSO, London, Februaiy 1962), P. 5
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population and birth rate, along with increasing numbers of the elderly, increased
pressure for the provision of all types of welfare services. The slow realisation of this
situation emerged from the 1961 census, which forecast that the Britain's population
would grow from 51 million in 1961 to nearly 57 million by 1981.142 The implications
of this were intimidating, and are analysed in Table 11.2. This table takes three sectors
of the welfare state, and applies 1961 rates of provision for the greater number of
people that would have to be provided for if the new population projections were
borne out. As the examples given in this table demonstrate, an increased population
meant significant extra demands over and above qualitative changes.
Table 11.2. Increased demand for selected services at stable levels of provision, implications
of 1961 projections for 1981 (GB)
Public sector affected	 1961	 1981	 Implied extra need, 1981
Housing	 4.117m LA households	 4.584m LA households	 467,196 new houses
Education	 7.818m schoolchildren	 9.035m schoolchildren	 50,763 teachers
Sheltered elderly care	 7.561m pensioners	 9.815m pensioners	 85,390 places
Sources: Census of England and Wales 1961: housing tables (HMSO, London, 1965), table 16
Mitchell, Historical statistics, table Il, pp. 886-7
MOH report 1960 (HMSO, London, 1961); Registrar General's statistical review for England and Wales (1961),
vol. II, p. 7; Population trends 38 (1984), table 2, p. 37
Scottish Registrar General's Reports, 1959-64; Census 1961. Housing: national summary totals (HMSO,
Edinburgh, 1964); Scottish Department of Health report 1960 (HMSO, Edinburgh, 1961), p. 81
While improving staff: patient ratios in homes for the elderly, or teacher: pupil
ratios, or even building more local authority housing to re-house those displaced in
'slum clearance', Ministers would have to find half a million more houses, 50,000
more teachers, and more than 85,000 more places in elderly residential care. In short,
they would have to run ever faster in order simply to stand still. The implications of
unexpected population growth on this scale were clear, and demanded a long-term
look at spending and resources. As Powell and Michael Noble, the Scottish Secretaiy,
put it to the Cabinet: given population growth, 'we must now change substantially our
142 Registrar General's statistical review for England and Wales (1961), vol. II, p. 7; Reports of the Scottish
Registrar General, 1959-64; Census 1961 (Scotland), Housing: national summary totals (HMSO, Edinburgh,
1964)
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assumptions about the future of the country in ways which cannot but have
implications for many of our policies, economic, social and political'.'43
These unwelcome facts emerged as the Treasury pleaded, not for more
spending, but for retrenchment, Treasury Ministers for instance appealing to
Conservative political principles. 'Our supporters in Parliament wish to see us curbing
expenditure', wrote Henry Brooke in 1962: 'in fact it is rising rapidly'.' In his
emergency statement on the economic situation in July 1961, Lloyd had promised to
hold Supply spending by government departments to a 2.5% increase in 1962/63.
However, departmental bids came in for a 4.5% increase in 1962/63, with 8% more in
1963/64.' Even though Cabinet agreed £31m in 'cuts' to the 1962/63 programme,
Lloyd could not achieve the £1 urn that would have brought him within his target.'46
Furthermore, by the next spending round, Departmental appetites had risen again, to a
1963/64 spending increase of 11.5%.' Although Maudling and Boyd-Carpenter were
able to bid this down to a nominal 6%, the next year they were confronted with total
requests for a 9.5% increase in 1964/65.148
The concern with the level of public expenditure came out strongly in the first
overall 'review of resources', conducted in 1959 and projecting spending into 1963 on
known trends. This attempted to identif' areas for savings to maintain Britain's
external payments and defence stance. The payment of subsidies to industry and
agriculture, that depended on circumstances and could not be 'programmed', came
PRO CAB 129/112: Powell, Noble memorandum to Cabinet, Population prospects', 15 January 1963
' PRO CAB 129/108: Brooke memorandum to Cabinet, 'Estimates 1962/63', 3 January 1962
PRO CAB 129/108: Brooke memorandum to Cabinet, Public expenditure 1962/63 to 1965/66', 4 January 1962;
PRO CAB 128/36: Cabinet minutes, 8 January 1962
' PRO CAB 129/108: Brooke memorandum to Cabinet, 'Decisions on savings', 13 February 1962; PRO CAB
128/36: Cabinet minutes, 15 February 1962
' PRO CAB 129/110: Boyd-Carpenter memorandum to Cabinet, 'Public service investment 1963/64', 27 July
1962
48 PRO CAB 128/36: Cabinet minutes, 1 August 1962; PRO CAB 129/1 14: Boyd-Carpenter memorandum to
Cabinet, 'Forecast estimates 1964/65', 12 July 1963
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under fierce scrutiny. 149 The search for economies remained at the heart of the
Treasury's interest. The second phase was a new classification of public expenditure,
which sought to free the description of government spending from its departmental
classification, breaking it into blocks describing the service or investment. 150
 Clarke
then became more ambitious, suggesting to his colleagues that they institute an annual
three-stage expenditure process. In the first stage, five year expenditure appraisals
would set out what 'could be afforded'. The second stage would determine the
forecast estimates for the following year, and the third stage would attempt five year
'forward looks' about what would be spent.'5'
To bolster this, and to form a high-level committee along 'Plowden' lines,
• there was to be a 'public expenditure committee', 'to receive... reviews, to form
judgements on them and to develop the strategy'.' 52
 To service this committee -
appointed in December 1960 as the ad hoc Ministerial Committee on Public
Expenditure - there would have to be an official committee to do the detailed work.
This was the Public Expenditure Survey Committee, or PESC, on which committee
sat most of the large departments' finance officers.' 53
 The Cabinet agreed to the
formation of PESC in March 196 1.154 Its reviews were based on a 'target date' four
years ahead: for instance, the initial PESC review, conducted in 1961-62, was based
on negotiating expenditure figures for 1965/66.' However, PESC did not have
explicit authority to take decisions, but simply to prepare expenditure and resource
' 49 PR0 1 320/42: Treasury memorandum to the ad hoc group, 'Containing public expenditure', 21 January 1961;
PRO CAB 129/104: Selwyn Lloyd memorandum to Cabinet, 'Public expenditure', 23 March 1961
'° PRO T 325/64: Treasury memorandum, 'Long term resources review', February 1960; Clarke, Expenditure, pp.
21, 41-2, 45-6
'' PRO T 325/64: Clarke to Permanent Secretaries, 17 February 1960
152 PRO 1 325/75: Clarke to Padmore, 4 November 1960
' PRO T 320/42: Treasury memorandum to the ad hoc group, 'Public Expenditure Survey', 15 December 1960;
PRO T 298/134: Rawlinson to Clarke, 30 March 1961, Treasury circular to Departments, 'Public expenditure
survey committee', II April 1961
' PRO CAB 128/35: Cabinet minutes, 28 March 1961; House of Commons debates, vol. 638, cols. 793-4: Budget
statement, 17 April 1961
e.g. PRO T 298/137: Rawlinson to Vinter, 'Public expenditure: presentation to departments', 27 March 1961
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reviews for higher authority. It therefore acted as a clearing-house for the
identification of areas for negotiation, and consequently could easily be side-tracked:
its first review, for instance, was hampered by the dispute about Selwyn Lloyd's
proposed reductions to the 1962163 Estimates.'56
1963 witnessed an attempt to plan a number of spending areas - seven in total,
including education, health, housing and defence - in blocks with actual expenditure
limits, for three years ahead.' 57
 However, emboldened by the apparent failure of
PESC to develop control, as opposed to monitoring, functions, departments frustrated
this, arguing that it should be delayed until after the 1963-64 exercise. 158 Although
Boyd-Carpenter and Maudling spent that winter attempting to get the Cabinet to agree
to 'block plans', with penalties for departments which did not obey, they failed.'59
Douglas Home summed up the case for flexibility in deciding not to implement this
scheme in January 1964: 'the Government could not easily acquiesce in a position in
which their freedom to add new projects to their forward programmes would be
conditioned by the need either to specify at the same time which existing projects
would be eliminated or, alternatively, to foreshadow increases in taxation'.' 6° This
failure related to results, and not simply machinery, for if PESC was indeed designed
to control public expenditure, it failed. It is clear, for instance, from both Table 11.3
and Chart 11.5, that public expenditure began to accelerate, not decelerate, after 1959.
' 36 e.g. PRO 1 298/136: Treasury memorandum to PESC, 'PESC: progress report', 14 November 1961
'"The other areas were roads, police and prisons, and NI benefits. PRO CAB 129/111: Boyd-Carpenter
memorandum to Cabinet, 'Public expenditure', 14 December 1962; PRO CAB 128/36: Cabinet minutes, 20
December 1962; PRO T 320/120: Boyd-Carpenter to Clarke, 13 April 1963; PRO T 320/89: Treasury
memorandum to PESC, 'Survey of public expenditure 1963', 16 April 1963
138 PRO T 320/120: Boyd-Carpenter to Maudling, 'Control of public expenditure', 23 April 1963; PRO CAB
129/113: Boyd-Carpenter, Maudling memorandum to Cabinet, 'Rates of growth of public expenditure', 26 April
1963
159 PRO CAB 129/114: Boyd-Carpenter memorandum to Cabinet, 'Long-term growth of public expenditure', 29
July 1963; PRO CAB 128/37: Cabinet minutes, 18 July, 12 September 1963
160 PRO CAB 128/38: Cabinet minutes, 23 January 1964
62
Conservative economic planning / 959-64
As might have been predicted, most spending Ministers had found ways to
limit co-operation. The ad hoc Ministerial committee never gained the prominence
that Plowden thought should attach to a central decision-making committee. Given
that Macmillan deliberately included Macleod on this Committee, it was no surprise
that doubts were immediately expressed about reining back public spending. The
minutes show this clearly, for instance recording the opinion that 'it might be for
consideration whether the country at large, if faced squarely with this dilemma, would
wish taxation to be reduced if this meant a cutting of services to which the public
attached value'. More systematic doubts were also expressed: 'in general individual
Ministers were naturally jealous of their own programmes. An invitation to them to
offer candidates for economy was unlikely to be particularly successful'.'6'
161 PRO PREM 11/4209: Macmillan to Selwyn Lloyd, 30 November 1960; PRO T 320/44: ad hoc group, minutes,
1 December 1960
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Chart 115. Government expenditure, 1955-64 (em, 1955 prices)
H D
—6-- Roads
—N--Tr&aport
1955	 1956	 1957	 1958	 1959	 1960	 1961	 1962	 1963	 1964
Source: National income and expenditure (1965), table 48, pp. 58-62; Department of Employment, Retail Price
Indices (1987), p. 45
Table 113. Government expenditure as a percentage of GDP (excluding debt repayment,
market prices), 1951-64
Government expenditure! GDP (%)
1951	 37.2
1952	 37.6
1953	 36.4
1954	 34.0
1955
32.4
1956	 32.7
1957	 31.9
1958	 32.3
1959	 32.4
1960	 32.4
1961	 35.6
1962	 36.3
1963	 38.6
1964	 40.7
Sources: Peacock & Wiseman, Growth, table A6, p. 166, Cmnd. 2235, Public expenditure in 196364 and 1967/68
(HMSO, London, December 1963), Annex A, CSO, National income and expenditure (1971), table 44, p. 53
These twin doubts - about the political wisdom of reducing public
expenditure, and the chances of forcing Ministers to consider their colleagues when
making claims on the Exchequer - were behind the failure of the ad hoc committee.
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The Treasury attempted, on a number of occasions during the committee's lifetime of
December 1960 to March 1961, and June to November 1962, to force 'policies which
during the next few years will give the Government a reasonable chance of
accommodating the growth of expenditure within the growth of resources'.' 62
 But by
the end of its life, the members of the ad hoc committee were discussing frankly the
'inconsistency' of promising both improved social services and lower taxes, and
concluding that in fact 'it might be desirable to stimulate the economy by means of a
big increase in public expenditure'. As there had been at the very beginning of the
committee's life, there was the admission that 'in the last resort expenditure decisions
were taken on political grounds; and in the nature of things, this would always be the
case'. 163
In a parallel reform, the Treasury was reorganised, to aid the Chancellor in
negotiations within Cabinet. In order to facilitate the 'Plowden' process of matching
public spending to what was possible given economic developments, two separate
divisions of the Treasury were to deal with public spending. The first, the National
Economy Group, were to work on forecasts for the national economy, and the second,
Public Income and Outlay, were to bring together public expenditure work to bring it
in line with national economic trends.' 64
 Henry Brooke was also appointed as Chief
Secretary to the Treasury, a new post devoted entirely to negotiations over the control
of public expenditure.'65
This re-organisation, however, did not fundamentally change the nature of
central control. It remained for spending departments to set their priorities, in ways
that often remained opaque to the Treasury. Only once their demands had been
formulated could separate Ministries be challenged. Increased delegation, to force
financial responsibility onto departments, had indeed been one of the key elements of
162 PRO T 320/42: Treasury memorandum to the ad hoc group, 'Containing public expenditure', 21 Januarj 1961;
PRO T 320/43: Boyd-Carpenter memorandum to ad hoc group, 'Public service investment 1963/64', 4 June 1962
163 PRO T 320/44: ad hoc group, minutes, 31 October 1962,22 November 1962
PRO T 320/16: AlIen memorandum, 'The duties of the National Economy Group', 7 November 1962, Bancroft
to head of Treasury Divisions, Duties of public income/outlay division', 29 November 1962
65 Clarke, Expenditure, pp. 26-7
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the Plowden Report.' 66 But as the Treasury found, Departments often produced
figures based on very different classifications from those in the National Income and
Expenditure 'blue book', which the Treasury used for yearly Budgetary control.
Furthermore, given local authorities' responsibility for many services, Departments
often had little idea what the likely effects of different policies were likely to be on
spending at the margin.' 67
 For instance, once permission was given to councils to
build schools or houses, or to borrow to that effect, it could not be rescinded, and
might affect government spending for years to come.
This new structure also failed to resolve the inherent tension between long-
term public expenditure planning, and short- to medium-term economic management.
The Treasury recommended only the use of small-scale maintenance work, and
variations in the housing programme, to vary the rate of economic growth.'68
However, given the failure properly to integrate long-term expenditure planning into
the Whitehall machine, spending decisions continued to be made on a short-term
basis. The arbitrary investment 'halt' of 1961-62, imposed for instance on all local
authority building work is only the best example of this.' 69
 This particular 'stop'
phase also involved small, though significant cuts to the capital budget, quite outside
the PESC system! 7° As the realists on the ad hoc Ministerial Committee pointed out,
Ministers were still reacting to short-term economic crisis, rather than long-term
projections of need.
Furthermore, as part of the growth experiment, Ministers allowed their public
expenditure projections to become entangled with the 4% growth target. From the
PRO T 325/81: Plowden, Eighth Interim Report, 'Establishments Control and Management Services', June 1961
167 PRO T 298/165: Embling to Phelps, 15 November 1961, Harding to Phelps, 4 December 1961
' PRO T 325/75: Treasury memoranda, 'Flexibility of public investment, 'Public investment and reflation',
March, April 1960
' 69 Hoe of Commons debates, vol. 645, cols. 436-7: Selwyn Lloyd statement, 'The economic situation', 26
November 1961
170 PRO PREM 11/3291: Bligh note for the record, Macmillan-Selwyn Lloyd meeting, 14 June 1961; PRO CAB
128/35: Cabinet minutes, 16 June 1961; PRO CAB 129/106: Selwyn Lloyd memorandum to Cabinet, 'Public
investment 1962163', 20 July 1961
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very beginning, it had been clear that the five-year spending plans 'depend... on
sustained rates of growth both of productivity and of exports well above anything
achieved in the past over a comparable period'. This was already the case in 1960-61,
on the basis of 3% per annum economic growth.' 7 ' The effect of adopting the 4%
growth target, not just as an aspiration, but an assumed probability, meant that when it
failed to materialise, public spending as a proportion of GNP surged ahead. The slow
growth of 1961-62 in particular, meant that the economy would have to grow at an
unprecedented rate just to hold public expenditure within the rate of economic
growth) 72
 Clarke later pinpointed 1962-63, when the 4% growth target was
incorporated as part of the PESC growth assumptions, as the moment when the whole
process was 'stood on its head'.'73
There were political reasons for this change. Powell had warned of these in his
reaction to the Plowden Report:
Given the present preoccupation of politicians and the public with 'growth', the
Government dare not.., pitch their estimate of prospective resources low. As it is,
they are liable to be told by their opponents that the rate of growth anticipated is
miserable, and that all difficulties would be resolved by a policy to make it increase
faster. Inevitably therefore the estimate of prospective income is on the high side.'74
Even Treasury submissions to PESC began to envisage 3% as a 'minimum' rate of
growth, with 4% as a 'maximum'. In November Maudling announced public spending
PRO T 320/42: Treasuty memorandum to the Ministerial ad hoc group on public expenditure, Public
expenditure and resources', 23 January 1961; for the 3% assumption PRO CAB 129/104: Selwyn Lloyd
memorandum to Cabinet, 'Public expenditure', 23 March 1961
172 PRO T 325/80: Report of the working party on economic assessment, 'Long term review 1961-1966', February
1962
'"Clarke, Expenditure, pp. 72-3
PRO T 298/115: Powell to Selwyn Lloyd, 16 September 1961; also PRO PREM 11/4778: Trend to Douglas-
Home, Government expenditure after 1968', 22 January 1964
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plans to 1968, 'compatible with' 4% growth.' 75
 The Public Expenditure White Paper
of December 1963 envisaged a 4.1% yearly increase in public expenditure.176
PESC did stimulate long-term thinking, though often of a very speculative
character. Chief among these (and claiming its own sub-committee of PESC) was the
appropriately-named 'very long term planning', which was supposed to explore long-
term priorities up to 198O.' First attempts at this were not impressive, with most
departments simply sending in their existing (often published) projections of, for
instance, population increases. Robert Hall's report for the Ministry of Transport on
the 'transport needs of Great Britain in the next twenty years' was one document sent
to the PESC sub-committee.' 78
 However, in spring 1962, Cairncross recruited Alan
Holmans, from Glasgow University, to prepare an 'economic map of 1980.179 This
map brought together projections for total and working population, fuel and energy
consumption, numbers of cars and overall journeys, skilled manpower, and the
implications of all of these for government spending, especially investment.180
By its very nature, however, this remained academic, for there was no way of
relating public expenditure decisions in 1962 to the needs of 1980. One official
summed this up well: 'we should not try to work out a centralised long-term pattern
for the economy into which the planning of each segment would be made to fit. It is
impossible to make a sensible plan for the economy twenty years ahead. Too much is
uncertain'.' 8 ' Even Clarke admitted that the 'map' was best left to one side, though
' PRO T 320/89: Treasury memorandum to PESC, 'Resources for public expenditure 1962-1967', 19 June 1963;
House of Commons debates, vol. 684, col. 202: Maudling, Debate on the Address, 13 November 1963
176 Cmnd. 2235, Public expenditure, table, p. 5
PRO T 325/89: Clarke to Padmore, 'Future planning: civil side', 23 January 1962
' PRO T 320/200: MOT memorandum to PESC VLT, The transport needs of Great Britain in the next twenty
years', 13 March 1962
179 PRO T 230/665: Clarke memo to permanent secretaries, 'Very Long Term Planning and the Economic Map of
1980', 22 May 1962
180 PRO T 230/665: Holmans report, 'An economic map of 1980', October 1962
181 PRO T 311/116: Rawlinson to Clarke, 'VLT: paper for permanent secrçtaries', October 1962
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kept in mind for very large capital decisions.' 82
 At Permanent Secretaries' November
1962 Sunningdale conference, most participants objected to the Holmans map, fearing
that all freedom of manoeuvre would be removed.' 83
 The 'map' was left as a means of
examining 'relative orders of uncertainty' among departmental plans, and as a means
of checking the 'internal consistency' of government's plans.'84
The failure of PESC was not only due to contingent political factors, or the
structural inadequacy of governmental machinery. Indeed, it contained the seeds of its
own destruction, primarily because it did not allow sufficiently for the Relative Price
Effect (RPE), or the tendency of prices and wages in the public sector to rise faster
than those in the rest of the economy. The spending projections of PESC were
couched in real terms, that is, adjusted for 'the most likely expectation of changes' in
'prices, wages and GNP'. By these means officials hoped to avoid the 'risk of
Ministers being subsequently unpleasantly surprised.., that a policy which someone
had told them would cost some £Xm rising to LYm in three years' time'. The social
service costs projection made in 1955 had been based on wages and prices prevailing
in that year, and had therefore 'disastrously' underestimated spending in 1959-60. All
concerned believed that they had learned their lesson, and could now project future
spending, in real terms, with more precision.'85
However, government cost increases were highly unpredictable. Public sector
wage and salary increases made up two-fifths of total government spending, but were
highly volatile, determined as they were by global settlements covering very large
numbers of employees, for instance non-industrial civil servants, nurses, doctors and
teachers. When the government imposed greater control on these settlements, for
instance in the wage pause of 1961-62, the RPE was reduced (see Table II.4).186
Secondly, much of the RPE was due to an unavoidable principle of national
182 PRO T 230/665: Clarke to Vinter, 27 September 1962
183 PRO T 311/116: Permanent Secretaries Conference, main conclusions, November 1962
' PRO 1 320/87: Treasury memorandum to PESC, 'VLT', 12 December 1962
185 PRO T 325/64: Rossiter to Clarke, 'Plowden Committee', 8 February 1960, Bligh to Macmillan, 'Government
expenditure', 6 April 1960
'CSO, Economic stat istics: a handbook (HMSO, London, 1968), passim
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accounting. Given that government spending was not marketed for cash, it was
impossible to measure labour productivity against final output costs, and to
incorporate this in price analyses. This exaggerated relative cost increases in the
public sector, for the productivity gains measured in private industry acted to deflate
calculations of final output cost increases.187
Table 11.4. Government cost increases above general GDP cost increases, 1955-64
Government costs increase
above GDP costs increase
1955	 1.2
1956	 2.9
1957	 2.2
1958	
-0.6
1959	 2.1
1960	 3•5
1961	 0.1
1962	 0.0
1963	 2.7
1964	 2.1
Source: Economic trends (1975), table 2.4, p. 21
Thirdly, and even more fundamental if future cost trends were to be utilised in
forecasting expenditure, these projections could only be based on past experience,
which given the previous unstable behaviour of the indicator, was little indication of
how prices in the public sector would behave in the future.' 88
 The unpredictability of
cost trends put further pressure on the Treasury in PESC negotiations, for departments
repeatedly demanded that their programmes be revalued on the basis of 'present
wages and prices'. Spending departments such as the Ministry of Education
continuously came back to this theme, arguing on a number of occasions that the cost
limits imposed on school building had become unrealistic. The Ministry of Defence
M.S. Levitt & M.A.S. Joyce, The growth and efficiency ofpublic spending (CUP, Cambridge, 1987), pp. 14-15,
21, 159-60; CSO, Economic statistics, pp. 44-5
' P.M. Rees & F.P. Thompson, 'The RPE in public expenditure', Statistical news 18 (August 1972), p. 18.15
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was another persistent irritant. Officials struggled, without much success, to find a
formula to integrate the RPE within public expenditure decisions.'89
Given the failure fully to incorporate PESC into public expenditure machinery
- and the confusion over what PESC was for - the accelerating trend of public
expenditure could not be restrained. However, given the prevailing political climate,
and the daunting technical problems that confronted the architects of expenditure
planning, it is debatable how much control could have been established, whatever the
machinery. It was, as Powell had in fact argued, the will of public, Ministers and
Parliament to rein back, not the number and scope of government committees, that
was paramount. 'There is only one key to the control of expenditure', he had argued.
That is for the government to wish it, and to wish it more than they wish anything
inconsistent with it'.' 90 The Plowden inquiry ignored these wider political questions,
and focussed on governmental machinery. But without a sea-change of public and
official attitudes, the appearance of making actual choices remained an illusion.
'	 T 298/161: Treasury meeting with spending departments, 'Civil public investment', 20 June 1960; PRO T
320/121: Peck to Harris, 'Defence estimates 1963/64, 6 December 1962, Burdett to Nodder, 'Control of defence
expenditure', 6 June 1963; H. Heclo & A. Wildavsky, The private government ofpublic money (Macmillan,
London, 1974), pp. 96-7; PRO T 320/120: Rawlinson to Phelps, 'Public expenditure programmes in proportion to
GDP', draft memorandum for Treasury Public Expenditure Committee, 18 July 1963; PRO T 320/121: Berman to
Noddern, PESC and Clarke's law', 11 June 1963
'° PRO T 298/115: Powell to Selwyn Lloyd, 16 September 1961
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'Proper national balance '. returning to regionalism.
Those regions which had since the 1930s been known as the 'depressed areas' - South
Wales, Central Scotland, North East England, Merseyside - had attracted a great deal
of attention from the post-War Labour Government. These regions had a number of
problems. Most of them were hundreds of miles from the new industrial heartlands -
and markets - of the West Midlands and the South East. All suffered from a structural
over-reliance on the industries of the Industrial Revolution, for instance coal and
shipbuilding.' 9 ' The 1945 Distribution of Industry Act was an attempt to right these
structural imbalances, as it granted the Board of Trade the powers to issue both loans
and grants for the reclamation of derelict land, to provide 'advance factories' for
industrial use, and to build industrial estates. The Treasury was empowered to issue
further grants and loans for investment in plant and equipment, under advice from the
Development Areas Treasury Advisory Committee (DATAC) provided that the
project would at least break even. 192 This extended powers that went back to the 1928
Industrial Transfer Act and 1934 Special Areas Act.'93
Labour was able to pursue regional policy with more vigour, partly due to the
introduction of Industrial Development Certificates in the Town and Country
Planning Act of 1947. These IDCs were required by industry wishing to build, or to
expand, in the 'congested areas' of the West Midlands and South East. BUT refusal of
IDCs was supposed to add the 'stick' to the 'carrot' of BUT and Treasury funding for
re-locating industry.' 94 By contrast, the 1950s had seen regional policy in abeyance.'95
By 1958, the amount of money given in loans and grants to industry moving to
Labour's Development Areas had been nearly halved. Expenditure on BUT advance
' J. Glasson, An introduction to regional planning (2" edn., Hutchinson, London, 1978), PP. 199-202; B. Rhodes
& J. Moore, 'Evaluating the effects of British regional economic policy', Economic journal 83 (1973), tables I-Il,
p.92
192 G. McCrone, Regional policy in Britain (Allen & Unwin, London, 1969), p. 110
Glasson, Planning, p. 210
Mccrone, Policy, pp. 109-10
G. Cherry & U. Wannop, 'The development of regional planning in the UK', Planning perspectives 9, 1(1994),
p.40
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factories had already been greatly reduced.' 96
 IDC refusals in prosperous areas
dropped to a post-war low in 1956-57 (see Table 11.5), and the number of firms
moving to the development areas reached its low in 1959.197
Table 11.5. Refusal of IDC applications, 1951-64
Year	 IDC refusals, percentage ofpossible
employment refused as percentage of
total official applications
1951	 13.2
1952	 15.7
1953	 7.7
1954	 6.4
1955	 6.3
1956	 1.8
1957	 2.1
1958	 13.8
1959	 13.7
1960	 16.7
1961	 19.1
1962	 24.2
1963	 21.6
1964	 26.1
Source: Moore & Rhodes, 'Movement', table A2, p. 30
It was at this point that the Government's interest in regional policy revived,
culminating in the Distribution of Industry Act 1958. This widened the Development
Areas to include contiguous areas for DATAC aid, though not the full benefits of
'scheduling' under the 1945 Act. But this Act also introduced for the first time the
concept of a 'high and sustained level of unemployment' as the qualifying test for
central government aid.' 98 This involved a shift away from an overall 'development'
emphasis, to more selective intervention. This trend was reinforced following the
1959 Election, spurred by a joint BOT-Treasury inquiry into the Development Areas,
submitted to Ministers in July 1959. 'With the exception of Glasgow and Liverpool',
this report concluded, 'the large towns in the blighted areas whose problems gave rise
to the pre-war legislation now have or are in sight of attaining unemployment rates
' P. Scott, 'The worst of both worlds: British regional policy 1951-64', Business history 38, 4 (1996), pp. 41,49,
54; D.W. Parsons, The political economy of British regional policy (Croom Helm, London, 1986), pp. 103-104
Rhodes & Moore, 'Regional economic policy and the movement of firms to development areas', Economica 43
(1976), figure 1, p. 18
198 Mccrone, Regional, pp. 118-9
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not greatly higher than the national average'. Thus help should be concentrated on
those 'pockets' that remained.' 99 Rather than a re-invigoration of regional planning,
the early 1 960s were therefore marked by an extension of the local alleviation
approach pioneered in the 1950s. The focus was on 'black spots', those 'smaller
towns dependent on one industry or even one firm', or localities marked out by
'remoteness... [a] poor transport system, or geographical location'. 200
 Smaller
development districts, based on Employment Exchange areas, replaced development
areas.201
The Local Employment Act of 1960 did give the BOT more powers: for
instance, building grants were to be available for the first time. Furthermore,
Ministers could 'list' or 'de-list' areas by administrative action, rather than having to
pass legislation to declare one part of the country a Development Area. 202
 However,
while the final Act gave the BOT more discretion on how to use its powers, and added
some new regional policy instruments, the 1 950s policy of concentration was still
being followed, since the Act's practical effect would be reduce the workforce
covered by regional assistance finance measures from 19% to 14%. Reginald
Maudling, as President of BOT, considered this a virtue of the measure: 'If we spread
the "butter" in the form of the assistance available too far, there will not be enough to
help where help is really needed'.203
The disadvantages of concentrating too much on the most depressed areas
soon became apparent. The first was that it created uncertainty. The building grants
PRO CAB 130/165: Bishop, Bancroft memorandum, 'Distribution of industry policy: report of an
interdepartmental committee', 3 July 1959
200 PRO CAB 130/165: ibid
201 PRO CAB 130/165: DIC, minutes, 9 July 1959; PRO CAB 129/98: Erroll memorandum to Cabinet,
'Distribution of industry', 20 July 1959; PRO CAB 128/33: Cabinet minutes, 23 July 1959
202 PRO CAB 130/165: Eccles memorandum to Distribution of industry conmiittee [DIC], 'Local employment
Bill', 3 September 1959; DIC, minutes, 7 September 1959; PRO CAB 128/33: Cabinet minutes, 8 September 1959;
A. Cox & D. MacKay, The politics of urban change (Croom Helm, London, 1979), p. 203
203 House of Commons debates, vol. 613, cols. 45-6, 58-59, 90-1: Maudling, Griffiths, Houghton speeches, second
reading, Local Employment Bill, 9 November 1959
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under the 1960 Act were set at 85% of the difference between the cost of building and
the market value of the site, in order to concentrate aid on the poorest areas, where
building costs formed a much higher proportion of the total outlay of business start-
ups. 2°4 Unfortunately, this created a number of delays, for the final value had to be
estimated by the District Valuer and the final grant negotiated with DATAC, which
was taken into the BOT under the 1960 Act, becoming the Board of Trade Advisory
Council (BOTAC). BOTAC was also instructed to set a 'cost per job' threshold,
above which they would not fund a project: this, too, involved lengthy negotiation
with industry before a grant or loan could be made. Finally, areas could be listed and
de-listed with speed, by Ministerial decree, a fact unlikely to recommend investment
by companies looking for long-term guarantees.205
Under the new Act, the Treasury was able to insist that the list of areas eligible
for help should remain under regular review, in order to make sure that no district
received help for any period longer than that it was entitled. Although Maudling was
initially able to ward off this pressure, and even to extend the list a little, this pressure
did not go away. 206
 Eventually, in July and October 1960, fifteen areas were either
taken off the list of those eligible for help altogether, or placed on the 'stop list',
meaning that no further applications for financial aid would be taken from industries
in these places. Plymouth, the Isle of Wight and Merseyside were indeed on this list,
along with a number of other districts where unemployment had been on the decline:
Thanet, the Isle of&ee, Skegness, and Llanelly, for instance.207
The second main problem with the 1960 Act was that it drew an unrealistic
line around the depressed 'pockets', to the detriment of overall regional
204	 General Acts and Measures, 1960, Ch. 18, p. 285: Local Employment Act, Part II, 22 March 1960
205 McCrone, Regional, pp. 131-2; Cherry, Town planning, p. 165
206 PRO T 224/271: Maudling to Heathcoat Amory, 24 March 1960; PRO T 224/3 90: Painter to Goldman,
'Deletions from the list of development districts', 24 May 1960, Painter to Robertson, 'Industrial development in
South Lancashire and Merseyside', 18 June 1960, Peterson to Goldman, 'De-listing of development districts, 24
June 1960
207 PRO CAB 134/1625: Macpherson memorandum to DIC, 'Changes in the list of development districts', 12 June
1961; PRO BT 177/1256: NPACI meeting, brief for Chairman, 21 July 1961
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development. 208 Academic fashion was at this time moving away from a reactive
policy, aimed at the relief of unemployment, and towards an approach originating in
development economics: the so-called 'growth pole' policy, adapted from the works
of the French economist Francois Perroux. 209 Although Perroux's original emphasis
was not in fact geographical, investigating inter-industry linkages and concerning
'space' as an economic rather than a geographical concept, it was soon employed by
geographers interested in conditions for regional economic growth, especially in
under-developed countries. 210
 Out of this came an emphasis on encouraging the
development of large industries, which would stimulate demand for raw materials,
services and labour throughout a region, and encouraging 'clusters' of economic
change in areas that could quickly attract investment to benefit the whole of their so-
called 'zone of influence'.21'
Ministers' views also swiftly turned against the 1960 policy. The operation of
local measures, based on Employment Exchange areas, had the further disadvantage
of attracting industry to areas of older housing and poor infrastructure, which could
not be expected to cope with the influx of traffic and workers. Pressure therefore built
up for the Government to recognise that 'in some places... the most serious
unemployment was in congested areas where there was also a shortage of land... it
would be sensible from the long-term planning point of view to introduce new
industries not directly into the areas of unemployment themselves but to overspill
areas to which the population could be moved'. 212 This view was reinforced by the
complaints of a number of regional BOT offices, that they were not allowed to help
projects in areas just a few miles away from areas of high unemployment because the
209 P. Hall, Urban and regional planning (2d edn., Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1982), pp. 135-6; P. Self, Cities in
flood: the problems of urban growth (2d edn., Faber and Faber, London, 1961), pp. 13-14
209 Hall, Urban and regional planning, pp. 136-8
210 D.F. Darwent, 'Growth poles and growth centres in regional planning: a review', Environment and planning 1
(1969),passim; J.R. Lausen, 'On growth poles', Urban studies 6 (1969), pp. 138-9
211 J.B. Parr, 'Growth pole strategies in regional economic planning: a retrospective view I, origins and advocacy',
Urban studies 7, 36 (1999), p. 1197; Lasuen, 'Growth poles', pp. 141-3, 149-50
212 PRO CAB 134/1625: DIC minutes, 24 October 1961
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projects would not actually be sited in development districts. 213
 The FBI were
particularly irritated by this.214
Chart 11.6. Regional unemployment, GB, 1959-64 (000s)
Source: Monthly digest of statistics (various)
As both academic and Ministerial views changed, the unemployment situation
in these areas deteriorated during the relative deflation of 1961-62. The situation on
Merseyside, for instance, attracted a great deal of Ministerial attention. 215
 The figures
for regional unemployment can be clearly followed in Chart 11.6. What is not so clear
from the chart, however, is the very high peaks of unemployment within the broad
regional headings, at the level of actual Development Districts (see chart 11.7). From
these it can clearly be seen just how high unemployment was, compared with the
national average. The situation in such areas was one of the mainsprings behind
213 PRO BT 177/2039: Whitehouse, Glasgow BOT, to Fisher, London BOT, 9 February 1963; FBI, The regional
problem (FBI, London, 1963), p. 4
214 PRO BT 190/12: Runge, NPACI minutes, 3 May 1963
215 PRO CAB 134/1626: Price memorandum to Distribution of Industry Committee [DIC], 'Merseyside
unemployment', 22 November 1962, DIC minutes, 30 November 1962
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Macmillan's 'new approach', arguing as he did that 'politically the country may be
able to tolerate... 2%, or even 3%, of unemployment overall; it will not accept this if
the figure is an average between 5% in one place and 1% in another'.216
This was the logic behind the Prime Minister's decision to appoint a Cabinet
Committee on Population and Employment in August 1962, with instructions to
'concentrate our attack on the North East and Scotland'. 217
 Local development was
one of the main topics in Macmillan's 'modemisation of Britain' memorandum to
Cabinet, in which he said he would 'welcome ideas for further study into growing
points, though fearful that 'in the long run it would be a mistake... to divert too much
development from settled and existing industrial centres'. 218
 In February 1963, as
unemployment continued to rise, Macmillan also set up an ad hoc Ministerial
Committee on Modernising Britain, to prepare what he told Maudling would become
'a great national plan... [which] would give local encouragement as well as a feeling
of a national forward movement'. 219
The unemployment situation stimulated short-term action. Merseyside was
placed back on the list of areas to receive help, despite Treasury resistance.220
Government also intervened through procurement orders, which were speeded up in
the North East, especially, and defence contracts were brought forward. £2m of orders
for the Royal Navy, for example, were put out to tender, rather than given to the
216	 PREM 11/4520: Macmillan to Maudling, 'Modernisation of Britain', 30 November 1962
217	 CAB 134/2437: Brooke memorandum to Committee on Population and Employment, 'North East England
and Scotland', 10 December 1962; PRO PREM 11/4519: Macmillan to Brooke, Population and employment', 4
July 1962
218	 PREM 11/4296: Macmillan memorandum to Cabinet. 'Modernising Britain', 29 October 1962
219	 PREM 11/4520: Woodfield note, 27 November 1962; PRO PREM 11/4202: Macmillan] Maudling
meeting, minutes, 22 February 1963
220 CAB 134/1696: Erroll memorandum to EPC, 'Restoration of Merseyside to the active list', 17 December
1962; PRO CAB 134/1693: EPC minutes, 19 December 1962; PRO CAB 134/1698: Erroll memorandum to EPC,
'Merseyside unemployment', 15 January 1963; PRO CAB 134/1697: EPC minutes, 16 January 1963
78
Conservative economic planning 1959-64
Royal Dockyards, in order to help Glasgow, Newcastle, and Liverpool. 22 ' Special
discretionary loans were made to projects such as the LiOm granted to the pulp mill
project at Fort William, in the Scottish Highlands. 222
 There was also a return to using
IDCs to halt industrial development in the South East and Midlands (see Table 115).
Encouraged by Macmillan, large spending increases were authorised for the North
East and Scotland in both 1963 and 1964.223 The number of Development Districts
was increased throughout 1962 and 1963, and while the unemployment problem
remained acute, expenditure increased - though it should be noted that it was
deliberately reduced again in 1963 and 1964 (see table 116).
Table 11.6. Local Employment Act expenditure, GB, 1960/61-1963/64 (em, 1960 prices)
Total Local Employment
Act aid paid out
1960/61	 11.75
1961/62	 31.49
1962/63	 22.49
1963/64	 15.02
Source: Mintech Report on the Local Employment Acts 1969/70, table 1, p. 31
Local authorities were also encouraged to act against unemployment. During
the winter of 1962-63, Ministers were asked to prepare a one-off list of minor
projects, costing less than £15,000 that could be approved quickly in the North East
and Central Scotland.224 While it lasted, this was seen as a useful counterpoint to the
Government's accelerated investment schemes in the 40 local authority areas with the
PRO T 320/7 1: Boyd-Carpenter to Macmillan, 'Acceleration of defence orders', 10 December 1962, Macmillan
to Maudling, 12 December 1962; PRO PREM 11/4521, T 320/72: Macmillan meeting with Ministers,
'Modemisation of Britain', minutes, 15 January 1963
222 PRO CAB 134/1697: EPC minutes, 5 February 1963
223 PRO PREM 11/4521: Macmillan meeting with Ministers, 'Modernising Britain', minutes, 29 January 1963;
PRO T 320/74: Noble to Boyd-Carpenter, 13 February 1963; PRO PREM 11/4519: Macmillan to Maudling, 22
February 1963
PRO PREM 11/4521: Macmillan meeting with Ministers, 'Modernisation of Britain', minutes, 15 January 1963;
PRO T 320/81: Treasury memorandum to PESC P1 sub-committee, 'The construction industries and
unemployment', 22 February 1963
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worst problems of 'slum housing'. 225 Though the Treasury was not necessarily
committed to long-term spending increases on social service infrastructure in the
depressed areas, a formula was also established by which such areas would receive
the first claims for such investment over the five-year spending plan. 226
 Grants to
local authorities for the purposes of converting derelict industrial sites were also
increased: where the 1960 Act had only granted discretionary powers for BOT to
make grants for this purpose with the consent of the Treasury, and the practice was to
make these grants on a 50% basis to local councils, in 1963 administrative action was
taken to increase this to a fixed rate of 85%.227
The immediate measures were backed up by a more subtle, but ultimately
more important, shift towards regional planning. Pressure to amend the 1960 Act
came first from Scotland, the subject of the Toothill Report on the Scottish economy,
published in late 1961. This Report wove together the themes of the depressed areas'
need for economic help, and the perceived opportunity for faster economic progress
stimulated by 'the build up of industrial complexes and centres which offer prospects
of becoming zones of growth'. Grants on a standardised basis should replace the
percentage scale introduced in the 1960 Act, the Report recommended; BOTAC help
should be speeded up; infrastructure spending and advance factory building should be
concentrated on sites that could achieve fast growth. 228 The debt to the 'growth pole'
theories was clearly evident: more significantly, this argument allowed John Maclay,
the Scottish Secretary, to say in the Economic Policy Committee that this was 'not
just another report moaning about Scotland's industrial prospects and seeking various
PRO HLG 118/267: Treasury meeting with spending departments, 'Long term programming', minutes, 25 June
1963; see below, chapt. V
226 PRO T 320/275: Public expenditure to 1968/69: report by the Public Expenditure Survey Committee, 3 July
1964; PRO T 320/67: Phelps to Petch, Public service investment in Central Scotland and the North East', 20
September 1961; PRO T 320/70: Padmore to Lee, 30 August 1962
m Public General Acts and Measures, (1960), Ch. 18, P. 286: Local Employment Act, 22 March 1960; PRO T
320/71: Noble to Boyd-Carpenter, 13 December 1962; Cmnd. 2206, The North East: aprogrammefor regional
development and growth (HMSO, London, November 1963), p. 6; McCrone, Regional, p. 138
228 Scottish Council (Toothill Report), Development and industry. report of inquiry into the Scottish economy
1960/61 (Scottish Council, Edinburgh, 1961), pp. 161-3, 178
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special forms of Exchequer subsidy... Its emphasis is on the stimulation of growth
and economic progress'.229
Chart IL 7. % Unemployment in Development Areas! Districts and GB average (not
seasonally adjusted), 1959-64
Sources: MOL Gazette (various); Monthly digest ofstatistics (various)
The North East was even more important in facilitating the turn to 'regional
planning'. Macmillan, with his long-standing ties to the area as MP for Stockton-on-
Tees before the War, was particularly concerned with the area. He continuously asked
Frederick Erroll, President of BOT, and Maudling to pay special attention to the
North East as a part of Britain with a particularly acute complex of problems. Finally,
in January 1963, he initiated a full-scale 'machinery of government' review for the
North East.23° Given that inter-departmental jealousies were aroused by the possibility
PRO CAB 134/1692: Maclay memorandum to EPC, 'The Scottish economy', 15 December 1961
° PRO PREM 11/4207: Macmillan-Maudling meeting, minutes, 4 December 1962; PRO PREM I 1/4519:
Macmillan to Erroll, 'North East coast', 23 August 1962, ErroIl to Macmillan, 27 August 1962, Helsby to
Maudling, 'North East development', 2 January 1963
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that the BOT would take overall responsibility, Macmillan decided to give the job to
Hailsham.23'
On the Lord President's return from visiting the region, he placed the
emphasis on the region's overall problems, stressing not only 'the improvement of
communications, town planning, culture and education and amenities' but the fact that
they had to 'forecast for success', and focus their energies on particular parts of the
region.232
 His attack on the 1960 Local Employment Act was particularly evident in
his second report, where he argued that it was suitable 'only for a context of full
employment marred by localised pockets of recession.., a precision tool for an
operation which needs a blunt instrument' ,233 The result was that the recently-created
Committee on Population and Employment was charged with drawing up a list of
'growth points' that would foster the development of the North East and Central
Scotland as a whole. By December 1962 the Committee had indeed resolved both to
employ Local Employment Act powers across wide areas to secure 'comprehensive
redevelopment', and to concentrate government infrastructure projects on the 'growth
areas'.234
 It was hoped that these areas might help to absorb some of the surplus
labour of contiguous areas: as Maudling told the NEDC in February 1963, 'the
government accepted the concept of growth areas', though keeping in mind the
interests of 'small areas of high unemployment'.235
Hailsham continued to press throughout spring 1963 for mechanisms by which
central government could help 'relatively prosperous and promising areas', such as
Durham and Newcastle, in his view crucial to developing the whole of the North-East.
PRO PREM 11/4519: Woodfield note for the record, Trend-Chancellor-Chief Whip-PM meeting, 4 January
1963, Macmillan to Hailsham, 5 January 1963; PRO CAB 128/37: Cabinet minutes, 10 January 1963
232 PRO CAB 129/112: Hailshani memorandum to Cabinet, 'Visit to the North East of England, 4-8th February
1963', 14 February 1963
233 PRO CAB 134/1699: Hailsham memorandum to EPC, 'Visit to the North East of England, 4-8th March, 1963',
19 March 1963; PRO CAB 134/1697: EPC, minutes, 21 March 1963
PRO CAB 134/2396: Committee on Population and Employment, minutes, 12 December 1962; PRO PREM
11/45 19: Brooke to Macmillan, 'Modemisation of Britain', 14 December 1962
235 PRO FG 1/4: NEDC minutes, 6 February 1963
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He met strong opposition from Errol! and the BOT, worried that any extensions of the
1960 Act would cause a flood of applications from other areas that wanted more help:
the battle eventually went to Cabinet, with Macmillan attempting to broker a
compromise between the two positions. 236
 Hailsham won his fight, and large sections
of the North East with relatively low unemployment (for instance Durham) were
indeed scheduled. The emphasis on growth and redevelopment was aided by the
replacement of the 'sliding scale' system of BOTAC approvals under a new Local
Employment Act, and its replacement with a fixed percentage grant structure. This
was part of the Government's policy of offering free depreciation on investment,
under which companies could choose to write off their investments against tax at any
rate they chose. It was hoped this would speed up capita! re-equipment in the
depressed areas.237
By June 1963 the Lord President's Office and the Scottish Development
Group had identified the specific 'growth places' on which wanted government policy
to focus. The Scottish Report came in three stages - the programme to 1966, which
was to focus on the New Towns as points that were already experiencing rapid
growth, along with medium term plans for 1971 and 1981. This Report envisaged
£300m additional capital spending on infrastructure projects such as roads, docks,
airports and railways by 1971 •238 Peterlee and Aycliffe were chosen as the areas for
most effort in the North East: the eventual population of both was boosted, as was the
projection of future industrial expansion in their environs. 239
 These plans were
236 CAB 129/113: Hailsham memorandum to Cabinet, 'The Local Employment Act and the North East',
Erroll memorandum to Cabinet, 'The Local Employment Act and the North East', 10 April 1963; PRO PREM
11/4207: Macmillan - Maudling meeting, minutes, 18 April 1963
7 Public Acts and Measures (1963), Ch. 18, pp284-5: Local Employment Act 1963, 10 July 1963; PRO BT
177/2042: Fisher, BOT, London, to Regional Controllers, 'Local Employment Act', April 1963; House of
Commons debates, vol. 675, col. 482: Maudling Budget statement, 3 April 1963
23 PRO CAB 134/1700: Noble memorandum to EPC, 'The economy of central Scotland - report by the Scottish
Development Group', 18 June 1963
Cmnd 2206, The North East: a programme for regional development and growth (HMSO, London, November
1963), p. 26
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endorsed by first the EPC, and then the full Cabinet, in June and July 1963.240 They
were to become the foundation for the twin White Papers, or 'programmes for
development and growth', of November 1963. Investment in the North East was to be
concerted on a similar basis to that in Scotland, with the planned road programme for
1964-69 nearly doubled from £50m to £108m.24'
The growth point plan also reflected BOT's opposition to a return to
'development area' policies, emanating from the Scottish Office and the Office of the
Lord President. Instead of scheduling the whole of Central Scotland and the North
East of England, the Government was to concentrate on infrastructure (especially
transport) projects to aid the development of promising growth points. Erroll referred
to this in the EPC as a 'compromise formula', under which BOT would not insist that
districts with falling unemployment be immediately taken off the list of scheduled
areas, but would not on the other hand initiate any overall spread of development
district status.242
 There was certainly no mention in the 1963 Local Employment Act
of any change in policy, aside from granting the BUT powers to complete projects
they had already agreed on even if a district stopped counting for regional aid under
the 1960 Act. 243
 Aside from the emphasis on infrastructure and communications, the
most that can be said for the Government's change of heart was that wider areas were
scheduled for help.
However, this did not mean that 'regional planning' was an illusion, or that
there had not been a significant shift in government policy, which has to be seen
240 PRO CAB 134/1697: EPC minutes, 26 June 1963; PRO CAB 129/114: Maudling memorandum to Cabinet,
'Central Scotland and the North East of England', 22 July 1963; PRO CAB 128/37: Cabinet minutes, 25 July 1963
241 Cmnd 2206, The North East. a programme for regional development and growth (HtvISO, London, November
1963), p. 21; Cmnd 2188, Central Scotland: a programme for development and growth (HMSO, Edinburgh,
November 1963), pp. 9-10
242 PRO CAB 134/1697: EPC minutes, 23 September 1963
243 Public General Acts and Measures (1963), ch. 19, P. 285: Local Employment Act, clause 3; House of Commons
debates, vol. 685, cols. 989-90: Heath, regional development debate, 3 December 1963
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within the context of PESC and Clarke's emphasis on 'long term planning'.2"
Treasury Ministers and officials were concerned about the rising costs of social
welfare provision associated with 'overcrowding' in the South East; Clarke summed
up this view when he argued that an 'even level' of employment would 'enable.., us
to run the economy at a lower level of pressure without being pressed to inflate'.245
The Committees on Population and Employment, and on Regional Development,
were supposed to help bring together work from all departments on the balance of
industry, population and investment across the country. Many measures proposed in
that Committee - for instance, controls on office building in the South East, proposed
by Keith Joseph as Minister for Housing - were too controversial to be
implemented. 246 However, these committees did perform the useful function of
forcing Ministers to consider how their plans fitted together.
MHLG work on housing and population needs for the South East -
incorporated in the South East study - was supposed to fit together with the designs
for the North East and Central Scotland to form a scheme for the entire country.247
Here as in the field of public spending, Ministers were 'faced everywhere with a
growing population... and with a movement towards the Midlands and the South
East' ,248 Though it could not prevent this drift, official action could at least direct the
population pressure, to those regions' own 'growing points'. 249 Furthermore, as the
official and Ministerial Committees worked on preparing the South East study as a
White Paper for public consumption, they were forced to consider how their plans for
246	 T 320/72: Clarke memorandwn, 'Modernisation of Britain', 14 Januaiy 1963; PRO T 224/1069:
Armstrong to Clarke, 6 November 1963
245 PRO T 325/89: Treasury Ministers' meeting with Padmore, Clarke and Vinter, Population distribution and
regional planning', minutes, 9 January 1962; PRO T 224/1069: Clarke to Padmore, 'Committee on Population and
Employment, 24 July 1962
246 See below, chapt. V; also PRO CAB 134/2398: Secretaries' memorandum to Official Committee on Population
and Employment, 'Restriction of industrial expansion in South East England: a reappraisal', 22 August 1962
247 MHLG, The south east study 1961-1981 (HMSO, London, 1964), pp. 8-12, 14
248 PRO PREM 11/4519: Erroll to Macmillan, 22 October 1962
249 PRO CAB 134/2397: Committee on Population and Employment, minutes, 25 January 1963
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the South East fitted together with employment and population trends for the rest of
the country.25°
Indeed, alarmed by Joseph's estimates of population movement into the South
East, Heath as Secretary of State for Regional Development attempted to delay and
amend publication of the White Paper's estimate of 3.5 million more people in the
South East by 1981 • 25 1 It was only after Heath was assured that it would be five years
at least before the 'growth points' in the South East were ready to receive population
and industry, and reference to the regional problems of the North East and Central
Scotland was included in the draft, that the problem was resolved. 252
 The White Paper
London: housing, employment, land, published in March 1964, therefore made clear
• that the 'special needs of individual regions' had to 'be identified and a proper
national balance achieved and maintained' 253 Influenced by the controversy that had
proceeded its publication, this document was a rather weak affair, and fully bore out
one official's verdict: 'we have still to devise a distribution of industry policy which
will at one and the same time enable us to let industry go from London to these places
without starving the development areas in the North'.254
Having flirted with a laissez faire approach in the 1950s, Ministers had
gradually returned to a fully-fledged regional policy. They embarked on a fairly
orthodox selective intervention in 1962-63, but they also went further than any
previous Conservative Government in pursuit of a total national solution, with
ambitious 'regional plans' covering population, industry and housing in every area of
the country. But Macmillan and his colleagues had done this, not out of ideological
conversion, but because they did not wish to pay what they considered would be the
250	 CAB 134/2399: MHLG memorandum to Official Committee on Population and Employment, 'South East
Regional Study: employment', 2 May 1963
251 PRO CAB 134/2346: Committee on Regional Development, 2nd meeting, minutes, 18 December 1963, 22
Januaiy 1964; PRO T 224/1070: Morton report, 'South East Regional Study: discussion in Committee on Regional
Development', 18 December 1963
252 PRO CAB 134/2346: Committee on Regional Development, 4th meeting, minutes, 30 January 1964
253 Cmnd 2308, South East England (HMSO, London, March 1963), p. 8
254 PRO T 224/1071: Petch to Burrett, 'Regional Development Committee: the South East', 21 January 1964
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political cost of mass unemployment. This held back their full re-conversion to the
Development Area policy of 1945-51, as their acceptance of the development needs
of the South East over the foreseeable future showed. The Labour administration of
1964-70 would show far more enthusiasm for regional policy.
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The impossible legacy
By 1963/64, many of the 'new approach' initiatives had clearly run into the ground.
The NEDC's industrial inquiries had provided useful research materials, but
investigations at the level of individual industries had hardly begun. The attempt to
run economic policy through a grand 'social bargain' had failed, partly because the
Government was itself confused as to its aims, and partly because the participants'
views were fundamentally incompatible. The return to regional planning appeared to
have been more successful, but increased infrastructure investment would take years
to bear the fruit of economic progress, if any were in fact forthcoming. The expansion
of public expenditure, ostensibly for 'economic' purposes, was threatening to run out
of control. The divide between 'planners' who believed in increasing efficiency
through mutual industrial co-operation, and those in government who believed in a
more dirigiste and interventionist approach, remained unresolved.
Most worryingly, the overarching objective - to secure a higher growth rate,
without running into the balance of payments constraints of 'stop-go' - appears to
have been jettisoned for yet another 'go' phase. Without any evidence of rising
productivity, the Government expanded the economy, through both fiscal and
monetary means, and by the time of the General Election of October 1964, the
familiar consequences were apparent. Although growth was abating from an
unsustainable 6% per annum, and had settled down to the 'target' 4%, forecasts for
the balance of payments were for unprecedented deficits, perhaps up to £600m on an
annual basis, in the winter of l96465.255 Maudling attempted to hide this at a meeting
with his putative successor James Callaghan in June 1964, but Callaghan rightly
suspected that the situation was far worse than was being presented. 256 Consequently,
Labour would inherit the worst of all Sterling crises to date.
255 PRO CAB 128/38: Cabinet minutes, 16 July 1964, 18 August 1964; PRO CAB 134/1808: Cairncross
memoranda to EPC, 10 April 1964, 7 August 1964, 7 October 1964
256 K. Morgan, Callaghan: a Ife (Oxford UP, Oxford, 1997), pp. 188-9
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LABOUR'S NATIONAL PLANS 1964-70
This is the time for change, dynamic, exciting, thrilling change. And the first decision we
must take is to change the direction of our national life.
-Harold Wilson, May 1963'
The 'true alternative'? Economic management in crisis, 1964-70
Although Labour hoped to achieve faster and more consistent growth, their hopes
were to be disappointed. In fact, the weary cycle of expansion and contraction was
repeated, only this time in a more acute fashion. The new government was
overwhelmed by a series of Sterling crises, each more severe than the last, until it was
forced off parity and thereafter obliged to run the economy at a lower pressure of
demand and with higher unemployment (charts 111.1-111.2). Given Britain's parlous
balance of payments position, the Government was continually forced to act against
its instincts, under pressure from the IMF, the US, and the financial markets. The
series of deflationary packages can be followed in table III. 1, coming at times of
Sterling crises, most notably July 1965, July 1966, and January, March and November
1968. However, these initiatives were supposed to be temporary, and Ministers looked
forward to a time when they would no longer be necessary. Wilson lost no chance to
promote 'selective reflation', and even as Britain's credit lines were running out in the
summer of 1967 promoted a less stringent policy.2
The logic behind these policies was that the payments situation would
improve, given the Government's economic policies, and that it was necessary only to
stave off crises until the improvement occurred. Essentially, management would buy
time for planning. It would be supplemented by a number of other expedients. The
new Prime Minister was beguiled by physical control measures, which Balogh (who
originally opposed devaluation) called the 'third way', a 'true alternative to both
'PPB, 8 May 1963: Wilson, Purpose, p. 249
2 PRO PREM 13/1405: Wilson memorandum, 'Comments on Sir William Armstrong's Report and comments on
timing', 9 August 1967, Wilsonl Callaghan conversation, minutes, 18 August 1967
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deflation and devaluation'. 3
 'Administrative measures', such as Wilson's 28-point
programme outlined to the Balance of Payments Committee in July 1965, would in
this view at least buy the Government a breathing space. 4
 On their first full day in
office, Ministers decided to impose a 15% import surcharge. £70m worth of tax relief
for exporters was also announced in January 1965. This caused a furious row within
EFTA, other members arguing that this was illegal under the Stockholm Convention.
The Government was forced to promise abolition 'in a matter of months'. 5
 The
surcharge was therefore relaxed in April 1965, and allowed to lapse in November
1966. The export rebate was abolished at the time of devaluation.
The Government's Investment Grants scheme, with 20% grants (40% in the
new Development Areas) replacing tax relief for investment, was also intended to act
as a 'concealed subsidy' to visible exports, since it was only paid to manufacturers.6
The Selective Employment Tax, introduced in the 1966 Budget, can be seen in a
similar light. On the surface, SET was designed to 'redress the balance' between
services and manufacturing, by collecting SET per employee from both, but refunding
manufacturers, with a premium on top: for men over 18, manufacturers would pay 25s
per week in SET, but receive 32s 6d, plus the refund, in return. 7 This rested on
Kaldor's 'Verdoom Law' theory - that productivity in manufacturing rose faster than
PRO PREM 13/253: Balogh to Wilson, Balance of payments measures', 29 June 1965; PRO PREM 13/272:
Balogh to Wilson, 16 July 1965
CAB 130/237: Wilson memorandum to MISC 69, 'Thoughts on the economic situation', 6 July 1965, MISC
69, minutes, 12 July 1965; ACD, 13 July 1965: Caimcross, The Wilson years: a Treasury diary 1964-69
(Historians' Press, London, 1997), p. 67
PRO PREM 13/32: brief for Wilson, 24 October 1964; PRO T 312/1240: Customs and Excise memorandum for
Callaghan, Export rebates', 22 December 1964; H. Parr, 'The Wilson government, Whitehall and policy towards
the European Community 1964-1967', University of London PhD thesis (forthcoming), chapter II, pp. 3-4;
Zeigler, Wilson, p. 192
6 PRO EW 24/19: Brittan to Stewart, 8 January 1965, Secretaries memorandum to Fiscal Incentives Committee,
'Fiscal incentives for exports', 3 February 1965; PRO CAB 130/204: Trend memorandum to MISC 1, 'Investment
incentives', 21 December 1965; PRO CAB 130/202: MISC 1 minutes, 22 December 1965
Cmnd 2986, The selective employment tax (May 1966), pp. 3-4, Public general acts and measures 1966, c32, pp.
544-6: Selective Employment Payments Act, 9 August 1966
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that in services, and if manufacturing was encouraged, overall productivity would
therefore rise more quickly. 8 However, in Kaldor's own words, the tax would
'achieve a reduction of the effective cost of British labour in terms of dollars [while
avoiding] any direct subsidies [and] therefore not contrary to international obligations
under... GATT'. 9 Although introduced in great haste to reduce demand by £200m in
1966/67, SET was also intended as another hidden subvention for exporters.'°
Along with these measures, spending on export promotion, and the range and
level of Export Credit Guarantees were successively increased. 1 ' Wilson also asked,
as had Macmillan, for a system of import licensing to be prepared in 1965, and draft
legislation was prepared: they would at least have had the advantage that they were
not illegal under GATT and EFTA.' 2
 The work took on a new seriousness at the time
of the July 1966 measures, and two schemes for issuing licenses only for 50% or 75%
of the 1964 level of imports were developed.' 3
 In its eventual form as the 'Orestes
plan', quantitative restrictions were brought to final readiness in March 1969, though
as the balance of payments gradually improved in that year, it was never implemented
(chart III. J)•14 However, import deposits were eventually imposed in November 1968,
Kaldor, Causes, pp. 25-6, 30; PRO EW 24/20: Kaldor memorandum to Fiscal Incentives Committee, 'The effects
of differential payroll taxes and subsidies on productivity', 5 May 1965
Kaldor memorandum, 'Tax Instruments for Adjusting Balance of Payments', 25 October 1964: A. Blick, 'The
role of special advisors in the first Wilson Government, 1964-70', University of London PhD thesis (forthcoming),
chapter IV, p. 67
'°A. P. Thirlwall, Nicholas Kaldor (Wheatsheaf, Brighton, 1987), P. 242; Brittan, Steering, p. 210
"Wilson, The Labour government 1964-1970: a personal view (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1971), pp. 76-
7; PRO PREM 13/281: Note for Wilson, 'Proposals so far submitted for the package statement', 7 January 1965;
PRO CAB 130/238: Jay memorandum to MISC 69, 'ECGD bank guarantee facility', 15 July 1965; PRO CAB
130/237: MISC 69 minutes, 18 July 1965
2 PRO CAB 130/237: MISC 69 minutes, 4 August 1965; PRO T 312/1813: Report of the DEA working party on
the temporary import charge, 31 January 1966; PRO PREM 13/853: Jay to Wilson, 15 July 1966
B PRO CAB 128/41: Cabinet minutes, 20 July 1966; PRO PREM 13/1431: Brown to Wilson, 29 July 1966
PRO CAB 130/497: MISC 205 minutes, 11 March 1969
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with 1/3 of importing industry having to deposit 50% of the value of those imports for
six months in the UK.'5
' R. Jenkins, A life at the centre (Macmillan, London, 1991), p. 263; PRO CAB 134/1737: EDC minutes,
confidential annex, 13 September 1965; House of Commons debates, vol. 773, cols. 1793-6: Jenkins statement,
'International monetary situation, economic measures', 22 November 1968
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Charts 11.1, 11.2. Economic indicators, 1964-70 (contemporary non-revised data)
Sources: Economic trends, UK balance ofpayments (various)
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Table 111.1. Macro-economic management, 1964-70
Bank rate	 Notable Budgetary/fiscal changes	 Other measures
1964	 Nov. - from	 Nov. - rise in Income Tax, oil duty, 	 Oct. - 15% surcharge on imports
5% to 7%	 National Insurance contributions, along 	 of manufactures
with pensions and NI benefits.
Net tax increase of £210m.
1965	 June - 6%	 Apr. - Corporation Tax and full Capital 	 Apr. - call for 1% Special
Gains Tax details announced. Rises in 	 Deposits from the banks. Import
indirect taxes on drink, tobacco and	 surcharge reduced to 10%.
vehicle licenses. Net tax increase of 	 May - bank advances ceiling fixed
£422m	 at 5% growth over year
July - six months moratorium on
government capital contracts,
exempting schools, hospitals,
housing. Hire purchase repayment
period shortened from 3 years to
30 months.
1966	 July - 7%	 May - Selective Employment Tax on 	 Feb. - HP controls increased
service employment with	 again.
manufacturing rebates.	 July - 10% Regulator on indirect
Net tax increase of £386m for 1966/67, taxation imposed for one year. HP
£285m in 1967/68.	 tightened. Special Deposits
increased.
Nov. - Import surcharge lifted.
1967	 Jan. - 6.5%	 May - 'Standstill' Budget. Net tax	 Apr. - some relaxation in HP
March - 6%	 decrease of £1 4m. 	 terms (motorcycles)
May - 5.5%	 June - more HP relaxation (cars)
9 Nov. —6%	 August - more HP relaxation
18 Nov. - 8%	 (furniture, appliances).
Nov. - SET refund to
manufacturers withdrawn; ceiling
on bank advances imposed;
Corporation Tax increased. HP
terms on cars once more
tightened.
1968 March - 7.5%	 March - SET raised; indirect taxes on 	 May - Bank lending ceiling of
Sept. - 7%	 tobacco, drink, and vehicles, along with 	 104% of November 1967 level
Customs Duties, again rise. Net tax	 imposed.
increase of923m.	 Nov. - HP terms on cars, furniture
tightened again. Indirect tax
regulator of 10% imposed.
50% import deposits imposed.
1969	 Feb. - 8%	 March - Rates of Corporation Tax and June - Special Deposits interest to
SET again increased. Net tax increase	 banks halved.
of368m.	 Sept. - Banks asked to raise
overdraft rates by 0.5%, to 1.5%
over Bank Rate.
Nov. - Import Deposits to 40%.
1970 March - 7.5% Apr. - Income Tax threshold increases 	 Apr. - SET premium to DAs
Apr. —7%	 and Surtax decreases. Net tax decrease	 abolished, leaving only REP.
of £285m.	 Special Deposits increased.
Sept. - Import deposits to 30%.
Sources: Economic trends (various); CCAC CLRK 1/2: Budget notes, 1964/66; Cairncross & Eichengreen,
Decline, pp. 177, 182; Blackaby, Policy, pp. 31, 35, 43, 51, table 4.2, pp. 156-7; Brittan, Steering, pp. 198, 215;
NJER (Feb. 1966), pp. 5-6, (May 1966), pp. 5-6, 17-19, (August 1966), pp. 6-9, (Feb. 1967), pp. 4-6, (Feb. 1968),
pp. 7-11, (Feb. 1969), table 1, p. 5, (Feb. 1970), table 1, p. 5, (Feb. 1971), table 1, p. 5.
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Attempts were made, with some short-term success, at strengthening Sterling
through direct action. Capital controls were tightened, with successive reductions in
the amounts businessmen and tourists could take abroad, and for the first time, a
Voluntary Programme of investment restraint in the Sterling Area, which would see
capital investment vetted by the Bank of England.' 6
 Short-term fluctuations in the
currency holdings of Sterling Area governments were reduced through the Basle
agreements of June 1966. This was extended in June 1968, putting a $2bn credit from
twelve leading industrialised countries at Britain's disposal to cover short-term losses,
accompanied by pledges from Sterling Area countries to hold certain guaranteed
levels of Sterling.' 7 A number of last-ditch crisis measures were prepared. These
included taking over private portfolio investments, extending statutory capital controls
to the Sterling Area, and blocking the Sterling balances. But ultimately capital
controls could not suffice in holding the Pound's parity, if the current balance
continued in deficit.
Devaluation was one alternative, though not one without pain: this was ruled
out on the Friday night after Wilson entered No. 10, at a meeting with Callaghan as
Chancellor, and Brown. Unwillingness to make Labour the party of the 'weak pound',
the American link, a desire to protect Commonwealth Sterling holders, and a belief
that devaluation was no panacea in any case, were at the heart of this decision.'8
Although Wilson attempted to ban discussion of devaluation, and insisted on the
destruction of official papers dealing with it, the possibility of devaluation lingered
on, until it became unavoidable in November 1967. The Treasury set up its 'forever
16 Cairncross, Managing, p. 112; on the Voluntary Programme PRO PREM 13/829: Callaghan to Wilson, 'Control
over capital exports', 25 April 1966; PRO T 295/92: Bancroft to Goldman, 'Capital exports', 26 April 1966; PRO I
295/94: Callaghan circular to companies, 9 May 1966; PRO T 295/151: Rawlinson to Hubback, 'Paper for
Chancellor on voluntary programme', 12 October 1966, Hubback to Rickett, 'Progress report on the voluntary
programme', 13 October 1966
17 Cmnd 3787, The Basle facility and the Sterling Area (October 1968), passim
18 Wilson, Governments, pp. 5-7; S. Crosland, Tony Crosland (Cape, London, 1982), p. 125; D. MacDougall, Don
and mandarin: memoirs of an economist (John Murray, London, 1987), pp. 152-3; E. Roll, Crowded hours (Faber
& Faber, London, 1985), p. 158; Cairncross, Managing, p. 94; T. Bale, 'Dynamics of a non-decision: the "failure"
to devalue the Pound 1964-67', TCBH 10, 2 (1999), pp. 197-203
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unmentionable' committee, bringing in the DEA and the Bank of England, which
drew up a 'war book' of practical arrangements for devaluation.' 9
 By summer 1965
all the Government's Special Economic Advisers were in favour of devaluation, along
with a vocal minority in Cabinet, including Brown. 2° They mounted their strongest
challenge in July 1966, taking advantage of Callaghan's short-lived indecision on the
issue, with one of Brown's temporary resignations the result. 2 ' The hopes invested in
direct intervention, however, were decisive - along with the dissenters' own divisions
- in allowing Wilson successfully to oppose this until it was forced upon him.
By November 1967 the continuing current imbalance, the French insistence
that Britain would have to devalue before joining the EEC, and the stern conditions
that would inevitably come with new international loans, became too much.
Devaluation of Sterling from $2.80 to $2.40 was announced. 22 The existing loans
were close to exhausted, without faster growth and a markedly better balance of
payments having been achieved. 23 More fundamentally, the Government had been the
victim of the slow break-up of the Bretton Woods currency system, which had pegged
most major currencies together since convertibility returned in the 1950s. 24 This was
the main reason the Americans tried to support Sterling during 1965-66: as a first line
PRO 1 312/1635: Devaluation 'war book', July 1965; PRO T 312/1398, 1401: FU minutes, 1965, passim; PRO
T 312/1636: FU minutes, 1966,passim; PRO PREM 13/255: Stewart to Balogh, 22 July 1965
20 PRO EW 28/4: Brown to Wilson, 23 July 1965; PRO PREM 13/255: MacDougall, Balogh, Neild, Kaldor,
'Economic situation', 23 July 1965; PRO PREM 13/850: Balogh, Neild, Jukes to Wilson, 'Economic measures', 8
January 1966; Zeigler, Wilson, p. 255
21 PRO CAB 128/46: Cabinet minutes, confidential annex, 19 July 1966
22 Wilson, Governments, pp. 447-455; K.O. Morgan, Callaghan: a life (Oxford UP, Oxford, 1997), pp. 268-73;
ACD, 13 November 1967: Cairncross, Diary, p. 244
23 PRO 1 318/190: Hubback to Baldwin, 'The length of our tether', 16 October 1967; ACD, 2 November 1967:
Cairncross, Diary, p. 242
24 B. Tew, The evolution of the international monetary system 1945-85 (3 edn., Hutchinson, London, 1985), pp.
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of defence for the Dollar, and to help ward off its collapse as the world reserve asset,
and its replacement by the French scheme for a new Currency Reserve Unit.25
Lack of confidence in the Dollar was particularly acute during the March 1968
gold crisis, during which gold trading in the UK and US had to be suspended: this
caused Sterling to come very close to a second devaluation, as it seemed for a few
days as if the US would float the Dollar. This crisis was the closest the British ever
came to implementing their crisis contingency plans for floating the Pound, seizing
Sterling assets in London and blocking payment from the Sterling balances - and also
the occasion of Brown's final and irrevocable resignation, accusing Wilson of
deliberately excluding him from decision-making.26
In the event, the US adopted a dual price system, offering the Bretton Woods
rate of $35 per ounce of gold only to central banks: though the British thought this
unstable and unlikely to last, the moment of maximum danger had passed, and the
improvement in Britain's current balance thereafter was enough to prevent another
devaluation, especially since she had secured another $1.2bn in credits from the Gold
Pool countries, bringing her total potential support to $4bn.27 To some extent, then,
Labour had been unlucky - it had come to power at a time of crisis for the stability
upon which the post-war boom was based, and this had subverted their desire for
faster, directed growth. But 'planning' also had internal contradictions and
inadequacies, and to these we now turn.
25 ibid, also PRO PREM 13/252: Wilson! Johnson meeting, minutes, 7 December 1964; PRO CAB 130/203: Trend
memorandum to MISC 1, 'International liquidity', 26 May 1965; PRO CAB 130/202: MISC 1 minutes, 24 June
1965
26 PRO CAB 128/46: Cabinet minutes, confidential annex, 15 March 1968; PRO PREM 13/205 1: Balogh to
Wilson, 16 March 1968; Wilson, Governments, pp. 508-10; P. Paterson, Tired and emotional: the life ofLord
George-Brown (Chato & Windus, London, 1993), Pp. 247-53
27 PRO CAB 130/497: MISC 205 minutes, 17 March 1968; PRO PREM 13/2051: Wilson to Johnson, 18 March
1968; PRO CAB 128/46: Cabinet minutes, 18 March 1968; Jenkins, Centre, pp. 241-3
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'Pretty worthless '. the National Plan and after
'Planning' had been on Labour's agenda throughout their Opposition years, though
the word had subtly and gradually changed its meaning. Challenge to Britain, their
1953 policy statement, recommended specific investment targets for each industry,
which could be enforced by the government. 28
 Capital and price controls, and powers
over the allocation of raw materials, would all be retained. 29
 Even Gaitskell and the
Right, although lukewarm about Challenge to Britain, were in favour of such
measures - partly because the document was silent about the Bevanite proposal for a
National Investment Board to buy up shares in large companies to further control over
investment. 30 However, by the 1955 Election Gaitskell had already achieved the
downgrading of 'planning', fearing that Challenge to Britain promised too many
incompatible achievements. After the Election, Gaitskell as leader ordered a complete
review of these policies.3'
This policy review, with Bevan fully involved following his truce with the
Right, culminated in the acceptance of Industry and society at the 1957 Conference.32
The statement was mainly concerned with a new direction on nationalisation,
replacing the Morrisonian corporation with state 'participation' through share
purchases by Labour's proposed National Superannuation pension scheme. However,
since the document admitted that classical nationalisation had partly been undertaken
28 C.A. Tome, 'Ideas, policy and ideology: the British Labour party in opposition 195 1-59', Oxford University
D.Phil. thesis (1997), p144; P. Williams, Hugh Gaitskell (OUP, Oxford, 1979), pp. 316, 318; UCL library,
Gaitskell papers, box C92: 'Challenge to Britain - more planning please!, article for Leeds Weekly Citizen, MS
notes, 22 July 1953
29 Labour Party, Challenge to Britain (1953), p. 21
30 M. Foot, Aneurin Bevan (Paladin, St Albans, 1975), vol. II, pp. 404-5
Tonic, 'Ideas', 1997, p. 145; M. Donnelly, 'Labour Politics and the affluent society, 1951-1964', University of
Surrey Ph.D. thesis (1994), p. 93
32 D. Jay, Change andfortune (Hutchinson, London, 1980), pp. 263-4; L. Minkin, The Labour Party Conference
(Allen Lane, London, 1978), p. 95; S. Haesler, The Gaitskellites (Macmillan, London, 1969), pp. 107-8, 141; N.
Thompson, Political economy and the Labour Party: the economics of democratic socialism (UCL Press, London,
1996), p. 179
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to 'facilitate central economic planning', the change could not but have implications
for general economic policy. This led on to Plan for pro gress, Labour's 1958 policy
document that showed how far actual government controls had been downgraded.
Although general investment aims were invoked, no machinery was mentioned, and
only a vague promise that 'measures can be taken to retard or accelerate' investment
was given. The only actual measures that were mentioned were building controls. A
place was found for monetary policy, the relaxation of which would aid investment,
and there was a specific pledge that 'planning does not mean a return to detailed
controls
Since the emphasis on direct controls and 1 940s-style nationalisation had been
• jettisoned, Labour had to look for a new policy framework. This they found in
indicative planning. The idea was seized on as a compromise between Keynesians and
nationalisers in the Party, and had been implicit in the more radical parts of Peter
Shore's drafts of Industry and society, focussing in Galbraithian terms on the
'irrelevance' of the private shareholder, and the need for government intervention.35
The re-evaluation culminated in Signposts for the sixties, which outlined a National
Industrial Planning Board that 'would work out the expansion plans of the basic
sectors of the economy and see that the resources are there to meet them'. The idea of
channelling pension funds into more government ownership was retained, though the
creation of new government enterprises, in technologically advanced sectors, was now
to be the focus of these efforts. This expansion, and new investment incentives, rather
than the actual direction of resources or old-fashioned nationalisation of staple
industries, were the means by which Labour would direct the economy. 36
 This was at
the heart of Wilson's 'white heat' speech in 1963.
Labour Party, Indu.sriy and Society (1957), pp. 7-8, 40
" Labour Party, Plan for Progress (1958), pp. 8-9, 12-13, 16
' Author interview, Lord Shore, 10 October 2000; Labour Party, Industry and Society, pp. 11-14
36 Labour Party, Signposts for the Sixties (1961), pp. 13, 15-16; Thompson, Economics, p. 183
TBD, 1 October 1963: Benn, Wilderness, p. 66; R. Miliband, Parliamentary socialism (Merlin, London, 1972),
p. 353
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Labour was naturally attracted by the possibility of faster growth, for with
'economic expansion providing more available for sharing out' they could begin both
more generous social programmes and looser incomes policies. The 'optimism' that
would allow 'the plan to carry itself out' would be achieved through new machinery,
partly by new tripartite Industrial Planning Councils in each sector of industry.38
Above this, Balogh and others proposed, there would be a whole new 'Ministry of
Expansion or Production' that might relegate the Treasury to a mere 'Bureau of the
Budget'. 39
 Douglas Jay opposed such ideas, seeing them as a repeat of the 'discredited
muddle' of 1947-48; but Wilson initially saw in them a potential to make No. 10 more
powerful through arbitration between the Treasury and a Ministry of Production, and
latterly as a safe berth for George Brown. 4° The Head of the Home Civil Service, Sir
Laurence Helsby, held talks with the Opposition on such a Ministry from May 1963,
and Labour began to speak publicly about a 'Ministry of Planning' from the autumn
1963.'
This foreshadowed the creation of a new department - the Department of
Economic Affairs, with Brown as First Secretary of State, effectively Deputy Prime
Minister, and chair of the Economic Development committee of Cabinet. Although its
centrepiece would be a five-year National Plan for the economy, it had a range of
other responsibilities in the broad field of the 'real economy'. DEA was originally
organised into five divisions: Internal economic co-ordination, working on public
expenditure and incomes policy; External economic co-ordination, on long-term trade
and the balance of payments; Industrial policy, on productivity; Regional policy, on
the distribution of industry; and finally Economic planning, which worked on the
National Plan.42
 As the DEA lost influence, this was narrowed down to Regional
38 HABLP LPRD memoranda, I, lI/RD 427: LPRD memorandum to Finance and economic policy sub-committee,
'Outline of requirements of economic planning', March 1963; LPA NEC sub-committee files: Finance and
economic policy sub-committee, minutes, 19 April 1963
TBD, 25 May 1963: Benn, Wilderness, p. 25
° Jay, Change, p. 295
' C. Clifford, 'The rise and fall of the Department of Economic Affairs, 1964-69: British Government and
indicative planning', Contemporary British history 11, 2 (1997), pp. 97-9
42 Leruez, Planning, pp. 132-4
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policy, Industrial policy, General planning, External policies and Information. The
External policy division was abolished when Wilson took over direct responsibility in
October l967.
The DEA was designed to be a new type of department, free of traditional
thinking, working from scratch. This would help secure industrial agreement to
Labour's 'planned growth of incomes', among other objectives. A number of
industrialists were brought in as Industrial Advisers, as well as economists and
outside experts: Fred Catherwood went to the DEA from Tube Investments as Chief
Industrial Adviser, and Shanks, Robert Neild and Samuel Brittan were also recruited.
There was initially a period of tremendous excitement, even elation, at the entry of the
'irregulars' into government service. This industrial side to its work was the reason
that the Secretary of State at DEA became chairman of NEDC, in place of the
Chancellor, until Wilson took charge personally.45
The DEA had a series of successes to begin with. Most notably the 'Joint
Statement of Intent' on prices and incomes, signed by employers, unions and
government on 17 December 1964, promised that all three would 'raise productivity
and efficiency so that real national output can increase, and to keep increases in
wages, salaries and other forms of incomes in line with this increase'. 46
 This was
more than the Conservatives had managed, though as Brown told his staff, 'we must
not delude ourselves that this statement represents anything more than a first step
along a very difficult road'.47
 To reach agreement, Brown had made a series of
tortuous compromises, promising Woodcock that there would be no 'freeze', that
prices and dividends would be included in the policy, and that the Government's new
DEA, Progress Report (July 1967), pp. 1-2; ibid (December 1967), p. 5
K. Coates, The crisis of British Socialism (Bertrand Russell Foundation, Nottingham, 1971), p.42
Lord Rodgers, interview, 29 June 2000; Lord George-Brown, In my way (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1971), pp.
95-6; MacDougall, Mandarin, pp. 150-1; Roll, Crowded, p. 154; Mueller, at ICBH Witness Seminar: Clifford &
A. McMillan, 'Witness seminar: The Department of Economic Affairs', Contemporary British history 11, 2
(l997),p. 127
Leruez, Planning, p. 165
PRO EW 8/7: Brown memorandum, 'Productivity, prices and incomes', 10 December 1964
101
Labour's national plans 1964-70
regional and welfare policies would be in line with TUC thinking. 48
 He was also able
to assure the CBI that incomes policy would be aimed at bringing wages in line with
productivity, though he was careful to say that this would be the productivity norm
over the medium-term in the forthcoming National Plan, which he expected to run at
35%4%•49
Although Brown was able to reach agreement on machinery establishing a
National Board for Prices and Incomes to adjudicate on the eventual 3-3.5% pay
norm, and a general appeal for price stability, the divisions at the heart of prices and
incomes policy had still not been resolved. 5° The policy did have some success.
Placed under huge pressure from the Americans to secure wage restraint during the
• July 1965 Sterling crisis, Brown was able to secure agreement to a 90-day voluntary
prices and incomes pause in August l965.' This was followed by the CBI and TUC
setting up 'early warning systems', under which a number of key prices and incomes
would be referred to those bodies, for instance the TUC's new Incomes Committee.
These were embodied in the famous Part II of the 1966 Prices and Incomes Act,
which also gave the Government powers to delay settlements for three months while
the NBPI considered them. 52
 This would prove a hollow victory, and the first stage in
48 TJWMRC MSS 292B/560.1/9: TUC Economic committee minutes, 26 October 1964; PRO EEW 8/1: Brown to
Woodcock, 24 November 1964
PRO EW 8/7: DEA brief for Brown meeting with employers' organisations, 30 November 1964, fourth draft of
Statement of Intent, 1 December 1964
50 Cmnd. 2577, Machinery ofprices and incomes policy (February 1965), pp. 2-4; PRO CAB 129/120: Brown
memorandum to Cabinet, 'Prices and incomes', 23 March 1965; PRO CAB 128/39: Cabinet minutes, 25 March
1965; Cmnd. 2639, Prices and incomes policy (April 1965),passim
PRO PREM 13/257: Wilson, Callaghan, Brown, Trend, Roll telephone conversations, 13, 17, 20 August 1965;
Brown! Bator telephone conversation, 26 August 1965: D. Kunz, "Somewhat mixed up together": Anglo-
American defence and financial policy during the 1960s', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth history 27, 2
(1999), p. 217; C. Ponting, Breach ofpromise: Labour in power, 1964-1970 (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1989), p.
52; Ziegler, Wilson, p. 205
52 TUC Congress report 1965 (TUC, London, 1966), p. 473; Cmnd. 2808, Prices and incomes policy: an 'early
warning'system (November 1965), passim; Public Bills and minutes ofproceedings 1965/66, Prices and Incomes
Bill, 8 December 1965
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the disintegration of industrial co-operation. Woodcock had told the TUC Congress to
agree to the voluntary machinery because there was 'not the remotest possible chance'
of imposing the norm. 53 The new TUC committee, with no powers to challenge actual
settlements, nodded most of them through. In its first six months, only fifteen out of
three hundred unions submitting settlements were even called to give evidence.54
The Sterling crisis of July 1966 - which again brought American pressure for
a wage freeze - forced the Government to bring in a statutory six months wage and
price standstill. 55 This overrode Brown, who was only persuaded to stay by Bill
Rodgers, his deputy at DEA, organising a hundred Labour MPs to sign a request to
him to stay on. 56 But the 'planned growth of incomes', and part of the DEA's whole
raison d 'etre, had been destroyed. Under a new Part IV for the Prices and Incomes
Bill, the prices and incomes stop could be legally enforced through Orders in Council.
Disastrously for 'planning', the TUC were only brought to 'acquiesce' in new
government powers by Wilson's threat of 'swingeing and irreversible measures',
including massive cuts in the social services, if he was rebuffed. 57
 From this point on,
the TUC and CBI disbelieved all the Government's talk of co-operation was as a
matter of course. 58
 This situation was not helped by the six months period of severe
restraint that followed the freeze, during which only 'exceptional' pay and price
" W.A. Fishbein, Wage restraint by consensus: Britain 's search for an incomes policy agreement 1965-79
(Routledge, Boston, Mass., 1987), P. 42
PRO FOul: TUC representatives' memorandum to NEDC, 'Productivity, prices and incomes', March 1966
PRO PREM 13/853: Fowler/ Callaghan telephone conversation, 15 July 1966; PRO CAB 128/41: Cabinet
minutes, 20 July 1966; Cmnd 3074, Prices and incomes standstill (July 1966), passim
56 Author interview, Lord Rodgers, 29 June 2000; Paterson, Brown, p. 190; TBD, 20 July 1966: Benn, Wilderness,
p. 458
PRO PREM 13/859: Wilson meeting with TUC Economic committee, minutes, 25 July 1966; UWMRC MSS
292B/560.1/12: TUC Economic committee, minutes, 25 July 1966
58 
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increases would be allowed, nor the Government's threats widely to use the previous
Part II powers even after the period of severe restraint.59
The TUC leadership had to reflect the increasing radicalisation of its member
unions, given that for instance a 1967 Congress resolution, passed against
Woodcock's advice, had rejected all prices and incomes policy. 60
 Thus they refused
this time to acquiesce, refusing to distinguish between Part II powers that could only
run while the NBPI was considering a case, and wider powers to halt wage rises. This
time, Wilson could not bring the TUC to co-operate, and although the CBI confined
their objections to details, their membership was also at the end of its patience with
'permanent intervention in wage bargaining and price fixing'. 6 ' However, the
Government proceeded to impose a 'nil norm' for wage and price increases, and more
powers to delay settlements under Part II. The criteria for exemption (rising input
prices or the need to raise capital for investment, for instance) returned to those of the
April 1965 voluntary policy. 62
 But Ministers were now proceeding alone, and without
agreement: they had spent much political capital on this effort, and the hopes of the
National Plan - 'real and lasting progress... based on consent' - were being
frustrated.63
Furthermore, there were a number of problems with the basic DEA blueprint.
The DEA was simply being asked to do too much, especially for its unpredictable
Secretary of State, who also took an ad hoc interest in, for instance, European policy
and Rhodesia. 64
 The new Department also lacked executive power over many parts of
Cmnd. 3150, Prices and incomes standstill. period of severe restraint (November 1966), pp. 6-8; UWMRC
MSS 292B/560. 1/15: TUC Economic committee minutes, 8 February 1967
motion no. 10, TUC Congress report 1967 (mc, London, 1968), p. 536
61 PRO PREM 13/1437: Wilson, Stewart, Gunter, Lee, meeting with TUC Economic committee, minutes, 28
February 1967; UWMRC MSS 200C/3/P2J1O/13: Economic committee memorandum to General Council,
'Businessmen's anxieties', March 1967
62 Cmnd 3235, Prices and incomes policy after 30k" June 1967 (March 1967), PP. 3-7; Public general acts and
measures 1967, c53, pp. 1052 1-5: Prices and Incomes Act (no.2), 14 July 1967
63 Cmnd 2764, The national plan (September 1965), p. 68
Roll, Crowded, pp. 163, 172
104
Labour's national plans 1964-70
its remit, for instance regional policy (where the BUT was responsible for investment
grants) and industrial investment (where the Ministry of Technology had taken over
technology and R&D policy). 65 DEA's links with other departments - and their
willingness to co-operate - therefore became of prime importance. 66
 Furthermore,
having taken most of the NEDO staff into government service, the role of NEDC, and
the co-operative work of employers and unions, seemed to have been downgraded, a
development to which the CBI was opposed. 67
 Thus DEA could not easily call on
industry voluntarily to carry out reforms: all the emphasis was thrown on government
policy.
Added to this was the conflict with the Treasury over the direction of
economic policy. This was never fully resolved, though in theory DEA was
responsible for the 'real economy' and economic forecasting, while the Treasury
remained in charge of public expenditure, monetary policy and the short-run balance
of payments. This 'concordat' was in fact virtually worthless, attempting to make a
virtue of 'unity in diversity', and making clear that none of the allocations were
'absolute'.68
 Roll regarded it as a 'hopeless mish-mash', while Callaghan admitted
that the Concordat represented 'a verbal truce rather than a true meeting of minds'.69
It proved impossible to draw a clear line between long run planning and immediate
economic necessity, for as MacDougall commented, 'the long run is a succession of
short runs'. 7° It was these basic design faults that saw the DEA constantly down-
graded, for instance losing day-to-day prices and incomes policy to the Ministry of
65 C. Pollitt, Manipulating the machine: changing the pattern of Ministerial departments 1960-83 (Allen & Unwin,
London, 1983), P
. 
56
Clifford, 'Department', pp. 103-4
67 IJWMRC MSS 200C/3/DG 1/4: Brown to Davies, 17 Februaiy 1966; CBI memorandum to DEA, 'NEDC', 1
March 1966, Brown] CBI meeting, minutes, 1 March 1966
PRO CAB 129/119: Trend memorandum to Cabinet, 'Co-ordination between the Department of Economic
Affairs and the Treasury', 16 December 1964
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Labour in April 1966, European policy when Brown left in August 1966, and its
remaining P&I responsibilities in April 1 968.'
All these limiting factors were on display as DEA prepared the National Plan.
Brown had initially wanted to publish in April 1965, and was restrained only by a
chorus of dissent from Roll, Catherwood, and Austen Albu as Minister of State.72
Armstrong and Vinter from the Treasury pointed out that reliable figures for 1970 and
1971, the end of the Plan period, could not yet be provided. 73
 Brown was therefore
forced to delay publication until the autumn. 74
 But the emphasis on speed, even to the
detriment of quality, remained. So did the fact that publishing a Plan was unavoidable
given Labour's promises: as Trend told the Americans, 'to defer publication of a
• document which is now widely expected would be liable to be counter-productive in
terms of confidence'. 75
 MacDougall's deputy, John Jukes, admitted that 'in the rush to
prepare the Plan... we necessarily left a large number of loose ends'.76
What was more, work on the Plan progressed on the basis of deciding the 4%
growth rate first (to reach an overall figure of 25% growth by 1970) and only then
deciding on measures to fit around the target. As one of the Economic Advisers
argued, 'the provisional assumptions (especially the 25% figure) were adopted at far
too early a stage... It was merely a hypothetical skeleton with political connotations.
But once this had been constructed it developed a force of its own in that it became
extremely embarrassing to alter a provisional assumption'. 77 Growth was at the heart
of the Plan, to eliminate 'the slow rate of growth associated with alternating periods
Clifford, 'Department', pp. 104-5; Pollitt, Machine, p. 53
72 PRO EW 24/48: Albu to Brown, 8 March 1965, Brown meeting with officials, 'An outline of the economic plan',
minutes, 11 March 1965
' PRO T 320/585: DEAl Treasury meeting, 'The outline Plan White Paper', minutes, 18 March 1965
PRO CAB 129/121: Brown memorandum to Cabinet, 'The outline plan', 30 March 1965; PRO CAB 128/39:
Cabinet minutes, 1 April 1965
PRO PREM 13/257: Trend to Bundy, 18 August 1965
76 PRO EW 24/93: Jukes to Wiggins, 24 September 1965
PRO EW 24/93: Goodhart to MacDougall, 'The strategy of planning', 7 September 1965
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of boom and stagnation' •78 But the chosen growth target - four per cent - was never
accepted by the Treasury or BOT. They favoured a 'range' approach, perhaps of
3.25% to 4%, rather than a single target, with different scenarios laid out for each
different growth rate. 79 The politics of the time was against them: given the
Conservatives' commitment to 4%, Ministerial pressure was for a higher rate, not a
lower range.8°
The structure of the Plan owed much to the previous NEDO exercise, with an
Industrial Questionnaire sent out to companies, asking them about their behaviour if
the economy were to grow as desired The Government also consulted trade
associations, and those EDCs that had already been set up, on the same basis. 8 ' They
were asked for their projections for employment, use of raw materials, investment,
skilled manpower and training requirements, and the balance of imports and exports.82
But the crucial mistake was to imagine that this was actually a guide to what would
happen, rather than a statistical exercise: most industries took the 25% target at face
value, as an increase in demand for their industry, as none could even begin to
calculate how 4% p.a. overall would affect them. Nor were companies reassured by
high growth targets: some large companies such as ICI reported that they would not
be investing the amounts they would need to meet the Plan targets until they could be
assured that the country would actually meet them.83
Treasury opinion on the Inquiry were withering: 'these forecasts are pretty
worthless since they do not cover enough firms and, in any case, the firms themselves
78	 EW 24/4: Secretaries' memorandum to PCWP, 'The objectives and methods of the plan', 16 December
1964
79 PR0 EW 24/7: Macdougall to Caulcott, 'The draft paper on the Plan', 11 November 1964, Hopkin to Jukes, 31
December 1964; PRO T 320/584: Petch to Clarke, 'Expansion and the Plan', 6 January 1965, Clarke to Armstrong,
'Next steps in the Plan', 18 January 1965
80	 CAB 134/1737: EDC minutes, 28 January 1965
PRO FG 1/8: Brown memorandum to NEDC, 'A plan for economic development', 26 February 1965
82 PRO FG 1/8: Brown memorandum to NEDC, 'Progress report on the Plan', 29 April 1965
83 Cmnd. 2764, Plan, appendix C; PRO CAB 130/203: DEA memorandum to MISC 1, 'The plan: a report on
progress', 27 May 1965; ACD, 13 June 1965: Cairncross, Diary, p. 60
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have based their replies on greatly varying assumptions'. 84
 Much of the statistical
work extrapolating from the questionnaire was indeed inadequate. For instance,
returns covered three quarters of the chocolate confectionary industry, but DEA took
this as a good enough indicator for the whole sector: the chalk, clay, sand and gravel
extraction industry answered only on sand and gravel, but again this was extrapolated
for the whole industry. 85 Additionally, it appears that even on its own terms the
Inquiry proved that the growth target could not achieved, for companies even on the
growth basis provided predicted a 23.5% rise in output, and 20% in productivity.86
The balance of payments assumptions behind the Plan were similarly suspect.
MacDougall estimated that with a growth rate of 4% in 1970, Britain would still be
running a large current account deficit in 1967-70. He had to add up a deeply
unconvincing list of savings on current account - £50m in tighter capital controls,
£50m through expansion in depressed regions without general inflation, £250m
annually by 1970 through P&I, and £50-lOOm through the 'Catherwoodery' of
industrial and EDC policy. Even then, he could only conclude that 'if all these
measures [are] successful, [we shall be] in approximate balance by, say, 1969.87
Other departments were incredulous, with export projections for instance attacked in
the Plan Steering Group as 'completely implausible'. 88 The balance of payments
projections for 1970 also rested on continuing trend growth in world trade, invisible
earnings and a reduction in investment abroad: none of these assumptions were in fact
borne out. They also rested on the Industrial Inquiry, which exhibited the same
problem of an over-optimistic brief as the rest of the Plan. 89 DEA found it very
difficult to respond, for its planners did not know the answers to crucial decisions,
such as when the import surcharge would be removed, or the relative priorities the
Cabinet gave to the balance of payments and growth.9°
PRO T 230/740: Hubback to Armstrong, 'The Plan', 28 May 1965
85 PRO EW 24/8: Dallas to Watts, 'The Industrial Inquiry', 21 April 1965
PRO LAB 8/32 16: Todd to Dewar, 28 May 1965
87 PRO EW 24/8: MacDougall to Russell, 'Policies for the Plan', 12 March 1965
88 PRO EW 24/94: PCSG minutes, 18 May 1965
89 Cmnd. 2764, Plan, pp. 75-6, 81-2
9° PRO EW 24/8: Grieve Smith to MacDougall, 'The Budget and the Plan', 23 April 1965
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MacDougall's vague calculations highlighted another problem: the 'manpower
gap'. Due to the fact that the growth of the working population was slowing, growth
in the late sixties would require higher per capita productivity growth rates than
hitherto. 91 To plug the 'gap', the manpower sub-group of PCWP assumed that
regional policies could bring the unemployment rates in those areas down to the
national average. Even this heroic assumption, however, did not seem likely to
suffice, even along with massive releases of labour from agriculture and declining
manufacturing industries and mining.92
 Productivity would have to rise at over 3.5%,
and it had been rising even in the early 1960s, a period of relative success in this field,
at about 3%. Although all sides in NEDC stressed the 'great contribution that
increased investment could make to solving manpower shortages', the implication
was clear: they were relying on State action to raise productivity in a way that British
governments had never been achieved before.93
Since the success of those policies was uncertain at best, it was no wonder that
Shone told Roll that the draft Plan was 'not very convincing in dealing with the
problems of the next eighteen months or two years'. 94 This was especially so given
the July measures of 1965, and Brown warned the Cabinet when he submitted the
Plan to them given those measures 'it might prove to be impossible to ensure
sufficient acceleration in later years to achieve the full objective of a 25 per cent
increase in national output'. Nevertheless, the Cabinet agreed to go ahead with
publication in order to attempt the 'growth trick', 'to encourage industry to aim at a
higher level of output'. 95 Given the speed at which the Plan had been compiled, along
with its questionable manpower and balance of payments assumptions and its
apparent divorce from immediate policy, it was, as Shore later put it, 'an inadequate
' Crnnd. 2764, Plan, pp. 24-5
92 ibid, pp. 37-8; PRO EW 24/6: Manpower sub-group to PCWP, 'Additions to the labour force', 22 April, 10 May
1965
PRO FG 1/9: Brown, Gunter memorandum to NEDC, 'The labour supply position as it affects the plan for
national development', 28 May 1965; PRO FG 1/8: NEDC minutes, 2 June 1965
PRO EW 24/10: Shone to Roll, 22 July 1965
PRO CAB 128/39: Cabinet minutes, 3 August 1965
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document which sank without trace within minutes of its being completed'. 96 DEA
officials in private were just as candid, Grieve Smith, assistant Director of Planning,
arguing that their targets 'had.., been falsified before the Plan was actually
published'
Table 111.2. National Plan % p.a. growth targets and actual outcome, 1964-70
	
Plan Ia	 Actual
	
3.8
	
2.2
	
3.4
	
2.6
GNP
GNP per employee
Cap italformation:
Manufacturing! construction
Other private industry
Nationalised industry
Housing
Public services
Total capitalformation
Defence spending	 1.0	 -3.0
Public sector current spending	 4.0	 4.2
Personal consumption	 3.2	 1.8
Imports of goods	 4.0	 4.4
Exports of goods	 5.3	 5.7
Source: Blackaby, Policy, table 9.3, p. 416
It soon became clear that the economy could not grow at the speed envisaged,
which caused the government deep anxiety, given that they were committed to
publishing a review within a year. 98 In fact, given the economic packages of July 1965
and July 1966, there was no way the Plan targets could be met at all (see table 111.2).
Though productivity continued to rise, there was not much evidence that the 'third
way' had delivered the necessary medium-term breakthrough. 99 The question then
became whether to publish the revised assessment, of 18-20% growth to 1970, or to
Paterson, Emotional, p. 181
PRO EW 24/96: Grieve Smith to MacDougall, 'The next plan', 18 October 1966
98 PRO EW 24/96: Catherwood to Allen, 'Review of the Plan', 1 June 1966; House of Commons debates, vol. 730,
col. 319: Brown written answer, 'Review of the Plan', 30 June 1966
S. Gomulka, 'Britain's slow industrial growth: increasing inefficiency versus a low rate of technical change' in
Beckerman (ed.), Slow growth in Britain: causes and consequences (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979), table 9.2, p.
123; Cairncross & B. Eichengreen, Sterling in decline: the devaluations of 1931, 1949 and 1967 (Blackwell,
Oxford, 1983), p. 216
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remain silent altogether, since as Michael Stewart, head of DEA after Brown, told
Wilson 'there is no progress to report in terms of the original National Plan targets'.'°°
Brown had already told the Cabinet, before the July 1966 package, that economic
growth could only reach 2.5% on an annual basis to end-1967, whereas the Plan had
promised 3.8%: in August 1966, the DEA announced publicly that the growth target
itself was under review. 101
 However, Stewart made it clear that this would not be
published in the near future, and DEA would instead focus on the 'more far-reaching
and constructive task' of discussing the future of planning in NEDC, so as to provide
a whole new Plan.'° 2
 In a meeting with officials six days later, Stewart confided that
in fact the situation was so 'gloomy' that it was 'impossible to think at present of
publishing a further National Plan'.'°3
The second phase of planning concentrated more on the selective industrial
planning work of DEA. One single growth target for the whole economy having been
discredited, the Government turned to work on individual industries, and a number of
growth 'paths' and their implications. The DEA envisaged an 'Industrial Flexible
Budget', testing the implications of at least three different rates of economic growth.
The 'low rate' would be between 2.2% and 2.9%, while the 'high rate' would be 3.7%
to 4.4%, with an intermediate rate in between.'° 4
 This, as Stewart told his colleagues,
would 'examine the range of possibilities open to us rather than merely exploring the
implications of one particular growth rate'.'° 5 This, he hoped, would emphasise 'the
agreed need to improve our industrial efficiency, our international competitive
'°° PRO PREM 13/827: Stewart to Wilson, 17 October 1966; PRO EW 24/93: MacDougall to Burgh, 'Planning:
the next steps', 13 May 1966
'°' PRO CAB 129/124: Brown memorandum to Cabinet, 'The growth rate and productivity, 8 July 1967; F.
Broadway, State intervention in British industiy 1964-1968 (Kaye & Ward, London, 1969), p. 23
'°2 Houre of Commons debates, vol. 735, cols. 341-2: Stewart, written answer, 'National Plan', 10 November 1966
103 PRO EW 24/96: Stewart meeting with officials, minutes, 16 November 1966
'° ibid: Bond-Williams to McIntosh, 26 July 1966; PRO EW 24/46: Ennals memorandum to PCWP, 'Planning
assumptions', 27 January 1967
105 PRO CAB 134/2737: Stewart memorandum to EDC, 'Future planning work', 30 January 1967
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position and our balance of payments'. The DEA and Ministry of Technology hoped
to intervene directly to ensure this.'°6
However, both the CBI and TUC from this stage were united in scepticism
about the Government's intentions, partly because of the failure of the Government's
prices and incomes policies. One reason the TUC came out in open opposition to P&I
was that they believed devaluation made 6% growth possible in 1968, allowing an
'affordable' growth of incomes of 5% a year. Their Yearly assessment, promised to
the 1967 Congress in an attempt to placate rank-and-file opposition to pay restraint,
became a regular thorn in the Government's side)° 7 Wilson and Shore spent the first
few months of 1968 trying to disabuse the TUC of this notion, to no avail; the
Government announced its own 3.5% 'ceiling' for wage increases in April without
TUC support.'° 8 Furthermore, it became clear during the debates on the new 'ceiling'
that a majority in Cabinet (notably Crosland and Callaghan) now believed continuing
with a statutory prices and incomes policy containing very low targets was 'asking for
the impossible': and the alternative this time was to alienate the CBI.'°9
The new idea - in fact resurrecting the attempted 'grand bargain' of 1962-63 -
was to link price control with incomes policy, this time in a single body, which Castle
and Shore proposed would be called the Commission for Industry and Manpower.
This would bring together the NBPI and the Monopolies Commission, but give it new
powers to control prices for two years in 'monopolistic' markets. The CIM would not
need even to suspect anti-competitive practices to intervene: LiOm in fixed assets, or
1/3 of any single market, would qualify any company for	 This would
'°	 FG 1/13: Stewart memorandum to NEDC, 'Planning', 1 March 1967
107 TUC Congress report 1967 (TIJC, London), pp. 322-3; TUC Economic review 1968 (TUC, London), pp. 88, 92
108 PRO T 230/781: Wilson, Jenkins, Shore, Gunter, Allen, Cairncross, MacDougall, Balogh meeting with TIJC
Economic Committee, minutes, 18 December 1967; PRO EW 24/215: Wilson, Jenkins, Shore, Gunter, Lee
meeting with TUC Economic Committee, minutes, 5 January 1968; Cmnd. 3590, Productivity, prices and incomes
policy in 1968 and 1969 (April 1968), pp. 3-4
'° PRO CAB 128/43: Cabinet minutes, 5 March 1968; BCD, 5 March 1968: Castle, Diary, p. 193
° PRO CAB 134/2007: Castle, Shore, memoranda to SEP, 'Industrial policy and the Monopolies Commission',
28 October, 8 November 1968; PRO CAB 134/3201: SEP minutes, 14 November 1968
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link up with the new selectivity in industrial and regional policy, and allow the
Government to supervise prices and incomes more closely." The CBI was furious,
accusing Castle of 'dropping all attempts to control the activities of trade unions...
and.., instead seeking greater powers to control prices'." 2
 But their opposition gained
only a reduction in the price standstill powers to eighteen months, and the once the
CIM was set up (forecast for 1971) the Government would have very wide-ranging
powers of compulsory price reference for Britain's 400 biggest companies." 3
 The
attempt to gain consensus on a 'planned growth of incomes' could not have seemed
further away.
Woodcock and the TUC remained committed to changing the macro-
• economic realities through planning, which would 'establish what this country was
capable or, and so help to avoid the dilemmas of incomes policy. The CBI, aghast at
the Government's increasing interventionism, had turned against the 'confidence
trick' itself, and wanted merely a 'realistic forecast' of the growth in the economy, by
a wholly independent planning commission." 4
 Nevertheless, the Government pressed
on with its new planning exercise, though delayed by having to revise their forecasts
following devaluation." 5
 The DEA's draft document, with its 'fan-shaped' growth
assumptions based on different rates of productivity growth, was a serious
disappointment to both the TUC and CBI when it was presented to NEDC in
December 1968. Both organisations opposed publication - though the TUC's
opposition to a document which did not guarantee productivity gains from
PRO CAB 128/44: Cabinet minutes, 25 September 1969. The link is most explicit in PRO PREM 13/2795:
Shore to Wilson, 25 April 1969
112 PRO CAB 129/147: Castle memorandum to Cabinet, 'Commission for industry and manpower', 12 January
1970
113 Public Bills and minutes ofproceedings 1969/70, Commission for Industry and Manpower Bill, 13 March
1970; House of Commons debates, vol. 799, cols. 560-2: Castle speech, second reading, CIM Bill, 8 April 1970
114 PRO FG 1/13: NEDC minutes, 2 August 1967
' PRO EW 24/135: DEA memoranda to MTAC, 'Medium term outlook after devaluation', 19 December 1967,
'Alternative assumptions to be explored', 22 April 1968
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government policies was the more bitter." 6 Some committed planners were also
dismayed at the document's weakness: Andrew Graham in the Cabinet Office
commented, 'Oh God, I have heard all this 	 17
In the event the Government did publish The task ahead: an economic
assessment to 1972, though at CBI and TUC insistence gutted even of many of the
projections in the NEDC draft" 8 The 'basic' path, of the medium level of expected
growth, was 3.25%, and the implications for this in terms of sectoral growth were
outlined. But there were few commitments. The document began with the promise
that 'this is a planning document, not a plan', and emphasised that it was only a
contribution to the 'continuing process of consultation between Government and both
• sides of industry'. It aimed at a £500m balance of payments surplus by its terminal
date of 1972, which was to be the 'overriding goal'." 9
 3.25% growth was based on
the continuation of the previous growth of productivity. It would be hard to imagine
an approach to planning further removed from the hopes of 1965.
But while the certainties of planning were removed, lower-level consultation
was encouraged, most notably with EDCs, most of which had hardly begun work in
1965. Their number was greatly expanded under Labour, to twenty-one, covering
about 80% of the employees of private industry.' 20 This allowed officials to ask
industry about real projections, rather than supposed reactions to a previously
determined growth rate. EDCs had conducted a great deal of unglamorous work in the
interim, for instance on transport links with Europe, one area where it was clearly
advantageous to bring different transport interests (such as BR and the docks) together
116 UWMRC MSS 200C/l/l/E1471.68: NEDC liaison committee, minutes, 10 December 1968; PRO FG 1/15:
NEDC minutes, 11 December 1968; PRO FG 1/18: NEDC minutes, 14 January 1969
117 PRO PREM 13/2046: Graham to Wilson, Economic assessment to 1972', 1 November 1968
118 PRO FG 1/18: NEDC minutes, 14 January, 5 February 1969; UWMRC MSS 200C/1/1IE/106.69: NEDC liaison
committee, 4 February 1969
" DEA, The task ahead: an economic assessment to 1972 (HMSO, London, 1969), pp. 1, 5-7, charts 7.1-7.2, pp.
67-8
' 20 T. Smith, 'Industrial planning in Britain', in Hayward & Watson, Planning, p. 116
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with wholesalers and exporters. 12 ' But they had few links to top-level planning
machinery: their Chairmen were often summarily treated at NEDC meetings, their
business placed at the end of the agenda.' 22 From mid-1967, the EDCs were brought
fully into macroeconomic planning for the first time.123
Most EDCs were highly suspicious, just as wary as the CBI and TUC
leaderships of government promises following the failure of the first Plan. Most only
reluctantly agreed to a new plan, since the Government seemed intent on one, and
would be better informed if they co-operated.' 24
 A number of sectors that were
particularly sensitive to the balance of payments were chosen for particular scrutiny:
motor manufacturing, mechanical engineering, electronics and chemicals. The task
ahead focussed on these, inviting EDCs in these sectors to comment on the use
government and NEDC had made of their figures.' 25
 When the EDCs reported, they
were less optimistic than the figures in The task ahead, mainly because their import
penetration projections were higher than government's.' 26
 Furthermore, the supply
constraints forecast by the engineering EDC made officials worry that the capital
equipment requirements of their projections were unrealistic.' 27
 Despite this
121 PRO FG 1/12: Report by exports working group EDC, 'Through transport to Europe', 8 May 1966
122 R. Bailey, Managing the British economy: a guide to economic planning in Britain since 1962 (Hutchinson,
London, 1968), p. 46
123 PRO CAB 134/3 198: Stewart memorandum to SEP, 'Future planning work', 16 March 1967
124 
e.g. PRO EW 24/118: Paper and Board EDC minutes, 11 April 1967, Hotels and catering EDC minutes, (?May)
1967, Building and civil engineering EDC minutes, 2 May 1967, Motor vehicles distribution and repair EDC
minutes, 10 May 1967
125 PRO CAB 134/29 17: Nield memorandum to Ministerial Committee on Industrial Policy, 'Economic assessment
to 1972: consultations with industry', 26 February 1969; PRO CAB 134/2917: Ministerial Committee on Industrial
Policy, minutes, 13 March 1969; DEA, Task, p. 110
' 26 DO Industrial report by the chemicals EDC (NEDO, 1970), p. 1; NEDO, Industrial report by the motor
manufacturing EDC (NEDO, 1970), pp. 26-7
127 NEDO industrial report by the mechanical engineering EDC (NEDO, 1970), p20-2; PRO 1 342/18: Evans to
Smith, 'Industrial consultations on the economic assessment', 4 November 1969
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pessimism, Mintech, now responsible for EDCs, was pleased with the information
that had been gathered, and envisaged its repeat every two years.'28
EDC views allowed the Treasury (responsible for planning following the
abolition of DEA) further to downgrade the central growth projection, from 3.25% to
3%. This January 1970 Revised assessment also contained lower estimates than any of
the other plans for the growth of the working population, which helped to justify the
even slower growth prediction. However, Ministers insisted that the 1970 revisions to
The task ahead retain the 'fan' concept, and include at least the possibility of an
optimistic rate of growth, at 3.75% (it was eventually included as 3•5%)•129 Tripartite
agreement having finally collapsed, this had to be published as a purely government
document, with no NEDC backing at all. The ambivalent vagueness of Labour's
Opposition compromises, followed by the rushed and inadequate National Plan and
the gradual expansion of statutory prices and incomes policy, had hopelessly
undermined the uneasy and contingent consensus on which hopes for macro-
economic planning had been built. The new realism of the Economic assessment
exercises could not heal the damage.
128 PRO T 342/20: Treasury officials' meeting, 'Future of planning exercise and EDCs', minutes, 5 February 1970
129 PRO 1 342119: AlIen meeting with other officials, 'NEDC paper', minutes, 13 January 1970; PRO CAB
134/3215: SEP minutes, 19 January 1970; Treasury, Economic assessment to 1972 - a revised assessment (HMSO,
London, 1970), pp. 5-6
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'A more discriminating approach '. towards selective intervention
The DEA had never been Labour's only interventionist tool, as a separate Ministry of
Technology was also created in October 1964. Labour had put a great deal of
emphasis on science in Opposition, the NEC concluding that a new Department
would be needed for 'encouraging technical progress... supporting industrial
research... giving development contracts and... administering the participation of
government in new industries'.' 30 Labour had staged a series of conferences with
sympathetic scientists to talk about this in 1963-64.'' Such a Department, it was
hoped, would complement DEA's macroeconomic work with 'selective interventions'
to aid British technology and productivity. To begin with, the Ministry was small, and
had a standing responsibility only for a third of government civil R&D. It took over
responsibility for the Atomic Energy Authority, the National Research Development
Corporation, and the laboratories of DSIR.' 32
 This was one of the smallest options
Labour had considered in Opposition, with the Ministry of Aviation and its large
R&D office retained as an independent department.'33
However, 'Mintech' always had the potential to grow. Wilson took a personal
interest in it as proof of the 'white heat' ideology, and appointed Frank Cousins from
the TGWU to be its first head, allegedly because Cousins was no political threat to
him as Prime Minister.' 34
 Although Mintech's statutory responsibilities were
originally small, it had the potential to spread across Whitehall. The Ministry's
scheme for the computer industry, which was to provide £20m to fund mergers and
concentration, as well as research work on defence, telecommunications, and civil
contracting, were good examples of this, as was their links with the DES on the output
130 HABLP LPRD memoranda, I, Il/RD 440: Albu memorandum to Labour Science Group: 'Relations between
government and science and technology', March 1963
131 Author interview, Lord Shore, 10 October 2000
132 D. Edgerton, 'The "white heat" revisited: the British government and technology in the 1960s', TCBH 7, 1
(1996), p. 65
133 HABLP LPRD memoranda, I, IL/RD 670: Hart memorandum to science and industry working group,
'Constructing the Ministry of Industry and Technology', February 1964
Pimlott, Wilson, pp. 278, 527
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of scientifically-trained manpower.' 35
 March 1965 witnessed the first in a number of
extensions to Mintech's powers. Under the Science and Technology Act, the Ministry
was empowered to direct the AEA to undertake non-nuclear research, and DSIR was
abolished, its functions vested in new Research Councils under Mintech. The Minister
could now also make discretionary research grants, within his overall budget.'36
Wilson certainly took much more interest in Mintech than he did in DEA.'37
He asked Heisby in 1965 to look into bringing MOA and the BOT's engineering
industry responsibilities into Mintech, and asked Jenkins as Minister of Aviation to
cede joint control of pure science (for instance radar) to Cousins' department. He held
off abolishing MOA until he could make Jenkins Home Secretary.' 38
 Interestingly in
the light of Mintech's emergence in 1969 as a 'super-ministry', Wilson wanted even
at this stage to create a 'Ministry of Industry and Technology', taking over not only
the industries for which the BOT was sponsor (including shipbuilding), but also
regional policy and investment incentives, as well as the Ministry of Power.'39
Although other transfers would have to wait, the move of MOA duties was settled by
the time Benn arrived at the Ministry in July 1966, and was finally transferred to
Mintech in February 1967.'° The transformation of Mintech through the absorption
of MOA's large engineering research budget confirmed Wilson's desire, over the
' PRO PREM 13/945: Wilson to Cousins, 3 December 1964, Cousins to Wilson, 15 December 1964; PRO CAB
130/217: Cousins memorandum to MISC 24, Proposals for the support of the computer industry', 3 February
1965, MISC 24 minutes, 16 December 1964, 5 February 1965
136 Public general acts and mea.sures 1965, c4, pp. 53-7: Science and Technology Act, 22 March 1965; Bailey,
Guide, p. 107; Pollitt, Machine, p. 58
137 Hennessy, Prime Minister, p. 303
' PRO PREM 13/945: Helsby to Wilson, 'The Ministry of Technology', 28 June 1965, Wilson to Jenkins, 4
August 1965, Helsby to Wilson, 'Machinery of government', 7 October 1965, Mitchell to Wilson, 'Machinery of
government', 12 October 1965
'' PRO PREM 13/945: Helsby to Wilson, 'Ministry of Technology', 11 November 1965
140 TBD, 4 July 1967; Benn, Wilderness, p. 444; Clarke, 1967, pp. 1-2; Edgerton, 'Heat', p. 67; Pollitt, Machine, p.
59
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objections of the MOD, to build up the department as 'the instrument of progress in
the engineering field'.14'
Wilson's sponsorship of Mintech continued right up to 1969, when he decided
to break up DEA. He wanted its regional policy responsibilities, NEDC, and the
manufacturing functions of BOT given to Mintech, reconstituting BOT as a foreign
trade department. Sir William Nield, DEA's last Permanent Secretary, and William
Armstrong both opposed the creation of a 'super-ministry', as did Sir Anthony Part
from the BOT, and most of the officials involved, who expressed 'astonishment' and
'horror' at the idea that Mintech should also take over the Ministry of Power.'42
Nevertheless, the Prime Minister was able to impose his will. Mintech became a
'Department for Industry', with its remit expanded to cover the execution of regional
policy (though overall strategy would go to Crosland at Local Government and
Planning), all government research and development, the EDCs and industrial work
on the new Plan, as well as general industrial policy (including engineering, steel and
power).' 43
 It was grouped in five divisions - Aviation, Industry, Regional, Economics,
and General Co-ordination - to cope with this workload."
Mintech expanded into every field where it had even the slightest influence.
From its initial responsibilities for standards and weights and measures, Mintech
expanded into encouraging industrial standardisation and longer production runs.145
From monitoring technology purchases by government, it expanded into subsidising
" PRO PREM 13/1550: Wilson to Healey, 11 November 1966; R. Clarke, Industry and the Ministry of
Technology (HMSO, London, 1967), p. 5; R. Coppey, 'Labour's industrial strategy', in idem, S. Fielding & N.
Tiratsoo, The Wilson governments, 1964-1970 (Pinter, London, 1993), p. 112
142 PRO PREM 13/2680: Halls to Armstrong, 27 June 1969, Armstrong to Halls, Machinery of government
changes: reallocation of DEA functions', 11 July 1969, Halls to Armstrong, 12 September 1969
TBD, 4-5 October 1969: Benn, Office without power, pp. 203-4
PRO PREM 13/2681: Armstrong draft Lobby notice, 'Machinery of Government', 30 September 1969, Berm to
Wilson, 15 October 1969; D.K. Fry, The administrative revolution ' in Whitehall (Croom Helm, London, 1981), p.
178
PRO FG 1/1 1: Brown memorandum to NEDC, 'Progress report on standardisation, variety reduction and longer
production runs', IS February 1966
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specific sectors, for instance computers, through those orders.' 46 Its advisory and
consultancy services were constantly expanded, with ad hoc task groups negotiating
to bring together purchasers and providers in industries as diverse as fork-lift trucks,
glass containers, hydraulics and scientific instruments.' 47
 Frustrated with NRDC's
slowness in commercial exploitation of inventions, Benn took over DEA's links with
larger companies, leaving NRDC to deal with small and medium sized concerns.'48
Even medium-term economic forecasting was Benn's field by 1970, and Mintech
aided a large expansion of civil science, at the expense of defence R&D, in these
years (see table JJJ•3)•149 There was also a conscious effort to reinforce links between
defence industries and the civil sector.'50
Table 111.3. Public sector civil and defence R&D expenditure (em, 1964 prices), 1964-70
Civil R&D Defence R&D Civil increase Defence
expenditure expenditure	 (%)	 increase (%)
1964/65	 191.8	 263.5	 12.3	 5.6
1965/66	 196.5	 251.0	 2.4	 -4.8
1966/67	 221.0	 239.9	 12.5	 -4.4
1967/68	 247.0	 216.5	 11.7	 -9.7
1968/69	 281.1	 203.0	 13.8	 -6.2
1969/70	 289.7	 196.2	 3.1	 -3.4
Source: Statistics of science and technology (1970), table 12, pp. 34-5
This was part of a more selective approach to industrial policy overall. Two
NEC conferences on 'financial institutions', in November 1967 and June 1968, saw
pressure for a State Holdings Company, focussing on providing funds for export
industries and technological re-equipment. These also concluded that 'what is
required in place of the present broad and relatively indiscriminate channels... [is] a
much greater measure of selectivity [and]... a more discriminating approach' was
needed. Considering that Castle was the chair of the study group that steered these
conferences, these views carried obvious weight in government, as well as in the
' PRO CAB 129/125: Benn memorandum to Cabinet, 'Productivity', 8 July 1966
'' PRO FV 3/37: Mintechl IRC meeting, minutes, 2 August 1967; PRO FV 11/20: ibid, 2 December 1969
' PRO FV 3/35: Benn meeting with Bray, officials, minutes, 9 December 1968
PRO CAB 134/32 14: Benn memorandum to SEP, 'Industrial situation and prospects up to the end of 1970', 15
October 1969; PRO CAB 134/3215: Benn memorandum to SEP, 'Industrial report', IS January 1970
's° Coopey, 'Strategy', pp. 113-4
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Party) 5 ' The trend towards more discriminating industrial intervention was already
established, for joint DEA-Mintech approaches to large firms had been going on since
1966, with Stewart holding talks directly with a number of exporters on what their
plans were in the medium-term.' 52
 Following devaluation, DEA was particularly keen
on 'a more considered and systematic approach', 'selective intervention' as an
inexpensive counterpoint to general deflation.'53
As hopes for macro-economic planning faded, direct intervention moved to
the centre of the Government's collective imagination. The two National Productivity
Conferences held in September 1966 and June 1967 were good examples of this.
Their aim was to encourage 'greater productivity' and 'the most effective use of
manpower'.' 54 At the core of the NPCs were members of NIEDC, which indeed
prepared the agenda for the Conferences, and were themselves keen on the themes of
investment, technological innovation, and labour utilisation.' 55
 A major theme of both
conferences was the 'enormous gains' that could be made through greater
management training, wider use of technology, and integration between different parts
of a company.'56
Some progress was made, for instance on bringing together and publicising
public and private advisory services. Agencies such as the British Productivity
HABLP RD 1111, Re 582: 'The role of financial institutions in Britain's economy', June 1968; HABLP NEC
minutes vol. 9, pp. 645-51 (Januaiy - April 1969): Memorandum from Study Group on economic strategy,
'Economic planning', 1 March 1969; KCCL Kaldor papers 10/5: Pitt to Callaghan, 'Weekend conference on the
City', 5 May 1967
152 PRO EW 16/7: Albu meeting with industrial advisers, 7 July 1966; PRO PREM 13/978: Balogh to Wilson, 22
September 1966; PRO FG 1/13: Stewart memorandum to NEDC, 'Industrial work for the next Plan', 15 February
1967
153 PRO CAB 134/2915: Shore memorandum to Industrial Policy Committee, 'Review of industrial policy
following devaluation', 16 Februaiy 1968
154 PRO CAB 134/3030: Secretaries' memorandum to Productivity Committee, 'A national conference on
productivity', 19 May 1966, Productivity Committee minutes, 23 May 1966
PRO FG 1/Il: NEDC minutes, 3 August 1966
56 PRO PREM 13/978: NEDO memorandum to NPC, 'Productivity techniques', 22 August 1966
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Council and the British Institute of Management were expanded in reaction to
proposals made at the Conferences; EDCs were set to work more closely together in
comparing productivity across and within industries.' 57
 A great deal of information
was produced, including material on technology's contribution to company growth,
and the possibilities of advertising and marketing.' 58
 But one noticeable feature of the
NPCs was the increasing rancour between the employers and govermnent: when the
first NPC turned to investment, the CBI complained that given the Government's tax
rises and deflationary packages, there was little point in devising new programmes.'59
At the second NPC, they complained about the level of public spending.' 6° It was CBI
opposition to holding any more Conferences that brought this particular 'selective
intervention' to an end.'6'
The Industrial Reorganisation Corporation was another element in Labour's
interventionist policy, set up to encourage mergers and industrial concentration and
therefore, it was hoped, international competitiveness.' 62
 The IRC was instrumental in
a series of very large mergers, often spending funds from its own capital of £1 50m to
smooth the path towards rationalisation: the English Electric! Elliott Automation,
GEC! Associated Electrical Industries, and GEC! EE mergers, along with the creation
of British Leyland from British Motor Holdings and Leyland Motors, created two
'"PRO LAB 10/2999: British Institute of Management, 'Action campaign on productivity', November 1966; PRO
LAB 10/3000: Productivity Services Advisory Group minutes, 17 November 1966; PRO PREM 13/2166: Trend to
Wilson, 'Follow up of the NPC', 1 December 1966; PRO FG 1/12: Catherwood memorandum to NEDC, 'Follow
up of the NPC',21 December 1966
CAB 130/308: Official memoranda to MISC 123, 'Marketing, distribution and productivity', 'The role of
technology in productivity', 15 May 1967, MISC 123 minutes, 24 May 1967; NEDO, Business efficiency: an ABC
of advisory services (October 1968), passirn
PREM 13/978: NPC minutes, 27 September 1966
'° PRO PREM 13/2 166: Second NPC minutes, 14 June 1967
161 PRO PREM 13/2166: Catherwood to Stewart, 12 June 1967
162 PRO CAB 134/2708: Brown memorandum to EDC, 'The industrial reorganisation finance corporation', 5
January 1966; PRO CAB 134/2707: EDC minutes, 6 January, 20 January 1966
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'national champions' in electronics and motor vehicles.' 63
 These were not always
encouraging precedents, partly because there was continuous conflict between DEA
and Mintech over who was to take charge of IRC operations, especially as Mintech
was supposed to have special responsibility for Britain's computer industry.' TM
 Some
of the mergers - for instance the creation of British Leyland - were economically
disastrous, with BL's market share falling rapidly before being nationalised in
1975.165 Ministers' discontent with their lack of powers over the IRC and its merger
clients was to lead to wide-ranging discretionary powers being taken by government.
Another spur to legislation was the fact that over the winter of 1966-67
Mintech had become frustrated by its limited powers over industry, since it regarded
Investment Grants as too crude to focus adequately on its priority sectors.' 66
 A study
of enabling powers was commissioned under Harold Lever to look at ways of
intervening more selectively, since most Ministers felt that the existing rules were too
'strict and rigid'.' 67 Once again, Wilson's influence can be seen behind this
development, for it was he who had originally called for a 'crash programme for
capital investment and re-equipment', and had first suggested the Lever working
party.' 68
 Although the Prime Minister was thinking of raising investment incentive
rates again, and extending their coverage to the service trades and industrial building,
D. Hague & G. Wilkinson, The IRC - an experiment in industrial intervention (Allen & Unwin, London,
London, 1983), pp. 50-4, 58-60, 122-5, 253-5, 258-9
S. Young & A.L. Lowe, Intervention in the mixed economy (Croom Helm, London, 1974), pp. 9 1-3; Fry,
Revolution, p. 178
'65 JF Wilson, British business history 1720-1994 (MUP, Manchester, 1995), pp. 210-11; Pliatzky, Spending, pp.
63-4
'	 CAB 134/2742: Bray memorandum to EPC sub-committee on industrial policy, Industrial policy', 4 May
1967, EPC sub-committee on industrial policy minutes, 16 June 1967
167 PRO CAB 130/338: MISC 168 minutes, 5 September 1967
PRO PREM 13/1429: Wilson to Shore, 30 August 1967, Brown to Shore 'Ministerial Working Party on Capital
Investment and Re-equipment', 11 September 1967
123
Labour's national plans 1964-70
such measures would probably be very expensive, and not necessarily effective; the
Industrial Expansion Act eventually stood in for them.'69
This Act actually began as an administrative measure, for Mintech, having
absorbed MOA, had to deal with subsidies for three different aircraft projects
(including Concorde and Airbus), and officials thought that one Bill granting enabling
powers would be simpler than three individual enactments. But it also originated with
the desire for selective intervention: as promoted by Benn, it would give the
Government permanent powers, with the agreement of companies concerned, to help
with supplies stockpiling, technology leasing (especially for computers) and to buy up
shares in subsidised firms.' 7° However, when the CBI was informed of what was
intended, they were furious that the Government was taking 'blanket powers applying
to all industry'; Wilson had to mollify them with the assurance that the Bill would
'enable the Government to act quickly in cases where the firm concerned agreed to
the need for Government assistance'. But Davies countered that the proposals were 'a
permanent threat to private industry', given the pressure for co-operation that the
Government could bring to bear as a major purchaser.' 7 ' Cabinet nevertheless
approved the measure in September 1967)72
Benn and Shore were prepared to make some concessions: they agreed, after
discussion in NEDC, that the powers would only be used after an Affirmative
Resolution of the House of Commons in each case. They also agreed to consider an
overall financial limit on intervention in each industry, for instance the aircraft
169 Most of these proposals were rejected when SEP came to consider MISC 168's report: PRO PREM 13/2590:
Castle to Wilson, 6 November 1967; PRO CAB 134/3196: SEP minutes, 8 November 1967
170	 CAB 134/2738: Benn memorandum to EDC, 'Industrial expansion Bill', 14 June 1967; PRO CAB
134/2736: EDC minutes, 20 June 1967
PRO PREM 13/1576: Stewart to Wilson, 'Industrial expansion Bill', Benn to Wilson, 28 July 1967, Wilson,
Stewart meeting with CBI, minutes, 2 August 1967; Davies to Shore, 'Proposed enabling legislation to provide
government support for industrial development, 22 September 1967
172 PRO CAB 129/133: Benn memorandum to Cabinet, 'Industrial expansion Bill', 27 September 1967; PRO CAB
128/42: Cabinet minutes, 28 September 1967
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sector.' 73
 The White Paper on this in January 1968 was couched in conciliatory terms,
stressing 'co-operation with private industry', the creation of an advisory body, and
the fact that government would only provide money in the last resort.' 74
 Specific
spending limits were also inserted in the final Act: £lOOm for Concorde, £24m for the
QEII, and £75m for general shipbuilding, with £lOOm (15Om with further
Parliamentary approval) for other projects.' 75
 But it could not be disguised that the
Government had taken a series of major new discretionary powers over industry, even
though the actual amounts paid out outside those special projects listed in the Act
amounted to only £21m to the computer industry, and £28m to the Government's ill-
fated aluminium smelters scheme.'76
'"PRO CAB 129/133: Shore memorandum to Cabinet, 'Industrial expansion Bill', 25 October 1967; PRO CAB
128/42: Cabinet minutes, 26 October 1967
Cmnd 3509, Industrial expansion (January 1968), pp. 2-3
'' Public general acts and measures 1968, vol. I, c32, pp. 772, 774-5: Industrial expansion Act, 30 May 1968
76 Mintech, Reports on the Industrial Expansion Act (1968/69, 1969/70), passim
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'Hostage to fortune': Labour and public expenditure
Immediately upon coming to power, Labour embarked upon a 'strict review' of public
expenditure, since resources had been fully 'pre-empted' by planned Conservative
spending rises. 177 This review faced powerful political constraints, for instance on
NHS prescription charges: Callaghan failed to delay Labour's commitment to abolish
these. Much more expensive was Labour's election pledge to up-rate pensions above
increases in average earnings, the cost of which was estimated at £126m in 1965/66.
Callaghan also failed to have the proposed 12s 6d increase in the basic pension scaled
back to lOs.'78
Despite these initial setbacks for the Chancellor, Diamond as Chief Secretary
was put in charge of the 'strict review' of the general civil side, and a Task Group
under Clarke asked to look at 'civil projects with an economic aspect' (except
Concorde, part of the general exercise). The Government was already also committed
to a general Defence Review.' 79 This review also failed to achieve its aims, for legal
reasons (the French threatened to sue if Concorde was cancelled), political promises
(that the Farm Subsidies scheme would be kept, for example), and the fact that the
capital costs of many projects had already been incurred (for instance the AEA).'8°
Although the European Space Launcher project was condemned by the Clarke group,
Ministers refused to cancel it until 1968.181
PRO CAB 130/202: MISC 1 minutes, 18 December 1964; PRO CAB 128/39: Cabinet minutes, 19 October, 28
October 1964; Treasury, The economic situation (October 1964), p. 3
PRO CAB 128/39: Cabinet minutes, 28 October 1964
'79 PRO T 320/362: TPEC minutes, 20 November 1964; PRO CAB 134/2420: Callaghan memorandum to Public
sector programmes committee, 'The "strict review" of government expenditure', 20 November 1964
Jenkins, in 'The Development of Concorde', ICBH seminar, 19 November 1998,
http://www.icbh.ac.uk/seminars/concorde.html; PRO T 320/361: Marshall memoranda to Task Group,
'Agricultural support policy', February 1965, 'The civil R&D programme of the AEA', March 1965
PRO CAB 134/2420: Callaghan memorandum to Public sector programmes committee, 'ELDO: interim report
of task group', 11 January 1965; PRO CAB 129/124: Callaghan memorandum to Cabinet, 'Public expenditure:
1966/67 estimates', 18 January 1966; PRO CAB 128/41: Cabinet minutes, 20 January 1966; Edgerton, 'Heat', p.
63
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The longer-term exercise then began. The DEA was powerful enough at this
stage to play a central role, and to press successfully for a five-year spending plan.
Callaghan also welcomed this, so long as long-term figures could be used to set the
very high February 1965 Estimates into context, and promise lower spending rises in
the future. 182 Some officials, especially Clarke, were more concerned, arguing that
they had to be much more cautious in projecting the potential growth rate in an
official plan, as opposed to an internal PESC review or a NEDC plan.' 83 The initial
review therefore witnessed a conflict between DEA and Treasury over the possible
growth rate. DEA was able to secure 4.25% yearly increases in public expenditure for
the Planfrom 1965/66, that is, after the 8-9% increase of 1963/64 to 1964/65. This
obviously allowed more leeway for public spending to expand over the whole period
than the Treasury's desired starting date of 1964/65, though it was admittedly lower
than the 5.25% projected in the PESC report even before the Election.' 84 But the
decision remained a gamble, in Clarke's words 'a tremendous hostage to fortune'.'85
During this exercise, there was for the first time an attempt to develop
'priority-setting', as Plowden had recommended, as the central feature of public
expenditure decisions. Each Minister was to submit their 'basic' programme to
Cabinet for approval, listing prior commitments, and a series of 'additional', possible
spending increases. The 'natural' increase in public expenditure, under the growth
assumptions of the time, could then be divided up between the 'additional'
programmes.' 86 Additional spending bids came to £513m for 1969/70, in 1965 prices;
PESC officials thought that there might be £150m-200m to spread between
programmes without raising taxes. 187 This job fell to the Public Expenditure
182 PRO PREM 13/286: Trend to Wilson, 'Public expenditure', 23 December 1964
183 PRO T 320/584: Clarke to Petch, 5 Januaiy 1965
' PRO EW 25/25: Henley to Allen, 5 January 1965, Crosland to Allen, 8 January 1965
185 PRO EW 24/10: Clarke to Roll, 'The plan', 16 July 1965
' PRO CAB 129/120; Callaghan memorandum to Cabinet, 'Public expenditure', 26 January 1965
PRO EW 25/28: Stevens to Jukes, 'PESC returns', 28 April 1965; PRO PREM 13/270; Stewart to Balogh,
'Public expenditure', 8 July 1965
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Committee, chaired by Callaghan, and containing no major spending Ministers.'88
This allocated £240m of additional spending for 1969/70: £35m extra for education,
£25m for health, £60m for benefits, LiOm for police and prisons, and £1 lOm for
housing. This represented a 2.3% increase over the 'basic' £10.2bn programme for
1969/70, itself a large increase over the £8.2bn 1964/65 spending total)89
However, as Clarke had feared, this public commitment to 4.25% came to
haunt the Government.' 90 The exercise had contained some highly dubious
assumptions: the contingency reserve assumed for 1969/70 was cut to £150m, a tiny
fraction of public expenditure, and uncontrolled 'miscellaneous' expenditure was
supposed to rise by only 10% in real terms in five years. 19 ' This was without
mentioning the huge task Ministers faced if they were to implement the Defence
Review, which projected a steady £2bn in real terms being spent on this throughout
the period to 1970. Furthermore, the 'basic' programmes had in 1965 been taken for
granted: all the choices involved were increases. This was not therefore a true re-
allocation exercise.
The failure of the economy to grow as the Plan projected also called the
priorities exercise into question. Expected growth after the July 1966 measures clearly
could not accommodate 4.25% increases per annum without large tax rises) 92 Thus
the normal PESC exercise on 1970/71, which would usually have been conducted in
1966, was postponed. Instead Ministers were to focus on 1967/68, which Callaghan
hoped would concentrate their minds. It had become clear that cuts of between £50m
and £500m (as estimates continued to rise) would be required even to bring the
increases in government spending down to the 4.25% target.' 93 This time, Callaghan
' PRO CAB 130/232: MISC 64 minutes, 24 June 1965,4 July, 7-8 July 1965
189 PRO CAB 129/121: Trend memorandum to Cabinet, 'Review of public expenditure from 1965/66 to 1969/70:
background and submissions', 13 July 1965
'° PRO CAB 134/2395: Callaghan memorandum to PEC, 'The prospects for public expenditure', 2 August 1966
'' PRO PREM 13/270: Trend brief for Wilson, 'Public expenditure 1969/70', 14 July 1965
92 PRO CAB 128/41: Cabinet minutes, 12 July 1966
PRO CAB 134/2395: Callaghan memoranda to PEC, 'Public expenditure: the immediate prospect', 'Public
expenditure 1967/68', 11 July, 19 October 1966, PEC minutes, 18 July 1966
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wanted a 'contingency exercise', providing for a range of options, including zero
GNP growth in 1967/68, to prepare them for possible cuts. Spending Ministers would
have to prepare lists of both increases and cuts, to provide for genuine choice. They
were to provide a list of their priorities if spending was to be reduced by 5%, and if
they were to be able to spend 5% more. 194
 Callaghan therefore reconmiended PEC's
final report as 'turning from increasing public expenditure every year to deciding
whether our present priorities are... those to which the Cabinet attaches the highest
importance'.195
Callaghan managed to persuade PEC to recommend £277m of reductions for
1967/68, though only £80m of this was firmly accepted by full Cabinet.' 96
 He
therefore tried again, gaining approval of an official review of the five main civil
programmes - housing, education, roads, social security, and health - to run to
1970/71. This time the review would proceed on the basis of costed options for a
7.5% decrease in public expenditure, and a 5% increase. The Treasury also wanted a
£250m contingency reserve for 1970/71, in line with the unplanned increases due to
policy decisions for 1966/67.' 'Reviews in depth' were presented to Cabinet in June
1967, with options for increases and decreases in each programme, though the
Chancellor's preference was for a £500m reduction overall for 1970/71, with £200m
of that coming from Defence, and the rest from civil programmes.' 98
 The preference
of the rest of the Cabinet, however, was for only £300m-350m worth of planned
' PRO CAB 134/2395: PEC minutes, 5 August 1966; PRO CAB 128/41: Cabinet minutes, 10 August 1966; PRO
T 277/1651: PESC minutes, 18 August 1966
'"PRO CAB 129/127: Callaghan memorandum to Cabinet, 'Public expenditure 1967/68', 11 November 1966
' PRO CAB 128/41: Cabinet minutes, 15 November 1966
'' PRO CAB 134/319: Callaghan memorandum to SEP, 'Public expenditure to 1970', 11 January 1967; PRO CAB
134/3 196: SEP minutes, 13 January 1967; PRO CAB 134/3048: Callaghan memorandum to FEC, 'Public
expenditure to 1970', 23 January 1967; PRO 1 277/1827: Secretaries' memorandum to PESC, 'Contingency
allowance', 26 April 1967
' PRO CAB 129/131: Callaghan memoranda to Cabinet, 'Public expenditure: continuation of existing policies',
'Public expenditure: areas of choice', 15 June 1967, 'Public expenditure', 21 June 1967
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spending reductions, and more taxation to plug the gap. Callaghan was able to make
only about a quarter of the desired cuts.199
Such resistance was finally overborne by devaluation, with Jenkins as
Chancellor warning that another devaluation might follow if they could not achieve a
'shift of resources' to production for exports. 20° In order to steady post-devaluation
nerves, Callaghan had already publicly announced a desired savings total of £400m
for 1968/69.201 Initial decisions were of the usual type, with £76m to be taken out of
nationalised industries' investment. 202 However, the consequent devaluation package
of January 1968 contained a number of political retreats for a Labour government,
notably on prescription charges and the raising of the school leaving age. Total
savings added up to £416m. 203 These reductions at least would hold public
expenditure increases within a 4.75% increase in 1968/69, with just a 1% planned
increase in 1969/70, though the contingency reserve remained very small, at just
£lOOm for that second year. Without the reductions, the increase would have been
between 8% and 9% in each year. 204 Even then, Ministers had to look for a further
£lOOm in reductions to bring the total within their 1968/69 target, and make further
substantial savings (of up to another £500m) for 1969/70.205 Yet another cut - of
£290m for 1970/7 1 - was made in July 1969.206
PRO CAB 128/42: Cabinet minutes, 27 June, 6 July 1967
200 PRO CAB 128/42: Cabinet minutes, 20 December 1967
201 House of Commons debates, vol. 754, cot. 935: Callaghan statement, ' (exchange rate)', 20 November 1967
202 PRO CAB 128/42: Cabinet minutes, 21 November 1967
203 House of Commons debates, vol. 756, cols. 580-1592: Wilson statement, 'Public expenditure', 16 Januasy 1968
204 PRO CAB 129/135: Jenkins memorandum to Cabinet, 'Public expenditure, post-devaluation measures, 1968/69
estimates', 3 January 1968; PRO CAB 128/43: Cabinet minutes, 9 January, 11 January 1968; PRO CAB 129/136:
Jenkins memorandum to Cabinet, 'Public expenditure prospect', 26 March 1968; PRO CAB 128/43: Cabinet
minutes, 28 March 1968
205 PRO CAB 134/3204: Jenkins memoranda to SEP, 'Public expenditure', 14 June, 18 1968
206 PRO CAB 129/143: Jenkins memoranda to Cabinet, 'Public expenditure 1970/71, 'Public expenditure: report
on discussions on 1970/71, Public expenditure 1970/71', 15 July, 22 July, 28 July 1969; PRO CAB 128/44:
Cabinet minutes, 3 July, 17 July, 29 July 1969
130
Labour's national plans 1964-70
However many civil expenditure reductions were approved, they have also to
be set against Labour's huge defence cuts. The 1966 Defence Review recommended a
16% cut in defence spending by 1970, of £400m in cash terms, reducing its share of
GNP from 7% to 5% 207 This would involve 'a gradual... withdrawal from the Middle
East', though not, under US pressure and commitment to allies, from Britain's
position East of Suez.208 A further £ lOOm in cuts was requested of all the overseas
programmes in the post-July 1966 spending exercise, and £50m was the figure
actually achieved. 209
 Another £1 lOm was cut from defence in the immediate post-
devaluation exercise, with bombers, aircraft carriers and transports all cancelled.210
The real turning point came in January 1968. Despite a ferocious fight put up by
Healey, Ministers decided to cancel the American F 1-11 fighter-bomber. This,
Jenkins hoped, would save a further £350m over ten years. 21 ' Ministers also took the
decision to withdraw entirely from East of Suez by 1970/71, despite opposition in this
from both the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Office. 212
 Overall, Ministers
decided on a 12% cut in defence expenditure by 1972/73.
207 j Fielding, 'Coping with decline: US policy toward the British defence reviews of 1966', Diplomatic history
23, 4 (1999), pp. 634-5
208 PRO CAB 128/39: Stewart, in Cabinet minutes, 23 September 1965; Fielding, 'Coping', pp. 649-50
209 PRO PREM 13/861: Caliaghan to Stewart, 10 June 1966, Stewart to Callaghan, 'Proposed review of overseas
expenditure', 16 June 1966; PRO CAB 128/41: Cabinet minutes, 15 November 1966
2)0 PRO CAB 128/42: Cabinet minutes, 21 November 1967; Healey, Time, pp. 275-6
21) PRO CAB 129/135: Healy memorandum to Cabinet, 'Defence cuts: the Fl-i 1', ii January 1968; PRO CAB
128/43: Cabinet minutes, 4 January 1968, 12 January 1968; Healey, Time, p. 273
212 PRO CAB 129/135: Brown, Thompson memorandum to Cabinet, 'Defence cuts', 3 January 1968, Stewart
memorandum to Cabinet, 'Public expenditure, post-devaluation measures, defence cuts: negotiations with
Singapore and Malaysia', ii January 1968, Thompson memorandum to Cabinet, 'Defence cuts: discussions with
governments of Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore', 15 January 1968; PRO CAB 128/43: Cabinet
minutes, 4 January, 15 January 1968; Healey, Time, p. 293
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Chart 111.3. Government expenditure, 1964-70 (em, 1964 prices)
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Source: National income and expenditure (1971), table 50, p. 6
Table 111.4. Government expenditure as a percentage of GDP (excluding debt repayments,
market prices), 1964-70
Government expenditure! GDP (%)
	
1964	 40.7
	
1965	 41.6
	
1966	 45.4
	
1967	 46.1
	
1968	 45.3
	
1969	 46.0
	
1970	 44.7
Source: ibid, table 4.4, p. 53
Although Ministers did finally rein back on public expenditure, chart 111.3 and
table 111.4 demonstrate that public expenditure, despite the savings on defence,
remained on an upward trend, mainly due to increases in education and health
spending. Ministers' ambition to create a smooth public spending path, going up in
line with resources, was frustrated. Initially, all their costed options were for increases
- and they were planning for five years ahead, a very long time for any limit to hold.
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This was unrealistic, for it failed to take account of the political pressure that would
lead to Ministers continually taking political decisions to increase expenditure: and
the abolition of prescription charges, benefit upratings, extra capital expenditure on
hospitals and large expansions of local authority house building had all led to large
policy-driven spending increases by 1967. Since the growth targets were not met, the
growth of spending as a proportion of GDP was all the steeper.
Nor had the question of 'uncontrolled expenditure' been properly addressed.
Local government spending is a good instance of this, though MAFF farming
subsidies or nationalised industries' expenditure are also instructive examples. Central
government still did not have full control over councils' spending, only being to able
to influence expenditure through general grant levels, control over their access to
borrowing, and their veto on capital expenditure. This was evident during the 1965-66
deferment exercises, during which the Treasury was constantly frustrated in PESC by
claims that local authority spending could not be programmed with close accuracy.213
When Ministers came to consider a large cut in local authority expenditure in
the devaluation exercise, Stewart warned that they were 'in no position to enforce
this', even though the draft Estimates before them showed local authorities'
miscellaneous expenditure as the fastest-growing item since they had drawn up their
last Estimates for 1968/69.214 They were forced into the crude method of simply
capping Rate Support Grant increases in 1968/69 and 1969/70 to 3% a year. 215 By
1970 the Treasury was asking departments simply to bid for overall spending totals,
within which local authorities would be free to set their own priorities, but which
would act as proper ceilings on expenditure.216
213 
e.g. PRO EW 25/90: Henley to Allen, 'Moratorium on government procurement contracts', 6 July 1965; PRO T
277/1720: TPEC minutes, 29 March 1966
214 PRO CAB 129/135: Stewart memorandum to Cabinet, 'Public expenditure, post-devaluation measures, local
authority manpower', 3 January 1968; PRO CAB 129/135: Jenkins memorandum to Cabinet, 'Public expenditure,
post-devaluation measures, 1968/69 estimates, 3 January 1968
215 PRO CAB 128/43: Cabinet minutes, 11 January 1968; PRO PREM 13/2066: Greenwood to Wilson, 12 January
1968
216 PRO T 227/3118: Treasury memorandum, 'Control of local expenditure', June 1970
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Table 111.5. Government cost increases above general GDP cost increases, 1964-70
Government costs increases
above GDP costs in creases
1964	 2.4
1965	 1.7
1966	 2.8
1967	 1.4
1968	 2.9
1969	 3.3
1970	 2.1
Source: National Income and Expenditure (1971), table 16, p. 20
The RPE also continued to be a problem, as is clear from table 111.5. Public
expenditure reports did take account of this factor, with 'Clarke's law' stating in 1964
• that prices in the public sector, at 3% levels of economic growth, would rise by 3.7%
a year, as against 2.6% in the whole economy. 217 However, these figures turned out to
be under-estimates, with general prices rising into 1967 at 3.9% annually, while
government current prices were going up 4.5% a year. This meant that the relative
share of government spending, determined by the relationship of these two rates of
price rises, did not therefore rise as fast as Clarke predicted. But it also meant that in
cash terms, the Government continued to face large demands for 'pay and prices'
uprating, just to keep up with their pledges on spending in constant tenns. 218 The
Government did become more open about this effect, promising to publish figures
showing its influence in its annual White Papers. 219 However, by 1970 the issue of
differential productivity (and hence implied cost inflation) across different parts of
government spending was unresolved. Figures still did not exist to show the different
levels of RPE across different types of spending.22°
There was some progress towards more effective department budgeting,
encouraged by the Treasury, using the fashionable technique of output budgeting, or
217 PRO T 320/335: Downey to Nicholls, 'Chequers briefing: Clarke's law, 13 November 1964
218 PRO T 328/48: Edge to Roy, 'Medium term projections of public expenditure 196 1-66', 1 April 1967
219 Cmnd 4017, Public expenditure: a new presentation (April 1969), p. 9
220 PRO T 331/461: Levitt to Atkinson, 'The productivity differential: some problems', 23 April 1969, Levitt to
Widdup, 'The RPE for individual programmes', 2 January 1970
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Planning, Programming, or Budgeting. This was promoted by a June 1966 circular
from Heisby to Permanent Secretaries:
When Governments took less of the country's resources than now, the main question was
whether they should do more. As they have taken more and more resources, that question
has been changing into one of making choices, rejecting one thing in order to be able to
do another... Departments have made great efforts.., to find ways of ensuring that they
obtain the best value for money; for instance, by applying the techniques of cost
effectiveness, cost benefit analysis, investment appraisal, operational research, work
measurement, and so on. All this is good... But are there areas of expenditure.., where
there is a need for more systematic analysis...?22'
Experiments with PPB were greatly influenced by the American use of this technique
in military budgeting, and the MOD's own use of it in judging the relative merits of
spending in different branches of the Forces. 222
 Instead of measuring government
spending in terms of 'inputs', usually in cash, this technique attempted to measure
outputs, that is, how well that spending was meeting its objectives.
As a means of judging centrally where resources shouhed, it encouraged
enthusiasm for 'block budgeting' (see below), and Wilson's own preference for super-
departments with executive planning bureaux. PPB also stood behind the work being
done in the Programme Committees, expanding the work done on the inter-urban road
programme, defence procurement, and nationalised industries' investment to less
obvious, less narrowly economic, candidates such as health, housing and education.223
This in turn supported the work of Cabinet and Cabinet Committees when they came
to choose between priorities - though as a technical innovation only in the very early
stages of development, its influence should not be exaggerated.
Other, more important, technical improvements were being made. One
innovation of the public expenditure exercises from 1967 onwards was that public
expenditure was brought more closely together with medium-tenn economic
assessments. The vehicle for this was the Medium-Term Assessment Committee
' PRO T 277/1705: Helsby memorandum to Permanent Secretaries, 'Policy, planning and control', 13 June 1966
222 PRO PREM 13/837: Wigg to Wilson, 'Cost effectiveness', 20 November 1964; PRO T 277/1705: Secretary's
memorandum to TPEC, 'Output budgeting (functional costing)', 22 February 1966
See below, chapts. IV-VI
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(MTAC) set up in early 1967 to replace PCWP and work on a new National Plan.224
Although its work had not progressed far enough to contribute much to PESC in
1967, the 1968 PESC Report stated clearly that public expenditure 'will depend
mainly on the manner in which the economy as a whole develops.., on this the latest
assessment is given in the MTAC report'. 225
 In accordance with the new 'wedge'
philosophy, in which different models were built on high and low productivity
assumptions, MTAC gave figures for different economic outcomes on just this basis,
along with estimates of the effects of both planned, and lower, public spending.226
MTAC reports showed a range of options rather than simply the most hopeful, with
average growth figures of 2.6% to 3.5% all considered up to 1972.227
Along with the new realism went a renewed emphasis on central control, with
the Treasury operating a monthly 'running tally' on expenditure from summer 1966,
listing both new policy demands and pay and price upratings every month. 228 This
allowed the Chancellor to be warned immediately of any 'alarming' developments,
and in its revised form from September 1967 listed 'inevitable', 'possible' and
'unlikely' expenditure claims, for use by the Treasury alone, detailed not only their
cash value but their likely manpower, growth and taxation implications. 229
 From May
1968 similar figures went monthly to the Ministerial Steering Committee on
Economic Policy as well, and they seem to have been a much more salutary lesson in
224 PRO T 328/47: Allen to Sir W. Armstrong, 'Economic planning committees', 20 December 1966, Armstrong to
Allen, 'Economic planning committees', 6 January 1967; PRO EW 24/132: Jukes memorandum to MTAC, 'Sub-
committees of the MTAC', 2 February 1967
225 PRO T 277/1980: PESC report: summary report (June 1968), p. 5
226 PRO EW 24/133: MTAC report: economic outlook to 1972 (?June 1968), e.g. tables Al-2, A4-5. B2, B5, pp.
31-2, 34-5, 38,41
e.g. PRO EW 24/135: DEA memorandum to MTAC, 'Industrial production and employment in 1972', 4
December 1967, MTAC memorandum, 'Medium term outlook after devaluation', 19 December 1967
228 PRO T 277/1720: TPEC minutes, 12 August 1966
229 PRO T 331/232: Vinter to Sir William Armstrong, 'The running tally', 10 October 1967, Vinter meeting with
other Treasury officials, minutes, 11 August 1967
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public expenditure control than the annual 'star chamber' of PEC had been. 23° This
effectively allowed the Treasury direct monthly input into Ministerial decisions.23'
Another attempt to gain control was the Public Expenditure Review
Committee, set up by Jenkins in July 1968. This was a comprehensive 'internal
review of the working and effectiveness of the "post-Plowden" system'. It attempted
to resolve a number of outstanding questions, including the price conventions of
PESC, and the need for bringing public expenditure more closely into line with the
total growth of resources. 232
 It was made up of Treasury civil servants and officials
from the major spending departments, working in sub-groups before reporting to the
main committee. 233
 Treasury alarm at the upwards trend of public expenditure,
especially on a number of 'uncontrolled' spending items, for instance the Farm Price
Subsidy system and the BR deficit grant, was one reason for this. The economy was
also taking longer to recover than expected, and this was causing the tax take to be
lower than projected.234
Pressure was building up for reform elsewhere. A majority of SEP's members
argued that it had become just another committee taking ad hoc decisions, not setting
economic strategy as envisaged at its inception. These Ministers, unhappy at the 1968
cuts exercise, demanded a new presentation for public expenditure, allowing them to
see the 'real impact on resources', net of claw-backs in tax take, and allowing for the
fact that (as Crossman saw it) transfer payments had little impact on overall demand.
They were also attracted by 'block budgeting', in which they would be able to move
cash between individual programmes within each group of budgets (for instance,
health), so meeting particularly acute demands for spending without it costing more in
230 PRO CAB 13/3201: SEP minutes, 7 May 1968
PRO T 277/2001: Secretaries' memorandum to TPEC, 'Public expenditure: savings in 1968/69 and 1969/70', 13
May 1968
232 PRO PREM 13/2068: Allen to Permanent Secretaries, 10 July 1968
PRO T 277/1978: PESC minutes, 30 July 1968
234 PRO I 277/2001: Hudson to Baldwin, 'The threats of further pressure for increased public expenditure', 17 July
1968, Vinter memorandum to TPEC, 27 July 1968
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total. 235 There had been a long-running campaign by Crossman and Balogh, among
others, to have transfer payments treated differently in public accounting from
expenditure on goods and services, resisted by the Treasury on the grounds that the
Government still had to raise the money, whatever the impact on final resources of the
actual expenditure. 236 They were only prepared to accept that transfer payments had
'no effect' if they were exactly matched by increases in taxation.237
Treasury members of PERC made their aims clear from the start. They
attacked existing PESC practice for aiming at one 'focus' date, five years in the
future, in the jargon planning the 'target' rather than the 'path'. This in their view
reduced flexibility, meant that spending could move quickly out of line with
resources, and made for inherently less realistic target-setting for an unforeseeable
future. They wanted PESC to become a really meaningful 'planning, decision-taking
and monitoring' body, one that would plan the path as well as the target. 238 PERC's
first report was an attempt to tackle these concerns, though it made a series of
concessions to the Crossman-SEP view. In future, for each category of expenditure,
public spending would be set alongside net revenue, officials recommended. There
should also be a 'transfer of real resources' column in this new presentation, showing
the impact of public expenditure on demand, net of transfer payments. However, this
would not concede the simplistic view that transfer payments 'did not matter', and the
effects on savings, consumption and the timing of final demand changes would all be
drawn out for each different type of spending.239
The Treasury got a lot of what it wanted out of this committee, which
approved making the three-year 'focus' of the 1968 cuts a permanent part of PESC,
PRO PREM 13/2068: Jenidns to Wilson, 17 July 1967; PRO CAB 13/3201: SEP minutes, 15 July 1968; RCD,
15 July 1968: Crossman, Diaries (1977 edn.), vol. III, pp. 135-6
236 PRO PREM 13/270: Balogh to Wilson, 5 July 1965; PRO PREM 13/861: Crossman to Brown, 13 May 1966;
Balogh to Wilson, 'PESC exercise', 7 October 1966
PRO T 277/1714: Secretaiy's memorandum to TPEC, 'Transfer payments and public expenditure', 15
November 1966
PRO T 33 1/231: Treasury memorandum to all PERC sub-committees, 'What is PESC for?', (?August) 1968
239 PRO T 277/1973: Secretaries' memorandum to TPEC, 'PERC: first report', 15 October 1968
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though recommending more information on years one and two, and the longer term
beyond year three. 24° MTAC and PESC should also be brought together, the
committee argued, to tease out the real implications of each extra spending decision in
the medium term. This would reveal any 'prospective imbalance' between public
expenditure and the growth requirements of the real economy. 24 ' PERC was less
enthusiastic about block budgeting, especially where local authorities' role made
Whitehall direction too diffuse and distant to be make switching resources under
central criteria realistic: more studies were required on output budgeting before it
could be recommended across government. 242
 There was great enthusiasm in
Whitehall for PERC. 'By indicating clearly the nature of the real constraints', Ronnie
McIntosh of the Cabinet Office hoped, such a system 'would make it possible for
Ministerial control of public expenditure to be something more than the simple
process of sitting on the lid of a boiling kettle'.243
The public expenditure exercise of 1968 was informed by some of these
principles. Each spending category was judged on its real effects on resources,
especially helpful when Ministers were most concerned to secure a movement from
home demand to demand for exports. But this did not work how Crossman and
Balogh had imagined. Housing expenditure, for instance, was judged to be a good
candidate for cuts because almost all of it was on goods and services, rather than
transfers between individuals. 2 Longer-term work was furthermore to be handled by
an inter-departmental Steering Committee on Public Expenditure (SCOPE) under
Samuel Goldman, head of Public Income and Outlay, which would follow up the
240 PRO T 277/2307: PERC second report, January 1969
' PRO T 331/227: PERC sub-committee on economic implications of public expenditure, draft report, November
1968; PRO CAB 134/3210: Jenkins memorandum to SEP, 'Handling of the report of the public expenditure review
committee', 24 February 1969
242 PRO T 331/231: Secretary's memorandum to PERC sub-committee on block budgeting, 'Sub-committee report',
22 October 1968
243 PRO PREM 13/2068: McIntosh to Andrews, 'Public expenditure', 18 October 1968
244 PRO T 277/2002: TPEC minutes, 23 October 1968
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reforms listed in the PERC report. 245
 SCOPE recommended building a greater degree
of flexibility into the system: figures after the third year from the PESC exercise were
to be given on a much more tentative basis than the near-term figures, to increase the
realism and the flexibility of decision-making. 246
 Ministers, however, were impressed
enough with the exercise that they ordered the preparation of a White Paper on the
new methods. 247 This would help them meet Parliamentary pressure for more scrutiny
of government expenditure.248
None of this structural change would have been meaningful without the
political will to restrain public expenditure, and select priorities rather than postpone
choices into the future. This process was speeded by IMF pressure to restrain central
government borrowing, as part of their wider pressure for credit restriction. In their
Letter of Intent to the IMF of November 1967, the Government promised to hold
down their borrowing requirement in 1968 to not more than £lbn, a reduction from
the pre-devaluation projection of £1.5bn (though this in itself only involved holding
the increase in public spending in that year to 4%). Even this proved politically very
difficult, especially as the central government part of the borrowing requirement ran
£1 60m over target in May 1968, due to the same factors that led to the creation of
PERC - cost overruns, cancellation charges, and lower tax revenues than expected.
The IMF delegation to London immediately registered their 'alarm' at this.249
IMF views on this were an additional factor in Jenkins' continued efforts to
reduce public expenditure in 1969, for in a further Letter of Intent to the Fund Britain
was forced to accept targets for overall Domestic Credit Expansion, measuring
PRO T 277/2297: Secretary's memorandum to SCOPE, 'Terms of reference and membership', 14 January 1969;
PRO T 277/2229: Cousins memorandum to SCOPE, 'Membership of the committee', 1 August 1969
246 PRO T 277/2297: Marshall memorandum to SCOPE, 'Treatment of years 1 to 3 and 4 to 5 in an annual White
Paper', 2 April 1969
247 PRO CAB 134/3209: SEP minutes, 31 March 1969; Cmnd 4017, New presentation, pp. 7-9
248 PRO T 277/2229: Secretary's memorandum to SCOPE, 'Proposed Parliamentary Committee structure', 12 June
1969
249 PRO T 230/909: Treasury to IMF, 'Public expenditure and the borrowing requirement 1968/69', 21 May 1968,
Treasury/ Bank meeting with the IMF, minutes, 22 May 1968
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liquidity changes across the whole economy, in return for another $1 bn standby
credit.25° DCE targets subsumed the public sector borrowing objectives, but were
even more difficult for government to meet than the previous limits, as they relied on
the Government issuing more bonds to the non-banking sector to reduce total
credit.251 Treasury insiders feared that this might start a run on guts, as confidence in
them declined through over-issuing. 252 The £400m DCE target for public and private
credit expansion combined meant that there would have to be net government
repayment of debt in 1969/70 (900 was the target for that year, which would allow
for some economic expansion). 253 The Chancellor had already made public very tough
targets for public expenditure in February 1969, of 4.6% growth in 1968/69, 1% in
1969/70, and 2% for 1970/71.254 Some over-compensation then took place, with a
small reduction in 1969 allowing debt repayment on a scale that had certainly not
been seen since 1945 (see charts 11.4-11.5).
° PROT 326/979: Letter of Intent to IMF, 22 May 1969; House of Commons debates, vol. 785, cols. 1001-2:
Jenkins statement, 'International monetary fund (standby facilities)', 23 June 1969
RCD, 22 October 1968: Crossman, Diaries (1977 edn.), vol. III, pp. 23 1-2
252 PRO T 326/978: Robert Armstrong to Figgures, 'IMF standby and overall credit ceiling', 7 February 1969; PRO
PREM 13/2577: Graham to Wilson, 'Domestic credit and the IMF', 16 May 1969
253 PRO 1 326/979: Jenkins letter of intent to the IMF, 22 May 1969; House of Commons debates, vol. 785, cols.
1001-2: Jenkins statement, 'International monetary fund (standby facilities)', 23 June 1969
254 Cmnd. 3936, Public expenditure 1968/69 to 1970/71 (February 1969), table 2, p. 6; Pliatzky, Spending, p. 89
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Chart 111.4. Percentage increase! decrease in total government expenditure, 1964-70 (constant
1964 prices)
Sources: National income and expenditure (1971), table 50, p. 64; Economic trends (various)
Chart 111.5. Public sector deficit! surplus, 1964-70 (em, current prices)
Source: Blackaby, Policy, table 4.9, p. 187
142
Labour's national plans 1964-70
Labour had repeated many of the Conservatives' mistakes. They had, of
course, come to power committed to raising public spending, and they did so.
However, its tendency to keep rising, above and beyond Ministers' targets, continued.
The economy's refusal to grow at the expected rates also saw public spending, which
was hard to restrain once committed, soar as a proportion of GNP in 1966-67.
Although by 1970 a series of technical innovations had made it easier to monitor, plan
and control, the insistence on constant rather than cash prices continued, a Treasury
committee under Goldman rejecting cash limits in July 1969.255 Nor were there any
easy answers to the question of spending control on nationalised industries and local
authorities. Success in controlling expenditure in 1968-70 had rested on the leeway
given Jenkins by Sterling's parlous situation, and the intervention of international
monetary authorities, rather than on the reform of machinery. There is therefore little
evidence that the Plowden reforms had achieved their aims.
255 PRO T 331/534: Economic Section memorandum to Goldman ad hoc group, 'Cash limits on public
expenditure', 25 July 1969, Goldman meeting with other Treasury officials, minutes, 16 July 1969
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'Restiveness and dissatisfaction': Labour's plans for the regions
Labour wanted to give a new central direction to regional planning. In Opposition,
they had considered some very radical ideas, with Jay for one arguing that there
should be 'regional controllers' at the head of inter-departmental Regional Boards,
charged with both economic and environmental planning. 256
 In government, the party
also wanted to extend both the range and the geographical extent of regional aid to
industry. Labour's primary regional policy legislation, the Industrial Development
Act of 1966, was presented as just such a break with the past: as Jay told the
Commons, they had 'swept away entirely the misguided notion of small isolated
development districts'. 257 Instead of making regional incentives dependent on the
employment situation, the Government simply scheduled all of northern England, all
of Scotland except Edinburgh, most of Wales and the South West. The percentage of
the British population covered by incentives under the Local Employment Acts was
once again raised, from 16% to nearly 21%.258
These new Development Areas were also to be backed by higher rates of
Investment Grants paid out in Development Areas, replacing investment incentives
that, since they were paid out as a proportion of a company's tax bill, were seriously
advantageous only to large and highly profitable firms. As plans for the grants were
worked out during 1965, a number of senior advisors, including Kaldor and Roger
Opie, advocated payroll subsidies per worker to an investment subsidy (a position
which eventually issued in SET). 259 MacDougall appears to have agreed with them,
arguing (in the jargon) that Plan D was preferable to Plan E, since its effects would be
more immediate and dramatic. 260 However, they were overruled, since the majority of
256 LP LPRD memoranda, I, H/RD 466: Jay memorandum, 'Regional planning', May 1963
' House of Commons debates, vol. 728, col. 941: Jay speech, Industrial Development Bill, second reading, 16
May 1966
258 McCrone, Policy, p. 126
259 PRO EW 24/20: Opie, Stewart, Marquand to Macdougall, 'Payroll of investment subsidy for the depressed
regions', 5 May 1965, Kaldor memorandum to Fiscal Incentives Committee, 'The effects of differential payroll
taxes and subsidies on productivity', S May 1965, Fiscal Incentives Committee minutes, 21 May 1965
260 PRO EW 24/19: MacDougall to Burgh, 'Second Report of Sir Richard Clarke's Tax Committee', 12 March 1965
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members of the Fiscal Incentives Committee, most notably those from the DEA's
Industrial Division, objected to Plan D. They believed that payroll subsidies would
simply encourage declining labour-intensive industries to move to the Development
Areas, while subsiding employment might simply be passed on in wages and
prices.26 ' Ministers were therefore recommended to reject Plan D in favour of Plan
E's Investment Grants, and although Wilson had this conclusion sent back for further
consideration in June 1965, the result was the same. 262
Labour's wish for increased central direction was also to the fore. Economic
Planning Councils under the control of the DEA were set up to advise Ministers on
the 'broad strategy on regional development and the best use of the regions'
resources'. 263 There were to be two layers of regional planning machinery. Firstly,
Economic Planning Councils were created, made up of local businessmen, trade
unionists, academics, and local government representatives. Ministers also created
Economic Planning Boards, constituted of the regional officials of each Ministry, who
would provide the raw material (for instance on land use planning or transport
priorities) for the EPCs to consider.2M One out of the four divisions of DEA was to
work with the EPCs and EPBs on a series of regional plans that would hopefully
cover the entire country. 265 However, since the Government made it clear from the
start that neither of these new tiers would have executive powers, their input would
necessarily remain limited only to advice.
The role of the regional machinery also remained frustratingly elusive for the
members of these bodies, especially civil servants serving on EPBs. They certainly
261 PRO EW 24/20: Fiscal Incentives Committee minutes, 7 May 1965, BOT memorandum to same, 'Views of the
Board of Trade', 19 May 1965
262 PRO CAB 130/203: DEA, Treasury, and BOT report to MISC 1, Report on plans D and E', 15 June 1965; PRO
PREM 13/272: Brown to Wilson, 16 June 1965, Balogh to Wilson, 21 June 1965
263 House of Commons debates, vol. 703, col. 1829: Brown statement, regional economic planning, 10 December
1964; Mccrone, Policy, pp228, 230
264 DEA, Economic planning in the regions, pp5-6; DEA Progress Report, December 1965, pp7-8; Leruez,
Planning, p. 158; Bailey, Guide, pp87-8
265 Clifford, 'Department', pp 101-2
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did not make any significant contribution to the National Plan; indeed the South
Eastern EPB was not established until 1966. Ministries such as the Ministry of Labour
continually complained that there was no uniform structure, list of responsibilities, or
central direction on procedure. 266
 The regional machinery was supposed to come into
its own during the Plan review, providing advice on very long term environmental
issues over a twenty-year time span.267 Acting on this time-scale, there was very little
possibility of EPCs and EPBs deciding 'to dabble in 5 year planning'. 268
 They were
thus excluded from what the Government's preferred time-horizon for economic
planning.
Regional planning machinery was also handicapped by departmental rivalry.
MHLG, as its name implied, was traditionally responsible for co-ordinating the
physical planning responsibilities of local government, and tended to regard the EPCs
as a nuisance.269
 In areas of particular pressure on the housing stock, for instance the
South East and West Midlands, MHLG continuously attempted to wrest the lead on
environmental planning from DEA. 27° The DEA always wanted a role in planning
long-term population and industry distribution: for instance, it was the joint head of
their Regional Division, Jack Beddoe, who chaired the inter-departmental Long-Term
Population Distribution Committee in 196566.271 Beddoe and the other DEA
members of LTPD used their position to press for a 'wholly new' regional
environmental policy, developing virgin areas of the country for industry and
population, rather than concentrating on industrial overspill to New Towns. They
266 
e.g. PRO LAB 8/3345: MOL regional officers' conference, 13 January 1966; PRO LAB 8/3348: St John
Wilson to Dunnett, 19 May 1966
267 PRO EW 7/315: Steele memorandum, 'Developments in regional policy having implication for regional
planning and the need for more regional statistics', 3 May 1966
268 PRO EW 7/1145: Steele memorandum, 'Private sector planning, regions: why do we want information from
private industry on a regional basis?', 29 June 1966
269 
e.g. PRO CAB 134/2762: Environmental Policy Committee [EP] minutes, 20 February 1967
270 PRO EW 7/3 15: Beagley to Allen, 'The next stage in regional planning', 12 October 1967
27! PRO EW 7/513: Steele to Peterson, 'The next Plan: regional component', 20 October 1965
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particularly favoured the relocation of millions of people into Humberside, Dumfries
and Galloway, and Flintshire in North Wales.272
However, other departments were totally opposed to this idea. BOT argued
that there would not be enough mobile industry to encourage into these areas, and it
would not be successful even if it did move, given these areas' distance from the
'thriving industrial belt'. 273
 MHLG were even more aghast at LTPD's interim report,
written inside DEA, and insisted that work on housing needs should be carried out in
the official committee on environmental planning, where their ideas would take
precedence. This was in fact a fundamental clash between post-war urban planning
policy, with its emphasis on reducing urban overcrowding through moving jobs and
people to satellite towns, and a more radical movement of people and employment to
whole new regions. MHLG was committed to the more traditional ideas.274
This conflict was brought out very clearly when the DEA attempted to set up a
Central Unit for Environmental Planning. The idea of a central unit, bringing together
the work of all regional bodies and attempting to give them central direction, had
emanated from Roll and the DEA. But when Brown and Rodgers met Greenwood to
tell him about these plans, they had to accept that 'the intention was not to take away
functions from other Departments but to get away from the piecemeal planning of the
past'.275
 What the DEA hoped would become the nucleus of a national environmental
planning agency was in fact diverted to study the problems of Humberside, relying for
the physical planning aspects on a joint local authority team led by MHLG.276
 DEA
272 PRO EW 25/25 8: Secretaries' memorandum to LTPD, An alternative choice of strategy for long-term
population distribution', 20 January 1966, LTPD interim report, 9 May 1966
273 PRO EW 25/25 8: BOT memorandum to LTPD, 'Some distribution of industry problems during the remainder
of the century', 30 June 1966
274 PRO EW 25/259: Study group on long-term population distribution, minutes, 5 October 1967; PRO CAB
134/2763: Heaton memorandum to EP, 'The new towns programme', 8 May 1967; PRO CAB 134/2762: EP
minutes, 19 June 1967
275 PRO EW 7/315: Brown, Rodgers meeting with Greenwood, 14 June 1966
276 PRO EW 6/3: Cox, MHLG, to Vernon, DEA, 'Humberside', 13 July 1966
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had hoped to accommodate perhaps 500,000-750,000 more people in Humberside by
1981: MHLG made sure that the Humberside study recommended only 75,000.277
Nor was the DEA able to bring the EPCs into the heart of government
decision-making, for instance on public expenditure. The DEA tried very hard to
force regional expenditure considerations into PESC, and managed in early 1965 to
have public expenditure on new construction work broken down by region in PESC
figures. 278
 By autunm 1965, the next step envisaged by the DEA's Regional Division
was to bring the actual EPC reports into the PESC structure, to help guide expenditure
decisions through regional priorities. 279
 However, even the DEA was not united in this
desire, with senior members of Economic Planning and Public Expenditure Divisions
arguing that the idea was too complicated, and premature. 28° Departments also told
PESC that 'regional budgeting' under advice from EPCs was impracticable, with for
instance education and health only possessing regional figures for two years ahead,
not the five years of PESC. 28 ' This did not stop DEA continuing to press the idea
throughout 1967.282
277 PRO EW 6/27: Abbott to Jefferies, 'Humberside study - population assumptions, phasing of growth', 28 March
1968
278 PRO EW 25/28: Rees to Brown, 11 January 1965, Goodhart to Henley, 'PESC - regional information', 2
February 1965
279 PRO EW 7/513: Emanuel to Cory, 'Public expenditure and regional policy', 11 October 1965, Officials'
meeting, 'Public expenditure and regional policy', minutes, 18 October 1965
EW 25/30: Henley to Cory, 'Public expenditure and regional policy', 2 November 1965; PRO EW 7/513:
Grieve Smith to Peterson, 'Public expenditure in the regions', 4 November 1965, Henley to Beddoe, 'Public
expenditure and regional planning', 4 November 1965
281 PRO T 277/1593: TPEC minutes, 15 November 1965; PRO EW 25/30: Balogh to Brown, 17 November 1965,
Departments to Kitcatt, secretary of PESC, 24 November 1965
282 PRO EW 25/404: DEA memorandum to working group on regional public expenditure, 'Preparation of material
for the EPCs and EPBs', 8 May 1967; PRO EW 25/414: Working Group on regional public expenditure, minutes,
11 May,7 July 1967
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Here there was a more fundamental problem than departmental rivalry, for
allowing EPCs input into spending policy ran counter to the realities of government.
As one Treasury official put it privately:
While DEA are anxious to give the councils some sense of performing a role in relation
to public expenditure, our whole system of allocation and control is operated through
Departments which work on a national scale. There is no machinery whereby a regional
council could bring about a reduction in the road programme in their region in order to
provide more schools, because if they could persuade the Minister of Transport that
their region needs less roads, that Minister would... wish to use the available resources
elsewhere in the roads block, and not make a present of it to the Secretary of State for
Education.283
More widely, the Treasury was quite correct in its basic argument that the
regional bodies would always have quite different priorities, which had to be
reconciled at the centre. For instance, those EPCs outside the areas that would benefit
from the Regional Employment Premium (see below) were furious that it was
adopted. 284 The South East EPC wanted a looser IDC control to allow small firms to
expand on site, quite contrary to the interests of the other regions.285 Even the DEA's
own regional planning division realised that EPCs tended 'to be regional pressure
groups without the limitations imposed by powers and financial responsibilities'.286
The whole point of receiving reports from every area of Britain was to fit them
together in a national framework - meaning that the answer to EPCs would
sometimes have to be 'no r. By 1967, even the head of DEA's Regional Division,
Arthur Peterson, doubted the worth of having regional planning councils at all.287
The Government was in fact forced to reject outright a number of EPC reports,
for instance that for the West Midlands, which called for a massive overspill housing
operation and the lifting of office and industrial building restrictions, given the
283 PRO 1 331/120: Marshall to Isaac, 'Working group on regional public expenditure: draft paper on public
expenditure', 11 September 1968
284 e.g. PRO EW 25/301: East Anglian EPC to DEA, 'REP', 15 May 1967
285 South East EPC, A strategy for the South East (HMSO, London, 1967), p. 64
286 PRO EW 7/315: Beagley to Allen, 'The next stage in regional planning', 12 October 1967
287 PRO EW 7/315: Peterson to Burgh, 'Future development of the regional machinery', 27 October 1967
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priority Labour gave to the Development Areas. 288
 EPCs and EPBs had never been
envisaged as having actual executive powers of their own: but the hopes of 1964-65,
that they could form a potent source of advice, were thwarted by both departmental
rivalry and the sheer pressure of choosing regional priorities at the centre. 289
 Only
DEA and MOT 'freely consulted' with the regions: given the important regional
responsibilities of other particularly MHLG, consultation must be accounted a
failure. 29° Stewart reported on the EPCs' 'restiveness and dissatisfaction' in February
1967, while some of the EPC reports explicitly called for more help with research and
administration if they to make any headway. 291
 Despite continued efforts, and Prime
Ministerial intervention, the experiment with regional power sharing was a failure.292
Regional planning ran into other problems. The whole basis of SET, for
instance, in discriminating against services, was highly controversial in geographically
isolated areas of Britain that relied on tourism. By aiding manufacturing in the
Midlands, SET directly contradicted the Government's regional policies. The DEA
estimated that only £18m was taken out of the economy of the Midlands annually by
SET, £21m from the North West, and £23m from Scotland.293
 Those within
government (Kaldor, for instance) who had always preferred a regional payroll
subsidy to investment grants, were able to argue that SET should therefore be
West Midlands EPC, The West Midlands: patterns ofgrowth (HMSO, London, 1967), pp. 54-50, 52-5 PRO
EW 7/682: Shore to GAH Cadbury, 'Government's views on the Council's first report', 20 December 1967
289 PRO EW 6/100: DEA memorandum to meeting of EPB chairmen, 4 July 1968
290 PRO EW 24/200 II: Shore meeting with EPC chairmen, 17 October 1968
291 PRO CAB 134/2762: Stewart memorandum to EP, 'Regional economic planning councils', 14 February 1967;
North West EPC, Strategy II: the North West of the 1970s (HMSO, London, 1967), pp. 66-7
292 
e.g. PRO PREM 13/1399: Wilson to Stewart, 7 March 1967, Stewart to Wilson, 21 March 1967, 8 May 1967
293 PRO EW 25/348: Scottish Office memorandum to SET sub-group on regional differentiation, The case for
regional differentiation', 27 October 1966; PRO T 328/198: MacLennan, Dewar meeting with Callaghan, minutes,
14 March 1967; House of Commons debates, vol.730, cots. 1575-6: Callaghan oral answer, 'SET', 28 June 1966;
PRO 1 320/667: DEA memorandum to SET sub-group on regional differentiation, 'Regional effects of SET', 12
September 1966
150
Labour's national plans 1964-70
amended, to use it as a regional as well as a sectoral economic implement.294
Callaghan ordered a review of this in October 1966.295
This review recommended that SET indeed be altered, but in the most
conservative way possible, to cover only areas where tourism was vital for the
economy - the South West, West Wales, and the Scottish Highlands. 296
 Some of the
ideas in this report were embodied in the 1969 Tourism Development Act, with grants
for developing hotels and leisure industries. 297
 But the idea of a regional payroll tax
and subsidy remained controversial. BOT carried on its opposition to regional payroll
differentiation, continuing to argue that physical measures, for which it was
responsible, would have more impact. 298
 However, Callaghan (prompted by Kaldor)
was attracted by the possibility of 'selective reflation', boosting demand in depressed
areas without having to raise additional taxes to prevent over-heating, as well as the
promise of further Treasury leadership on this issue, given its responsibility for the tax
system.299
 He therefore brushed aside colleagues' argument that the proposed £l-2 per
man, per week, rebate on manufacturing employment in the Development Areas would
do nothing for tourism and services in these areas, which would have to be helped in
other ways, at further cost.300
Such ideas were at the root of the June 1967 Green Paper that proposed a
Development Area rebate from SET, additional to the manufacturing premium, of 30s
294 PRO LAB 8/3436: Kaldor to Bretherton, 'Regional incentives', 3 Januaiy 1967
295 PRO T 320/667: SET sub-group on regional differentiation, minutes, 12 October 1966
296 PRO EW 25/348: Secretaries' memorandum to SET sub-group on regional differentiation, Report to SET
working group, 14 November 1966
297 Public genera/acts and measures 1969, vol. II, c.51, pp. 1427-3 1: Development of Tourism Act, 25 July 1967
29S PRO T 3 20/669: BOT memorandum, 'Regional aspects of SET, 3 Januaiy 1967; PRO LAB 8/343 6: Callaghan
meeting with Stewart, Ross, Jay, Gunter, Benn, minutes, 22 February 1967; PRO CAB 134/3198: Jay
memorandum to SEP. 'Financial assistance to development areas', 2 March 1967
299 He commented 'we should keep control of it'; PRO T 328/198: Baldwin to Edwards, 'Regional employment
premium', 20 March 1967; B lick, 'Revolutionaries', chapter IV, pp. 74-5
°° PRO CAB 134/3198: Callaghan memorandum to SEP, 'The development areas: a proposal for a regional
employment premium', 1 March 1967; PRO CAB 134/3196: SEP minutes, 6 March 1967
151
Labour's national plans 1964-70
per week for every full time male employee, 15s for women, 15s for boys, and 9s 6d
for girls. This was a product of 'selective reflation', since this Regional Employment
Premium might help the planned economic upswing 'to be achieved without adding
effectively to inflationary pressures or leading to any worsening in the balance of
payments'.30 ' Despite opposition from the CBI, the Government adopted REP for just
this reason. 302
 It was thought that increased re-training opportunities and investment
grants in the Development Areas would allow firms to take advantage of the higher
unemployment rates in those areas. 303
 MOL officials were highly sceptical as to
whether this could be achieved, and feared that REP would be passed on in wages.304
However, Ministers decided that the original scheme should go ahead. 305 The
Government increased regional employment subsidies further in April 1968, when the
SET manufacturing industry premium (worth 7s 6d a week, per male worker) was
withdrawn, since the premium was kept for Development Areas for another year.306
As Ministers and officials had realised when preparing REP, giving more and
more aid to Development Areas was harming the prospects of adjacent localities.
MHLG, for instance, had pressed very hard for New Towns to be included in REP, so
that they could attract new industry. There was also pressure for the so-called 'grey
areas', most notably North East Lancashire, Plymouth, Cardiff, and South East Wales,
to be included. The pressure for some extension of government aid was clearly
increased by the increased strength of regional policy. 307
 Officials warned that there
301 Cmnd 3310, The development areas: regional employment premium (June 1967), p. 4-6
302 The CBI's counter-advocacy of a profit-related regional incentive is summarised in UWMRC MSS
200C/l/1/E/3 18.68: CBI Office memorandum, 'CBI regional study', September 1968
303 PRO EW 25/301: DEA memorandum to Environmental Planning Official Committee, 'Economic assessment of
comments on the Green Paper', 10 May 1967; PRO PREM 13/1441: Allen, DEA, to Halls, No. 10, 'Unofficial note
of CBI Grand Council Conclusions on 17th May about REP', 17 May 1967
PRO LAB 8/3436, PRO T 224/1385: Treasury/ DEAl MOT/ MPBW meeting, 'REP', minutes, 18 May 1967
305 PRO CAB 134/3 196: SEP minutes, 23 May 1967; PRO CAB 128/42: Cabinet minutes, 25 July 1967
306 PRO CAB 128/42: Cabinet minutes, 16 November 1967; House of Commons debates, vol. 757, cols. 664-5:
Diamond speech, Revenue (no. 2) Bill, Second Reading debate, 8 Februrary 1968
307 307
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would be calls for Bridlington, Fylde and North Wales coast, North Norfolk and South
Devon, to be scheduled if those 'grey areas' were helped.308
Structural economic changes were also driving this process. The planned run-
down of mining in localities outside Development Areas, for instance in Leicestershire
and Yorkshire, where the government was offering more spending on roads and
special supplements to employment benefits for unemployed miners, was a cause of
particular concern. 309 A 'mixed' enquiry, composed of both civil servants and outside
experts, was appointed in summer 1967, under Sir Joseph Hunt, to look at the
problems of the 'intermediate areas', as they became known.31°
However, it might take two years for the Report to be completed. As the
employment situation worsened through 1967 and 1968, pressure therefore built up for
interim measures that could be taken within existing powers. Frustration grew in
Whitehall that the Hunt Inquiry was delaying government action. 311 But without the
perceived authority of a Report Ministers themselves had commissioned, and its
hoped-for quantitative guide to 'grey area' selection, Ministers proved unable to
decide on extensive measures of help to these areas. 312 Help was again only given on
the public expenditure side, amounting to over £7m of capital works brought forward,
in parallel with the 1967-68 winter works exercise.313
The Government did take interim action in the coal-mining areas. A number of
colliery closures were deferred: eight out of thirty six were put back by between three
308 PRO CAB 130/338: BOT memorandum to MISC 168, Industrial investment, 'Investment incentives in grey
areas', 8 September 1967
Cmnd 3438, Fuel policy (November 1967), pp. 50-1; PRO CAB 134/2761: Peterson memorandum to EP, 'The
colliery closure programme', 23 May 1966
'° PRO PREM 13/2587: Jay to Stewart, 13 June 1967; PRO T 224/1384: Bretherton to Bell, 7 June 1967
PRO BT 177/2416: Darling memorandum, 'Yorkshire and Lancashire grey areas', 27 October 1967,
Whitehouse memorandum, 'Yorkshire and Lancashire grey areas', 30 October 1967, Crosland! Darling meeting,
minutes 3 November 1967
312 PRO CAB 134/2766: Shore memorandum to EP, 'Interim assistance for intermediate areas, 29 March 1968
PRO CAB 130/356: Dell memorandum to MISC 168, 'Investment projects in the grey areas', 30 January 1968
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and six months during the winter of 196768.314 Some extension of travel-to-work and
retraining grants, and £6m more in minor roadworks, were also allocated in the areas
listed for closures, though such action was confined to those very small areas where
unemployment might go above 8%.315 More interventionist schemes were also
developed to help these areas, which became known as 'Special Development Areas'.
These included a central Relocation Corporation with executive powers, though this
was eventually thought impractical. 316
 Government eventually settled on a 10% grant
on the purchase and operation of capital goods, over and above the 20% non-
Development Area rate already in place. 317
 Bespoke regional aid had been designed
with one particular group of localities in mind, a crucial pointer to the future - though
the cost was only LiOm over the first two years.318
The Hunt Report, published in April 1969, was in the end deeply unpopular in
government, on grounds of cost, the geographical extent of the proposed intermediate
areas, and IDC policy. Hunt recommended that Merseyside be de-listed, while the
whole of the North West and Yorkshire and Humberside economic planning regions
should be designated as 'intermediate areas' with 25% building grants available for
new industry, and a 15-year plan for the clearance of derelict land. This would attract
85% central government grants. IDC policy, Hunt recommended, should be relaxed,
with the lower exemption limit raised from 5,000 square feet to 10,000 319 But officials
314 PRO CAB 134/2764: Burrett memorandum to EP, 'Rundown of coal industry - possible measures of assistance
for localities with high unemployment', 11 September 1967; PRO CAB 134/2762: EP minutes, 12 September
1967; PRO CAB 134/3 196: SEP minutes, 26 September 1967; PRO PREM 13/1414: Halls to Burgh, 12
September 1967
313 PRO CAB 134/2764: Secretaries' memorandum to EP, 'Rundown of coal industry - possible measures of
assistance for localities with high unemployment', 12 October 1967; PRO CAB 134/2762; EP minutes, 17 October
1967; PRO EW 7/1160: Lomax to Casey, Vernon, 'Road improvement in special development areas', 19 July 1968
316 PRO EW 7/1165: Williams to Shore, 'Public ownership and special development areas', 29 January 1968, Shore
meeting with officials, minutes, 13 February 1968
317 PRO CAB 134/2762: EP minutes, 10 November 1967; PRO EW 7/1157: Burgh to Peterson, 'Super-
development areas', 31 October 1967, Peterson to Burgh, 3 November 1967
318 PRO EW 7/1161: O'Bnen to Caplan, 'Special development areas', 16 December 1968
Cmnd 3998, The intermediate areas (April 1969), pp. 150-1
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had already decided that such proposals 'would involve spreading resources too
thinly', as well as being 'expensive.., and the effects... long term and uncertain'.320
Allen and the rest of the official committee on economic policy preferred a much more
tightly drawn list of areas to help, with help tied to the creation of employment (a
criterion which Hunt wanted to abandon).32'
Many Ministers were also bitterly opposed to Hunt's recommendations. Even
before the report was published, Gwyneth Dunwoody, Crosland's junior Minister at
BOT, had already concluded that the rumoured inclusion of all of Lancashire and
Yorkshire within intermediate areas would be unacceptable, diluting government help
to truly needy regions. 322
 Furthermore, most Cabinet Ministers disagreed with
downgrading Merseyside, which was one of the measures Shore thought 'would
undoubtedly dishearten our supporters and give gratuitous encouragement to the
Opposition'.323 Most Ministers agreed, those broadly on the Right worried that
intermediate areas would be just another step towards near-universal expenditure on
support for industry, and those on the Left resisting an apparent attempt to down-grade
the Development Areas. Wilson came up with a typically ingenious compromise at
SEP: the whole of the 'Hunt areas' would be designated Intermediate Areas, but this
would mean only the adoption of a liberal IDC policy. Special zones within the grey
areas would then be selected for further aid using grants and loans.324
The Environmental Planning committee of Cabinet was asked to work out the
details. 325
 A two-tier solution was adopted for the intermediate areas, meaning that
there were now to be six tiers of regional policy in all. 25% Building grants and the
full range of BOTAC assistance would be available in the Yorkshire coalfield, South
320	 CAB 134/3211: Secretaries' memorandum to SEP, 'Report of the working group on fiscal and economic
aspects of regional policy', 13 March 1969
321 PRO CAB 134/32 12: Allen memorandum to SE?, 'Intermediate areas: the Hunt Report: memorandum on the
issues for decision', 14 March 1969
PRO BT 177/2417: Dunwoody to Crosland, 'Hunt Committee', 14 November 1968
323 PRO CAB 134/3212: Shore memorandum to SEP, 'Regional policy: Hunt Report', 17 March 1969
324 PRO CAB 134/3209: SEP minutes, 19 March 1969
325 PRO CAB 134/3212: Shore memorandum to SE?, 'Regional policy: Hunt Report', 10 April 1969
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East Wales, Plymouth, parts of North Eastern Lancashire, Northern Humberside, part
of Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire coalfield area, and Leith. The rest of the Hunt
'intermediate areas' were to be eligible, as were those priority zones, for 75% derelict
land grants and liberal IDC policies.326
One of the basic problems had been that, at a time of public expenditure
constraint, Ministers only had been able to allocate about £20m to the new policy. This
caused a bitter debate on where the money was to come from, which Crossman
excoriated as '[getting out] the pork barrel, sorting it out and sweating it round'. 327
 But
the intermediate areas could not now be ignored, despite Benn and Jenkins being
against Hunt in its entirety. Crossman wrote of the crucial meeting of SEP that 'so
• many promises have been made in Blackburn... Humberside... Yorkshire...
Derbyshire and... Plymouth that all kinds of expectations have been built up'. 328
 The
Cabinet at first settled on offsetting savings by reducing Investment Grants in
Development Areas from 40% to 35%. However, Crosland and BOT (unhappy with
the whole idea of intermediate areas) were able to delay final commitment by arguing
that the Government's aluminium smelter project would be endangered. 329 They were
able to force a review, during which Ministers decided instead to withdraw the 7s 6d
regional SET premium to pay for Intermediate Area measures. Given REP, this was
thought to be less politically hazardous.33°
326 PRO CAB 134/3209: SEP minutes, 21 April 1969; PRO CAB 129/141: Shore memorandum to Cabinet, 'The
Hunt Report', 22 April 1969; House of Commons debates, vol. 782, cols. 669-71: Shore statement, 'Hunt
Committee (Report)', 24 April 1969
327 RCD, 21 April 1969: Crossman, Diaries (1977 edn.), vol. III, pp. 448-9
322 PRO CAB 134/3209: SEP minutes, 17 April 1969; RCD, 17 April 1969: ibid. p. 444
329	 CAB 129/141: Crosland memorandum to Cabinet, 'Hunt Committee Report; Investment grants', 23 April
1969; RCD, 24 April 1969: Crossman, Diaries (1977 edn.), vol. LII, p. 452
330 PRO CAB 128/44: Cabinet minutes, 24 ApriL 1969; PRO T 328/444: Crosland to Diamond, (May?) 1969,
Diamond to Wilson, 22 May 1969, Bean to Wilson, 2 June 1969; PRO CAB 134/32 13: Diamond memorandum to
SEP, 'Intermediate areas: offsetting savings, 3 June 1969; PRO CAB 134/3209: SEP minutes, 6 June 1969
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Table 111.6. Refusal of IDC applications, 1964-70.
Year	 IDC refusals, percentage ofpossible
employment refused as percentage of
total official applications
1965	 27.5
1966	 26.9
1967	 24.5
1968	 17.6
1969	 18
1970	 20.5
Source: Moore & Rhodes, 'Effects', table A4, p. 109
Labour's large increase in regional expenditure did give much less of a relative
boost to industry in the Development Areas than the absolute figures suggest, since
Investment Grants, unlike the allowances and incentives that prevailed before 1966,
were paid out across the country. But traditional policies were continued, and usually
intensified. IDC refusals, for instance, ran higher than the Conservative years, at least
in the expansionary earlier phase of Labour government. In the later phase, the lower
pressure of demand for new industrial premises, the Hunt Report's recommendation of
a more liberal IDC policy, and greater scepticism about the extent of mobile industry,
all led to a relative easing - though never back to the laissez faire attitude that
prevailed before the 'new approach' (see table 111.6).
The lower exemption for factory building expansion, below which IDC control
did not apply, was lowered from 5,000 square feet to only 1,000 in 1965. Ministers
rejected Hunt's recommendation that this lower limit should be raised again. 33 ' Labour
also introduced controls over office building in London, a measure the Conservative
had considered and rejected in 1962. From 1965, Office Development Permits, on the
same lines as IDCs, were required for new or expanded office space: this control
covered the South East, Midlands and East Anglia by 1966.332
331 House of Commons debates, vol. 717, cots. 228-31: Callaghan statement, 'Balance of payments, government
measures, 27 July 1965; House of Commons debates, vol. 782, cols. 669-71: Shore statement, 'Hunt Committee
(Report)', 24 April 1969
332 PRO CAB 128/39: Cabinet minutes, 3 November 1964; McCrone, Policy, p. 130
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Moreover, by 1969/70, investment grants disbursed in Development Areas
were massively disproportionate to their population and economic importance: overall
help remained far above LEA expenditure under the Conservatives (see table 111.7).
Government factory building and derelict land clearance had been exempted from the
1965 six month spending moratorium, the cuts of 1966 and the emergency devaluation
exercise. 333
 These programmes were increased in November 1966 and April 1967.
Local authorities were encouraged to use the NCB's expertise in land clearance, and a
more benevolent attitude taken towards such expenditure, from spring 1967.
Ministers remained keen on 'physical' regional policy throughout 1964-70, with
increased factory building authorised in March 1970.336 Overall expenditure under the
Local Employment Acts, derelict land payments, and advance factory building can be
followed in tables 111.8-111.9.
Table IlL 7. Investment grant payments (em, 1968 prices, excluding shipbuilding)
Total paid out in Development Areas Total paid out DAs as % of total
1967/68	 152.13	 294.00	 51.74
1968/69	 184.25	 415.13	 44.39
1969/70	 188.15	 461.67	 40.75
Source: BUT! Mintech, Reports on the Industrial Development Acts, 1967/68, table 8, p. 8, 1968/69, tables 6-7, pp.
8, 10, 1969/70, tables 5-6, p. 7
" PRO 1 277/1714: TPEC memorandum, 'Public expenditure review and regional policy', 16 September 1966
PRO CAB 134/3195: Secretaries' memorandum to SEP, 'Advance factory programme', 11 November 1966;
PRO CAB 134/2761: Jay memorandum to EP, 'Further measures in the Development Areas', 18 November 1966,
EP minutes, 23 November 1966; PRO CAB 134/3198: Jay memorandum to SEP, 'Development areas: further
measures', 20 April 1967; PRO CAB 134/3 196: SEP minutes, 24 April 1967
" PRO CAB 134/2761: Greenwood memorandum to EP, 'Derelict land', 30 November 1966; PRO CAB
134/3198: Jay memorandum to SEP, 'Financial assistance to development areas', 2 March 1967; PRO BT
177/24 15: MHLG Circular 17/67, 10 March 1967
336 PRO CAB 134/2771: Urwin memorandum to EP, 'Advance factory programme 1970', 10 March 1970, Varley
memorandum to EP, 'Advance factory programme', 11 March 1970, Ross memorandum to EP, 'Advance factory
programme 1970', 16 March 1970, EP minutes, 18 March 1970
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Table 111.8. LEA and derelict land reclamation payments, 1964-70 (sm, 1964 prices)
Total LEA payments Derelict land paym ents	 Total help
1964/65	 40.61	 1.08	 41.69
1965/66	 40.38	 0.65	 41.03
1966/67	 50.91	 0.08	 50.99
1967/68	 41.65	 1.92	 43.57
1968/69	 47.00	 1.74	 48.73
1969/70	 68.08	 1.82	 69.90
Sources: BOT/ Mintech, Reports on the Local EmploymentActs, 1964/65, table VI, p. 8, p. 10, 1965/66, table VI, p.
6, pp. 10-11, 1966/67, table VI, and text, p. 8, 1967/68, table VIII, p. 8, pp. 10-11, 1968/69, table VIII, p. 8, p. 11,
1969/70, appendices IIIB, tables 1-4, pp. 2 1-2, IIIC, tables 1-2, p. 23, hID, table, p. 24, VII, p. 31, tables 1-2, p. 34
Table 111.9. Government advance factory building, 1964-70
Number Area (000s sgfl) Cost (fm, 1964 prices)
1964/65	 130	 3273	 12.73
1965/66	 114	 3148	 11.77
1966/67	 120	 3096	 13.20
1967/68	 101	 2572	 10.35
1968/69	 134	 3039	 11.89
1969/70	 149	 3492	 14.61
Sources: BOT/ Mintech, Reports on the Local Employment Acts, 1964/65, table I, p.4, 1965/66, table I, p.3,
1966/67, table I, p. 2, 1967/68, table I, p. 3, 1968/69, table I, p. 2, 1969/70, app. LIlA, table 1, p. 42
Chart 111.6. Percentage unemployment in three regions against GB average (not seasonally
adjusted), 1964-70
Source: MOL Gazette (January 1968), tables 104-116, pp. 62-74, (February 1971), tables 104-116, pp. 198-210
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Chart 111.7. Development areas' unemployment against GB average, 1966-70 (not seasonally
adjusted, % of work-force)
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However, many of these policy instruments had been available since the 1930s,
and pressure grew, for instance on Labour's NEC, for more 'selective' measures, with
the NEC Study Group on Regional Strategy in 1969 recommending more central
direction in regional policy and increased discretion and selectivity in the payment of
Investment Grants. 337
 Crosland therefore launched a wide-ranging internal review in
November 1969.338 This too was focussed on 'more industrial selectivity', in doing so
revealing a worrying lack of information and regional organisation and having to start
from scratch on the effectiveness of REP, the mobility of employment, and the
prospects for the declining industries in the Development Areas. 339 By the time Labour
" HABLP NEC minutes vol. 9 (April - July 1968), p75: HABLP RD 1111, Re 523: LPRD memorandum, 'Study
group on regional policy: summary of draft report', October 1969
PRO CAB 134/2770: Crosland memorandum to EP, 'Review of regional policy', 14 November 1969; PRO
CAB 134/2771: Crosland memorandum to EP, 'Review of regional policy', EP minutes, 23 March 1970; PRO BT
177/2762: Andrews to Coates, 'Review of regional policy', 25 March 1970, Heaton to Leckie, 26 March 1970
PRO BT 177/2762: BOT memorandum to regional policies review group, 'The contribution of regional offices',
April 1970, Regional policies review group minutes, 23 April 1970
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left office, the review had therefore reached only preliminary conclusions, though it
was clearly sceptical about the amount of mobile industry that could be forced into the
Development Areas.34°
Labour in power had enormously expanded both the geographical range, and
the cash value, of regional policy. But the aim was fundamental re-orientation, away
from the relief of local unemployment and towards regional development as a whole.
Despite a range of innovations, this had met with only partial success. Nor, as charts
111.6 and 111.7 make clear, had a marked improvement in the problem areas' relative
regional unemployment situation - or in the case of the South West, a reduction in its
reliance on seasonal tourism for employment - been achieved, though of course
• absolute levels of unemployment in those areas would have been even higher if
regional policy had not existed at all. 34 ' The promised regional planning machinery
was emasculated by departmental vested interests and at odds with some of the
realities of government: it quickly fell by the wayside. 'Industrial selectivity' seemed a
fruitful source of new ideas, but had not progressed beyond inchoate ideas by June
1970. It was no wonder that some Ministers, and others within the wider Labour Party,
were questioning the whole basis of regional policy itself.
°	 CAB 134/2771: EP minutes, 29 April 1970
" Though there is a discussion of the difficulties ofjudging the counterfactual effects of regional policies as
against inaction in E.G. West, "Pure" versus "operational" economics in regional policy', in G. Hallett, P. Randall
& idem (eds.), Regional policyfor ever? (lEA, London, 1973), pp. 108-9, 120-21, 129-31, 139-40
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EDUCATION
[Education was] a Looking Glass country, where it was always necessary to run faster and
faster to stay in the same place.
-Sir William Pile, 1979'
'Savage reductions': the paradox of expansion, 1959-64.
Education should have been a Conservative success story, for it fully shared in the
gains of prosperity. As charts IV 1 and IV. 2 show, a long-term shift of resources to
education began in this period. Between 1951 and 1964, Education's share of national
income rose from 3% to nearly 5042 The Conservatives built 6,754 new schools, and
reduced the pupil-teacher ratio; at constant prices, they increased Education spending
from £366m to £919m. 3 The expansion was especially noticeable in Higher
Education, where eight new Universities and tens of thousands more student places
were created.4 By 1960 it had been clear to the Minister of Education, David Eccies,
that more pupils were staying on at school until 18, and taking A Levels, while
University provision was failing to keep pace. The appointment of an inquiry into
University provision, under Lord Robbins, began as an attempt to relieve this
frustration.5
Robbins' recommendation of expansion was never in doubt. Anticipating this,
the Government had already announced an increase from 113,000 to 150,000
University students between 1961 and 1965. This would allow a target of 170,000 for
'W. Pile, The Department of Education and Science (Allen & Unwin, London, 1979), p21
2 Convatjve Manifesto 1964, Prosperity with a purpose: Craig, Man ifestos, p. 248
M. Seaborne & R. Lowe, The English school, vol. II: 1870-1970 (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1977), table
II,p. 155;AAS(1958, 1963, 1971)
W.A.C. Stewart, Higher education in post-war Britain (Macmillan, London, 1989), pp. 95-6, tables 15.1, 15.4,
pp. 268, 274
PRO CAB 134/1665: Eccles, Boyle memorandum to Education Committee, 24 March 1960, Education
Committee, minutes, 12 April, 2 November 1960; PRO CAB 134/1665: Butler memorandum to Education
Committee, 'Full time higher education', 27 October
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the early 1970s. 6 The Robbins proposals were even more radical, for not only did the
Report recommend sweeping away distinctions between all types of HE, it envisaged
an expansion of HE numbers to 560,000 by the academic year 1980-81, from a 1962-
63 base of 216,000. 350,000 of these places were to be provided in Universities.7
Some in the Treasury were horrified at the 'lowering of... academic standards'
implicit in wider access, and a Treasury-led working party was also highly sceptical.8
Nonetheless, Ministers accepted most of the Robbins Report. 9
 The Cabinet thus
agreed to 197,000 University places by 1967-68 - though Boyd-Carpenter would have
liked to keep that to 170,000 - though keeping its options open on l980-81.'°
Consequently, the last academic year for which Conservative Ministers budgeted
(1964-65) saw University spending at £157m, a huge rise from the £67.9m spent in
1959-60."
6 PRO ED 150/125: Boyle to Boyd-Carpenter, 5 Februaxy 1963
Cmnd. 2154, Higher education (October 1963), pp. 269-272
PRO T 227/1617: Bennett to Carswell, 29 January 1963; PRO T 227/1631: Working Party on Higher Education,
minutes, 12 June 1963; PRO T 227/1632: Treasury note for Working Party, 'Robbins Report: numbers and costs',
16 July 1963
Cmnd 2165, Government statement on the report of the committee under the chairmanship of Lord Robbins
(November 1963)
CAB 129/114: Boyd-Carpenter memorandum to Cabinet, 'The Robbins Report', 1 October 1963; PRO
CAB 128/37: Cabinet minutes, 8 October 1963
Statistics of education (1965), table 31, p. 65, ibid(1970), table 1, p.2
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Charts IV.1, 1V2. Education spending, UK, 1920-1974
Education Spending, United Kingdom (% of GOP), 1920-1974
Total government education spending (UK), 1951-70 (fm, 1951 prices)
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Sources: AAS (various); Vaizey, Costs, table III, p. 76; Simon, Order, table 15, p. 599
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CLASP and after: local authority models of efficiency
Increased spending was complemented by efficiency gains, especially in school
building. The main part of the education budget that the Ministry could control -
building costs - came under close scrutiny throughout this period. Following the
creation of a Development Group within the Ministry in 1948, and the imposition of
cost per place limits in 1949 (tightened in 1951 and 1954), central government
possessed levers to control spending. Efficiency gains were achieved through
standardisation of parts and prefabrication, following what became known as the
'Hertfordshire model', after the first LEA to make use of these techniques. 12 This
emphasis on standardisation led to the birth of local authority consortia, which
attempted to reduce costs by pooling expertise and orders. The most famous of these
was CLASP - the Consortium of Local Authorities Special Project - which began in
1957, led by Nottinghamshire County Council.' 3 By 1970 only a handful of councils
remained outside these, and consortium schools formed nearly half the total built (see
chart IV. 3). 14
The Ministry seized on this development, encouraging LEAs to join consortia
as soon as possible. Their exhortations led to the creation of SCOLA - the Second
Consortium of Local Authorities - in 1961.15 The Development Group published a
Building bulletin on the topic in June 1961, and continued the administrative task of
brokering deals between LEAs throughout 1962 and 1963.16 Further political impetus
was given to the Ministry's efforts when the House of Commons Estimates
12 Several influential Hertfordshire officials moved to the Ministry in the 1940s and 1950s: Seabome, Primary
school design (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1971), p. 55; Seaborne & Lowe, English school, pp. 161-2
13 S. Maclure, Educational developments and school building (Longman, London, 1984), pp. 100- 102
14 Seabome & Lowe, English school, figure 37, p. 164; R. Lowe, Education in the post-war years: a social history
(Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1988), p. 102
PRO ED 150/118: Dacey to Arthur, 26 January 1960, Meeting with the local authority associations and the
Churches, minutes, 17 February 1960
(6 PRO ED 150/167: Ogden to Pott, 28 July 1962, Pott to Ogden, 30 July 1962, press statement: consortium for
method building. 30 July 1963, Hardyman note, 'meeting with voluntary schools representatives', 26 November
1963
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Committee lauded 'prefabrication, standardisation and bulk purchase' as a way of
saving money.' 7 Eventually, in February 1964, LEAs were asked to make 'wider use
of industrialised methods of building', and informed of the creation of an information
centre on this subject in the Ministry.' 8
 This Productivity Group compiled a list of
prefabricated parts, worked on 'collation and analysis of site labour records' and
produced guides to the consortia.19
The development of consortia played a major role in encouraging a more
rational planning and budgeting system for educational programmes, for if
standardisation was to work, long-turn programmes would have to provide a steady
demand for buildings. 20
 The Ministry also thought long-term planning might insulate
them from economic crises. Frustration had mounted at their failure, especially in
peripheral projects such as Special Needs schooling, to keep hold of money 'carried
over' from one year to another: longer approval programmes would let them hold on
to money that was left over at the end of each year. Furthermore, officials could
circumvent the annual round of recriminations when LEA plans were turned down.
LEAs were also pressing for this change, which might allow more flexibility in how
they spent their allocations, as well as more efficient building methods.2'
Long-term planning also suited the Treasury, looking to make PESC more
effective by costing programmes well in advance, and comparing social spending of
different kinds using economic criteria. 22 This confluence of interests was decisive.
Two year-programmes were introduced by Circular in 1960, for 1963-64 and 1964-
Estimates Committee of the House of Commons, 8th Report (1960/61), xvi
PRO ED 142/18: Ministry of Education Circular 1/64, 28 February 1964
' PRO ED 150/171: Kitchin to Lloyd and Archer, 'Building productivity group, report and programme, 1964', 10
March 1964
20 Estimates Committee, 8" Report, xv-xviii, xi
21 PRO ED 150/118: Clinkard to Pile, 19 March 1959, Banwell to Andrew, 10 April 1959, Houghton, Dacey to
Arthur, 25, 26 January 1960
CCAC CLRK 1/3/1/3: Clarke to Cairncross, 15 November 1961, 19 December 1961; PRO ED 150/124: Lee
memorandum to departments, 'Short-term public investment', 25 March 1960
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65.23 This movement culminated in October 1963, when the Government announced
that it would now take bids from LEAs for each of the years 1965-66, 1966-67, and
1967-68. It would then announce the whole programme for the first two years, and a
proportion of the third.24
Chart 1V3. LEA consortia, school building, England and Wales, 1959-1970
Total mending, school billding (England and Wales), 1959-1970
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Source: Seabome & Lowe, English school, table II, p155, table VIII, p165
PRO ED 86/448: Ministry Circular 6/60, 13 April 1960
24 PRO ED 142/17: DES Circular 12163, 18 October 1963
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'Moral crime': the pressure of numbers and public opinion
Regardless of increases in spending, the Opposition were able to exploit discontent
with education: Labour's 1966 Manifesto promised a 50% increase in resources for
Education as a whole. 25
 Why should an Opposition see political capital in a service
expanding so quickly? One simple reason for continued controversy was that central
government had no control over estimates of need, since educational administration in
Britain was highly decentralised. The 162 Local Education Authorities of England
and Wales were the bodies that built schools, employed teachers and set the
curriculum, while the 1944 Education Act gave central government the role of
superintendent, clearing house and co-ordinator. This fact was all the more notable
since the Ministry was divided up into branches, for example those dealing with
Schools, Teachers I (Supply) and Teachers II (Training), all of which dealt with the
institutions within their sphere on a case-by-case basis.26
The Minister could require LEAs to keep their buildings up to standard, and
veto general expansion plans and changes to the character of individual schools.
Overall, however, the system was one of overlapping and competing authorities. As
well as LEAs, Churches, voluntary bodies and charities ran one third of 'state'
schools, containing a fifth of secondary pupils in the 1950s.27 Universities were self-
governing bodies, which until 1964 were responsible to the Treasury, rather than the
Ministry. There were therefore a number of institutions within the education system
that could voice opposition to central government. The best example was the annual
round of complaints from LEAs at their approved building lists.28
But the complaints were increasingly due to the rising pressures on Education.
Firstly, there was a rise in the levels of absolute demand. The Ministry's position up
25 Labour Manifesto 1966, Time for decision: Craig, Manfestos, pp. 304-5
26 J.P. Parry, The provision of education in England and Wales (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1971), pp. 83,
88-97; cf. Edward Boyle's view in M. Kogan (ed.), The politics of education: Edward Boyle andAnthony
Crosland in conversation, pp. 125, 137
27 Pile, Department, pp. 23, 27-31; Parry, Provision, pp. 102-3
28 
e.g. PRO ED 150/125: Alexander to Smieton, 3 April 1963
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to 1958 was that 'the pressure of numbers will soon begin to subside'. 29
 However, in
April 1958 the National Advisory Council on the Training and Supply of Teachers
projected that the rising birth rate would raise the number of pupils by 27,000 (from
299,000 to 326,000) by 1968.° In February 1960 the Government Actuary, analysing
rising fertility and marriage rates, concluded the 1 960s school roll might be 10%
higher than previously thought. 3 ' This meant that the day on which building for basic
provision could be slowed, which Ministers had been anticipating for a decade, was
indefinitely postponed. As Boyle later wrote: 'the... rise in the school population has
meant that the pressure for new school places is once again on the increase.., the
whole of the difference has had to be met by what has been felt... as savage
reductions in the level of replacements and improvements' 32
Teachers were in short supply, since the Government had been hoping that
smaller class sizes could eventually be achieved with the same number of teachers
when the post-war 'bulge' passed. It was hoped that large classes (over 30 in
Secondaries, and 40 in Primaries, implying overall teacher ratios of 16:1 and 30:1
respectively) could be eliminated by 1970. This process appeared to be beginning
when class sizes fell in the mid-'fifties, and the NACTST had even advised the
Government that it could safely lengthen the training period from two to three years in
1960. This meant that there would be a 'year of intermission', in which Teacher
Training Colleges would produce no new teachers. This made a grim situation worse,
and in 1958 NACTST was forced to recommend 16,000 more teacher training places
by 1962. Geoffrey Lloyd was able to win 12,000 from the Treasury. The following
29 Cmnd. 604, Secondary education for all: a new drive (December 1958), P. 4
ED 86/448: NACTST paper no. 186, 'Demand and supply of teachers in the 1960s', 17 April 1958; PRO
CAB 134/1663: Education Committee minutes, 19 May 1958
" PRO T 227/704: Government Actuary to Hutton, 10 February 1960
32 PRO T 227/1308: Boyle to Boyd-Carpenter, 6 June 1963; LUA MS 660/252 18: Boyle to Macmillan, 10
September 1963
u H.C. Dent, The training of teachers in England and Wales (Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1977), pp. 130. 134
5; P.H.J. Gosden, The education system since 1945 (Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1983), pp. 102, 108
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June, as population estimates continued to rise, the extra 4,000 places were indeed
added to the programme.34
The situation became more unpromising in 1960, as Eccles was advised that a
further 4,000 places, and a re-scheduling of the recently announced 4,000, would be
needed to meet class size targets. Cabinet refused this request, and Eccles was left
(having threatened resignation) merely to promise more training places at some
unspecified time in the future. 35 He had to make do with a series of ad hoc measures,
including a 'year of intermission conference' with the Training Colleges, to advise
them on 'crowding in', using their existing facilities to train more students.36
Meanwhile, the Ministry prepared new bids, with the requested number of places
finally settling at iO,000. 37 These estimates again ran into Treasury opposition.
Clarke, for instance, objected to 'wastage': 'of every 100 woman entrants... only 40
will be there after five years'. 'We are pouring water into a leaky bucket', he
concluded, 'and punching more holes, by having the third year of training'. 38 Cabinet
deferred decision on the extra places.39
Finding educational opinion implacably opposed to the suggested alternatives
- two years training for primary teachers, for instance - the new Education Secretary,
PRO CAB 134/1663: Education Committee minutes, 9 July 1958; PRO ED 86/459: Lloyd to Morris, 24
September 1958, Morris to Lloyd, 27 September 1958, Alexander to Fleming, 2 October 1958, Banwell to Weaver,
28 November 1958
PRO T 227/879: Education Ministry paper to Education Committee, 21 January 1960; PRO CAB 134/1664:
Eccles memorandum to Education Committee, 'Teacher supply', 25 January 1960; PRO CAB 129/100: Butler
memorandum to Cabinet, The Crowther Report, 15 March 1960; PRO PREM 11/3728: Eccles to Macmillan, 15
March 1960; PRO CAB 128/34: Cabinet minutes, 17 March 1960, PRO PREM 11/3728: Bligh to Macmillan, 18
March 1960; House of Commons debates, vol. 620, col. 47: Eccles statement, 21 March 1960;
36 PRO ED 86/347: Eccles address to intermission year conference, 5 July 1960; Ministry of Education press
release, 'Short term measures to recruit teachers: year of intermission conference', 5 July 1960
PRO 1 227/1306: Clarke to Couzens, 26 June 1962, Treasury-Ministry of Education meeting, minutes, 28 June
1962; PRO CAB 134/1666: Education Committee, minutes, 3 May 1962
38 PRO T 298/158: Clarke to Mountfield, 2 May 1962
PRO CAB 134/1666: Eccles, Brooke memoranda to Education Committee, and minutes, 13 July 1962
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Edward Boyle, decided to bid again for the new places, this time promising a
simultaneous squeeze on Training College current budgets. The Treasury, impressed
by the promised efficiency savings and worried by the even greater expansion
envisaged by Robbins, agreed. 4° Even estimates made at this time of school numbers,
however, were to prove optimistic, which would pose an enormous challenge in the
later 1 960s (see chart IV. 4). Indeed, it was the need to keep close control over the
Teacher Training system, so as to be able to meet any future emergencies, which led
to the Government's rejection of Robbins' recommendation that Teacher Training
should be integrated into the mainstream HE system.4'
Chart 1V4. 1960 projection of pupils, and out-turn, England and Wales, 1959-74
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Sources: PRO T 227/704, Ministry evidence to Treasury working party, 11 Februaiy 1960; Mitchell, Historical
statistics, table II, pp. 886-7
4° PRO 1298/158: Moseley memorandum, Teacher training', January 1963; PRO T 227/1307: Boyle to Boyd-
Carpenter, 19 December 1962, Harding to Couzens, 3 January 1963; R. Layard, J. King, & C. Moser, The impact
of Robbins (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1969), pp. 65-6
PRO CAB 134/1834: Cabinet Committee on Education and Research, minutes, 27 July 1964
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The early 1960s also witnessed an explosion in the number of pressure groups
and the extent of media concern about education. Parents increasingly thought of their
children as Degree material, and worried about securing a place in the Grammar
School, gateway to University. Where parents were asked about their preferences in
one southern borough, more than half wanted their children to stay at school until 16,
and more than one-quarter until 18.42 The best example of this pressure was the 1963
Campaign for Education, which began as a NUT protest but spread rapidly until it
encompassed major educational bodies, trade unions, civic and women's groups. 43
 The
Campaign called for £500m to be spent to bring all schools up to the Ministry's own
standards, and the Campaign's newspaper condemned the 'moral crime committed in
the condemnation of so many children to a second-class education' .' The Campaign's
'year for education', with regional meetings and hustings, ended with a mass rally at
the Albert Hall to cap November's 'education week'. 45
 This all attracted a good deal of
press interest - and a Prime Ministerial inquiry as to their motivation.46
The campaign was vindicated by a survey of school buildings the Ministry had
itself commissioned. Questionnaires were sent out to LEAs in the summer of 1962,
and the results were ready in draft form by the following February. 47
 These figures,
however, were not released to the public, for the picture that emerged was one of
dilapidation, backwardness and squalor. They were so bad (see table IVJ) that Dame
Mary Smieton, the Permanent Secretary at Education, did not think it would be worth
even asking the Treasury to help put them right. 48
 Boyle told Macmillan that the
42 CAC, England (Crowther Report), 15 to 18 (HMSO, London, 1959), PP. 66, 106
Leeds University Archives, Brotherton Library, Leeds [LUA], MS 61 8/A2 (b): Aims, members and members of
Campaign for Education, 31 October 1962
LUA MS 618/A45: Rob Robinson, The waste bin', in 1963 Campaign for Education newspaper, March 1963
R.D. Coates, Teachers' unions and interest group politics (CUP, Cambridge, 1972), p. 85
PRO PREM 11/4171: Macmillan to Boyle, 3 September 1963
PRO ED 150/144: Haste to Rowberry, 20 July 1962; Stevens, Stone memorandum, The school building survey
1962-63', 18 February 1963
48 PRO ED 150/125: Smieton to Boyle, 28 March 1963
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School Survey was 'a real "horror". 49
 Some Education officials were privately
admitting that more than £lbn would to needed to make good the deficiencies. 5° 'We
should do our best to avoid publication if we can', he told the Education Committee of
Cabinet. Even if it were to emerge, his colleagues reckoned, it would have to be
accompanied by a covering pamphlet placing the remaining defects 'in the context of
the Government's other achievements in education'. 5 ' The full Cabinet only agreed to
ask Boyle to 'consider' the survey's publication as a White Paper.52
Table IV] The School Building Survey, England and Wales, 1963
Primary % ofpupils in	 Secondary % ofpupils in
schools	 these schools	 schools	 these schools
No warm water
Sanitation mainly outdoors
No central heating
No electricity
No kitchens
No staffroom
in temporary buildings
School on more than one site
'Seriously sub-standard' site
No hall
Dining in classrooms
6,101
15,441
5,815
202
4,647
8,750
564
1,673
9,211
4,073
2,288
16.5	 373	 5
57
	
1,831
	
25.8
12.2
	
99
0.3
	
0
	
0
16.3
	
491
	
6
18.5
	
95
	
0.9
3.0
	
178
	
2.6
9.6
	
921
	
16.1
34.2
	
1,553
	
22.3
19.4
	
389
	
4.7
11.1
	
286
	
3.9
Schools with 1+ such
features	 18,406	 69.8	 2,902	 43.8
Source: PRO ED 150/146: School Building Survey, September 1963
This delay did not do the Government much good, for the NUT had
commissioned its own survey in two-thirds of the schools in England and Wales (see
table IV.2). As the Government's own Survey had shown, primary schools were in the
worst state. Only 28% of them had all their lavatories inside the main building; only
22% had specialist rooms for all their activities, such as gymnasia, dining rooms, and
assembly halls. Some Secondary Moderns were in similar straits: only 11% of heads
PRO PREM 11/4169: Boyle to Macmillan, 30 October 1963
° PRO CAB 134/1 834: Committee on Education and Research, minutes, 3 March 1964
PRO CAB 134/1834: Boyle memorandum to Education Committee, 'Schools survey', 24 February 1964;
minutes, 3 March 1964
52 PRO CAB 134/1834: Education Committee, minutes, 23 June 1964
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were able to report that they had no specialist rooms appropriated for other uses,
though about a half had inside toilets.53
Table 1V2. Secondary Modern schools, various characteristics, England and Wales, 1963
Charactericiic of school	 % schools
Pre-1914 buildings	 40
10% or more classes 30+ pupils 	 47
No specialist foreign language teacher	 57
No specialist special needs teacher 	 70
No specialist commercial subjects teacher	 73
No specialist engineering teacher 	 93
No gymnasium	 45
No library	 28
No science laboratory	 6
Source: NUT, State, tables 1,4,6, 11, pp. 11-13, 15
Expert opinion contributed to the general outcry. Academics such as John
Vaizey helped to foster the sense that Britain needed to invest more in its education
system in order to raise its rate of economic growth. In the new science-based
economy, Vaizey argued, 'people will have to know far more than ever before',
'and... be far more flexible, adaptable, and resilient to change'. 54 The new science of
'growth accounting' was crucial to this view. The American economist Theodore
Schultz, for instance, used earnings profiles of individuals educated in different ways
to show how, 'over the last two decades, schooling has been a larger source of growth
than material capital represented by structures, equipment and inventories'.55
" NUT, The state of our schools (NUT, London, 1963), pp. 9, 16
' J. Vaizey, Britain in the sixties: education for tomorrow (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1962), pp. 7-8; cf. idem, The
costs of education (Allen & Unwin, London, 1958), p. 67
T.W. Schultz, The economic value of education (Columbia UP, New York, 1963), p. 44
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'Complete and irrevocable denial': the collapse of tripartism
The Government faced other acute problems, for the 'tripartism' of the 1944
Education Act - under which pupils were judged suitable for a Secondary Modern,
Technical, or Grammar School education - began to crumble even before it was
complete. The academic rationale of selection at 11 was subjected to such a virulent
academic attack that its credibility collapsed. 56
 Sociologists and psychologists, who
set out to test whether the new phenomenon of working-class entry into Grammars
was leading to better long-term opportunities for such children, answered their
question definitively in the negative. In one northern city, 22% of the population was
from white-collar backgrounds, but 64% of pupils passing A Level (and 74% of the
girls) were from such families. 57 Even more disturbingly, other evidence indicated
that there was more chance, for the same test scores, of Grammar selection for
children from higher social classes. Parental pressure and interview performance
slanted the process towards the articulate.58
Predictably, the main influence on children's progress was the attitude of their
parents, and the atmosphere at home: one survey concluded that 'any form of
nominally academic selection will in effect be a form of social selection'. 59 J.W.B.
Douglas' books drew a similar moral. He found that parents' expressed interest in
education - across all social classes - was significantly related to their children's test
scores at 8 and 11. This gap was most acute at the level of basic verbal reasoning,
reading and arithmetic, the key elements of both written tests and interviews for
grammars. 6° Loss of talent within Grammars was another finding. Working-class
leaving, highlighted in Early leaving, the Central Advisory Committee report of 1954,
56 Lowe, Education, pp. 146-7
" B. Jackson & D. Marsden, Education and the working class (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1962), tables I-
III, pp. 10-12
58 j Floud, A.H. Halsey & F.M. Martin, Social class and educational opportunity (Heinemann, London, 1957), pp.
44, 46-7
Jackson & Marsden, Class, appendix, table XV, p. 253
60	 Douglas, The home and the school: a study of ability and attainment in the primary school (Macgibbon
& Kee, London, 1964), appendix III, tables VII (b)-(c), pp. 156-7
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was clearly going on at much higher rates than for other children. Even among those
working class children who did go to Grammars, only a third managed to get 3 or
more 0 Level passes. 61 According to teachers' own assessments, 50% of working
class children of 'high ability' left school at the minimum age in 1961-62, whereas
only 10% and 22% respectively of the same children from the upper and lower middle
classes did so.62
Even more lethal to the credibility of the 11 + were doubts as to its accuracy.
Work by A. Yates and D. Pidgeon in Middlesex found that verbal reasoning tests,
which many LEAs used at 11+, did theoretically do rather well in predicting
achievements in the first couple of years at the Grammar. However, this still left an
inevitable margin of error: A concluded that any system of rigid allocation would
lead to 'a considerably greater number of wrong allocations than can be viewed with
equanimity', with '10% of the children in any age-group, or about 60,000 children per
year at present' misallocated. 63 A British Psychological Society inquiry, published in
1957, concluded that it was 'unlikely' that this 'wastage' could be reduced below
10%. 'Complete accurate classification of children, either by level or type of ability, is
not possible at 11 years', the author concluded.M
Inside the Ministry, such evidence exacerbated latent doubts as to its efficacy
of selection at 11: one civil servant bemoaned the fact that 'this country is pouring out
its human wealth like water on the sands'. 65 One immediate reaction was to consider
ways to open up later transfer if pupils' academic ability developed during a
Secondary Modern course; others were to examine an expansion of the grammar
61 N. Timmins, The five giants: a biography of the welfare state (Fontana, London, 1996), P. 239; H. Judge, A
generation of schooling: English secondary schools since 1945 (Oxford UP, Oxford, 1984), p. 41
62 Douglas, J.M. Ross & H.R. Simpson, All our future: a longtitudinal study of secondary education (Panther,
London, 1968), pp. 24-6, and table 10, p. 207, table 14, p. 210
63 A. Yates & D. Pidgeon, Admission to grammar schools (NFER, London, 1957), pp. 63-4, table V I, p63, pp. 66
P. E. Vernon, Secondary school selection (Methuen, London, 1957), pp. 77, 169
65 PRO ED 147/205: Peaker to Part, 16 December 1954
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intake, and to seek ways of making selection at 11+ more accurate. 66 By 1960 another
official admitted that:
A system under which failure to win a place in a selective school at 11+ meant
complete and irrevocable denial of the coveted opportunities associated with a
grammar school education could not hope to win the support of parents, and could not
survive the day when their wishes could gain a hearing. The very successes
themselves which some of the new secondary schools recorded pointed the way to
more ambitious aims for these schools.67
Ministers agreed with this analysis, David Eccies pointing out that 'the gap between
what we are doing and what a better-informed public expects us to do is widening very
fast' while pleading for more resources in 1962.68 Although Secondary Modems had
been permitted to offer GCEs to their pupils from the mid-fifties, very few of these
schools offered external examinations to their pupils. At time when parents were
beginning to see qualifications as the key to economic success, this caused frustration
and discontent.69
However, this Conservative Government did not wish to end selection.
Comprehensives were seen as an experimental and local option, especially appropriate
for rural areas. Conservative education policy was directed to quite different ends, well
expressed by Geoffrey Lloyd in 1957:
The... way ahead lies in building up the Secondary Modern schools as quickly as we
can, to provide in them courses going beyond the age of 15 for children willing to take
them... to make transfer easier from one type of school to another, and to soften the
differences between schools with different labels. There is real promise that this policy
will succeed, if only we can get enough specialist teachers and improve accommodation
quickly enough.70
This policy was embodied in the December 1958 White Paper Secondary education
for all, which announced the Government's desire that 'every Secondary school, no
matter what its description, is able to provide a full Secondary education for each of its
PRO ED 147/635: Ministiy paper, 'transfer to secondary education', December 1955; PRO ED 147/205: Peaker
to Humphreys, 8 February 1955; Maxwell-Hyslop to Part, 11 January 1956
67	 ED 147/641: Elliott memorandum, 'Various forms of secondary school organisation', 10 December 1960
PRO T 227/1307: Eccles to Brooke, 10 July 1962
Pile, Department, p. 86; Judge, Generation, p. 24; Lowe, Education, p. 117
70 PRO PREM 11/4171: Lloyd to Macmillan, 24 December 1957
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pupils in accordance with his ability and aptitude'. 7 ' Secondary Modems were
encouraged to provide a range of courses, including 0 Level, tecimical and vocational
courses. To this end a £300m 5-year building programme was announced.72
Conservative Party worries about comprehensives were clear throughout the
period: Lloyd had to meet worried back-benchers individually, and address the Party's
backbench Education Committee in the spring of 1959 to allay their concerns after he
agreed to the establishment of comprehensives in rural areas of Dorset. 73
 That
committee was inherently hostile to comprehensive schools, most of its members
wanting 'to define the limits within which comprehensive schools were justified: for
example, large catchment areas where only one new school was practicable'. Some
were concerned that Ministers were 'weakening' in their resolve, and worried away at
themes that were to become familiar: comprehensives that were 'being run by the
wrong people', over-large schools, and the dangers to Granimars.74
Even MPs who wanted experimentation envisaged transfer to secondary
education at 13 rather than 11, for example, or an even greater degree of academic
selection, to leave more bright children in better Secondary Moderns. 75 Local
Conservatives mounted increasingly angry campaigns in defence of Grammars, as
Labour-run LEAs embarked on reorganisations. 76
 If anything, Conservative opinion on
selection hardened in the months before the 1964 Election. Conservative Research
Department officials thought that 'academically... the [comprehensive] schools still
have to prove themselves and until they have done so there would seem obvious risks
in agreeing to the merging of established Grammar Schools in the pursuit of
Cmnd. 604, Secondary education for all, p. 5; cf. Simon, 'The Tory government and education 1951-60:
background to breakout', History of education 14, 4 (1985), p. 293; Lowe, Education, p. 118.
Cmnd. 604, Secondary education, pp. 6-8
PRO PREM 11/2644: Lloyd to Macmillan, 23 March 1959; I.G.K. Fenwick, The comprehensive school 1944-
70: the politics of secondary school reorganisation (Methuen, London, 1976), p. 117
CPA CRD 2/33/5: Conservative back-bench education committee, minutes, 11 July 1960
' CPA CRD 2/33/6: ibid, minutes, 20 January 1964
76 
e.g. CPA CCO 4/9/137: A.G. Davies (Chairman, Newport Conservative Association) to Macleod, 19 August
1962; 9 July 1962
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"desegregation". 77 Quintin Hogg, recently installed as Secretary of State for
Education and Science, told back-benchers that he thought it would be a 'disgrace' to
destroy good Grammars. 78 The 1964 Manifesto condemned Labour's comprehensive
plans as 'foolishly doctrinaire'.79
Although many fully non-selective plans had been submitted by the time the
Conservatives left office, few had been approved. 1962-63 saw a number of
reorganisation schemes submitted to the Ministry, mainly from Labour councils in
northern cities, such as Manchester, Coventry and Sheffield. 8° But the most high-
profile experiment was in London, where the LCC had begun experiments with
'comprehensives' in the late 1 940s, and opened its first custom-built comprehensive,
Kidbrooke Girls in Eltham, in 1954. By 1961 over half the LCC's secondary school
children were taught in 'comprehensives', though only a handful of Grammars had
been closed. Florence Horsburgh, Conservative Education Minister in the early 'fifties,
had refused to integrate a local Grammar with Kidbrooke in a cause celebre. 81 Overall,
though, comprehension had not progressed far by October 1964, at least in England
and Wales (see table IV. 3) - though Scotland, much more sparsely populated and with
more sympathetic local authorities, was much more 'comprehensive', with up to a
quarter of pupils in fully-comprehensive schools.82
Furthermore, the word 'comprehensive' did not necessarily carry the overtones
of the all-in, all-through school that eventually attached to it. There were a number of
other schemes that attracted Conservative interest, especially the 'Leicestershire
scheme', promoted by Leicestershire's skilful and publicity-conscious Director of
CPA CRD 2/29/10: Udal to Fraser, 18 February 1964
CPA CRD 2/33/6: Conservative backbench education committee, minutes, 29 June 1964
Conservative Manifesto 1964, Prosperity with a purpose: Craig, Man (festos, p. 249
go D. Rubinstein & Simon, The evolution of the comprehensive school 1926-66 (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London,
1969), PP
.
 90-1; R. Pedley, The comprehensive school (2" end., Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1972), P. 42
Maclure, A history of education in London 1870-1990 (Penguin Allen Lane, Harmondsworth, 1990), pp. 172-5;
F. Campbell, Eleven plus and all rhat(Watts, London, 1956), pp. 185-6
82 Though figures were not published nationally on this in Scotland until 1965, Cmnd. 3549, SED reportfor 1965
(March 1968) has some retrospective figures
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Education, Stewart Mason, which divided secondaiy education into two streams. The
first, in old Secondary Moderns, was for 11 to 15 year olds, and the second, in old
Grammars, was for 14 to 18 year olds whose parents were prepared to promise that
their children would stay on and take GCE. This had the benefit of using existing
buildings and maintaining the Grammars' ethos, while also abolishing the 1 1+.83
Table 1V3. Comprehensive secondary schools, England and Wales, 1955-64
No. of schools	 % of schools	 No. ofpupils	 % ofpupils
1959	 111	 1	 107,000	 4
1960	 130	 2	 129,000	 4
1961	 138	 2	 142,000	 5
1962	 152	 2	 157,000	 5
1963	 175	 2	 179,000	 6
1964	 195	 3	 199,000	 7
Source: Fenwick, Comprehensive, p. 148
The DES did not like this idea, since it cut across the idea of making
Secondary Moderns more inclusive, but also because Inspectors did not think that the
buildings would long be suitable for Secondary education. One lower high school
shared its playing fields with another lower high school, and the upper school into
which they both fed: Inspectors thought this far too cramped. They also disparaged the
curriculum in the lower schools for 15 year olds, deprived of the upper streams of a
Secondary Modern that had been hived off into the upper school. 84 Ministers worried
about its 'political' use by less 'efficient' authorities - Labour LEAs using this
structure simply as a cover to introduce comprehensives. 85 For these reasons,
mainstream Conservative opinion turned against these ideas. 86 But 'comprehensives',
on the model Boyle was willing to accept, certainly would not always mean large, all-
in schools.87
S. Maclure (ed.), Comprehensive schooling: a symposium on the reorganisation of secondary education
(Councils and Education Press, London, 1965), pp. 5-6, 51; Lowe, Education, p. 144
84 PRO ED 109/9485: HMI Report, Abington High, Wigston Magna, Leicestershire, October 1962
PRO ED 147/641: Fletcher to Weaver, 29 March 1960, Smieton to Weaver, 21 November 1960, Boyle to
Thompson, 1 April 1961, Thompson to Boyle, 8 May 1961
PRO ED 147/641: Conservative Teachers Association, 'The state of secondary schools', 8 December 1962
LUA MS 660/25220: Boyle to Douglas-Home, 'Educational developments', 17 February 1964
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'Half our future '. School leaving age, Further Education and training
Another demand that proved very hard to meet was that for the raising of the
compulsory school leaving age, or ROSLA, from 15 to 16. ROSLA had been promised
in the 1944 Act, but never implemented. The call to fulfil this promise was sounded by
the Crowther Report, published in 1959 by the Government's Central Advisory
Committee. 'At every stage and on every level', the Report argued, 'the need is for
more time, for less pressure on both staff and students' •88 The Report recommended
the establishment of a system of County Colleges, again promised in the 1944 Act, to
cater for an extra year of technical education, as well as mandatory day-release of all
teenagers beneath the age of 18. The demands of increasingly technical jobs, Crowther
argued, were beyond learning at night classes, and the Committee presented a list of
night course wastage to prove their case.89
Both recommendations would prove acutely embarrassing. Even Eccies admitted
that implementing them might eventually cost as much as £200-250m per annum.
Given that the total Education budget was forecast to rise to only £920m in 1964-65,
this was a huge sum. 90 If the leaving age were to be raised in 1970, which was the
Ministry's preferred date, this would add a need for 18,000 teachers to the numbers
already demanded by demographic changes.9 ' However, still hoping that they would
have the teacher shortage under control by 1970, Ministers agreed to re-affirm the
principle of ROSLA, and to announce that the Government would take a decision on
the actual date before the General Election.92
The issue was again raised by the publication of another CAC report, by a
committee under Sir John Newsom, on non-academic school streams. Issued in 1963,
this Report - Half our future - agreed with Crowther on ROSLA. 93 But alongside
CAC (Crowther Report), 15 to 18, pp. 366-8
ibid, pp. 148, 154-8, 48-9, 5 1-3, 120, 360-1
° PRO CAB 134/1979: Eccles memorandum to Home Affairs Committee, 'Crowther Report', 23 November 1959
PRO ED 86/342: Ministry of Education memorandum to NACTST, October 1959
PRO CAB 134/1664: Education Committee, minutes, 10 January 1960
CAC (Newsom Report), Half our future (HMSO, London, 1963), xvi, p. 7
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population growth, Boyle admitted that 22,000 more teachers would be required for
ROSLA. This would set back the elimination of over-size classes by two years (to
1978 in Secondaries, and 1980 in Primaries). A £43m capital cost, along with an
annual current cost of £65m, might be incurred. 94
 Nevertheless, Boyle pushed hard for
ROSLA in 1970, and the Cabinet eventually agreed to let him announce that it would
be achieved within the life of the next Parliament. Boyle convinced them that after
Robbins they had to be seen to do something for the 'less able', and also showed that
voluntary staying on, on present trends, would only reach 40% of the age-group by the
early 1 970s.95 The proposal to establish County Colleges, however, had been ignored,
both due to cost and the difficulty of establishing a curriculum for young workers.96
The Conservatives did undertake a wide-ranging review of Further Education,
though as the post-war population 'bulge' passed into adolescence, the Government
was constantly increasing numbers in FE Colleges while failing to achieve a large or
sustained increase of the age-group, either on industrial training day release schemes
or in full-time FE. Noting this, Crowther recommended that the provisions for day
release in the 1944 Act - that under-18s should receive a compulsory 330 hours of
day-release training a year - be activated. The Report also called for much better
integration between school and FE training, as well as more block-release and
sandwich training schemes.97
The Government did satisfy some of these demands. The Ministry of Education
agreed that technical education was uncoordinated, and had become too narrow.
Preliminary courses for 15 year olds moving into FE were to be abolished, and the
relationship between 0 and A Levels, and FE qualifications, systemised. The gap
between school and technical education would thus be closed, and training
' PRO CAB 134/1833: Boyd-Carpenter memorandum to Committee on Education and Research, 6 December
1963 and minutes, 16 December 1963
PRO CAB 128/38: Cabinet minutes, 17 January 1964; Parliamentary report, Times, 28 January 1964
PRO CAB 129/100: Butler memorandum to Cabinet, The Crowther Report', 15 March 1960
Crowther Report, 15 to 18, pp. 372-5, 38 1-2, 384-5
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'normalised' as part of the education system as a whole.98
 Adolescents who had
rejected school, the reasoning went, would hardly react with enthusiasm to more
education. The Government's White Paper did promise a large expansion of
provision in Technical Colleges, emphasising a smooth transition from school to part-
time technical education, wider and more flexible craft courses to produce more
adaptable skilled workers, and more technically based Higher National Certificate
courses.'°° There was, however, to be no compulsory day-release, which would cost
£40-50m in building costs alone.'0'
A right to day release, to which young people would be statutorily entitled, did
attract some official support during 1961. Some employers seemed to favour the idea;
Eccles advocated it, conducting his own campaign against 'serious gaps in trained
manpower - particularly in the middle-ranges - which are deplorably weak'. 102
 In the
end, though, an inter-departmental working party came out against the idea.'° 3 LEAs
condemned the right as 'unworkable', since young workers were in no position to
insist on it; the main employers' association opposed the idea as damaging to
employers' own training effort.'°4 Once again, the cost was prohibitive, since universal
day release might cost the Government £45m over the next decade. Even with the
98 PRO ED 46/1069: Ministry memorandum, 'Routes into national certificate and city and guilds courses', 18
January 1960
PRO T 227/703: Wright to Rossiter, Clarke, Wass, 9 February 1960
'°° Cmnd. 1254, Better opportunities in technical education (January 1961); PRO ED 142/15: Ministry of
Education Circular 1/61, 5 January 1961
101 PRO CAB 134/1664: Eccles memorandum to Education Policy Committee, 'County Colleges', 8 February
1960
102 PRO ED 46/1070: BEC memorandum, 'Education between the ages of 15 and 18', May 1960; PRO PREM
11/3290: Eccles to Macmillan, 17 July 1961; PRO CAB 134/1695: Eccles memorandum to EPC, 'Right to day
release', 7 May 1962
103 PRO ED 46/1009: Report of working party on day release, 4 June 1962
'° PRO ED 46/1008: Right to day release working party, Sir William Alexander evidence, 28 June 1961, FBI
memorandum, 'The difficulties that employers foresee', September 1961
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extra money FE infrastructure might not have been ready if the right was introduced in
the 1960s.'°5
A further Committee, under Henniker-Heaton, chairman of BEC's Industrial
Training Committee, was therefore set up to look into encouraging voluntary day-
release. Although it thought an extra quarter of a million day release students should
be trained, the committee did not envisage any new administrative structure to achieve
this objective. LEAs were to work with local industry and the new Industrial Training
Boards to set local targets: the Ministry of Education would provide the extra places
within the existing FE system.'° 6 This was not the radical departure for which
Crowther had called, although to be fair to the Government, it was increasing FE
building to take in more students, to some extent accepting the argument that further
and technical education was crucial to industrial success. FE funding was boosted to a
new high level during the 1959-64 Parliament (it had been £l4m in 1958/59), though
its rise was uneven (see table IV 4). 107
Table IV.4. Government FE capital spending, GB, 1959-64 (1959 prices)
FE capital expenditure Increase! decrease (%) over previous year
1959/60	 21.5	 52.9
1960/61	 19.4	 -9.5
1961/62	 17.2	 -11.4
1962/63	 24.5	 42.4
1963/64	 22.7	 -7.4
Source: Statistics of education (1964), pt. II, table 60, p. 131; AAS(1965), table 102, p.94
Potentially just as important as improvements in FE was new thinking on
industrial training, which was dominated by tripartite agreements between trade
unions, employers and government on apprenticeship courses. The number of trainees
in Government Training Centres was tiny; the Carr Report of 1958, sponsored by
105 PRO T 227/705: Ministry of Education memorandum to Working Party on financial implications of Crowther,
'Development of Further Education', 25 February 1960; PRO ED 46/1008: Ministry of Education memorandum,
'Logistics of a right to day release', February 1962
106 PRO ED 204/4: Henniker Heaton Report, recommendations, January 1964
'o PRO T 298/158: Moseley to Carswell, 'Ministry of Education memorandum on FE', 18 December 1962; PRO
T 227/1309: Harding to Clarke, 11 October 1963, Boyle to Boyd-Carpenter, 25 October 1963
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government, had concluded that there were no grounds to interfere any further in
industrial relations.'° 8 As they constantly ran into shortages of skilled manpower,
especially in politically sensitive areas such as the construction industry, Ministers
began to doubt this. John Hare, Minister of Labour, demonstrated just how dire skill
shortages were in a memorandum of April 1961. There were five vacancies for every
unemployed engineer; just to satisfy current demand, employers would require a huge
expansion of apprentice facilities.' 09 Following a visit to France in February 1961,
Ministry of Labour civil servants were convinced of the scheme's role in increasing
the numbers being trained." 0 Both the Chancellor and the Ministry of Education
having expressed an interest in a 'levy/grant' system, an official working party was set
up under H.F. Rossetti from the Ministry of Labour."
This working party was hampered by the opposition of the Inland Revenue,
worried about the implications of hypothecation, and the Treasury, opposed to
'cumbersome administrative machinery' and the addition to costs. 112 The working
party in its interim report therefore concluded that change might do more harm than
good. A statutory requirement on employers to train their workers was dismissed as
'inflexible', while a levy/grant system would discriminate against employers whose
need for skilled labour was low, but who would have to pay out for technically-
advanced tn'3 Hare duly reported this negative result to his colleagues, whose
frustration ensured a further study." 4
 Forced back to consider ways in which training
L.M. Cantor & LF. Roberts, Further education in England and Wales (2" edn., Routledge & Kegan Paul,
pp. 8, 81
109 PRO CAB 134/1690: Haie memorandum to EPC, 'Shortages of skilled manpower', 28 April 1961; PRO CAB
134/1689: EPC minutes, 3 May 1961
PRO LAB 18/729: Stewart to Rossetti, 6 February 1961
' PRO LAB 18/729: Selwyn Lloyd to Maudling, 10 February 1961, Rossetti to Helsby, 17 February 1961; PRO
T 227/1576: Padmore to Johnston, 17 May 1961, Helsby to Padmore, 6 June 1961
112 PRO LAB 18/874: Inter-departmental working party on training levy schemes, Treasury and Inland Revenue
note, 'Training levy schemes', 8 September 1961; PRO IR 40/13836: Helsby to Johnston, 25 September 1961
113 PRO LAB 18/874: Interim Report, Working Party on Training Levy Schemes, 22 January 1962
PRO CAB 134/1695: Hare memorandum to EPC, 'Question of a levy rebate system', 22 February 1962; PRO
CAB 134/1693: EPC minutes, 7 March 1962
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levies might work, officials adopted the idea of an industry-by-industry scheme, which
would prevent unfairness to employers in low-skill industries. Tripartite, voluntary
Industrial Training Boards could thus be set up, if the industrial partners wished it, and
charge levies agreed within the industry. This combined industrial self-government
with statutory authority for the ITBs."5
This scheme emerged as the White Paper Industrial training, and the 1964
Industrial Training Act. The White Paper promised 'to improve the overall quality of
industrial training and to establish minimum standards'. The Minister of Labour was
given the power to set up ITBs, the constitution of which would be decided on an
industry-by-industry basis. The ITBs would then run their own training centres, decide
on qualifications, pay grants to trainees, and reimburse companies who provided
advanced training." 6
 By 1970 there were 27 ITBs, taking £208m yearly in training
levies."7
But there were crucial flaws. What began as a plan to establish government
control over apprenticeship had become yet another structure for industrial
consultation. The Minister would appoint ITB members and adjudicate on demarcation
disputes, but was to act on recommendations from employers and unions; civil
servants would attend ITB meetings, but as non-voting members. ITBs were allowed
to exclude smaller firms from any levies they might jntroduce." 8 ITBs could do
nothing to increase non-specific training or encourage inter-industry links. They ended
up repaying almost all the money paid to them, to companies they judged as having
PRO CAB 129/111: Hare memorandum to Cabinet, 'Industrial training, 23 November 1962; PRO CAB 128/36:
Cabinet minutes, 27 November 1962
116 Cmnd. 1892, Industrial training (December 1962)
117 R.M. Lindley, 'Active manpower policy', in G.S. Bain (ed.), Industrial relations in Britain (Basil Blackwell,
Oxford, 1983), p. 344
US House of Commons debates, vol. 684, cols. 1001, 1003-6: Godber speech, First Reading, Industrial Training
Bill, 20 November 1963
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adequate training programmes. 119
 Furthermore, the emphasis on tripartite training
agreements had taken some of the emphasis away from FE in state institutions, in
which although the absolute numbers of students (especially part-time students)
increased to 1964, the percentages of each age-group active in FE were static, or even
declining (see charts IV. 5-IV. 6).
The Conservatives had to struggle with rising school rolls, and increasingly
strident popular demands. As competing pressures grew, many overdue projects, such
as improved technical education of adolescents or industrial training, were held up.
When it came to schools, Ministers were content simply to manage the 1944 Act. The
weight of the past, expressed in crumbling buildings and grossly unequal educational
provision, continued to hold back progress. But there were noticeable achievements.'20
Over-size classes were not eliminated, but pupil-teacher ratios continued to fall;
Universities were enjoying undreamt-of growth. Most of all, Ministers had largely
ignored Treasury warnings that education spending 'cannot be allowed to run
loose'.' 21
 The Conservatives had maintained what they thought of as a flexible,
pragmatic system to provide for the infinite variety of students and pupils. In several
key respects, Labour was to break decisively with this vision.
fl9J• Sheldrake & S. Vickerstaffe, The history of industrial training in Britain (Avebury, Aldershot, 1987), P. 57;
E. Keep & K. Mayhew, 'The assessment: education, training, and economic performance', Oxford review of
economic policy 4, 3 (1988), pp. 25-31
120 Simon, 'Tory government', p. 283; C. Knight, The making of Tory education policy in post-war Britain 1950-
1986 (Falmer Press, Aldershot, 1990), p. 3
121 Clarke to Macmillan, 9 May 1962: Dean, 'Conservative governments 1951-64, and their changing perspectives
on the 1944 Education Act', History of education 24, 3 (1995), p. 262
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'Other people 's children '. Labour's education spending, 1964-70.
Of all the hopes raised by Labour's victory in 1964, those for Education were the
most bitterly disappointed. Their 1964 and 1966 manifestos promised 'the largest
school building programme in history', along with more funding for day-release,
technical training, Universities, and more teachers to finally attain the Conservatives'
targets on class sizes. 122 The National Plan correctly predicted that this would require
spending in this sector to grow by one-third, more than in other fields of govermnent
spending. 123
 In fact, the reverse happened. The percentage rate of increase in funding,
which for every other arm of the welfare state at least maintained the levels of 1959-
64, was in fact lower than under the Conservatives.' 24
 Planning spending totals were
downgraded throughout Labour's time in office, meaning that even though spending
did rise, it did so much more slowly than the Government had hoped when compiling
the National Plan (table IV 5).
Successive spending rounds involved cuts in the planned budget of £9m (July
1967), £97m over two years (January 1968), and a further £16.7m (July 1968),
although some of that last reduction was subsequently reversed.' 25
 Capital controls
were also imposed, first heralded in the six-month investment 'standstill' of July
1965. As it affected Education, this first postponed all non-school capital projects for
six months. The 'postponement', furthermore, was not made up through extra
spending when the building programme resumed. Building was to continue as if there
had been no gap at all.' 26
 There were specific reasons for some of the low totals - for
example, it proved cheaper than previously thought to expand the output of trained
teachers - but, overall, the shortfall cannot be disguised.
' Labour Manifestos, 1964, 1966, Let's go with Labour, Time for decision: Craig, Manfestos, pp. 263-4, 304-5
Cmnd. 2764, The national plan (September 1965), table 21.2, p. 193
124 PRO CAB 134/3283: Diamond memorandum to SSC, 'Increases in expenditure on the various social services
in recent years', 27 May 1968
125 PRO CAB 128/42: Cabinet minutes, 19 July 1967; House of Commons debates vol. 756, cols. 1586-7: Prime
Minister's statement, 16 January 1968; PRO CAB 134/3201: SEP minutes, 15 July 1967
126 House of Commons debates vol. 717, col. 228, vol. 724, cols. 214-5: Callaghan statements, balance of
payments, 27 July 1965, public investment and expenditure, 8 February 1966
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Table IV.5. National Plan spending increases and reality, GB (1965 prices)
	
Projected 1969/70 Real 1969/70	 Projected % Real %
Spending (fm)	 Spending (fm)	 Increase	 Increase
Schools	 1065	 1008.5	 27	 19.9
FE	 235	 222.9.	 58	 49.6
Teacher Training	 87	 49.2	 55	 -12.2
Universities	 267	 214.0	 33	 7.0
Sources: Cmnd. 2764, The national plan (September 1965), table 21.2, p. 193; Statistics of education vol. 5
(1970), table, vi; Scottish educational statistics (1970), table 70, pp. 192-3
The most painful cut was the decision to put back ROSLA from the target date
of 1970-71. The Cabinet found itself confronted with the unpalatable demand for this
saving by the Treasury as early as the summer of 1967. At that point, Crosland
successfully argued this was 'politically out of the question'.' 27 But following
devaluation, Callaghan's case for postponement grew more pressing, for opponents of
the suggestion had the problem that this was the one large and easily identifiable piece
of social spending that could make a real impact on overall government
expenditure.' 28 This fact swung enough members of the Cabinet, which - although it
split twelve to nine - endorsed deferment. 129 This decision was extremely fraught,
marked by George Brown's outburst 'may God forgive you', and Crosland's
accusation that fellow Ministers were betraying 'other people's children' 130 However,
it was confinned ten days later. 131
This was not the end of the cuts. Beyond the withdrawal of the £55m special
ROSLA capital allocation, the Government also imposed a total spending ceiling for
1967/68 and 1968/69. Even projects that were being held up for lack of technical and
127 PRO CAB 129/13 1: Callaghan memorandum to Cabinet, 'Public expenditure: proposed adjustments', 7 July
1967, Crosland Cabinet memorandum, 'Public expenditure: education', 10 July 1967
128 PRO CAB 128/42: Cabinet minutes, 16 November 1967; PRO T 227/2557: Ranipton to Houghton, 28
November 1967
' 29 Mthony Crosland Papers, LSE, London [hereafter ACP], 5/18: 'For and against', January 1968
130 RCD, 5 January 1968: Crossman, Diaries (1991 edn.), p. 437; TBD, 5 January 1968: Benn, Wilderness, pp. 6-7;
S. Crosland, Tony Crosland (Cape, London, 1982), pp. 195-6; CAB 128/43: Cabinet minutes, 5 January 1968
TBD, 15 January 1968: Benn, Wilderness, p. 17
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building staff were to be counted within this total. 132
 This new freeze ensured that
LEAs did not simply replace ROSLA plans with schemes from their backlogged
programmes, and apply further political pressure on the Government) 33
 The extra
approvals needed to enforce ROSLA in 1972-73 - £1 05m over three academic years -
were eventually accepted by the Treasury, though not without a further attempt at
delay.' 34 The whole building effort had been pushed back by two years.
There were, however, considerable advances, as in the supply of teachers.
Estimates of future pupil numbers had now reached their zenith, and in this situation
the Department was involved in a successful emergency action to increase their output
of new teachers. In 1965, NACTST raised their advice on the number of places
required in Teacher Training Colleges from 111,000 to 120,000, leaving the
outstanding promise of the late Government far behind at 80,000.' The cost,
estimated by the Treasury at £45m on buildings alone, seemed prohibitive, but as
Crosland told the Cabinet, 'I can hold the position [on class sizes] only if I can show
that we are not going to do worse than our predecessors'.' 36
 He did indeed win a large
increase in the places apportioned to the Colleges for 1973-74, increasing their
numbers to 110,000, by promising efficiency measures in this sector.'37
Although Teacher Training investment was hit by the investment standstills,
Crosland met his efficiency targets with a 'fourteen point plan' announced in April
1965.138 This centred on a concentrated four-term year to increase the use of facilities
and speed up the course. Longer hours, temporary training courses in FE institutions,
132	 ED 142122: DES Circular 6/68, 19 January 1968
133 PRO ED 203/4: Andrew to Gordon Walker, 12 January 1968
' PRO T 227/2557: Jordan-Moss to Hudson, 29 October 1968; PRO ED 207/32: Jameson to Hudson, 31 October
1968, Andrew to Short, 17 December 1968
'"PRO CAB 134/2534: Stewart memorandum to SSC, 'Teacher training colleges in England and Wales', 30
November 1964, Social Service Committee minutes, 2 December 1964
136 PRO T 227/2525: Battishill memorrandum, 'Teacher training places down to 1973-74', 4 February 1965; PRO
CAB 129/120: Crosland memorandum to Cabinet, 'The development of Higher Education', 29 January 1965
'"PRO T 227/2525: Crosland to Callaghan, 9 February 1965
' ACP 5/2: Crosland speech to AEC, April 1965
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•	
••bigger classes and new refresher courses were also mobilised.
	 of the 150
Colleges of Education met or exceeded the Department's target of a 20% increase in
output through savings: St Mary's in Twickenham, for instance, extended its working
day by one and a half hours for four days a week. These efficiency savings, which the
DES estimated at £2m a year, even impressed the Treasury, which agreed to re-phase
the College building programme for 1968-69 and 1969-70 along the lines the DES
had originally requested, to meet the 110,000 target.' 4° So successful was the crash
programme that by the end of 1968 the Treasury was worrying that numbers would
overshoot their target.'41
By 1969 the DES was highly optimistic, projecting teacher surpluses by 1978,
and a large and sustained drop in class sizes. 142 The huge overall expansion achieved
can be followed in chart IV. 8, and the gains in pupil-teacher ratios from chart IV 7.
There was an ironic end to this story, for the 1 970s saw a massive deflation of the
number of future pupils as birth rates sank. By the early 1980s, governments were
reducing the Teacher Training provision so painstakingly built up to 110,000: in
1980-81, 28,000 places were cut. 143
 These particular population forecasts were
invalidated by the passage of time.
139 PRO ED 86/429: DES memorandum, 'Measures to improve the supply of teachers from the training courses', 7
January 1965
140 PRO 1227/2629: Rampton to Hudson, 15 May 1967, DES memorandum, 'Output from colleges of education -
the response to college letter 7/65', 21 September 1967
PRO T 227/2629: Jameson to Jones, 24 September 1968, Harding to Jordan-Moss, 17 October 1968
142 PRO CAB 134/3285: SSC, minutes, 28 July 1969; 'Surplus of teachers expected by 1979', Times, 3 January
1969
M. Shattock, 'Demography and social class: the fluctuating demand for Higher Education in Britain', European
journal of education 16, 3 (1981), p. 381, and fig. I, p. 382
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Charts IV. 7 IV.8. Pupil-teacher ratios and teacher training provision, GB, 195 1-74
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HE as a whole continued to enjoy unparalleled advance. Labour's acceptance
of the Robbins objective was inevitable, given the pressure they had exerted on this
while in Opposition.' However, further pressures were emerging. Increasing
numbers of 18 year olds were passing A Levels: the DES was already estimating that
430,000, rather than the Robbins target of 390,000 places, would be needed by 1973-
74. No immediate decision on this further increase was taken, mainly due to the
opposition of John Diamond as Chief Secretary. 145
 Wilson also took a special personal
interest in the 'University of the Air', eventually the Open University, employing his
personal fixer, Lord Goodman, to negotiate with the BBC to give the project air
time. 146
 Wilson also protected his Arts Minister, Jennie Lee, from demands (some
from within the DES) that the project be dropped.' 47
 Established in 1970, the OU had
60,000 students, or 20% of the undergraduate population, by 1979.148
Table IV.6. FIlE numbers, GB, 1970-7 1 (000s): Robbins and reality
Universities: Robbins	 Universities: reality All HE: Robbins All HE: reality
Students	 200	 228	 344	 443
Source: Simon, Order, table 5.3, p. 314
As table IV. 6 confirms, the Government did indeed expand provision far
beyond the Robbins targets, as the A Level success rate ran at 25% above Robbins
estimates even by 1967.149 The capital standstills did apply to Universities, but even
so, current spending per student was at least maintained (chart IV 9). Although
pressure grew from the Treasury to introduce student loans, the DES was able to fend
this off with the argument that with loans the Government would lose control of a
' PRO CAB 128/39: Cabinet minutes, I Februazy 1965
' PRO CAB 134/2534: Social Service Committee, minutes, 9 December 1964
' B. Brivati, Lord Goodman (Richard Cohen, London, 1999), pp. 12 1-3
' Pimlott, Wilson, p. 514; P. Hollis, Jennie Lee (OUP, Oxford, 1997), pp. 306-7, 312-19
' Stewart, Higher education, table 15.2, p. 283
Layard, King & Moser, Robbins, table A.2, p. 108
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significant portion of HE funding, and the fact that such a scheme was unlikely to be
self-financing for ten years or more.150
Chart IV.9. Total spending per University student, GB, 1959-70 (total £, 1959 prices)
Source: Stewart, Higher, table 15.1, p. 268; AAS(1970), table 125, p. 114, (1972), table 140, p. 125
The last months of the Labour Government were, moreover, marked by a new
resilience on the part of the DES. This became apparent when the Department secured
the same capital allowances for ROSLA in 1973 that had been cut from 1971, even
though the increase of children compulsorily staying on would be lower.' 5 ' The DES
also managed to avoid cuts in the school transport budget, and protect most of its
minor works programme.' 52 This trend reached its climax when Short brought the
case to the Economic Policy and Parliamentary Committees of Cabinet, arguing that
Education had been made to suffer more pain than any other social service. His
' 50 PR0 CAB 129/13 1: Crosland memorandum to Cabinet, 'Public expenditure: education', 10 July 1967; PRO T
227/2557: Anson to Rampton, 27 November 1967, Rampton to Houghton, 28 November 1967
PRO ED 207/32: Andrew to Hardyman, 7 May 1968
152 PRO PREM 13/2070: Short to Wilson, 10 October 1968, 21 October 1968; PRO CAB 128/44: Cabinet minutes,
29 July 1969; RCD, 29 July 1969: Diary (1991 edn.), pp. 643-4
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spirited opposition to any more cuts was originally sparked by proposals to increase
FE fees to hold down LEA spending. This, the Education Secretary pointed out,
would mean that technical courses for those already working would be worst hit, since
full-time students would still be exempt. This would further damage the take-up of FE
courses the Government were trying to encourage.'53
Short further showed that, across the whole Education spectrum, the
Government's pledges were under threat. University building was at a standstill;
Polytechnic plans without more buildings were 'little more than a blueprint'; 'the
replacement of slum schools' was at risk; comprehensive reorganisation was
proceeding at a crawl.' 54 Although Short also had to report that the Social Services
Committee was divided on which areas to give priority to, they were at least
authorised to begin 'some reallocation of priorities.., without adding to the total of
public expenditure or the call it made on resources'. 155 The DES limited the cuts to
LiOm, since the Social Services Committee was content to offset some reductions
against one month's delay in uprating social security benefits, and rises in NHS
charges for dentures and spectacles.' 56 Short was then able to reverse SEP's decision
to charge LiOm more in FE fees, as well as for school transport, though only at the
cost of allowing an increase in school meal charges.' 57 He was also able to head off
further cuts in the school building programme, though there were small reductions in
miscellaneous University spending for 1970/71.158
PRO CAB 134/3201: SEP minutes, 22 October 1968
PRO CAB 134/3283: Short memorandum to SSC, 'Public expenditure and educational policy', 13 November
1968; PRO CAB 134/3301: Short memorandum to Parliamentary Committee, 'Public expenditure and educational
policy', 19 November 1968
PRO CAB 134/330 1: Parliamentazy Committee minutes, 28 November 1968; PRO CAB 134/3283:Short
memorandum to SSC, 'Educational expenditure', 4 December 1968
156 PRO PREM 13/2588: McIntosh to Wilson, 2 January 1969; PRO PREM 13/3169: Wilson to Short, 23 June
1969
'"PRO CAB 134/3285: SSC, minutes, 12 May 1969; PRO PREM 13/2953: Short to Wilson, 12 June 1969;
Wilson, Governments, pp. 647-8
' PRO CAB 128/44: Cabinet minutes, 24 July, 27 July 1969
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'Pros and cons ': planning machinery for education
Labour Ministers were concurrently involved in the creation of new machinery, with
which to make hard policy choices. This was partly Crosland's personal initiative,
insisting on the formation of a Planning Branch within the DES, with a Deputy
Secretary as its head, against much civil service advice. Herbert Andrew for example
complained of the 'vast philosophical haze' that surrounded the subject.' 59
 Officials
would have preferred to preserve the planning roles of separate Branches, and
opposed planning 'divorced from day to day administration'. However, Crosland was
adamant that forward planning should be at the heart of the Department, to judge 'the
pros and cons and consequences of spending Lx million on nursery education v. higher
education v. everything else one can think of'.' 6o
 Statistics, forecasting, and the DES
economists were taken into the new Branch, which began work in October 1966 on
the rationale of numbers in different post- 16 sectors. 161
 It provided a conduit from
academia through its Technical Advisory Group, which included such famous names
as Vaizey, Michael Young, Claus Moser, and A.H. Halsey.'62
Perhaps most importantly, the DES could now contribute actual original
research to the Treasury's Education Programme Committee, rather than simply pleas
for more money. This Committee, which first met in March 1966, was instituted to
'create and examine choices', and 'sort... out the longer-term possibilities of choice in
the education field'.' 63
 In the first eighteen months of the Programme Committee's
' PRO ED 100/154: Andrew to Rossetti, Turnbull, Weaver, Embling, Fletcher, Redfern, 17 June 1966, Andrew
memorandum, 27 October 1966
160 ACP 5/2: DES note for Crosland, 'Research, statistics, and forward planning' (?March) 1966, Crosland to
Andrew, 'Long term planning', 25 May 1966; Kogan, Politics, p. 176
161 ACP 5/2: Note of meeting, Crosland, Andrew, Rossetti, Weaver, Fletcher, Litton, 28 June 1966; PRO ED
181/213: Heigham to Crosland, 'The use of economists in the DES', 11 August 1966, Fletcher memorandum,
'Office organisation from 3rd October 1966', 8 September 1966
162 PRO ED 181/214: Stuart to Heigham, 7 September 1966, Heigham to Dovey, January 1967; PRO 1227/2334:
Stevens to Jay, 'Very long term planning exercise', 30 August 1966
163 PRO T 227/2205: Rampton memorandum, 'Education programmes committee', 30 March 1966, Treasury note,
'Education programme committee: scheme of future work', June 1966, Clarke to Andrew, 17 January 1966
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work, the DES submitted papers on the economics of different modes of teaching for
15-18 year olds, building for student accommodation, and new methods of teaching
such as the use of television. They also submitted work on the demographic,
educational and quality demands that made for increasing costs. 1 " In terms of public
expenditure, such work made it much easier to choose priorities, and understand both
the quantitative and qualitative implications of their decisions.' 65
 As an adjunct to
PESC, it helped provide the lists of 'increases' and 'decreases' with which Cabinet
Ministers became familiar in the later 1960s.'66
Education was a pioneer department for new budgeting methods, for instance
PPB.' 67 This further stimulated the improved planning effort, and played into
Crosland's hands. The Department agreed to test out such methods in consultation
with both the MOD and the Treasury.' 68
 Given the Treasury's interest in forward
planning, along with the DES's appointment of Ian Byatt (one of Crosland's choices
for Planning Branch) to the study, it came as no surprise that the work culminated in a
favourable report. The report broke down DES spending into blocks, with their own
objectives, and suggested ways to evaluate the effectiveness of spending in each
case. 169
Building planning was also brought to a new pitch in the later 1 960s. During
1964 and 1965, A&B Branch began to gather detailed information as to which LEAs
could actually meet their targets, inevitably encouraging the quicker industrialised
164 PRO T 227/2556: 'Education programme committee, progress report', 8 November 1967
165 PRO CAB 134/3282: Secretaries' memorandum to SSC, 'Development of the social services: work in hand', 27
March 1968
e.g. PRO CAB 129/130: Callaghan memorandum to Cabinet, PESC Report 1967, 'Public expenditure: areas of
choice', 15 June 1967; PRO CAB 134/3282: Crossman memorandum to SSC, 'Development of the social services:
areas of choice', 27 March 1968
167 See above, chapt. III
PRO ED 100/154: Andrew to Rossetti, 17 June 1966, Andrew memorandum to inter-departmental meeting, 27
October 1966, DES meeting with Treasury, minutes, 4 August 1966
169 PRO T 316/64: DES! Treasury Report, 'Feasibility of output budgeting', January 1969
198
Education
building methods by so doing.' 7° Direct pressure was put on Counties and County
Boroughs which had not yet joined building consortia, pointing out that they could
work directly with building contractors' proprietary building systems, under advice
from the Department.' 7 ' Detailed technical work continued to build up a pool of
standardised components on which all LEAs could draw, and the DES encouraged the
establishment of LEAs' own Development Groups. Such measures brought
industrialised building of schools to their late 1960s highs (see chart 1V3).'72
The continuing need to control public expenditure, however, was the main
reason why the Government established new controls, for example clamping down on
the number of so-called 'mini-minor' projects. For several years, LEAs had been
permitted by the DES to carry out works costing less than £2,000 'off the ration' -
that is, without permission from central government. Reg Prentice, Crosland's
Minister of State, announced this concession would end in February 1965, causing
consternation in local government.' 73
 Prentice received a delegation from the
Association of Education Committees, covering himself by protesting that it was 'not
part of his duty to say what [the] Treasury did'. 'Put your own construction on... why
there was delay in making the announcement', he told the AEC. He did consider their
proposal that repairs and maintenance be financed from revenue, rather than capital.
works that were scrutinised in Whitehall, but rejected this as simply another request
for increased spending.'74
Crosland announced in June 1966 that still longer periods of approvals notice
- up to two years - were also to be given to LEAs, allowing them to plan building
ED 150/171: Lacey to LEA architects, 25 March 1965
' PRO ED 150/171: Wigglesworth memorandum, 'Development group, programme of technical work', 19
October 1964, Hardyman to LEAs, 18 October 1965
172 PRO ED 150/172: Report on industrialisation of educational building, February 1966; PRO ED 150/171:
Kitchin note, 'Building productivity group: 1966 report', II November 1966, 'Chief Architects Committee: future
technical collaboration', December 1966
LUA MS 618/A19 (d): Labour press release, 18 February 1965
LUA MS 618/A19 (d): AEC meeting with Prentice, minutes, 24 March 1965, Prentice to Alexander, 3 June
1965
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with more assurance) 75 Although this effort was delayed by ROSLA deferment, a
concerted effort was being made by A&B Branch to build an orderly approvals
system, to replace the old 'stop-go' of yearly applications. This would allow backlogs
to be cleared, and end the system under which LEAs submitted 'inflated' bids and
'when we reduce the list this is headline news as a "Ministerial cut"...' DES
architects aimed at systemising their practice of asking LEAs how much building
work they could actually undertake, rather than just what they would like to do. They
would therefore establish four categories: a 'current programme', containing buildings
likely to be built in that academic year, 'starts', likely to go ahead next year, followed
by a 'design programme' for the following year, and an 'early warning list' that could
be worked on thereafter.' 76
 Refined after talks with LEAs into 'design', 'preliminary'
and 'starts' lists, this scheme was implemented in l968.' Partly due to this, the DES
and Treasury then worked on a deal that would swap detailed control by veto with a
general spending limit over much of LEA spending.178
'"ACP 5/2: Crosland address to AEC, 24 June 1966
176 PRO ED 203/13: A&B Branch memorandum, 'Building programme procedure', 4 April 1967
ED 203/13: DES meeting with Alexander, AEC, 16 November 1967, DES meeting with ILEA, 7
December 1967, Hardwick to Dovey, 1 February 1968
PRO T 227/3031: Forsyth to Jones, 'DES letter', 7 August 1969, Levitt to Forsyth, 'Control over local authority
capital expenditure on education, 12 August 1969; PRO T 227/3118: Treasury meeting with DES! DHSS/ MOT!
WO! MHLG, local authority associations, 'Local authority capital programmes', minutes, 12 March 1970
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'Melting pot '. Further Education and Polytechnics, 1964-70
Labour decisively rejected the Robbins recommendations for a unified system of 18+
education. Instead, Crosland declared for a 'binary system'. This would retain
Universities as research and teaching centres with the power to grant degrees, but
create new institutions - Polytechnics - that would focus on FE and non-University
HE. In Opposition, Crosland had contributed to a Report that condemned such an
idea. The Report of Labour's Study Group on HE, The years of crisis, had in 1963
condemned the 'segregation' of HE into 'dockets into which students are fitted'. 'The
time has come to end these artificial distinctions', it concluded: 'University status
should be conferred on a wide range of institutions which are at present excluded'.'79
However, in his famous Woolwich speech of April 1965, Crosland announced his
intent to establish Polytechnics through an expansion of Colleges already providing
HE under LEA control.'8°
This policy had been promoted within the Department by Toby Weaver,
Crosland's Deputy Secretary in charge of HE: but Crosland 'made it his own'.181
Along with an early decision to uphold the Conservatives' decision to maintain the
distinction between Colleges of Education and Universities, this irritated several of
Crosland's ideological allies. Robin Pedley, Director of the Exeter Institute of
Education, was among these. He wrote to Crosland complaining that maintaining a
segregated system was 'disastrous', since it 'seriously conflicts with the philosophy of
comprehensive education'.' 82
 Why, then, should Crosland have strayed so far from
Party policy and ideological orthodoxy? One reason was pressure from the local
Colleges of Technology, which had been left out of the Robbins scheme for HE
altogether. Those at Coventry and Brighton, for instance, had pressed very hard for
inclusion in Warwick and Sussex Universities, without success. Building them up as a
new sector was a compromise to assuage their annoyance.'83
'° Labour Party, The years of crisis (Labour Party, London, 1963), p. 9
° K. Jeffrys, Anthony Crosland (Richard Cohen, London, 1999), pp. 108-9
' Crosland, Tony Crosland, pp. 158-9
182 PRO ED 147/640: Pedley to Crosland, 3 May 1965
183 Parry, Provision, p. 135
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There was other, more pressing, justifications: cost and speed. 'It would have
been utterly wrong', Crosland argued, to throw evely institution into the 'melting-pot
of administrative reform... at a time of rapid expansion'.' With all but one of the
155 Regional, Area and Commerce Colleges offering degree courses in 1964-65, the
Government concentrated non-University HE in Polytechnics so that it would be
limited to only a few, cost-effective, centres. Buildings, administration and equipment
would all be concentrated in less than 30 institutions, which in a number of cases
made for awkward amalgamations. The South Bank Polytechnic, for instance, brought
together the City of Westminster College of Commerce, Borough Polytechnic, and the
Brixton School of Building.' 85
 Those Colleges 'left behind' would be left to develop
lower-level qualifications with the ITBs.'86
Table IV. 7. Polytechnic subject areas, numbers and percentages, GB, 1970-78
Subject group
	 1970	 1974	 1978
Engineering and technology	 43,628 (34.4)
	 37,744 (26.1)	 43,593 (21.2)
Science	 14,194 (11.2)
	 16,304 (11.3)	 21,845 (10.6)
Professional and vocational subjects	 10,531 (8.3)
	 11,863 (8.2)	 14,098 (6.8)
Social, administrative, business 	 42,326 (33.3)
	
54,882 (37.9)	 68,557 (33.3)
Medical and welfare	 3,613 (2.8)	 5,913 (4.1)	 7,455 (3.6)
Education	 2,675 (2.1)
	 5,106 (3.5)	 17,794 (8.6)
Languages, arts, music, drama
	 6,925 (5.4)
	 9,297 (6.5)
	
15,149 (7.4)
Language and literature
	 2,252 (1.8)	 3,364 (2.3)
	
5,112 (2.5)
Source: Gosden, System, table 6.1, p. 182
The Polytechnics did achieve a large expansion of facilities, and help to
relieve some of the pressure of numbers on Universities. But during the 1 970s, as
pupil numbers shifted towards arts subjects, Polytechnics' apportioned role was
threatened as they drifted into providing more space for these subjects (see table
'Pluralism in Higher Education', speech delivered at University of Lancaster on January 20, 1967: Crosland,
Socialism now (Cape, London, 1974), pp. 211-13
' Timmins, Five giants, p. 246
Cmnd. 3006, Higher education within the further education system (May 1966), pp. 4-6
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JJ/ 7)187 This would eventually see them redesignated as Universities in the
tMtj. Crosland identified this tendency, with some regret, as early as 1972.188
Beyond the new Polytechnics, the development of technical education was
stalled, at least in terms of students released for formal study in FE institutions.
Following expansion in the first four years of Labour Government, numbers and age-
participation rates were again in retreat by the time Labour left office. The results of
the ITA, leaving skill levels to individual companies provided they could persuade
their Boards that they had their own training schemes, were clear: while numbers in
full time FE went on slowly increasing, part-time attendance first stabilised, and then
began to fall (see charts IV.5-IV6). There were some plans, eventually aborted, to
reverse this stagnation. One idea was that ROSLA might be amended so that the last
year in school could instead be taken in full-time FE, which at least would have raised
the status of non-academic study and helped maintain interest in the less academic
streams. The idea was trailed by Education Ministers, and studied by officials, but left
unfulfilled for lack of funds and enthusiasm among LEAs, industry and Trade
Unions.'89
IE7 C. Landymore, 'Education and industiy since the War', in D. Morris (ed.), The economic system in the UK
(OUP, Oxford, 1985), table 22.9, p. 711
' 88 ACP 5/2: draft speech, City of London Polytechnic, 'The future of Polytechnics', 9 June 1972
PRO CAB 134/3288: Short memorandum to SSC, 'The last year of compulsoiy education', 30 September 1969;
PRO CAB 134/3285: SSC, minutes, 22 October 1969; PRO T 227/2998: Forsyth to Jordan-Moss, 3 October 1969
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'Making choices '. Labour and selectivity
One of the Government's palliatives for delaying ROSLA was to establish a novel
form of funding: Educational Priority Areas, (EPAs). These had been one
recommendation in the Plowden Report, Children and their primary schools, in
November 1966. That Report argued that the deprived areas revealed by the Schools
Survey should be given privileged status, and placed first in the queue for capital
investment and teacher recruitment. One-fifth of the favoured 10% could aim to
achieve their teacher supply targets in this way every year. Higher salaries would be
paid to teachers in these areas, while the emphasis in building would be on works that
could achieve the greatest improvement in the shortest time. Plowden estimated that
these measures might cost £8m per annum by 1973.190 These ideas were taken up by a
Government desperate to lessen the social inequalities of education, but constrained
by public expenditure limits.
In preliminary consultations on EPAs, Ministers made clear they wanted to
'draw a distinction between a slum area in Shoreditch... and a small mining village
with poor housing and poor cultural background where the kids still had plenty of
room and enough to eat'. They wanted to favour the former. 19 ' A Circular was issued,
inviting bids, in August 1967: there was to be extra money, over and above the
existing capital programme, for EPAs in 1969/70. This amounted to £16m over two
years. Although as Plowden envisaged, most of this money was aimed at Primaries,
Secondary bids would also be taken. The test for eligibility would favour the older
industrial conurbations, taking into account 'concentration of crowded, old, sub-
standard and badly maintained houses', noise and pollution, high numbers of benefit
recipients, and levels of truancy. About half the money was to be allocated to minor
works, so that if the Plowden recommendation of5,000 spending on each school was
followed, 1,600 schools could be upgraded.'92
° CAC (Plowden Report), Children and their prima?y schools (HMSO, London, 1967), pp. 50-1, 62-5, 437
PRO ED 207/3 1: Crosland reported in Andrew to Rossetti, 21 July 1967
' PRO ED 142/21: DES Circular 11/67, 24 August 1967
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This selectivity was reinforced by devaluation. Treasury officials were
'tactically' willing to offer up to LiOm of savings from this back into school building
in depressed regions, especially EPAs. Eventually, £8m was in fact held back,
forming the total EPA budget for 1968/69.193 But there was more to the programme's
survival than presentation, for the emergence of a 'liberal planning agenda', as in
housing and health care, had begun to seep into Education. For instance, the
Community Development Programme launched by Labour in 1968 played a crucial
role in securing EPAs' survival.' 94
 The inter-departmental CDP Working Party
sponsored a year's research into EPAs, to discover where the money would best be
used. These studies were conducted in partnership with schools, HMIs and LEAs to
form 'horizontally organised inter-service team[s] making use of existing local
strengths and leadership'. This technique closely mirrored the Ministry of Housing's
Deeplish study.'95
Their studies of 105 schools in 15 areas showed that, although there were no
areas with uniformly bad schools, areas of social deprivation did indeed endure
inferior provision. Preferential treatment might alleviate this, for many buildings were
poorly maintained, rather than structurally inadequate. The 'general sordidness, and
absence of good sanitation and hot water', officials concluded, 'suggests that a
programme of small minor projects might be effective' 196 Selectivity was reinforced
by the Urban Programme, co-ordinated by the Home Office, which aimed at
environmental improvements in inner city areas. The money involved for education
was only £3m a year, with just less than half earmarked for nursery education. Even
so, this might provide 20-30,000 nursery places, an increase in age-group
participation from 13% to 15%, concentrated in depressed areas.' 97 Ministers
PRO T 227/2557: Rampton to Houghton, 28 November 1967; PRO ED 142/22: DES Circular 6/68, 19 January
1968
J. Higgins, The poverty business (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1978), pp. 39-40, 43
PRO ED 207/10: DES memorandum, 'Identification of CDAs', 17 January 1968, Working party on CDAs,
minutes, 28 January 1968; on Deeplish, see below, Chapter V
PRO ED 207/10: Byatt to Leadbetter, 24 April 1968
PRO ED 142122: DES/ HOt MOH circular 19/68, 4 October 1968; PRO ED 142/23: DES/ HO/ DHSS Circular
2/69, 7 February 1969
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envisaged these measures coming to an end in 1970, but by then they had paid out to
86 LEAs in England and Wales.' 98 In Scotland, 'designated' schools could add £100-
200 a year to salaries to attract teachers to difficult schools, which helped recruitment
there too. 1 Some measure of the impact of EPAs can be divined from table 1V8.
Table 1V8. EPA spending, major conurbations, England and Wales, 1968-70 (000s, current
prices)
EPA	 EPA	 Normal	 Normal EPA as % EPA as %
major minor	 building:	 building:	 of major	 of minor
works	 works major works minor works 	 works	 works
ILEA
	
1630	 634	 3451	 1100	 47.2	 57.6
Birmingham	 1648
	
157	 787	 400	 209.4	 39.2
Liverpool
	
758
	
245
	
266
	
266	 284.9	 92.1
Lancashire	 453
	
455
	 5718	 820	 7.9	 55.5
Manchester	 340	 458
	
356	 256	 95.5	 178.9
Sheffield	 377
	 148	 142
	
200
	
265.5
	
78.0
Leeds	 385
	
100
	 364	 200	 105.8	 50.0
Total (E& W)	 12,891	 3,123	 39,070	 10,809	 32.9	 28.9
Source: House of Commons debates, vol. 774, cols. 163-66: Bacon written answer, 28 November 1968
Labour's EPA programme was not the nationally co-ordinated plan that
Plowden had recommended: it slanted existing programmes towards deprived areas,
but only after the existing allocation processes had been exhausted. Andrew was
sceptical about EPAs, and much of the work on them was conducted at the Home
Office under the crusading leadership of Derek Monet!, the civil servant in charge of
CDP. Central govermnent still did not have the powers to impose a central register of
actual schools, and target resources towards those performing badly, but had to settle
for an area approach, congruent with CDP and the Urban Programme. Although more
money was paid to teachers in these areas, the increase was not as much as Plowden
had recommended. 20° Nonetheless, it is clear that significant sums were diverted, and
this approach was to have increasing influence in the 1970s. 20 ' Furthermore, the
' 98 House of Commons debates, vol. 787, col. 874: Short, oral answers, 17 July 1969; House of Commons debates,
vol. 792, cols. 110-1: Short, written answers, 26 November 1969
Cmnd. 4605, Report of the Scottish Education Department for 1970 (May 1971), pp. 39-40
200 K.G. Banting, Poverty, politics and policy: Britain in the 1 960s (Macmillan, London, 1979), PP. 120, 123, 126-
8, 131; Halsey, Educational priority (HMSO, London, 1972), pp. 38, 46-7
201 R. Hambleton, Policy planning and local government (Hutchinson, London, 1978), p. 120
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'action research' effort of Ministerial teams in such areas, for example developing
social and community work from the 'Red House' centre in South Yorkshire, helped
to foster links between family social work and education.202
202 Higgins, Poverty business, pp. 56-7
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'Empty toughness'? Labour 's comprehensive plans
If EPAs were one example of Labour's political priorities, the planned comprehension
of secondary education lay at its heart. Labour's theoretical commitment went back as
far as the widespread discontent within the Party at the caution of Ellen Wilkinson
and George Tomlinson as Education Ministers in the 1940s: several hostile
Conference motions had then committed the Party to comprehension. So central was
this to Labour doctrine that in 1953 Challenge to Britain's recommendation of a
Leicestershire-type experiment was rejected by the Labour Conference. 203
 The NEC's
similar 'two-tier' solution in Learning to live, their 1958 policy statement, also ran
into opposition within the Party since it concluded that 'it would not be possible
within the period of a first Labour Govenment completely to abolish separation
between schools'. It was Labour's intention merely to advise LEAs on methods of
comprehension, to 'lay a firm basis' for a comprehensive future. 2°4 The unpopularity
of such opinions explained the much greater radicalism of Signposts for the sixties and
Labour's 1964 Manifesto, which vaguely but definitely promised comprehension as
an objective for any Labour Administration.205
Labour Ministers did their best to carry it out, against a background of ill-
fitting buildings, lack of staff and public opposition. Prompted by questions in the
House, the Cabinet decided on the broad lines of policy almost immediately: not to
legislate, but to 'request' LEAs to submit plans abolishing the 1 1+.206 This decision,
taken by Stewart before Crosland became Education Secretary, was partly due to the
fact that comprehension 'has got to fit into the existing stock of school buildings'.
Two-thirds of Secondary Schools had been built since the War, and replacement
would inevitably be 'very slow'. Central government could not therefore insist that all
203 R. Bilski, 'Ideology and the comprehensive school', Political quarterly 44, 2 (1973), pp. 201, 205; STWT
9/2/5: Pedley memorandum to NEC Social Services Committee, 'Summary of the case for the high school! county
college in a system of fully comprehensive education' (?1 953)
204 STWT 9/2112: Study Group on Education, minutes, 16 July 1957; M. Parkinson, The Labour Party and the
organisation of secondary education 1918-1 965 (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1970), pp. 84, 86
205 Labour Party, Signposts; Labour Manifesto 1964, Let's go with Labour: Craig, Manfestos, p. 263
206	 CAB 128/39: Cabinet minutes, 19 November 1964
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LEAs move, within one Parliament, to comprehension. All-in schools would have to
be large, to allow for academic streams; they would need specialist equipment and
buildings to upgrade Secondary Moderns, and adapt Grammars, for a variety of
needs. 207 Many LEA programmes were committed ahead into 1968, which made
forcing immediate re-organisation impossible.208
In January 1965 Cabinet thus accepted Stewart's compromise solution, which
was to invite LEAs to submit plans for re-organisation, and to leave the question of
compulsion for later.209 This led to the issuing of Circular 10/65 in July, asking LEAs
for their Secondary plans. However, the Circular went further than a simple request
for change, laying out the schemes that the DES would find acceptable. Although the
11-18, all-in, all through comprehensive was the preferred solution, Labour permitted
LEAs their own variants. Middle schools containing 8 to 12 year olds were to be
allowed, as were 11-16 comprehensives with Sixth Form Colleges, perhaps adapted
from Grammar Schools. 'Tiered' schools, with Lower and Upper High Schools
housing 11-14, and 14-18 year olds, were also allowed. However, schools exercising
self-selection (as in Leicestershire), and middle schools which did not adopt an age of
transfer of 11 were only provisionally accepted, pending thorough comprehension
later.21° The DES tacitly accepted a range of entry ages, given that they could not
supply the money to provide for a single age.21'
All this was later to come in for Left-wing criticism. Actually achieving
change in Government, however, was inevitably harder than a mere legislative
gesture. In fact, several administrative steps made it very difficult for recalcitrant
LEAs to hold out against comprehensives. The most notable of these was Circular
10/66 of March 1966. This declared that 'the Secretary of State will not approve any
new secondary projects... which would be incompatible with the introduction of a
207 PRO CAB 134/2536: Stewart memorandum to SSC, 11 January 1965
208 PRO CAB 129/120: Stewart memorandum to Cabinet, 'Comprehensive secondary education', 14 January 1965
209	 CAB 128/39: Cabinet minutes, 19 January 1965
2t0 Benn & Simon, Halfway, p. 32; Fenwick, Comprehensive, p. 135
211 PRO CAB 129/124: Crosland Cabinet memorandum (not considered), 'Comprehensive reorganisation and
raising of the school leaving age', 25 February 1966
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non-selective system of secondary education'. 212
 This made only a marginal
difference, as there were few authorities seeking to build new Grammars, but it did
signal a final end to officially sanctioned tripartism. 213
 Just as important was the fact
that, when postponing ROSLA, the DES was allowed to claw back £8m for special
allocation to re-organisation in 1968-69, and £4m more for 1969-70 and l9707l.2l4
Once more, Labour had to make choices, and plan for different priorities.
Given the economic situation, what Labour achieved was actually at the limits
of the possible. Crosland, for instance, knew that immediate legislation would
constitute 'empty toughness'. 'Botching' would not work, 'throwing together
buildings that lacked the physical requirements for a sixth form, or amalgamating a
Grammar School and a Secondary Modern School so quickly that instead of creating a
genuinely new school, the Grammar School ethos prevailed'.215
 The Department was
certainly not afraid to reject local plans, even if they came from Labour councils.
Some of these, notably Liverpool, thought that a Labour Government was the green
light for immediate reorganisation, and received an unpleasant surprise when 'their'
Minister disagreed. In that particular case, civil servants thought that the Council
'must have just got out a map of Liverpool and marked it up': furthermore, local
teachers were so opposed that they organised a deputation to the DES, where they
received a sympathetic hearing.216
Crosland vetoed most of Liverpool's reorganisation requests (13 out of 23
outright), given that many of them simply put existing buildings (some more than half
a mile apart) together as 'new' schools, duplicating laboratories, gymanasia, and
technology workshops. The Department thereafter kept a wary eye on the Liverpool
situation, receiving regular complaints from teachers and parents that the LEA was
attempting to re-organise 'by stealth', and forcing the Council to abandon many of its
212	 ED 142/20: DES Circular 10/66, 10 March 1966
213 ACP 5/1: Harte note, 'Labour's comprehensive policy, school building and circular 10/66', July 1977
214 PRO ED 142/22: DES Circular 6/68, 19 January 1968; PRO CAB 134/3209: SEP minutes, 6 January 1969
Crosland, Tony Crosland, p. 144
216 ACP 5/1: Harte note, 'Labour's comprehensive policy, individual problems', July 1977; PRO ED 147/1308: J4
Association, Liverpool, to Stewart, 18 December 1964, and to Gerrard, 19 January 1965
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plans. 217 Nor was the Department prepared to tolerate 'selection by stealth', as in the
case of the plan submitted by Surrey. This LEA proposed to keep Grammars 'for the
time being', while gradually expanding Secondary Modems to a size where they
could accommodate academic streams. The two types of school would 'overlap at all
points', with parents rather than exams deciding which children went to which. Once
the Secondary Moderns were ready to take all children, the Grammars might evolve
into Sixth Form Colleges. Officials thought this was simply a delaying tactic, 'totally
incompatible' with 10/65, and advised its rejection.218
The longer they remained in power, the more powers Labour Ministers took.
Following massive Conservative victories over Labour in local elections in 1968,
Alice Bacon as te<- of State promised legislation to an impatient Labour
Conference both that year and the next. 219 Short realised that 'the process of planning
had lost momentum and that a hard core of LEAs and... voluntary schools would hold
out against Government policy'. He therefore asked Cabinet to approve a new Act,
which would provide him with powers to force LEAs to submit plans on the basis that
pupils of any ability could enter all their schools. This was not to compel them to
actually introduce comprehension - the Government could hardly afford total
reorganisation in the next five years - but did increase the pressure to do 220 LEAs
would have had the legal duty to submit plans on a basis similar to Circular 10/65.
Clause one of the Bill ruled out 'selection by ability or aptitude' to established LEA
schools, despite Wilson's wishes that the legislation should not seen to be framed
against Grammars, but rather against the 11+ itself.22'
217 ED 147/1307: Stevens to Liverpool City Council, 1 February 1965; PRO ED 147/1308: DES 'Notes on
the Liverpool Authority's present proposals for the reorganisation of secondary reorganisation', December 1965,
Liverpool Teachers Association to the DES, 14 December 1965
218 PRO ED 147/1301: Stevens to Harte, 17 June 1966, Leadbetterto Rossetti, 20 June 1966
219 Alice Bacon, Labour Party Conference report, 1968, pp. 239-40; Bilski, 'Ideology', p.208
° PRO CAB 134/3285: SSC, minutes, 12 May 1969; PRO CAB 129/145: Short memorandum to Cabinet,
'Reorganisation of secondaiy schools', 21 October 1969; PRO CAB 128/44: Cabinet minutes, 23 October 1969
221 PRO PREM 13/3168: Gregson to Hetherington, 26 November 1969, 6 January 1970, Gregson to Wilson, 21
January 1970; House of Commons debates, vol. 795, cols. 1464-6: Short speech, First Reading, Education Bill, 12
February 1970
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Table 1V9. Comprehensive schools and their pupils, GB, 1966-6 to 1974-75
E& W Scottish E& W: E& W: Comp. Scotland: Scotland:
E& W Comp. Scottish Comp. Comps as % pupils as % Comps. as % pupils as %
Comps pupils Comps. pupils of secondary of secondary of secondary of secondary
	
(no).	 (no.)	 (no.)	 (no.)	 schools	 pupils	 schools	 pupils
	
1966-67 387	 31,2281	 137	 108,000	 6.7	 11.1	 22.3	 37.5
	
1968-69 748	 606,362	 157 120,536	 13.4	 20.9	 25.8	 42.6
	
1970-71 1,250 973,082	 182	 157,912	 23.2	 31.9	 33.6	 51.9
	
1972-73 1,777 1,412,174 239 233,257	 34.1	 43.4	 49.2	 71.9
	
1974-75 2,677 2,310,103 295 316,227	 52.7	 62.0	 61.7	 82.2
Sources: Gosden, System, table 1.5, p. 42; Cmnd. 3549, SED report 1967, p. 10; Scottish education statistics 1968
table 4, p. 20, 1969 table 4, p. 30, 1970 table 4, p. 56, 1971 table 4, p. 30, 1972 table 4, p. 30, 1973 table 4, p. 30,
1974 table 4, p.16
Total comprehension had not been achieved by 1970, but Labour had achieved
many of their objectives through a mixture of threats, persuasion and cajoling.
Ministers successfully relied on the fact that, although they did not have the power to
direct reorganisation themselves, they at least possessed the power of veto. By 1970
129 out of the 162 British LEAs had got the go-ahead to carry out their plans. 11 had
been sent back as unacceptable; only five had refused to submit any plans at all. 222 As
it was put into operation in the early 1 970s, reorganisation even outlived Margaret
Thatcher's appointment as Education Secretary. She withdrew Circular 10/65: but
having begun building in line with it, LEAs were in no mood to change tack again.
Thatcher was left with little choice but to approve most of them, and by the mid-
1970s comprehensives were the majority experience in British education, particularly
in Scotland (see table IV.] O).223
mHoe of Commons debates, vol. 793, col. 613: Alice Bacon, oral answers, 11 December 1969
R. Lowe, 'The social policy of the Heath Government', inS. Ball & A. Seldon (eds.), The Heath government
1970-74 (Longman, London, 1996), pp. 212-13
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We shall overtake the shortages, eliminate the slums and accelerate modernisation until
within ten years a modem or a decently modernised home is within reach of every person in
the land.
-Keith Joseph, October 1963'
'If we had more houses '. the Conservative U-turn, 1959-64
The market for housing and land had been extensively liberalised in the 1 950s, a
process that has been partly concealed by Macmillan's dirigiste methods in reaching
his 300,000 annual house building programme in the early 1 950s.2 Some key elements
of Labour's strategy were abandoned: for instance, although those New Towns
already designated were expanded, only Cumbemauld in Dumbartonshire was
designated during the 1950s, and New Town house completions were allowed to fall
well below Labour's targets. 3
 In place of planned dispersal beyond the immediate
proximity of the conurbations, the population in the putative Green Belt was allowed
to expand by default, with most Green Belt plans not approved until the late 1950s.4
The Conservatives preferred to rely on ad hoc negotiations between urban councils
and other local authorities: voluntary agreements were encouraged in the 1952 Town
Development Act. 5
 In the housing market itself, general needs subsidies were
withdrawn in 1956. Councils were thereafter to receive large subsidies only for slum
clearance: public sector building therefore halved between 1953 and 1959. Private
rents were decontrolled in 1957.6
'PRO T 224/710: Joseph speech to Conservative Party Conference, October 1963
2 A. Seldon, Churchill's Indian summer (Macmillan, London, 1981), pp. 256, 258
P. Merlin, New towns: regional planning and development (Methuen, London, 1971), pp. 3 8-9; P. Hall, Urban
and regional planning (2 edn., Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1982), p. 106
J.B. Cullingworth, Housing needs and planning policy (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1960), pp. 82-3, 92-3;
M.J. Elson, Green belts (Heinemann, London, 1986), xxvi-xxvii, p. 19; D. Thomas, London's green belt (Faber &
Faber, London, 1970), p. 33
Hall, Urban, p. 108
6 P. Malpass, Reshaping housing policy (Routledge, London, 1990), p. 91; A.E. Holmans, Housing policy in
Britain (Croom Helm, London, 1987), table A, p. 157; Timmins, Five giants, p. 189
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However, the early 1 960s saw Conservatives rethink their liberal instincts:
'planning' was now hailed as the solution to Britain's housing and land use problems.
The Government returned to a general means subsidy on council housing, and began a
second round of New Town building. By 1964, their election manifesto Prosperity
with a purpose was promising that 400,000 houses would be built evely year, as well
as hailing the success of regional planning in determining where land should be given
up for development. The manifesto also detailed how the government would buy up
land in advance for more New Towns, and utilise the National Building Agency to
promote industrialised building methods. 7
 What was behind this conversion? One
answer is that the conversion was born of simple desperation. Ministers confronted
with a unique combination of political, physical, and financial demands grasped at the
solution of 'planning'.
One driving force was Macmillan himself, nostaglic for the methods of his
days at Housing. His appointment of Charles Hill to the Housing portfolio in October
1961 was partly due to his frustration with the conservatism of Hill's predecessor,
Hemy Brooke. As soon as he had made the appointment, the Prime Minister was
pressing for action: 'I have always felt that quite a lot of the Housing difficulties
would be got over if we had more houses'. When Hill asked him for a five-year
programme of 120,000 council houses a year - an increase on the previous annual
forecasts of nearly 15,000 houses - Macmillan held a series of informal meetings with
Hill and Lord Mills, the totemic figure from his Ministerial Council of the early
'fifties. Hill was encouraged to press his demands. 8
 The following May Macmillan
again minuted Hill, with his suggestions for manifesto promises on housing, and
'immediate action whenever the economic situation allows - or requires - a measure
of reflation'. He had increased council house building, and slum clearance, in mind,
along with the development of more New Towns. 9 Macmillan's October 1962
1 Conservative manifesto, Prosperity with a purpose, October 1964: F.W.S. Craig, British election manfestos
(Research Publications, Aldershot, 1991), PP. 38-9
PRO T 224/38 1: Treasusy note, 'Ministiy of Housing and Local Government plans 1958/59 to 1964/65', April
1960; PRO PREM 11/4297: Macmillan to Hill, 13, 30 November 1961
PRO PREM 11/4297: Macmillan to Hill, 19 May 1962
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'modernisation of Britain' brief to Cabinet displayed a startling desire to 'control the
pattern of events, to direct development, to plan growth', mobilising both regional
policy and New Towns.1°
There were political dangers in doing nothing, as housing moved steadily up
the political agenda, much assisted in this by the so-called 'Rachman scandal'. The
landlord Perec Rachman, a post-war Polish immigrant, practised intimidation to force
people out of properties he had bought at prices reflecting the tenants' controlled
rents: then he rack-rented or sold the properties on. His death in 1962 lifted the
protection of the libel laws, and Ben Parkin, Labour MP for Paddington, seized the
opportunity to attack his methods. The media inquisition, made all the more feverish
given Rachman's proximity to the Profumo scandal through his mistress Mandy Rice-
Davies, was extraordinary. The fact that the 1957 Rent Act allowed complete de-
control of rents at change of tenancy was at the centre of a ferocious Labour attack."
Ministers reassured themselves that they were not to blame, since the incentive
to drive tenants out to reclaim properties for owner-occupation or re-letting had been
present before the 1957 Act. Their overall housing drive, together with more powers
to prosecute bad landlords and allow councils to insist on repairs, would ease the
situation. 12
 An inquiry was promised under Sir Mimer Holland, but the issue would
not go away. Opinion polls before the 1964 election showed housing in second or
third place in lists of voters' concerns, behind the economy and the cost of living.
90% of Labour candidates mentioned housing and land in their election addresses,
and 85% of Conservatives, making it the second and third most-mentioned topic,
respectively. Housing policy had been much further down all those lists in the 1959
election. 13
'° PRO PREM 11/4296: Macmillan notes, 'Modernisation of Britain', 29 October 1962
Timmins, Five giants, pp. 190-1
12 PRO HLG 117/164: Moseley to Ward, 17 July 1963; Ward to Corfield, 24 July 1963, 'Notes on the Rent Act',
(July?) 1963
' A. King, The British general election of 1964 (Macmillan, London, 1965), pp. 128-9, table, p. 143; Butler & R.
Rose, The British general election of 1959 (Macmillan, London, 1960), table, p. 129
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Ministers thought that there were more mundane reasons for this than
'Rachmanism'. By 1962 the fact that 'housing had become 'a lively political issue
again, particularly among our own supporters' was put down by Hill to the fact that
'there is growing up a considerable section of the community which cannot afford to
buy... and which does not want to look to the local council'.' 4
 The very people the
Government was at that time so eager to woo - young professional voters, thought to
have deserted the Conservatives at Orpington - were being hit at a time of pay
restraint and slow growth. House price rises were the main reason for this. As is
evident from charts V. 1 and V.2, house prices in these years ended their post-war fall
relative to average earnings, and began to climb steeply. Labour were to make great
play of this, since it fitted conveniently with their propaganda: 'under the Tories, the
relentless pressure of decontrolled rents, Rachmanism, high interest rates and soaring
land prices have pushed housing and flats beyond the reach of many ordinary
families'.'5
Land prices also rose very quickly, especially around London. The price of
land was to rise by 50% during this decade, steadily increasing its share in the overall
cost of houses, though its most acute rise was concentrated in the early 'sixties.16
Between 1960-61 and 1963-64 land prices rose by 10% per annum 17
 In the outer
suburbs of London, there were 640% increases in plot value in the decade from 1952:
even in Liverpool and Manchester the gains were 340-350%. This took land's share in
house prices up to a maximum of 40% in the former case, and 23% in the latter, from
around a fifth just after the War.' 8
 Even Brooke admitted that the price rises were due
to 'pent up forces' that had been released now that 'market value was restored as the
normal value for compensation'.19
CAB 129/109: Hill memorandum to Cabinet, 23 May 1962
Let's go with Labour, October 1964: Craig, British election manfestos, p. 52
16 Daunton, Democracy, p. 109
P.A. Stone, 'The price of building sites in Britain', in P. Hall (ed.), Land values (Sweet & Maxwell, London,
1965), p. 11,&figs.4&5,pp. 12-13
' PRO HLG 118/128: Joseph memorandum to ad hoc Cabinet Committee on land values, 3 June 1964
CPA CRD 2/23/14: Conservative Housing, Local Government and Works Committee, minutes, 6 July 1960
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The new Conservative agenda must therefore be seen in part as a reaction to
the political unpopularity of some of the liberal policies of the 'fifties. When in 1963
Joseph broached (and achieved) a 400,000 overall annual building target for 1965-70,
even Treasury resistance was couched in the terms of party politics. John Boyd-
Carpenter as Chief Secretary wrote to Joseph to argue that 'it seems to me to be very
doubtful whether a target without a date brings any political advantage. Once the
figure is given, there will inevitably be pressure to attach a date to it - and then one
has either to offend public opinion by refusing to do so or give way and hang a dated
commitment round the Government's neck like a dead albatross'. 2° Labour promptly
offered a 500,000 target - though when it came to the Election, Labour rather
unconvincingly pleaded in its manifesto that 'we do not intend to have an election
auction on housing figures'.2'
20 PRO T 224/710: Boyd-Carpenter to Joseph, 4 October 1963; A. Deriham & M. Garnett, Keith Joseph (Acumen,
Cheshain, 2001), p. 116
21 Let's go with Labour: Craig, Manifestos, p. 53
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Charts VI, V2. House prices and wages, 1956-1970
Average house prices and wages (adjusted for Inflation), 1956-1970(1956-100)
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Added to the general demographic pressure on the welfare state were
projections of falling household size and internal migration into areas of housing
stress. Officials reported that migration into the South East and West Midlands might
double even the natural rate of growth in those regions. That would result in over two
and a half million more households in the South East of England. 22
 These estimates of
total demand were not far from reality, since although the projected birth rate was too
high, the creation of new households progressed at a faster rate than expected. In the
early 1 960s experts' best guess were that there would be no further increase in
headship rates (the number of people treated as heads of households) in the population
over 40. Since headship rates were already high as marriage rates went up and the
average age of marriage went down, it was not thought that a large reservoir of
potential households remained. 23
 Even the highest estimate, of 22% growth in the
number of households by 1998, was based only on the hypothesis that all married men
would form the heads of households, and that almost all would be married. The social
changes that would make those presumptions obsolete, primarily the growth of single-
parent families and one-person households, were not yet apparent.24
Estimates of household growth were in the event outstripped. Academic
estimates of future yearly household formation ranged from 111,000 to 145,000: in
fact, it reached 180,000.25 Almost by accident, government was reacting to realistic
projections of demand. Other pressures came to the fore when Ministers prepared
their 1963 Housing White Paper. 'Many families', civil servants reported, 'were
"doubled up" in 1951 without being registered as separate households; thus for a
population increase of 3 '/2 million over the last twelve years the number of
households increased by no less than 2 million'.26
PRO CAB 134/1705: secretaries' note to Cabinet committee on population and employment, 20 July 1962
L. Needleman, 'A long-term view of housing', NIER (Nov. 1961), pp. 20-1; PRO T 224/713: D.C. Paige NIESR
paper, 'Housing needs', (April?) 1963; cL Ministry of Housing and Local Government, The South East study
1961-1981 (HMSO, London, 1964), p. 10
24 Cullingworth, Housing, pp. 43-4
Holinans, Housing, pp. 109-10; Cmnd. 2764, The national plan (September 1965), p. 172
26 PRO HLG 117/181: Housing White Paper, notes for Ministers, May 1963
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Even more numerically significant than projected demographic change, and
the extent of overcrowding, was the demolition of old and 'obsolete' housing. Here
information was becoming available about the numbers of 'slums' that would
transform the way governments thought about the demand for new houses. Up until
1960 the Ministry had been relying only on local government figures for houses that
their Medical Officers of Health regarded as 'unfit'. In 1960, however, it
commissioned the Government Social Survey to find out more about 'slum housing'.
This inquiry revealed the true extent of physical decay. By early 1962 it was clear to
Ministry officials that the problem of clearance was much more serious than they had
thought. 'The evidence that is available', two of them concluded, 'indicate[s] that the
problem of obsolescent housing extends well beyond the 850,000 dwellings recorded
as unfit'. Nearly five million households, about a third of the total, had no fixed bath;
2.8 million lacked the exclusive use of a WC.27
When the Report was published in May 1962, other conclusions were equally
worrying, for they showed just how far the private rented sector - which housed up to
a third of the population - had fallen into dilapidation. 39% of privately renting
tenants in Greater London, and 49% outside, had no fixed bath. The same figures for
owner-occupiers were 6% and 16%, while in the public sector they were 5% and
4%28 The reasons for the decline of the rented stock were various, chief among them
a tax structure slanted decisively away from landlords, and the rent control which had
prevented them charging their tenants market rates for their accommodation. 29 A
situation in which Ministers knew that 'since the war private enterprise has done
almost no building to let' was yet another spur to intervention.30
27 F.T. Burnett & Sheila F. Scott, 'A survey of housing conditions in the urban areas of England and Wales, 1960',
Sociological review 10, 1 (March 1962): J. English, R. Madigan, P. Norman, Slum clearance (Croom Helm,
London, 1976), p. 29
2$ PG. Gray, The housing situation in 1960 (HMSO, London, May 1962), tables 13, 41, pp. 25, 51
29 Cmnd. 2605, Report of the committee on housing in Greater London (March 1965), p. 56
° PRO CAB 129/103: Brooke memorandum to Cabinet, 17 June 1960
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The revelations about Britain's housing stock came at a highly sensitive time,
for the Government's Central Housing Advisory Committee was reviewing basic
minimum standards that should be set for new housing. The results were published in
the Parker Morris Report of August 1961. More space for 'circulation', better (and
preferably central) heating, increased privacy for children, and more electricity points
for the new household appliances, were all recommended in the Report. 3 ' The Report
laid down minimum standards, such as two double bedrooms for a family of four,
WCs inside the dwelling, kitchens large enough to accommodate a dining table, and
separate lounge-style living rooms, that millions of Britain's houses simply did not
have. 32
 Building would have to accelerate rapidly if these standards were to become
the norm.
' Burnett, Housing, pp. 292-4; D. Donnison & C. Ungerson, Housing policy (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1982), p.
52
32 MHLG, Homes for today and tomorrow (HMSO, London, 1961), pp. 15-27, 1-2, 8-12
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'Largely out of control '. the housing programme, 1959-64
Short of legislation, all the Government could do immediately was to give some
impetus to the public housing programme - though the Treasury was still pressing for
further reductions. The direction of policy did then change, as housing starts moved
upwards over the next three years (see chart V.3). By the end of 1961 Brooke, now a
Minister at the Treasury, and aware of the political pressure for more houses to rent
and councils' desire to build more, was prepared to accept the rise. This, however, did
not stop a temporary slowing-down of approvals in the first half of 1962, nor prevent
the Treasury's initial offer of 105,000 falling short of Hill's demand for 120,000
annual starts. 33 Councils had to wait until Joseph was installed in the Ministry to get
substantial increases, which amounted to around 15,000 more houses per annum than
the Treasury was prepared to countenance in 1962, building up to 125,000 approvals
for 1964/65.
It was, however, clear throughout these debates that any new council housing
drive would be linked both to subsidy reform to concentrate aid on the areas of acute
housing need, and to local authority rent reform. The latter consideration was
uppermost in Conservative minds. It had been the specific intention of the 1961
Housing Act to force councils to charge economic rents. If authorities did not charge
rents equivalent to twice the gross rateable value of their housing stock, they were to
be punished by a lower rate of Exchequer subsidy, of £8, compared to the £24 granted
to compliant authorities for each new house. 35 By the time the Conservatives left
office in 1964, 38.9% of councils ran these schemes, compared to 30% in 1957/58.
Nearly two thirds of metropolitan authorities had such policies in operation. 36 The
" PRO 1224/381: Vinter to Robertson, 4 December 1961, Phelps note for Brooke, 1 January 1962, Hill-Brooke
meeting, minutes, 3 January 1962; PRO PREM 11/4297: Macmillan-Hill-Brooke meeting, minutes, 18 January
1962
' PRO CAB 129/110: Joseph memorandum to Cabinet, 2 October 1962; PRO HLG 117/173: capital investment
review paper, April 1963
PRO CAB 129/103: Brooke memorandum to Cabinet, 17 June 1960; PRO CAB 134/2405: Ministry of Housing
memorandum to Cabinet Committee on Housing, 27 September 1960
36 Malpass, Reshaping, table 5.4, p. 98; Cmnd. 2050, Housing (March 1963), p. 16
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result was a relative net shift of resources away from northern industrial cities, which
had been using their rate funds to subsidise housing and were now being forced to
scale down such policies, and towards rural councils who had not used such subsidies
to any great extent.37
Chart V.3. Public and private sector housing starts, GB, 1959-1964 (000s)
Sources: Housing and construction statistics, July 1967, April 1968, Februaiy 1971, tables 50, 1 & I
This was supposed to be balanced by geographical selectivity, which the
Treasury also favoured as a means of limiting demands for overall national spending.
Hence Evelyn Sharp, Permanent Secretary at MHLG, could only get initial agreement
to 5,000 more houses for 1962/63 if she promised to concentrate them in 'black spots'
in the north of England, and her attempt to secure 15,000 more houses for the same
purpose in 1963/64 was rebuffed. 38 There had been a noticeable change of mood
towards council housing: by the end of 1963 planners were budgeting for 135,000
approvals for England and Wales in 1965, and MHLG were pushing for 145,000 by
" PRO 1-ILG 118/201: draft memorandum on differential rents, I May 1963
38 PRO 1224/381: Sharp to Padmore, 27 February, 22 March 1962; Padmore to Sharp, 16 March, 6 April 1962;
PRO CAB 134/1689: EPC minutes, 24 January 1962
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l967I68. However, the continued emphasis on selectivity meant that public
provision was supposed to remain only one element, and not the most important,
within housing policy.
The late summer of 1963 witnessed yet another change in emphasis, with the
Treasury pressing hard for cuts in the overall MHLG budget, rejecting the possibility
of separate long-term programming in housing expenditure, and even questioning the
gains the Ministry thought they had already made. 4° Caimcross was most forthright in
his assessment, writing that 'the housing programme seems to me to be very largely
out of control'. 4 ' As part of the expected 3% cut in the public investment programme
considered during January 1964, a standstill on local authority building was proposed,
since it appeared that the private sector could meet the Conservatives' 400,000
target.42 The only other option considered was to impose cash limits on building
already begun.43 Such a period of restraint was duly imposed during 1964, by a
government still uneasy about the expansion of public sector provision, and it
remained unclear how the 400,000 target was to be reached.
Some progress had been made in constructing machinery for housing plans,
through the inception of a Programme Committee between MHLG and the Treasury.
This was based on experience gained in the Roads Programme Committee, which
every year examined the progress of the five-year 'roads plan', and agreed the basis
on which it was to be rolled forward for another year. Given the large spending
increases on roads since the mid-1950s, many of Treasury officials were suspicious of
this idea, which originated in MPBW. Clarke overruled these objections, for he saw in
PRO HLG 117/173: Brain to Bretheron, 28 November 1963; PRO T 224/7 10: Bretherton to Brain, 16 December
1963
° PRO HLG 117/173: Rickard to Phillips, 23 August 1963; PRO T 224/713: Treasury draft, report of working
party on desirability of long-term planning in housing, 8 August 1963
41 PRO T 224/711: Treasury note on situation in construction industry, 10 January 1964, Cajrncross to Petch, 29
January 1964
42 PRO T 224/711: Petch to Bretherton, 16 January 1964, Phelps to Bretherton, 22 January 1964
PRO T 224/710: McKean to Petch, 12 December 1963, Bretherton to Brain, 16 December 1963
Garnett & Denham, Joseph, p. 129
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such committees the germ of a system of relating capital and current expenditure, and
giving the Treasury power to look 'inside' departmental decision-making. 45
 The
Housing Programme Committee, however, only met for the first time on 16
September 1964. And its agenda was limited to drawing up 'a background paper' on
'the present housing position showing past and future trends of supply and demand'.
Although work on the costs of different building and housing types was planned, this
was for the medium-term, let alone the costl benefit analyses that would have to wait
until this data had been prepared.46
PRO T 320/14: Ripon to Boyd-Carpenter, 16 January 1963, Boyd-Carpenter to Ripon, 17 April 1963, Petch to
Clarke, 'Machinery for handling public investment problems', 16 January 1963, Clarke to Petch, 17 January 1963,
Petch to Clarke, 24 January 1963; PRO HLG 118/267: Treasury meeting with spending departments, minutes, 25
June 1963, Treasury meeting with MHLG, minutes, 23 July 1963
PRO T 277/1346: Housing Programmes Committee, first meeting, minutes, 16 September 1964; PRO I
277/1345: MHLG, SDD memorandum, 'The make up of the housing programme', 29 October 1964, MPBW,
'Statistics on the value of work on housing and of housing starts and completions, 1950-64', 13 October 1964
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'All over expansion '. a return to planned development?
This cautious shift towards public housing was not the only change in emphasis, for it
was increasingly obvious that the Town Development Act could not mobilise either
the technical staff, nor the political support, to make any large-scale contribution to
the de-centralisation of the urban population: by 1960 its effect was limited to a few
thousand houses around Swindon and Bletchley. 47
 Even by 1968, the number of
arrangements made between urban councils and 'reception' authorities had reached
66, with a target of 162,240 houses - although only 56,669 of these had actually been
built. The New Towns had built 383,000 houses since 1944.48 Large conurbations
such as Manchester were prevented from moving people out of the city by the
surrounding Counties, in this case Cheshire, which had no intention of allowing the
city to develop a site at Lymm. Birmingham likewise suffered frustration at the hands
of Worcestershire when it proposed to build at Whythall. 49
 Eventually Ministry
officials lost patience with being blamed when their mediation efforts failed. 'It is
said', Hill remarked ruefully, 'that we have done nothing at all for Manchester except
shoot down every suggestion the City Council has made'.5°
Within two years, Joseph was prepared to admit that 'only central government
have the resources and the will to carry through major expansions or to open up new
sites... we have got to be prepared to start some more New Towns'. 5 ' The case was so
obvious that although Treasury officials thought that 'a good deal of thought needed
to be given to the fmancial implications', they privately 'did not dispute that further
New Towns would probably be needed'. 52
 By December Joseph was pressing
Macmillan for 'authority to start, at once, a new town close to Birmingham, [and]
another close to Liverpool (both really "expanded towns" but beyond the capacity of
" Cullingworth, Housing, p. 88
Merlin, New towns, pp. 10-11
49 Cheriy, Town planning, p. 152
50 PRO CAB 129/109: Hill memorandum to Cabinet, 23 May 1962
PRO CAB 129/110: Joseph memorandum to Cabinet, 2 October 1962
52 PRO T 224/701: Treasury official meeting, minutes, 30 August 1962
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local government)'. 'Before too long', he wrote, 'I would like to be able to promise a
succession of new towns'.53
Joseph continued his campaign throughout 1963, pressing for town expansions
at Redditch (for Birmingham) and Runcorn (for Liverpool) to be taken over by central
government. He also wanted an announcement that the government was looking for a
site in south-east Lancashire, to force through the relief of Manchester. The Cabinet
agreed, in order to still demands for even more New Towns. 54 Planning was already
underway for more public housing to be readied for the second stage: the Ministry
upgraded its New Towns targets to 13,600 per year for the later l960s. 55 Moreover,
detailed policy work on where and when to site the new housing was nearly complete.
Major extensions to Ipswich, Northampton, Peterborough, Portsmouth, Southampton
and Swindon were to be considered: two New Towns built wholly from scratch
(Bletchley, later to become Milon Keynes, and Newbury in Berkshire) might take
150,000 people by 1981, and up to 400,000 over the 'very long term'.56
Both Hill and Joseph still hoped to foster New Towns in which private owner-
occupation was the dominant form of tenure. 57 Furthermore, the proposals contained
in the Ministry's South East study mainly applied to extending older conurbations
faster than local authorities could manage, and building more houses in older New
Towns. To that extent their U-turn was less radical than it appeared. Joseph pleaded
this case to his own backbenchers:
An all over expansion would be needed if we were going to contain the population growth...
and at the same time preserve the green belts and areas of natural scenic beauty. It would be
much more economic if we expanded existing towns rather than built entirely new ones... the
first generation... [of New Towns were designed] for fixed population levels. This was in a
period before the 'population explosion' had taken place... [and now it] was undesirable to
PRO PREM 11/4297: Joseph to Macmillan, 10 December 1962
PRO CAB 134/2397: Joseph memorandum to Committee on Population and Employment, 10 January 1963,
minutes of meeting, 14 January 1963
PRO HLG 117/173: Ministry of Housing note, 'Housing costs', 15 January 1964
56 MHLG, South East study, pp. 72-4
"PRO CAB 134/1 980: Home Affairs Cabinet Committee, minutes, 29 July 1960
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consider building New Towns in the South East whilst existing New Towns could be
expanded, or where older towns could be rejuvenated or rebuilt.58
Regional plans for housing would take the form of government advance purchases of
land required for development, thus providing the framework for rapid private house
building, which would predominate.59
l'his was a far cry from the land policy some influential Tories were pressing
for, and fell a long way short of that considered, and rejected, by the Cabinet in 1963-
64. Influential backbenchers such as F.V. Corfield and Sir Cohn Thornton-Kemsley
pressed throughout the early 1 960s for the resumption of taxation on land. 6° Although
the 1961 Conservative Policy Committee of which Thornton-Kemsley was the
chairman and Corfield was a member stopped short of recommending such a tax, it
was clearly split, for instance going beyond the South East Study in proposing the
development of 'focal points' just beyond the Green Belts of parent cities and
recommending strengthened powers for urban councils who wished to decant their
population. The Committee also reported the wishes of some of its members, that a
government land holding body should be set up to aid urban local authorities with re-
development, buying up land and holding it until councils' comprehensive
development plans were prepared. The means by which such a body would be funded
remained a moot point, since the obvious way was a land tax.61
The trouble with such proposals was the protests they would inevitably evoke,
not just from laissez-faire liberals in the Party, but from County Councillors who
resented the interference with 'their' planning procedures. Thus Michael Fraser
secretly forwarded the Committee's Report - entitled Change and challenge - to
Brooke, who was reported to be 'not at all happy with what he read'. A sub-
committee of the Party's Advisory Committee on Policy was appointed. Butler
brokered a deal between the Policy Committee and ACP, under which the ACP would
58 CPA CRD 2/23/17: Conservative Housing Committee, minutes, 18 March 1963
PRO CAB 129/118: Joseph memorandum to Cabinet, 'The South East Study', 14 January 1964
60 McKay & Cox, Change, p.84
' CPA ACP 3/8 (61) 92: town and country planning policy committee, report, 17 October 1961, and interim
report, 1 July 1960
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put forward amendments. Recognising the pertinence of Butler's injunction that 'your
aim is for impact rather than explosion', the Policy Committee eventually accepted 14
drafting changes, which brought local authorities back into their proposed regional
planning structure.62 The suggestions about a land holding authority were not taken
up, for at this point Brooke's insistence that 'we have to accept that a firm planning
control is bound to result in higher prices for land' was accepted. 63
 Re-imposition of
land taxes had been rejected.
Part of the resistance came from officials at the Ministry of Housing, where
confidence was high that the regional studies would release enough land to ensure a
stabilisation in land prices. Joseph argued that 'we have got to get a great deal more
land allocated to building... I have attacked this in two ways: breaking the immediate
bottle-necks which are holding up the great cities, while we try to clear the way for 20
years ahead by means of the regional p1ans'. But the problems with the Green Belt
remained, as shown by an inconclusive meeting between Joseph and Douglas-Home
on 17 December 1963, at which both men weighed the opposite political dangers of
building on Green Belt land, or allowing price rises to go on as they were. 65 The
Treasury, however, noting the potential for new revenue, the possibility of damping
down demand, and a chance to hold back large-scale advance purchases by central
government, was exploring the possibility of a new development charge. Joseph and
his officials seized upon this possibility as a way out of the impasse. At a meeting
with Clarke back in November, Permanent Secretaries had agreed to explore this
possibility.66
Joseph urged that land taxation was politically necessary, aiding the
Government's pay policy by showing that speculators and not just wage-earners were
being hit. He also argued that in the present shortage of land and housing (exacerbated
by the planning control system) there was no such thing as a 'market price' that
62 j Ramsden, The making of Conservative Party policy (Longman, London, 1980), pp. 217-18
63 PRO PREM 11/4518: Brooke to Macmillan, 4 July 1960
PRO 1224/711: Joseph to Douglas-Home, 13 January 1964
65 PRO PREM 11/45 18: Douglas-Home, Joseph, Rippon meeting, minutes, 17 December 1963
PRO 1227/987: minutes of meeting, 18 November 1963
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should not be disturbed. Other Ministers considered that the £8 million per annum
yield of such a development charge at 30% was not worth the political capital they
would lose by introducing it. They would simply be seen as opportunists. 67
 Joseph
was defeated in Cabinet, despite his plea that 'we are letting the Opposition take all
the credit for being prepared to do something in a matter on which large sections of
public opinion feel strongly that something out to be done'. The majority view was
that it would be best 'to take their stand on the fact that any tax would be liable to
increase the price of land'. This caused Douglas-Home to conclude that the options
should be further studied, but that in the forthcoming election they would simply
'retain an open mind'.68
67 PRO CAB 130/198: Cabinet Committee minutes, 5 May 1964; Joseph memorandum to Cabinet Committee, 3
June 1964
PRO CAB 129/118: Joseph memorandum to Cabinet, 17 July 1964; PRO CAB 128/38, Cabinet conclusions, 30
July 1964
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'Endless vista '. encouraging the private sector
It was not planning, but rather attempts to revive the private rented sector, that was
the Conservatives' main focus. This faced not only the economic hurdles of mortgage
income tax relief and local authority subsidies, but also Labour's pledge to re-impose
rent control if they regained power. Addressing this would need a cheap, easy to
understand and popular new idea. Only this could right the fact 'that the rented
housing field had been left to the Socialist threat'. 69 To this end legislation on housing
associations, and 'new style' housing societies, was passed in 1961 and 1964.° The
1961 proposals were extremely limited in their scope, to test whether there was a
market among middle-income households for non-municipal renting closer to market
costs. The government would lend up to £25m to existing charitable Housing
Associations at the same interest rates as they loaned money to local authorities. They
could then see whether cost rents - since they were only aiding the original capital
borrowing of Associations, rather than the running costs - were feasible.7'
It took less than a year for the Ministry of Housing to return to the idea, which
the Cabinet considered in revealing terms as 'meet[ing] the needs of this literally
middle class' who could not afford to buy, but disdained council housing.72 This
'alternative to endless municipalisation' would need further measures, Hill and Joseph
argued. They included a central agency to co-ordinate the activities of new 'Housing
Societies', with fixed rates of interest for guaranteed terms. 73 These proposals were
made public in the 1963 White Paper Housing. The new Societies would be supported
by a government Housing Corporation, with £lOOm to lend in matching funds that
would accompany the £200m pledged by the Building Societies Association. There
CPA CRD 2/23/17: Conservative Housing Committee, minutes, 2 July 1963
° Burnett, Housing, p. 278
" PRO CAB 134/2405: MHLG memorandum to Cabinet Committee on Housing, 27 September, 12 November
1960; PRO CAB 129/103: Brooke memorandum to Cabinet, 29 November 1960; PRO CAB 128/34: Cabinet
minutes, 8 December 1960; McKay & Cox, Change, p. 127
PRO HLG 118/128: draft note to Cabinet, May 1962
PRO PREM 11/4297: Hill to Macmillan, 11 July 1962; PRO CAB 129/110: Joseph memorandum to Cabinet, 2
October 1962
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would be a special 40-year period of repayment, to lower the initial interest payments
on Societies' debts. The payment would be made by the Housing Corporation to make
up the difference between what they could borrow in the market, and the 100% they
needed to begin work.74
It proved impossible, however, to find an economic formula to which the
Treasury and Inland Revenue would agree. Preliminary contacts with the building
societies revealed that they were not prepared to sponsor a large-scale Housing
Society movement themselves without tax relief on their reserves, which could serve
a similar purpose to the tax relief on mortgages to owner-occupiers. They could not
otherwise hope even to cover their costs, relative to other property investments. The
Treasury, concerned at the 'hidden subsidy', and the Revenue, worried too at the
whole new tax concession this would involve, stalled Joseph's attempt to grant tax
relief. Housing Associations, as charities, and co-ownership schemes as a form of
owner-occupation, could be subsidised: it appeared that Housing Societies could not.
'You cannot want to contemplate an endless vista of extending municipal ownership
any more than I', Joseph told Maudling angrily: 'but that is what we do contemplate if
we cannot set up an alternative'.75
Joseph's prophecy was correct, despite the Housing Corporation's lending
powers. This failure to gain tax relief for the Housing Societies, lowering the
economic returns to the actual customer far below that of owner-occupation, was to
prove fatal to their success. Only 1,600 houses were to be built under the auspices of
the 1964 Act. Co-ownership, which lingered on given that it did attract tax relief as a
type of owner-occupation, was killed by the house price rises of the early 1 970s,
which made ownership a much more attractive investment option. 76 Housing Society
output fell far short of the 15,000 per annum Joseph hoped to achieve in the first few
' Cmnd. 2050, Housing (May 1963), pp. 7-8; PRO CAB 129/113: Joseph and Noble memorandum to Cabinet, 10
May 1963; PRO HLG 117/181: Ward to Waddell note, 'Housing Societies', 22 May 1963
15 PRO T 224/701: Sharp to Clarke, 16 November 1962, Ministry of Housing - Treasury officials meeting,
minutes, 23 November 1962, Joseph-Maudling meeting, minutes, 27 February, Joseph to Maudling, 14 February
1963
76 Holmans, Housing, pp. 207-8
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years, and failed to play the role he envisaged in securing owner-occupation for half
the population. 77
 As the number of owner-occupiers continued to grow, reaching half
of all British households by 1971, the Housing Association sector remained stagnant,
housing just 5% of households in that year.78
" PRO HLG 117/173: Brain to Bretherton, 28 November 1963; CPA CRD 2/23/17: Conservative Housing
Committee, minutes, 2 July 1963
A. Murie, P. Niner & C. Watson, Housing policy and the housing system (Allen & Unwin, London, 1976), p. 4
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'Improved methods '. the turn to efficiency, 1963-64.
With no powers to restrain non-housing construction, Joseph had to search elsewhere
to gain intellectual absolution for his ambitious plans. He eventually turned to the idea
of efficiency: 'We are going to need greatly to increase productivity to achieve the
400,000 housing programme', he wrote to Douglas-Home early in l964.
Overloading therefore explains one more feature of the Conservative U-turn, their
enthusiasm for industrialised building techniques. These methods saved on the
commodity in shortest supply, namely skilled building labour. 8° They were therefore
the only way that Ministers could see their ambitious building projects coming off -
though since the Ministry of Works admitted that it might be two to three years until
they could make a large impact, there was an element of wishful thinking about this.8'
Even by the time Labour took power, official briefs starkly concluded that
'industrialised methods of building may help in the longer run: but so far their
contribution has been small, and expensive'.82
In the medium-term, however, such methods did hold out some economic
promise, especially when linked to a boom in high building that had been set off by
changes to the local authority housing subsidy system in 1956. Given their antipathy
to decanting the population into New Towns, the Government decided to pay more
subsidies per storey built: a decision that was to have momentous consequences (see
below, tables V3-V 4)83 The growth of high-rise was inextricably linked to the new
methods. Off-site prefabrication and factory assembly meant that much craft labour
on site could be dispensed with. 84
 The cost benefits achieved by using industrialised
building methods in tall flats were indeed large compared to what it would have cost
to build such flats using traditional methods. Hence the hopes that had circulated in
the Treasury, that 'the relative costs in this field might very well be substantially
PRO T 224/711: Joseph to Douglas-Home, 13 January 1964
° PRO CAB 134/1689: Cabinet EPC, minutes, 1 March, 21 June, 2 August 1961
PRO T 224/711: Treasury/ MHLG/ M]'BW officials' meeting, minutes, 1 February 1964
82 PRO T 224/720: Treasury brief, 'Housing', 12 October 1964
83 Dunleavy, The politics of mass housing in Britain (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981), pp. 90-1
84 Holmans, Housing, pp. 116-7
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changed by further technical progress'. 85
 The Ministry of Works, which existed to
promote efficiency in both the public and private sector, had secured the creation of a
National Building Agency to foster this process. It was hoped that this would lower
prices through larger orders, longer runs and more standardisation. This semi-
autonomous body would undertake research, and take commissions on design and
planning.86
The 1963 Housing White Paper represented a triumph for the proponents of
industrialised building. The public building programme was explicitly linked to more
system building; a Research and Development Director was to be appointed in the
Ministry of Works; the government was to develop its own proprietary systems. Local
government, often organised in units too small to have a full-time planning staff;
could now consult the National Building Agency. 87
 This triumph was at least partly
due to a concerted propaganda campaign by the larger building companies. 1962
alone had seen Concrete Ltd, Taylor Woodrow and John Laing announce new, or
adapted foreign, industrialised building systems. 88
 Received wisdom had it that small,
overly-competitive units could never achieve the productivity gains that the industry
was achieving in Scandinavia and America. The Banwell Committee on civil
contracting, which reported in 1964, recommended that selective tendering, with only
three or four companies competing, should be introduced into the public sector. The
emphasis, as ever, was on serial contracting cementing close relations with a few
firms.89
" PRO T 224/381: Mithchell memorandum, circulated to Vinter, Robertson, Phelps, Carswell, 2 December 1961
Cmnd. 2228, National building agency (December 1963); PRO CAB 134/1705: MPBW memorandum to EPC
sub-committee on building, and minutes of sub-committee meeting, 4 February 1963
Cmnd. 2050, Housing (March 1963), pp. 4-5
gg Dunleavy, Politics, p. 116; B. Finnimore, I-louses from the factory: system building and the welfare state 1942-
74 (Rivers Oram, London, 1989), pp. 91-2
89 ibid, pp. 23, 25
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Chart V4. Industrial building's share in public authority completions, GB, 195 1-79
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Source: Finnimore, Factory, p. 262
The granting of a Cabinet seat to the Ministry of Public Building and Works
under Geoffrey Rippon in 1962, supposedly to promote these efficiency gains, was a
sign of political support for industrialised building. Douglas-Home, for instance, was
'greatly impressed with... the new capital intensive building techniques'. 9° This
worked itself out in other ways. The Ministry of Housing was keen on the type of
consortia that had facilitated large-scale school building, and saw encouraging such
co-operation as complimentary to Ministry of Works co-ordination inside the industiy
itself.9 ' Hill 'hoped that a more vigorous slum clearance drive would enable him to
get consortia of local authorities which.., would result in improved building
methods'.92
 Joseph's inauguration of a Manchester Office for the Ministry was
designed just as much to foster consortia as slum clearance.93 The encouragement had
its effects. Although only 70 out of 504 local authorities had joined such groups by
° PRO PREM 11/4518: Douglas-Home, Joseph, Rippon meeting, minutes, 17 December 1963
PRO CAB 134/1705: MPBW memorandum to EPC building sub-committee, 30 January 1963
CPA CRD 2/23/16: Conservative Housing Committee, minutes, 15 May 1962
Cmnd. 2050, Housing (March 1963), p. 11; English, Madigan & Norman, Slum clearance, p. 30
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July 1964, most of the large conurbations were members. 94
 These innovations would
facilitate a systems building boom which only began to abate in the early 1 970s (see
chart V.4).
The analytical basis for the boom seems to be highly questionable. There was
just a possibility that the extra construction work associated with the housing drive
could be borne if new techniques did succeed in raising this 5% rate of annual
productivity gains since 1945. However, as the Cabinet Committee on this noted, such
complacency would be 'unwise': those rises had only been reflecting a recovery from
a very low post-war base. 95
 Moreover, some research suggested that the situation was
in fact deteriorating. 96
 Productivity gains during 1962 had been small or non-existent;
the Ministry of Labour estimated that there was a shortage of skilled workers
throughout the industry, and that the take-up of apprenticeships was 'unlikely to do
more than offset the existing underlying shortage of labour'
The Conservatives had partly reversed their liberalising policies of the 1950s.
But there had been very little choice but to change course. The private rented sector,
and voluntary planning, simply could not survive the prevailing economic and
political conditions. In that situation Conservatives had to find new ways to rescue the
selectivity of welfare payments and the primacy of owner-occupation. There remained
a Conservative agenda quite different from Labour's, for instance in the
encouragement of housing societies. Joseph's land programme was an exercise in
speeding up the release of more land, predominantly for new private-sector building.
Land taxes and building controls were rejected. The public sector programme grew,
but this has to be put in context. More council house building followed years of cuts
in the programme, was concentrated in areas of acute need, linked to subsidy reform,
and by 1964 was being reversed.
Finnimore, Factory, pp. 144-6; Dunleavy, Politics, pp. 117-8
PRO CAB 134/1704: Report on construction industiy load to EPC Building Sub-Committee, 30 November 1962
PRO T 224/7 13: Rippon to Boyd-Carpenter, 16 January 1963, and long-term programming group, minutes, 17
December 1963
PRO CAB 134/1705: MOL memorandum to EPC Sub-Committee on Building, 3 May 1963; EPC Sub-
Committee on Building, minutes, 8 May 1963
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'The idea of a common purpose '. Labour's housing plan, 1964-70
Some of Labour's most radical commitments were in the field of housing and land.
Labour's manifesto pledged to 'end the competitive scramble for building land' by
setting up 'a Land Commission to buy, for the community, land on which building or
rebuilding is to take place'. 'A policy of lower interest rates for housing' was
promised, 100% mortgages for prospective owner-occupiers administered through
local councils. The Rent Act was to be replaced with 'fair rents' arbitration, and a new
slum clearance programme begun. 98
 Some of these policies fell by the wayside: but
there remains no doubt that Labour continued to believe in them, and that the package
was very different from those which would have emerged from a Douglas-Home
administration.
Wilson reserved his strongest reforming passion for housing. This were a
centrepiece of Wilson's popularity during his electoral honeymoon of 1963-64,
addressing 'ordinary families' problems'Y Wilson's mix of genuine idealism and
sense of political advantage were most evident in housing policy:
I am anxious to avoid the impression that all our measures - essential though they are to protect
the £ - add up to a pretty dismal and gloomy set of squeezes... There would be a very big
difference all round if there were one big growth sector of a popular and heart-warming
character, and from every point of view - not least our pre-Election emphasis - this would seem
to be housing. Moreover, I think this would have an enlivening effect on industrial morale and
productivity. Just as in the War the idea of a common purpose... had a dynamizing effect, so
possibly the launching of a great housing plan could have a similar effect today. We could then
present a real sense of housing purpose, including the 500,000 target (if possible), a big
increase in houses built to let, immediate help for owner-occupiers... [and] an attack on
Rachmanism and landlordism.'°°
Such enthusiasm was behind Labour's 1965 housing plan, which attempted to fix
three-year programmes building up to 500,000 houses per annum in 1970, though
focussing first on the large conurbations in greatest need, and choosing a further 300
in acute need during 1966.101
Lets go with Labour: Craig, Election manifestos, pp. 52-3
Harold Wilson PPB, 8 May 1963: Wilson, Purpose, p. 249
°° PRO PREM 13/374: Wilson to Brown, Callaghan, Ross, 8 June 1965
'° Cmnd 3282, MHLG reportfor 1965 and 1966 (May 1967), p. 62
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Some policies were carried over from the previous administration. The first
was the promotion of industrial building methods. This zeal had a different source
from Conservative enthusiasm, namely the need to convince the Treasury that more
council starts could be afforded at lower costs: but the effect was the same.'°2
Consortia continued to be encouraged, seeking to foster 'efficiency' throughout the
building industry. The rise of selective contracting and systems building thus
continued, as it held out the promise of greater efficiency gains on larger orders. For
instance, the North Tyne Development Group, under the guidance of the Ministry's
regional office, considered only seven industrial building schemes when the councils
involved began their systems building drive in l965)°
Following the publication of their 1965 White Paper, MHLG circulated local
authorities with advice and guidelines on how they should increase their systems
building. This included the usual advice on maintaining a constant flow of orders,
keeping the number of systems under review to a bare minimum, and concentrating
only on those large sites where factory methods would have most success. The White
Paper itself contained exactly the same urgings)° 4 This drive had the Prime Minister's
support: for instance, the autunm of 1966 saw him institute a review of whether 'we
are still making adequate use of industrialised housing'. He had seen school and
house-building going on at a rapid pace on his regular Scilly Isles holiday: on his
return he wanted to encourage the technique's use on the mainland. 105 The continued
increase in systems building, which lasted through to its peak in 1969, was partly a
result of such enthusiasm (see chart V 4).
Labour were as keen as were Conservatives to encourage Housing Societies
and Housing Associations. Crossman resumed the Ministry of Housing's attempt to
102 PRO CAB 128/39: Cabinet minutes, 10 January 1965; PRO CAB 129/120: Crossman, Ross memoranda to
Cabinet, 'Housing programme', 'Housing programme - Scotland', 22, 23 February 1965; PRO CAB 128/39:
Cabinet minutes, 25 February 1965
103 PRO HLG 118/302: North Tyne Housing Consortium working party, minutes, 17 February 1965
'° Circular 76/65, November 1965: Finnimore, Factory, p. 102. Dunleavy, Politics, pp. 118-9; Cmnd. 2838, The
housing programme 1965 o 1970 (November 1965), pp. 9, 14
'° PRO PREM 13/963: Wilson to Greenwood, Stewart, 7 September 1966
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secure tax relief for the new-style cost-rent organisations. Officials were under no
illusions as to the difficulties they faced in securing tax relief for those groups that
were not either co-ownership societies, or charities.' 06
 Not only the Treasury, but the
Inland Revenue remained against the idea. They saw no legislative means to give
effect to tax relief, without also giving up on income and profits tax for those
involved: thus they 'remain[ed] opposed to any suggestion that there should be some
special tax concession' 107
 Crossman did manage to extract a promise to reimburse tax
paid to the cost-rent Housing Societies, at the cost of promising to pay that amount
out of his own budget. 108
 The fact that no such concession actually did emerge was
due to the ongoing economic crisis, and need for retrenchment, rather than neglect.
Rent rebates were another policy that continued beyond 1964. This was a
departure for Labour, which had resisted them throughout the 1950s as a throw-back
to the days of the means test. They had hoped to use them as a simple stop-gap until
they could set up a comprehensive minimum income guarantee: as their social
spending targets fell, this became a distant dream.'°9
 They were left with little
alternative but to encourage rent rebates, as a way of subsidising poorer local
authority tenants. The 1965 Housing White Paper included an explicit commitment to
consult local authorities on the best means of progress, and also contained an implicit
threat. 'In considering what subsidy is required', the wording in the document ran,
'the Government must asswne that local authorities will charge rents properly related
on the one hand to the cost of housing, on the other to the ability of tenants to pay'."°
At a meeting with the Ministry in late November 1966, councils accepted that
although there would be no imposition of one scheme, model principles should be laid
down." A circular was issued in June 1967, containing such technical detail on rent
rebates that councils could be in no doubt what was expected of them. Another round
106	 HLG 17/195: Brain to Waddell, Sharp to Crossman, 6 November, 1 December 1964
'° PRO HLG 117/195: Willis to Waddell, 4 February 1965
'° PRO 1-(LG 117/195: Gilmore to Brain, 1 April 1965
106	 PREM 13/375: note for Wilson, 'Public expenditure settlement', 28 July 1965
110 Cmnd. 2838, Housing programme (November 1965), p. 16
1I PRO HLG 118/376: Beddoe to Mellish, 26 October 966, circular to local authority associations, 3 November
1966, Ministry meeting with GLC and local government associations, 30 November 1966
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of rebate take-ups followed." 2 Labour's P&I policies, by limiting the amounts
councils could raise rents, inadvertently encouraged councils to subsidise general
rents from general rates funds, further reversing the emphasis of the Conservative
years."3
112 Malpass, Reshaping, p. 106
PRO CAB 130/371: Stewart memorandum to MISC 193, Prices and incomes, Rents', 16 February 1968, MISC
193, Prices and incomes, minutes, 19 February 1968
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Radical measures. cheap mortgages, land reforms and rent control.
Officials were initially sceptical about Labour's plans for 'cheap money' for owner-
occupiers, fearing that the precedent would lead to calls for subsidising borrowing by
schools and hospitals. They advised that the Labour proposal for provision of 100%
mortgages was untenable. The maximum that was thought possible was to give
building societies enough funds to hold mortgage rates at around 1 '/2 percentage
points below the market rate of interest. This was indeed the initial scheme that
emerged from consultations with MHLG, along with promises to subsidise the
shortfall between what building societies would offer prospective borrowers, and
100% of the capital of a house. Robert Neild noted grudgingly that this was
'necessary in order to fulfil the election pledge and was not being pursued on its
merits'." 4
 Crossman was not fond of this idea, wanting more public housing instead
and angry that the Cabinet was so 'scared of public opinion'." 5
 But the manifesto
promise made it imperative that some scheme should emerge.
Various mechanisms were eventually considered, including the 'slice' scheme
where only part of a mortgage would be subsidised. This idea had the advantage of
limiting government's liability to 30% (later the more restrictive cash limit of £1,000)
of new mortgages, and thus holding down the cost. 116
 However, a simpler and cheaper
scheme won the day, despite reservations about the whole validity of mortgage
income tax relief: officials advised subsidising all those who earned less than the
minimum tax threshold, on the mathematical assumption that they did in fact pay
117 Borrowers retained the 'option' to keep their existing mortgage tax relief, much
to M1-ILG's distaste, since a large number of lending institutions would be necessary
to make the new subsidy apply to all mortgages. It was thought that it would be
" PRO 1224/720: Treasury meeting, minutes, 21 January, Neild to Armstrong, 3 March 1965
" RCD, July 17 1965: R. Crossman, The diaries of a Cabinet Minister, vol. 1: Minister of Housing, 1964-1966
(Hamish Hamilton, London, 1975), p. 277
116 PRO CAB 130/230: Callaghan memorandum, to MISC 60, Housing subsidies, 26 May 1965; PRO 1224/721:
Couzens to Brain, 2 June 1965
" PRO 1224/721: Stubbs memorandum, Assistance for mortgagers by means of tax relief, 14 June 1965,
Crossman, Diamond meeting with BSA, minutes, 18 June 1965
242
Housing
impossible in that situation to limit the concession purely to mortgages for house
buying: the scheme was therefore limited to the building societies. 118
 The net result of
all this was to give a redistributive character to the new mortgage subsidy. It extended
mortgage tax relief, in another guise, to those on low incomes who would not
otherwise have been able to afford owner-occupancy.
Table Vi. Mortgage tax relief and option subsidy, GB, 1968-79 (sm, current prices)
(a) Tax relief (b) Option subsidy	 (b) as % 01(a)
1968/69	 195	 5	 2.6
1969/70	 235	 10	 4.3
1970/71	 285	 15	 5.3
1971/72	 310	 20	 6.5
1972/73	 365	 30	 8.2
1973/74	 510	 50	 9.8
1974/75	 695	 75	 10.8
1975/76	 865	 105	 12.1
1976/77	 1090	 140	 12.8
1977/78	 1040	 150	 14.4
1978/79	 1110	 140	 12.6
Source: Holmans, Housing, table VI. 16, p. 277
'Option mortgages' were a casualty of the economic measures of July 1965,
but was revived in January 1966, as a contribution to 'selective reflation', and
although Cabinet postponed the introduction of option mortgages in November 1966,
from October 1967 to April 1968, the scheme did then go ahead." 9 The initial
evidence - during the four months in late 1967 when people were given a time-limited
period to choose whether to stay with tax relief, rather than 'opt' - was that about 5
per cent of existing borrowers took up the subsidy option, and about 10 per cent of
new buyers.' 2° The subsidy was to exercise a small but growing influence in the
1970s (see table V]).'21
One of the great betrayals Labour has been excoriated for is the Land
Commission. The promised development levy came out at 40%, rather than the 70%
118 PRO T 224/72 1: Brain to Bretherton, 9 July 1965, Bretherton to Brain, 12 July 1965
" PRO CAB 128/41: Cabinet minutes, 15 November 1966
120 PRO CAB 151/120: MHLG notes for Shore, October 1968; PRO PREM 13/2156: Girling to Andrews, 5
January 1968
121 Daunton, Democracy, p. 80
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desired by the Ministry of Land; Land Commission powers were limited to large
developments, and the assembly of land for private developers; small landowners
were exempted from the levy. Various commentators have therefore argued that the
Commission was 'really only a partial affair, for in essence a fully effective
Commission would be empowered to exercise rights of purchase in respect of land
over a certain size for which planning permission was being sought') 22
 A 'second
appointed day', on which the levy would be increased to 50% and the Commission
would take planning and compulsory purchase powers on the lines of those held by
local authorities, never materialised)23
Organisational failure reinforced the impression of failure. The Land
Commission was supposed to be the central responsibility of a new Ministry of Land
and Natural Resources, which would deal with all aspects of physical planning. But in
a set-piece Whitehall battle, the Ministry of Housing prevented this usurpation of its
planning functions, much to the annoyance of Wilson himself. On this occasion
Evelyn Sharp used all her connections and experience to thwart the emasculation of
her fiefdom. 'I always win', she told Crossman: 'but it was exhausting'. 124
 By the
middle of 1965 Sharp, Heisby and Crossman had managed to out-manoeuvre the
Minister of Land, Fred Willey, and agreed on the break-up of the infant Ministry)25
However, Labour's critics have given insufficient weight to the administrative
and political problems inherent in the venture. The 'global' solution, vesting
overriding planning functions with the Land Commission, was indeed considered. But
the danger that land would not be given up for years, while the Commission
assembled the necessary expertise in valuation, mapping and procedure, was
considered too great. Ministers were faced with other unpleasant facts that they had
not thought of in Opposition. If they were to give money from betterment levy to local
J. Ratcliffe, Land policy: an exploration of the nature of land in society (Hutchinson, London, 1976), p. 51;
Cherry, Town planning, p. 150; Ponting, Breach, pp. 128-9
123 Cullingworth & Nadin, Planning, pp.141-2
124 RCD, 22 October 1964: Crossman, Diaries (19911 vol. edn.), p. 8; Cox, Adversary politics and land: the
conflict over land and property in post-war Britain (CUP, Cambridge, 1984), pp. 129-30
C. Ponting, Breach ofpromise: Labour in power 1 964-70 (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1989), p. 128
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authorities or private sector developers in order to lower the price of houses, they
would run two risks. The first was that richer local authorities might press to recover
the betterment paid in their areas - the recurrent dilemma of hypothecation. The
second was that there was nothing to stop owner-occupiers aided in this way simply
realising the capital gain the Government had provided them with. At the back of their
minds was the memory of the two-price system the 1956 Town and Country Planning
Act had inadvertently created, with 'official' and 'market' prices in simultaneous use.
Wilson resented the necessity of retreating from his 1964 pledges. But he had no
choice.'26
The search began for a face-saving solution, which 'might go some way
• politically to satisfy our pledges while at the same time... also be workable'. This was
the origin of the 'second appointed day', a device which served to placate MHLG
(still watchful of its planning responsibilities) and negotiate the difficult first phase of
Land Commission operation, when it simply would not have the resources to plan for
all land use. 127 This was the package eventually accepted by Cabinet, subject to the
political presentation of a new type of tenure - 'Crownhold' - to maintain some
promise of lower house prices through the Land Conimission.' 28 Once again, Wilson
was deeply unhappy with this conclusion: Crossman feared that Willey had 'made
Harold believe I was in the pocket of the Dame [Sharp] and battling for reaction
against their honest-to-God Socialism'. Crossman, who had successfully (for now)
defended Housing's planning functions, believed Wilson to be an 'extremist' on this
question.'29
The actual operation of the Commission grants some validity to this
interpretation. It did, indeed, take years to assemble, but it was just beginning to fmd
its feet when the Labour Government fell in 1970, a year in which it bought up nearly
126 PRO CAB 130/224: MISC 113 minutes, 28 January 1965; PRO PREM 13/423: Trend to Wilson, 28 January
1965
127 PRO PREM 13/423: Balogh to Wilson, 9 February, 11 February 1965
128 PRO CAB 129/120: Bowden memorandum to Cabinet, 25 February 1965; PRO CAB 128/39: Cabinet minutes,
2 March 1965
' 29 RCD 2 March 1965: Diary (1975 edn.), p. 175
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ten thousand acres of land.' 3° The Commission battled continuously with local
authorities, overriding their planning ideas by forcing them to give up land for
development; its influence on the Ministry of Housing was vital in this respect. The
Ministry's 1967 instructions, to give up more land for building, were prompted by
Land Commission arguments. 13 ' The unfavourable terms for landowners were clear in
the economic effects of the levy, which in conditions of scarcity served only to raise
the price. With every expectation of the return to power of a Conservative Party
openly hostile to the whole idea of land taxation, withholding land from the market
became widespread. This was in fact the main effect of the 1967 Land Commission
Act. The £45 million yearly income of the Commission in its early years was not large
enough in a land market with a £1 .2bn annual turnover to act as more than an irritant
to developers and the profits they expected from their investment.'32
There were other radical innovations. The Rent Act of 1965 represented the
centrepiece of Labour's effort on privately rented housing. It provided for a form of
re-control related to the income of the tenants, and judged in each case by Local
Authority Rent Officers. The Rent Officers would hear appeals from either landlord
or tenant before fixing the rent; during this process, there was to be security from
eviction. This constituted an attempt to meet Labour's commitment to .control,
without fixing a controlled rent that could not thereafter be changed.' 33 In the first
month of office the Cabinet decided to introduce a Security from Eviction Bill. This
prevented landlords evicting tenants in property of less than £400 rateable value,
pending the introduction of a full-scale Rent Bill.' 34 They then searched for a system
that would be 'fair, flexible and able to endure... depend[ing] on current arbitration
and not on values fixed in the past on what may then have been old and inadequate
advice'.135
130 Cox, Adversary politics, table 6.4, p. 149
ibid, pp. 144-5, 149
132 Hall et a!, Containment, II, pp. 240, 243
' Malpass, Reshaping, p. 103; Berry, Housing, p. 123; McKay & Cox, Change, p. 131
PRO CAB 130/211: MISC 9, Rent Bill Cabinet Committee, minutes, 29 October 1964
135 PRO PREM 13/378: Trend to Wilson, 17 December 1964
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The decline of the privately rented market had not been reversed by the 1957
Rent Act. At the time of that Act, there had been 5¼ million for private rent:
by 1964 there were only 3Y2 million.' 36
 It was the intention of the Government to
revive it, while at the same time avoiding the iniquities that the Milner Holland
Report revealed when the Committee reported in March 1965. This Report tackled
head on 'growing concern about reports of unfair pressures on tenants by landlords,
the effects of creeping decontrol and extortionate rents'. Rehabilitation of slums, and
decontrol, coupled with high land and house prices, were all increasing homelessness
through raising rents. Given the tax disadvantages of private landlords, the pressure of
demand given the increasing population of the London area, and the continuing net
deficiency of dwellings for the number of households, Milner Holland held out little
hope of change without legislation.' 37
 The fact that Labour introduced rent
regulations, however flexible, rather than fiscal aid for the private sector, was a token
of ideological commitment.
136 PRO CAB 130/227: MISC 44, Housing programme, Cabinet Committee, minutes, 16 March 1965
137 Cmnd. 2605, Report of the committee on housing in Greater London (March 1965), pp. 22, 56, 67-8
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The balance of building, 1964-70
Labour had not set out to constrain the private sector. Their original intention was to
reach agreement with the building societies on a physical plan, by which they could
control the actual number of houses built, through managing mortgage demand.
Ministers initially offered talks on relief from profit tax, in return for discussions
relating to cheap money for mortgages, which would have to be an integral part of
guiding building society mortgage rate decisions.' 38
 Crossman saw the idea as a way
of avoiding building licenses, and began negotiations with the Societies. He
subsequently used the possibility of a 'national building plan' to wind up the April
1965 censure debate in the House of Commons, and put some flesh on the bones of
the Government's programme.' 39
 He then obtained permission to proceed with
negotiations, since the Building Societies had given an encouragingly positive
response to the Ministry's plea that 'they should voluntarily regulate the amount of
capital they make available for the purchase of new houses to match a level of
building for sale settled under the plan'. Wilson's active support was again crucial in
achieving this outcome. 140
Building Society leaders welcomed the idea - which was not surprising, since
Crossman was offering them a guarantee of the 1965 level of private sector housing
starts as a minimum starting point for negotiations.' 4 ' Unfortunately for him, the full
Council of the Building Societies Association was not so impressed with his plan
when they assembled in August. The Council rejected the scheme, arguing that other
institutions would simply offer market rates if they voluntarily constrained their
In the background was their fear of being co-opted by government. Lord
RCD, 30 October 1964: Diary (1975 edn.), pp. 38-9; PRO HLG 117/195: Sharp to Brain, 12 December 1964;
PRO T 224/720: Corlett to Gilmore, 23 December 1964
139 PRO T 224/721: Crossman, Diamond, Mellish meeting with BSA, minutes, 28 April 1965; RCD, Diary (1991
edn.), pp. 99-100: RCD, 29 April 1965
° PRO PREM 13/374: Ministry of Housing brief, 'Local authority associations', 3 June 1965; PRO 1224/721:
Crossman to Diamond, 4 June 1965
'' PRO T 224/721: Diamond, Crossman meeting with BSE, minutes, 17 June 1965; RCD, 17 June 1965: Diary
(1975 edn.), pp. 252-3
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Cohen, Chairman of the Alliance Building Society, admitted that 'the large Societies
were very nervous that this might be a first step towards a greater Government control
of Building Societies and they shied away from it like a frightened horse'.'42
Crossman realised that this was indeed 'the worst blow I ha[ve] received since
becoming Minister', though significantly he drew the comfort that now he was at least
'absolutely free to think out my own methods of fulfilling our pledge to build half a
million houses'.' 43
 Crossman was forced to tell Wilson that 'it is now clear that... we
shall not be able to rely on co-operation in controlling the volume of private house
building'.
In this situation what consultation there was with Building Societies and
builders was to relapse throughout the life of the Government into the mere exchange
of information and platitudes. Even though a Working Party was formed to look into
the possibility of co-operation, the Building Societies wanted to know beforehand that
they would retain the power to set their own interest rates, and that the public sector
programme was not considered 'sacrosanct'. They also wanted to know whether
Prices and Incomes policy was going to be extended to their operations. In subsequent
meetings they offered 'the good sense of societies' as a guarantee on mortgages, a
promise which officials well knew was worth nothing in practice. They also insisted
on including the National Federation of Building Trade Employers, notoriously
unsympathetic to government interference, in negotiations. As soon as negotiations
began with the NFBTE present, companies such as Laing's, Costain and Wimpey
began to insist on much larger shares of total resources for the private sector than the
Government was willing to allow: the atmosphere soured.' 45 Any thoughts of 'floors'
and 'ceilings' for mortgage lending evaporated, and one of the main physical planning
devices the Government thought it might rely on simply fell away.
142 PRO HLG 118/595: Cohen to Crossman, 7 September 1965
PRO HLG 118/595: Pitt, Deputy Secretary, Building Societies Association, to Sharp, 16 August 1965; RCD, 22
August 1965: Diary (1975 edn.), p.313
PRO PREM 13/960: Crossman to Wilson, 24 August 1965
' PRO HLG 118/595: Crossman meeting with BSA, minutes, meeting of Ministry of Housing and BSA officials,
minutes, 14, 29 September 1965, meetings with BSA and NFBTE, minutes, 27 October, 11 November 1965
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Twin Working Parties, one on land and the other on housing starts, were
indeed to do useful work, especially on improving the quality of statistical
information.' 46 But by 1967 these committees were simply another conduit for
economic special pleading. The Building Societies and builders were by now feeling
higher interest rates in lower levels of housing starts and mortgage borrowing. They
therefore used the Working Parties to call for government-backed bridging fmance,
loan credits on the lines of those provided to exporters, and the resurrection of the
Conservative £lOOm mortgages advance fund of 1959.147 Apart from a minor easing
of credit terms, Callaghan turned all this down.' 48
 The committees now lapsed into a
familiar round of bargaining for concessions, for example the NFBTE's demand that
local authority building for sale be curtailed.' 49
 Labour's planning machinery fell
short of their wishes because of the very lack of economic consensus between
government and the industries concerned.
Given these limits on private sector planning, the Government's targets could
only be met through an enlarged public sector. This sector nearly met its 1965
National Plan targets, while private housing starts fell away. Initial planning was for
many more public housing starts - certainly to 160,000 starts in England and Wales
by 1968, and building up to give 220-230,000 starts by 1969/70 in the United
Kingdom.' 5° The first set of public housing demands were put to the Cabinet in
January 1965, amounting to a rise of 12,000 in the public sector building programme
in England and Wales, to take the whole programme of starts approved from 144,000
in 1964, to 156,000 in 1965. Needless to say, the Treasury resisted this proposal as a
commitment to spend most of the public sector expenditure reserve.'5'
146 PRO CAB 130/286: Crossman memorandum to MISC 113, 21 June 1966
' PRO HLG 118/797: BSA, NFBTE memorandum to Ministry of Housing, Programme Working Party, 18
January 1967
PRO CAB 130/306: Greenwood memorandum to MISC 113, 18 January, MISC 113 Housing Committee,
minutes, 20 January 1967
PRO HLG 118/797: NFBTE memorandum to Programme Working Party, 28 July 1967
° PRO HLG 117/173: Rickard to Ward, 16 November 1964
' PRO PREM 13/374: Trend to Wilson, 10 February 1965; PRO CAB 128/39: Cabinet minutes, II February
1965
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Crossman got his way, convincing the Cabinet that reserves of skilled labour
would not be used up too quickly given the scope for industrialised building
techniques.' 52 By now MHLG had settled on a mechanism to deliver Labour's
election promise of cheap money for housing - a new subsidy for local authorities, to
hold their borrowing rates at 4% whatever happened to market rates. This would serve
effectively to double Exchequer subsidy to councils at prevailing rates of interest, and
as such enormously increase the pressure on the Ministry for more approvals (see
chart V• 153 Caimcross noted how local authority applications jumped when the new
subsidy arrangements were announced in November 1966.154
152 PRO CAB 129/120: Crossman memorandum to Cabinet, 'Housing programme', 22 February 1965, Ross
memorandum to Cabinet, 'Housing programme - Scotland', 23 February 1965; PRO CAB 128/39: Cabinet
minutes, 25 February 1965
'"PRO PREM 13/374: Crossman to Wilson, 13 May 1965; PRO CAB 130/230: Callaghan memorandum to MISC
60, 26 May 1965
' PRO CAB 130/286: Caimcross memorandum, 'The housing situation', 25 May 1966
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Charts V.5 & V6. Interest rates, public and private sector housing starts, GB, 1964-70
Sources: Economic trends (various); Housing and construction statistics (July 1967), (April 1968), (February
1971), tables 50, 1 and 1
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Chart V.7. Subsidy payments from central government for local authority housing,
GB, 1959-70 (constant 1959 prices)
1959	 1960	 1961	 1962	 1963	 1964	 196	 1960	 1 96(	 1960	 196w	 1WU
Sources: Housing and construction statistics, May 1971, table XV, p. 82; Economic trends (various)
The Wilson government had reversed the slum-clearing emphasis of 195 5-64,
and replaced it with a general subsidy to meet the acute shortage of houses to rent.
This new pressure for more starts would combine with the setting of overall targets to
aid the growth of the public sector. During the public spending round of July 1965,
for instance, Crossman used stalling private sector starts to justify a 20.4% increase in
capital spending allocations, and a 3 8.6% increase in subsidy spending, over the life
of the Government.' 55 Partly on the grounds that the extra subsidy spending would not
fall due until 1967/68, as it was only payable on new houses, the Cabinet allowed this
change through, at the cost of no more public sector starts in 1966/67 . 156 By now,
however, Crossman knew that 'the private sector will not achieve its 250,000 in 1967
even if it is to go all out'. The implication for the public sector programme was that
'we can... safely lay our plans for expanding the public sector knowing that the
danger of over-taxing the construction industry during the period of squeeze is likely
PRO CAB 129/121: Callaghan memorandum to Cabinet, 'Public sector spending allocation', 13 July 1965;
PRO PREM 13/375: Crossman to Wilson, 20 July 1965
156 PRO CAB 134/2001: Crossman memorandum to Home Affairs Cabinet Committee, 2 August 1965
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to be remote'.' 57
 Even as the 'national housing pian' was on the drawing board,
therefore, those responsible knew that it would necessarily entail a large expansion in
state housing.
By November Crossman was asking the Cabinet for 6,000 more approvals.
His colleagues agreed to 3,500, providing that the new starts should be in areas of the
country where the construction industry was under-utilised.' 58
 The Ministry of
Housing returned to the attack in June 1966, citing once again the threat of not
meeting their declared housing targets. Crossman told the Cabinet that 'the only
assured means of maintaining a better rate of completions in 1967 and 1968 is to step
up the local authority programme now, by giving additional approvals in the rest of
this year'. This time the demand was for a further 7,500 approvals in England and
Wales, and a further 9,000 at the behest of the NCB, for miners transferred to
economic pits.' 59
 As private sector starts continued to fall, and projections showing
that the public sector still could not meet their part of the 1970 target, the pressure
remained throughout the autunm to fund more public sector provision.' 60
 The figures
revealed by an inter-departmental inquiry in late 1966 were even worse than in
September, though Ministers were still reluctant to abandon their target.'6'
Early 1967 represented the high point of Labour's desire for more council
houses. By now Anthony Greenwood, who had replaced Crossman at Housing, was
asking for 17,800 more such houses, which would put the Government within striking
distance of their 250,000 target for the public sector. His colleagues limited him to
'"PRO PREM 13/960: Crossman to Wilson, 24 August 1965
PRO CAB 134/1741: Crossman memorandum to EDC, and minutes, 24 November 1965; PRO CAB 134/1737:
EDC minutes, 1 December 1965; PRO CAB 130/286: MISC 113, minutes, 11 May 1966
CAB 129/125: Crossman memorandum to Cabinet, 'Immediate increases in the local authority housing
programme', 28 June 1966
'°	 CAB 134/2895: MHLG memorandum to Official Committee on Housing, 15 September 1966; PRO
PREM 13/963: Greenwood to Wilson, 17 October 1966
161 PRO CAB 134/2895: Official Committee on Housing, minutes, 29 November 1966; PRO CAB 130/286:
Greenwood memorandum to MISC 113, 7 December 1966
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7,800, shared between the NCB and New Towns.' 62
 But this was to be the peak of the
public housing boom. By now a limited measure of reflation had somewhat revived
the private sector, undermining the case for more local authority starts. Greenwood
conceded that he would defer asking for 5,000 of his desired approvals until the end
of the year, and in the end was limited to an approvals increase of 5,000.163 By the
autumn, Callaghan had succeeded in shaving 5,000 completions off the 1970
estimates, taking public starts in that year down to 237,000. 164
Devaluation changed all these estimates, as officials realised immediately
when they examined the potential price rises triggered in construction and the fall in
private sector activity in an uncertain environment. 165
 The 500,000 target evaporated
immediately. 166
 In January 1968 the Cabinet reluctantly agreed to cuts amounting to
22,000 public sector starts in 1970.167 This was only the first of a number of spending
reductions. Another 2,000 reduction in 1968 starts for England and Wales was agreed
in July of that year - though at £7m in additional 1969/70 savings this was a fraction
of the £22m to £32m the Treasury had asked for. 168 The 1968 cuts exercises took
£70m off the planned 1969/70 Budget, which implied £77m of reductions in 1970/71
if the restraint continued, including cuts in local authorities' mortgage lending.'69
However, in 1969-70, as in the other social services, resistance to any more cuts
became fiercer. Although the Government reduced its approval for local authority
mortgage lending from the £55m councils had been promised to £30m for 1969/70,
162 PRO CAB 130/306: MISC 113 minutes, 20 January 1967
163 PRO PREM 13/2156: Trend to Wilson, 13 March 1967; PRO HLG 118/797: Programme Working Party paper,
'The present housing situation', 13 March 1967; PRO CAB 128/42: Cabinet minutes, 14 March 1967
PRO PREM 13/2156: Greenwood to Wilson, 10 July 1967; PRO CAB 128/42: Cabinet minutes, 20 July 1967
165 PRO HLG 118/800: MHLG memorandum, 'The effect of devaluation on the housing programme', 21
November 1967
e.g. PRO PREM 13/2066: Greenwood to Wilson, 12 January 1968
167 PRO CAB 128/43: Cabinet minutes, 5 January, 11 January 1968
PRO CAB 134/3204: Jenkins memorandum to SEP, Public expenditure 1969/70', 18 June 1968; PRO CAB
13/3201: SEP minutes, 11 July 1968
'	 CAB 134/3204: Jenkins memorandum to SEP, 'Public expenditure 1970/71, 12 July 1968; PRO CAB
13/3201: SEP minutes, 15 July 1968
255
Housing
Jenkins agreed to restore this cut if Crosland could find offsetting savings. The cut
was eventually	 However, this did not stop Labour falling far short of its
National Plan objectives for Housing (see table V2).
Table V2. National Plan building targets and reality, GB, 1964/65-1969/70 (000s dwellings)
1964/65 real 1969/70 plan 1969/70 real Planned %increase Real %decrease
GB starts	 347	 488	 319	 40.56	 -8.15
E&Wstarts	 350	 438	 291	 25.14	 -16.86
Scottish starts	 43	 50	 28	 16.28	 -35.12
Sources: Cmnd 2837, The Housing Plan for Scotland (November 1965), pp. 4-5; Cmnd 2838, The Housing Plan
(November 1965), pp. 3-5; Housing and construction statistics, November 1971, table 1, p1
This still left notional 1970/71 reductions at £55.7m, though shared between
• housing and general local environmental services. Jenkins was warned that this meant
that total housing starts could not even reach 380,000 in 1970.171 Wilson wrote to the
Chancellor, expressing his concern, and asking for a review of local authority housing
finance.' 72 A Cabinet inquiry was convened in early 1970, and so desperate were
Ministers to reverse the fall in house building that no options were ruled out. The
committee examined paying special three-year subsidies to house-builders, mobility
payments to allow council tenants to buy their houses or move out, and a Building
Society subsidy for new borrowers.' These debates demonstrated the ideological and
practical limits beyond which Labour could not go. Subsidised sales of council houses
were ruled out as favouring 'the richer council tenants', advances to building societies
on the more practical grounds that the Government could not afford to make a real
difference to the mortgage market. The Prime Minister eventually concluded that
local authority lending should be increased, with more 100% mortgages through
lifting the cap on these from £lOOm for 1971/72 to £150m.'74
170 PRO CAB 134/3209: SEP minutes, 6 January 1969; PRO PREM 13/3266: Greenwood to Wilson, 6 January
1969; PRO CAB 128/44: Cabinet minutes, 17 July 1969
PRO PREM 13/2589: Robinson to Jenkins, 19 September 1969
172 PRO PREM 13/3267: Wilson to Jenkins, 29 October 1969
PRO CAB 130/454: MISC 264 minutes, 6 February 1970
ibid, 17 March 1970
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'Repairs and conversions': a new liberal agenda, 1968-70
Public expenditure cuts only served to encourage a move away from treating housing
policy as if it were a simple numbers game. New slogans came to the fore, such as
'consultation', 'renewal', 'renovation' and 'improvement'. The industrial building
bubble burst, no longer necessary now the construction industry was not stretched to
its limits, and high-rise flat building wound down. This was hastened by the public
outcry following the disaster at Ronan Point, in East London, in May 1968. Five
people were killed in a gas explosion that led to the collapse of one corner of the
block: the most popular reaction was to blame the high-rise form itself.' 75 The
Ministry of Housing, which had harboured doubts about high-rise for years,
concurred. Centralised cost yardsticks, which from 1963 had been operated as a drag
on high building, had already been tightened, making it virtually impossible for local
authorities to carry on with large-scale high building. These had been under review
for at least two years before the Ronan Point explosion, and had been formalised in
the 1967 Housing Subsidies Act.'76
This intervention on the part of the Ministry evoked a great deal of protest
from local authorities, and pressure for constant reviews of the cash limits. Officials
admitted that 'the cost yardstick discriminates against the multi-storey block', since it
gave less subsidy at higher densities.' 77
 After Ronan Point, they wanted to take this
further:
The strongest case for review is at the lower densities if need be by reduction of the
yardsticks for the high density levels since recent events and the general discontent with high
flats show that there can be no justification for encouraging building which is not only very
expensive but which produced unpopular, and for many families inferior, homes.'7
' Dunleavy, Politics, p. 242; E.W. Cooney, 'High flats in local authority housing in England and Wales since
1945', in A. Sutcliffe (ed.), Mulri-storey living: the British working-class experience (Croom Helm, London,
1974), p. 151
176 MHLG Design Bulletin 7, Housing cost yardstick for schemes at medium and high densities (HMSO, London,
1963), cost table, pp. 5-8; McKay & Cox, Change, pp. 133-4; Berry, Housing, pp. 97-9; PRO CAB 130/286:
Greenwood memorandum to MISC 113, 'The speed of local authority housebuilding, 25 November 1966
'"PRO HLG 118/805: Swaffield to Ulrich, 8 January 1968
' PRO HLG 118/875: Stevenson circular to local government associations, 5 September 1968
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The yardstick was indeed further slanted against tall flats. As a result of the Ministry's
final review, very high rise building began immediately to abate (see tables V.3 and
V.4). System building immediately fell away, before collapsing in the mid to late-
seventies (see chart V 4) 179
Table V3. Local authority tenders for high flats in relation to other dwellings, GB, 1960-70
(% of total local authority dwelling tenders)
Houses 2-5 storey flats 5+ storey flats
1960	 52.4	 33.6	 14.0
1961	 52.2	 32.5	 15.3
1962	 49.4	 33.5	 17.1
1963	 46.8	 30.7	 22.5
1964	 44.5	 30.9	 24.6
1965	 47.3	 29.4	 23.3
1966	 47.4	 26.5	 26.0
1967	 49.3	 26.6	 24.1
1968	 51.1	 30.3	 18.6
1969	 52.8	 33.9	 13.3
1970	 51.8	 36.6	 11.6
Source: Housing and construction statistics, May 1971, tables 10-11, p. 24, February 1972, tables 10-
ii, p. 24
Table V4. Local authority multi-storey flat tenders, GB, 1945-1979
East Anglia
East Midlands
North
North West
Scotland
South East
South West
Wales
West Midlands
Yorks and Humber
LCC/GLC
1945-48
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3212
1948-52
0
0
0
0
396
316
0
0
806
0
12652
1953-5 7
0
39
0
935
563
828
594
225
4225
3214
20830
1958-62
132
255
3846
10932
10887
4076
2814
1111
10604
8157
24052
1963-6 7
722
4321
7289
27805
36858
11965
2886
807
27016
16089
62291
1968-72
65
1374
2125
7137
13396
2770
391
309
4688
3566
28925
1972-79
0
0
53
156
2052
770
221
0
288
280
7299
GB total	 3212	 14170	 31453	 76866	 198049	 64746	 11119
Source: M. Glendinning & S. Muthesius, Tower block. modern public housing in England Scotlana Wales and
Northern Ireland (Yale UP, New Haven, 1994), table 2, p. 333
The Ministry's R&D Group had long known that system building would never
be more efficient than traditional methods, whatever the density of development. Tall
'Dun1eavy, Politics, p. 177
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flats, it had been clear for a decade, were very expensive. 180 Now successive Ministry
prototypes revealed that the same was true of industrialised building. A low-rise
industrial housing system - which grew out of the CLASP system so successful in
school-building - showed that the system cost (at £2,557 per house) was over £400 a
house more than those built with traditional methods. This undermined the whole
logic of industrialisation.' 8 ' The NBA similarly found that industrialised 'efficiency
gains' were in fact due to the fact that larger and more efficient companies were the
only firms that could afford to build with industrial methods. When the same
techniques were applied to traditional brick-built houses, the gains were just as great.
The recognition of this fact led to the collapse of the demand for systems building.
Laing's, for example, closed their industrialised building plant in Livingstone as early
as 1969.182
MHLG planning, having embraced new social survey techniques, had changed
beyond recognition since the early 'sixties. Their study of St Mary's, Oldham, was the
first large-scale official sociological survey of a slum clearance area, and was to
become the first such study to reveal the mistakes and discontent behind the façade of
urban redevelopment.' 83 The Study asked new questions - how easy was it to
understand the 'bewilderingly complex' terms for re-settlement and compensation?
Did people actually like their new homes? Were the terms for compensation, crucial
in an area with high levels of owner-occupation in old, cheap houses, seen to be fair?
Though most of the new tenants seemed pleased with their new environment, at least
a year or two into their new tenancies, there was one glaring problem: the
unhappiness of families with children at living in flats. Only 11% of such families had
actually wanted flats, and only just over half were 'satisfied' with them once they had
'°MHLG, Flats and houses 1958 (HMSO, London, 1958), passim, esp. p. 61
MBLG Design Bulletin 18, Designing a low-rise housing system (HMSO, London, 1970), passim, esp. pp. 45-6
182 Finnimore, Factory, pp. 198-20 1, 109
Burnett, Housing, p. 275
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moved in. 184 Elsewhere, noise and privacy - along with an emerging problem with
damp - were perceived by tenants as the main flaws of the new estates.'85
The most famous example of the Ministry's new 'liberalism' was their study
of Deeplish, in Rochdale.' 86 Greenwood's introductory note on 'so-called rural
slums', condemning the 'city planner, [who], ambitious for wholesale redevelopment,
easily writes them off as the slums of tomorrow and decrees a clean sweep', set the
tone. 'This first impression is both superficial and one-sided', he argued: 'repairs and
conversions undertaken by owner occupiers can work wonders'.' 87
 The new
sociological investigative techniques were put to good effect, demonstrating that most
of the houses were in fact 'solid', as well as showing exactly which parts of the
Deeplish area were affected by the worst poverty and neglect. A team of architects,
designers, quantity surveyors and sociologists was put to work on the investigation.
They calculated that only about one-quarter of the houses were either 'expensive' or
'very expensive' to repair. Moreover, the popularity of the area was partly due to its
low rents and proximity to the city centre, which might be destroyed by re-housing.
The Study's recommendations were even more influential, for they prefigured decades
of traffic calming, tree planting, grass seeding and interior renovation.188
The Deeplish study showed that government policy was not only being
changed by the disrepute of high rise and system building. There were now new ideas
to promote: renovation and area improvement. The study had an impact even within
Cabinet, as Greenwood used it to press such policies on his colleagues. The Ministry
of Housing backed up the Deeplish findings with another survey, of 6,000 households
questioned by Medical Officers of Health. The results seemed to confirm that 'many
MHLG Design Bulletin 20, Moving out of a slum (HMSO, London, 1970), pp. 2-3, 6, 18-19, 21; Design
Bulletin 22, New housing in a cleared area (HMSO, London, 1972), pp. 6, ii, 64
185 MHLG Design Bulletin 21, Families living at high densities (HMSO, London, 1970), pp.4,8, table 2, p. 20,
pp. 28-9, 36
T.L. Blair, The poverty ofplanning: crisis in the urban environment (Macdonald, London, 1973), pp. 79-80;
McKay & Cox, Change, p. 133
187 MHLG, The Deeplish study (HMSO, London, 1968), p. v
188 ibid, pp. 2, 13-17, 26-7, 69-71
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people are well content to stay in old houses and areas if the houses and the
environment can be improved'.' 89 This conclusion led to a new emphasis on the
rehabilitation of so-called 'twilight areas'. Local authorities were to be instructed to
carry out area surveys on the Deeplish model, and the Ministry began to look at new
powers to force through the renovation of run-down urban areas. 190
 This process had
also been given impetus by the Dennington Report of 1966. This was yet another
attempt to get away from 'the concept of... "unfit" houses, the "slum" and its link by
definition with physical health'. The Report proposed a list of amenities that houses
should have - an inside toilet, a wash basin, a fixed bath, and so on - but also
minimum standards for housing families in reasonable comfort.'91
Such measures eventually emerged in the 1968 White Paper, Old houses into
new homes, and the 1969 Housing Act. This introduced the principle of General
Improvement Areas, for which money would be granted to councils for general
environmental upgrading. More importantly, increased improvement grants to pay for
half the cost of renovation (up to £1,000) could be given to householders. Standard
grant payments, which could be made by councils when residents did not have basic
amenities such as a WC, were upgraded.' 92 This applied to hundreds of thousands of
houses 'capable of providing good living conditions for many years to come and
unlikely to be affected by known redevelopment.., proposals'.' 93 Since the Ministry
estimated that there were up to 783,000 houses in or adjoining potential clearance
areas that could be repaired for less than £1,000, this was a major change of
direction.' 94
 The pace of general clearance orders dropped sharply, and following the
new Housing Act improvement grants were made at the fastest rate since 1945.'
CAB 130/306: Greenwood memorandum to MISC 113, 'The older housing stock: improvement and
clearance', 12 May 1967
° PRO CAB 134/2894: Greenwood, Ross memorandum to MG 68, The older housing areas: proposals for
rebuilding', 5 February 1968
'' MHLG, Our older homes (HMSO, London, 1966), pp. 6-9. 13-15
Cmnd. 3602, Old houses into new homes (April 1968), p. 5
Cullingworth & Nadin, Planning, p. 229
Cmnd. 3602, Old houses into new homes (April 1968), table 14, p. 29
Cmnd 4753, MHLG reportfor 1969 and 1970 (August 1971), p. 9
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This sensitivity was of a piece with the new emphasis on urban renewal, for instance
exhibited in the Home Office's Urban Programme of grants to local authorities for
community projects, which saw £4m in 1968/69 and £17.5m in 1969/70 allocated to
inner-city areas in England and Wales.'96
Paradoxically, the new agenda was also sustained by the strengthening of the
centre, facilitated first by the report of the Housing Programmes Committee in 1965,
and then by the work of Labour's new regional machineiy (including the EPCs).
While preparing for the national Housing Plan, the HPC had tried to estimate the
demand for private housing, to aid planning of the public programme, as well as
conduct work on transport links and the availability of land for new housing. In
bringing the MI-ILG and the Treasury together, the Committee combined realism
about costs with an awareness of the very real need for building and rebuilding.'97
The result of such work was that central government knew more about regional needs,
costs, and infrastructure than they had before. Although Ministers did not accept their
recommendations, the same went for local planning efforts such as the West
Midlands' EPC Study and the CEPU's Humberside exercise. 198
The new agenda took 'consultation' more seriously than ever before. The 1965
report of the Ministry's Planning Advisory Group was crucial here. It recommended a
separation between tactical planning decisions, which should be devolved to the local
level and removed from the procedures of Ministerial approval. Only 'structure
plans', laying down land use by area would be submitted to the Minister. Local
authorities' own Development Plans would fill in the detail, while 'local plans' on an
even smaller scale would complete the picture. It was hoped that this would allow
people to actually envisage the effect on their environment, rather than just looking at
a land-use map. Although the change was also intended to speed up the planning
'Wi1son, Governments, p. 526. Only £9.5m had actually been spent by the time Labour left office: PRO I
227/3191: Home Office, DES, DHSS joint Circular, 'Urban programme no. 3', 12 June 1970
197 PRO 1277/1546: MHLG, MPBW memorandum to HPC, 'The demand for new private housing', MPBW
memorandum to HPC, 'Building cost index numbers', 12 April, 24 April 1965, HPC Report, May 1965
PRO CAB 134/2761: Peterson memorandum to Environmental policy committee, 'Next steps in the West
Midlands', 25 November 1966; PRO EW 6/60: CEPU, 'Humberside Report', 21 March 1969
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process, the emphasis on persuasion and public relations was highly influential.'
Most of the PAG's recommendations were made law in the 1969 Town and Country
Planning Act.20°
This trend was further accelerated by People and planning, the report of a
Ministry of Housing Committee under the Parliamentary Secretary Arthur
Skeffington. A range of measures to involve the public - co-option, community
forums, advisory panels - were recommended in this report. The employment of
'community development officers', usually community workers able to reach those
people who usually would not take part in consultation exercises, was
recommended. 20 ' The 'new partnership' the Skeffington Report wanted to build was
still framed in terms of persuasion and public relations. But government had taken its
first faltering steps towards more popular, and more flexible, housing and planning
policies.202
'PAG, The future of development plans (WVISO, London, 1965), PP. 3-9, 15
200 Cmnd. 3333, Town and country planning (June 1967), passim, esp. pp. 3, 8-9
20! DOE, People and planning: report of the committee on public participation in planning (HMSO, London,
1969), pp. 13-2 1, 47-8
202 P. Levin & D. Donnison, 'People and planning', in Cullingworth (ed.), Problems of an urban society, vol. 111
(Allen & Unwin, London, 1973), pp.87-90; H. Gans, People and plans: essays on the urban problem and solutions
(Basic Books, New York, 1968)
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There is virtually no limit to the amount of medical care an individual is capable of absorbing.
-Enoch Powell'
'True level of need': the Conservative reorientation of the NHS.
The 1950s saw the NHS relatively starved of resources as a share of GDP, as Chart
VI.] reveals. In relation to other social services, the NHS lost out to the
Conservative's initial housing drive, the 'new deal' for secondary education, and the
rising costs of social security. 2 The 1956 Report of a Committee of Inquiry, under the
Cambridge economist Claude Guillebaud, revealed the results. Even though this
Committee was inaugurated at the behest of the Treasury, perennially pressing for
savings, it concluded that there was no room for further cuts. There had been no new
hospitals built since the War, and the Report recommended a large new £30m per
annum capital spending programme if hospitals were not to become altogether
obsolescent.3
Nor were resources the only problem, for decision-making was hampered by
administrative division and confusion. Labour's original 1930s design had been for
joint boards of local authority members to govern hospitals, with a salaried General
Practitioner service working in health centres bringing together health visitors,
doctors and nurses. Mainly through pressure from doctors, the 1948 NHS Act did not
achieve this. Instead, Regional Hospital Boards oversaw the hospital service, sub-
regional Executive Councils employed GPs, and local authorities governed health and
welfare services such as home helps, maternity clinics, hostels for the mentally ill, and
'R. Klein (2" edn.), The politics of the National Health Service (Longman, London, 1989), p. 67
2 T. Cutler, 'Dangerous benchmark? Early NHS cost estimates and the "problem" of NHS expenditure', ICBH
seminar paper, 15 March 2000
R. Lowe, The welfare state in Britain since 1945 (Macmillan, London, 1993), p. 181; D.M. Fox, Health policies
and health politics: the British andAmerican experience 1911-1965 (Princeton UP, New Jersey, 1986), p. 175; 8.
Watkin, The National Health Service: the first phase, 1948-74 and after (Allen & Unwin, London, 1978), p. 37; B.
Abel-Smith & R. Titmuss, The cost of the National Health Service (NIESR, Cambridge, 1956), pp. 24-47
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homes for the elderly. 4
 This tripartism would have serious consequences, both for
planning and growth, especially given the fact that many Conservatives had never
quite come to terms with the idea of a government-funded health service. The
Ministry itself lost initiative and drive, having yielded many of its functions to MHLG
when Bevan left for the Ministry of Labour in 1951. With seven Ministers of Health
between 1951 and 1962, none in the Cabinet, relegation to low priority was all the
easier.5
Chart Vii. UK NHS funding 1951-64 (Em, 1951 prices, and %)
MIS wending, 1951.64
Source: Webster, Seri'ices, II, pp. 802-3;Economic trends (various)
Watikin, First phase, pp. 23-8
C. Webster, 'Conservatives and consensus: the politics of the NHS 1951-64', in A. Oakley & A. Williams (eds.),
The politics of the welfare state (UCL Press, London, 1994), p. 56
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'Laboratory of new estates '. GPs and health centres, 1 951-64
Such restraint had inevitable consequences. For instance, the number of GPs
increased only at a very slow rate, from 23,019 in 1952 to 25,058 in 1963, with a
small fall in 1964: this allowed the number of patients per GP, which had fallen until
1958, to creep up again. 6 The NHS had achieved some rationalisation of the
distribution of GPs, with the semi-independent Medical Practices Committee
exercising some control over where doctors were able to set up practices. The country
was divided into three categories: 'restricted', where a ratio of less than 1,500 persons
to each GP meant that the MPC would only allow new GPs to enter in exceptional
circumstances; 'intermediate', where the MPC would judge each case on its merits,
and 'designated', which all GPs could automatically enter. This control brought the
average GP's list down from 2,436 to 2,287. All the same, average lists in designated
areas still stood at 2,737 in 1961: the relative deprivation of restricted areas persisted
much as it had since the 193 Os. 8 Slackening entry into general practice made the
situation worse in the early 1960s.9
Tripartism had allowed GP health centres, which the 1944 White Paper
envisaged as the gateway to specialist care, to be downgraded. Since relationships
between hospitals, local authorities and GPs had never been made entirely clear, no
one group was responsible for them.'° No-one was therefore prepared to champion
them. In practice, Circular 3/48 issued by the Ministry during the economic crises of
1948 therefore stalled local authorities' development of such centres. Indeed, GPs,
suspicious of local councils and hostile towards any suggestion of becoming salaried
state employees, were openly hostile to health centres in the early 1950s, and
6 D. Paige & K. Jones, Health and welfare ser'ices in Britain in 1975 (Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1966), table 5,
p.38
1 A. Lindsey, Socialized medicine in England and Wales: the National Health Service 1948-1961 (OUP, Oxford,
1962), pp. 153-5
C.J. Ham, Health policy in Britain (Macmillan, London, 1982), p. 20
PRO MH 135/254: MOH memorandum, 'General Medical Services: distribution of doctors', November 1961
'° Lowe, Welfare, p. 170
266
Health
Conservative politicians agreed. 1 ' Health centres, Macleod said in 1955, should
remain limited to the 'laboratory' of 'new towns and new estates'. 12
 By 1958 only
twelve new centres had been approved for England and Wales, most of them in
redeveloped areas such as Thurrock, or new housing estates. 13
 Opposition to health
centres was widespread, and not confined to GPs. Local authority Medical Officers of
Health were also wary of the costs involved.' 4
 However, Ministry officials privately
accepted that 'the credit squeeze was more to blame for the failure of LHAs to
establish Health Centres than opposition from the doctors'.'5
The Ministry thought that it could encourage group practice via a loan scheme,
rather than through health centres. This was based on expert assessments of existing
health centres, which concluded that they would not work if they did not have local
authorities' prior blessing.' 6
 The Government agreed to guarantee loans under the
Group Practice Loans scheme established in 1955, but only up to £2,000 or 80% of
the cost, whichever was the smaller.' 7
 This was increased to £2,500 in 1963.18
However, these loans did not cover the whole cost of buying into a surgery, and with
interest rates rising it became less attractive for new GPs to enter group practices. By
1959, only 150 group practices had been assisted in this way, and young GPs were
finding it more difficult to enter partnerships.' 9
 Although the situation improved in the
early 1 960s, the total number of grants made in the Conservatives last year in power
stood at only about £800,000 (see tables Vi1-V12).
Phoebe Hall, 'The development of health centres', in idem, H. Land, R. Parker & A. Webb (eds.), Change,
choice and conflict in social policy (Heinemann, London, 1975), pp. 281-3
12 PRO Mu 134/61: MOH press release, 'Future of health centres', 16 December 1955
PRO MH 134/51: MOH note, 'New health centres opened since 5th July 1948', 1957
"PRO MH 134/61: Survey of health centres and group practices, interim report, December 1959; PRO MH
134/62: 'Review of health centre projects which failed', 1960
PRO MH 134/62: Humphries to Herzmark, 'Review of health centre projects which failed', 14 October 1960
16 PRO MH 133/270: Lees and Carr, 'Survey of health centres and group practices, 1960', January 1961
PRO MH 153/252: Scott, GPL Committee, to Dr A.J. Danby, Lyndhurst GP, 22 March 1963
Cmnd. 2389, MOH report 1963 (July 1964), p. 8
' PRO MH 135/280: Roffey to Stevenson, 1 April 1957, Stevenson to Roffey, 1 October 1957, ECN Circular 306,
31 August 1959; PRO MH 153/256: MOH note, 'Group practice', March 1964, Brandes to Bourton, 15 June 1964
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Table VU. GP Practices and Group Practice Loans, England and Wales, 1959-64 (current
prices)
1959	 1960	 1961	 1962	 1963	 1964
GPL loan approvals	 40	 41	 63	 60	 95	 102
Amount approved	 £224,775 £181,300 £321,869 £294,775 £557,460 £687,500
Extra payments on old loans	 £8,700	 £29,100	 £34,200	 £20,127	 £51,230	 £44,000
Total	 £233,475 £210,400 £355,069 £315,087 £608,690 £731,500
Single GP practices	 6,119	 5,897	 5,598	 5,422	 5,208	 5,000
GPpartnerships	 13,535	 14,031	 14,590	 14,819	 15,114	 15,221
Partnerships as % of total 	 68.9	 70.4	 72.3	 73.3	 74.4	 75.3
Sources: Cmnd. 1086, MOH report 1959 (July 1960), p. 76,Cmnd. 1754, MOH report 1961 (July 1962), table A,
p. 187, table 8, p. 71, Cmnd 2062, MOH report 1962 (June 1963), p. 46, 1963, table 1, p. 62, table 8, p. 71, Cmnd.
2688, MOH report 1964 (July 1965), table I, p. 71, table 8, p. 82
Table IV. 2. GP Practices and Group Practice Loans, Scotland, 1959/60 - 1963/64 (current
prices)
1959/60	 1960/61	 1961/62	 1962/63	 1963/64
GPL loans approvals	 10	 11	 13	 6	 19
Amount paid out	 £20,000	 £20.875	 £37,100	 £25,350	 £69,665
Single GP practices 	 861	 796	 763	 718	 692
GPpartnerships	 1804	 1858	 1900	 1948	 1970
'merships as % of total	 67.7	 70.0	 71.3	 73.1	 74.0
Sources: Cmnd 983, SHD report 1959 (May 1960), p. 41; Cmnd. 1320, SHHD report 1960 (March 1961), p. 46;
Cmnd. 1703, SHHD report 1961 (May 1962), p. 45; Cmnd. 1996, SHHD report 1962 (June 1963), p. 44; Cmnd.
2359, SHHD report 1963 (June 1964), p. 43; Cmnd. 2700, SHHD report 1964 (September 1965), p. 47
However, enthusiasm for integrating GP practices with social workers, health
visitors and other welfare services was mounting, stimulated for instance by
preparations for the 1962 Hospital Plan, which forced the Government to consider
how hospital and LHA services interlocked with those of GPs. 2° Another example of
this trend was Dr Annis Gillie's 1963 report to the Central Health Services Council,
The field of work of the family doctor, which not only emphasised the importance of
group practice, and especially GP partnerships, but also 'adequately staffed and well
planned premises, daily course-load conferences between GPs and local authority
staff, and shared premises. The implications for health centres, though Gillie still
favoured group practices, was obvious.2 ' MOH established a working party to
20 PRO T 227/1336: MOH memorandum to CHSC, 'Future scope of general practice', June 1961; Hall, 'Health
centres', p. 299
21 PRO 1227/2145: Gillie Report. The field of work of the family doctor, October 1963
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consider the report, which would help add to the pressure for a 'new deal' for GPs
under Labour.22
PRO MH 153/247: Press release, working party on general practice, 20 February 1964
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'Body blow '. charging for the NHS
This was not the only Conservative re-orientation, for in 1952 the Government
introduced a one shilling per item prescription charge, powers for which had been
passed under Labour but never used. 23
 There was also a rise in the amount that
National Insurance payments - flat-rate impositions on all those in work,
supplemented by employers' contributions - were expected to raise for the NHS.
Total NHS contributions were increased from lOd (the rate since 1948) to is lOd a
week in Thorneycroft's April 1957 Budget. They were further increased, to 2s 4d, in
1958.24 Along with prescription charges, and charges for eye and dental treatment,
these rises constituted a move away from a redistributive NHS (see chart V12) -
though it should be noted that the scale of exemptions also increased over this period.
Chart VL2. NHS sources of finance, UK, 195 1-64
NHS finance: conthbutions and chare 1951-64
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Source: Webster, Services, II, p. 805
Webster, 'Consensus', p. 63; Helen Jones, 'Health', in R.M. Page & R. Silburn, British social welfare in the
twentieth century (Macmillan, London, 1999), p. 171
24 C. Webster, The health services since the war, vol. IL The NHS 1958-1979 (HMSO, London, 1996), pp. 51-2, 63
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Immediately after Al959 General Election, Treasury officials began to press
anew for increases in charges. 25
 Given Guillebaud's conclusions, however, Prime
Minister and Cabinet only agreed to make arrangements for new sources of revenue to
be 'further examined'. 26
 Even this involved a full-scale Ministerial battle. Chancellor
Heathcoat-Amory's argument was the Treasury's toughest yet. He wrote to Butler (in
charge during Macmillan's tour of Africa), arguing that contributions should be
pegged at one-third of all NHS funding, and should thus go up with the total.
Although he was careful to stick to demanding a 20% share for NI funding as an
immediate measure in the Social Services Committee, his desire to set the NHS on a
more contributory basis was clear. 27
 The Ministry of Health was unusually resilient in
opposing this. The Health Secretary, Derek Walker-Smith, attacked the regressive
nature of the NHS contribution, which 'bears most hardly on the lower-paid workers':
Who can claim that such an action was implicit - it certainly was not explicit - in the
Manifesto or the speeches of candidates7 .. . The proposal would come as a wholly
unexpected, and equally unwelcome, bolt from the blue... a lifeline to a floundering
Opposition and.., a body-blow to our supporters.28
The clash ended inconclusively, with Boyd-Carpenter as Minister of Pensions
arguing that if NI contributions went up, there would be pressure for pensions
uprating, as well as political unpopularity. 29
 On the other hand, the main consequence
of this battle was the most far-reaching Cabinet-level review of NHS funding there
had yet been: an official Committee was convened, with a brief drafted by Brooke as
Chief Secretary. This brief instructed the civil servants involved, led by Frank
Figgures from the Treasury, to try to find 'a satisfactory formula for automatic
25 PRO T 227/1119: Boys to Rossiter, 9 November 1959, Rossiter to Robertson, 'Estimates 1960/61', 6 November
1959
26 PRO CAB 128/33: Cabinet minutes, 10 November 1959
27 Amory to Butler, 11 January 1960: Webster, Services, II, p. 75; PRO CAB 134/2533: Heathcoat Amory
memorandum to SSC, 'The NHS Contribution', 15 January 1960
28 PRO CAB 134/2533: Walker-Smith memorandum to SSC, 'The NHS contribution', 19 January 1960
29 PRO CAB 134/2533: SSC minutes, 25 January 1960; PRO CAB 128/34: Cabinet minutes, 3 February, 9
February 1960
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determination of the shares in the total cost of the Service to be borne respectively by
general taxation, by a special impost and by direct charge'.3°
A prescient list of alternatives was provided by the Ministry, including more
pay beds in NHS hospitals, increasing prescription charges - though if there was to be
an increase in contributions they wanted to use part of that money to abolish these
charges - and increased charges for applications such as surgical prostheses. There
were some politically incendiary items on the list, including consultation charges to
see GPs, and hospital boarding charges. Technical advice was also taken from the
Inland Revenue on a hypothecated 'NHS tax'. However, the Ministry opposed an
automatic rise in contributions, or any arbitrary formula to peg contributions' share of
NHS funding. The Inland Revenue believed that hypothecation would be unworkable.
There was no point in changing to a flat-rate scheme, since this was effectively be the
same as NI. Alternatively, under a gradated scheme, with more tax due from the
higher paid, they would have to know the exact income of every worker in the
country, a huge and impractical rise in their workload.3'
In the end, these facts were decisive: the Treasury itself objected to an NHS
tax, which would effectively mean a large rise in the rate of income tax. 32 The
amounts actually involved in raising charges, or indeed imposing new ones, were also
not large enough to be worth the political opprobrium they would entail: a
consultation charge for seeing a GP, at 2s 6d, would only raise £3lm per annum. As
for more taxes, a flat rate tax would not be buoyant enough to rise with the national
income. Nor could any specific indirect tax, on tobacco for instance, raise enough to
cope with future demand. Hypothecation in any case was 'inherently unstable and
dangerous', effectively ending any government's flexibility to manage economic
demand. Ministers were presented with two choices: either impose an automatic
° PRO CAB 134/205 1: Brooke memorandum, 'Official committee on Health Service finance', 29 February 1960;
PRO CAB 134/2533: Kilmuir to Macmillan, 15 March 1960
' PRO CAB 134/205 1: MOH memorandum to Official Committee onNHS Finance: 'Charges', 22 March 1960,
Inland Revenue Memoranda to same, 'Health Service Tax', 23 March 1960, 3 May 1960
32 PRO T 227/1377: Hall to Padmore, 'Health Service Finance', 16 May 1960
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annual rise in NI, or impose a new NHS tax related to income. The latter, with all its
administrative complexity, was not recommended, but remained a possible option.33
Ministers were thus thrown back onto raising NHS contributions. This was
brought back before the Cabinet by Selwyn Lloyd, the new Chancellor, in October
1960, who proposed to raise £50m through an increase in the NHS Stamp to 3s 4d. It
took three meetings for the is increase he wanted, with its 'severe' political
repercussions, to be agreed. With a new system of gradated NI contributions being
brought in by the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance at the same time, many
Ministers were also worried at the impact on the low-paid. 34 Nor was this the end of
the increases, for Enoch Powell, now Health Minister, voluntarily offered a range of
increases in dental and eye charges. His proposal for £14m more in charges was
eagerly accepted by the Treasury. 35 Treasury officials expressed satisfaction at the
'greater acceptance of the principle of a means test'.36
When Powell came to announce these economies and contribution rises in the
Commons, they added up to an overall 'saving' of £65m over a full year. They
involved is on prescription charges, 5s on spectacles, and a 5s to lOs rise in charges
for dentures.37 The impact was just as Walker-Smith had predicted. Labour were
outraged, and one of the most bitter political confrontations for years developed in the
House. Labour, recently so divided over nuclear arms policy, was united by the 'cuts'.
George Brown, who opened Labour's censure debate, attacked Powell's willingness
to ignore 'any of us who grew up in circumstances where reliance upon a public
health provision was essential'; one sketch-writer described the scenes in the
Commons as the ugliest since Suez.38
PRO CAB 134/205 1: Draft report, Official Committee on NHS Finance, 16 August 1960
' PRO CAB 128/34: Cabinet minutes, 18, 25, 27 October 1960; Shepherd, Powell, p. 212
PRO T 227/1759: Powell to Selwyn Lloyd, 3 November 1960, Clarke to Hubback, 16 November 1960, Meeting
with Fraser, minutes, 17 November 1960
36 PRO T 227/1357: Collier to Robertson, 7 December 1960
"House of Commons debates, vol. 633, cols. 988-9: Powell statement, 1 February 1961
S. Heifer, Like the Roman: the lfe of Enoch Powell (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1998), p. 279; Timmins,
Five giants, p. 209
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Overall, although this furore put an end to further funding changes for the
moment, the drift of Conservative thinking was clear. 39 During the debates on health
charges, James Douglas submitted a paper to the party's Policy Committee on the
Future of the Social Services, arguing that the pharmaceutical and general medical
services ought to be put on an insurance basis, with the earmarking of contribution
funds as a first step. Although this was rejected in the Committee's interim report of
April 1961, other measures, such as more private provision within the NHS, were
not.40
 Although nervous of its unpopularity, some Conservative politicians were quite
ready to consider radical change. 41 Political considerations precluded raising more
revenue outside the tax system; hopes that the current cost of the NHS could be
stabilised or even reduced through 'planning' also played a part, allowing politicians
to hope that extra money would not be needed.
Lowe, 'The replanning of the Welfare State 1957-64', in Francis & Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Conservatives, pp.
268-9
° CPA CRD 2129/8: Douglas, Sewill memoranda to Policy Committee on the Future of the Social Services, 'The
philosophy of the social services', 3 February 1961, 'Social services and the distribution of income', 28 March
1961, and minutes, 15 March 1961; CPA ACP (61) 89: Interim report, April 1961
e.g. G. Howe, 'Reform of the social services', in D. Howell & 1. Raison (eds.), Principles in practice (CPC,
London, 1961), p72
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'Provocation of Nemesis '. the 1962 hospital plan
Despite this willingness to question the very basis of the NHS, in January 1962
Powell announced details of its most ambitious planning project yet: hospital plans for
ten to fifteen years ahead. This was a formidable undertaking. Even Powell lauded
'the opportunity to plan the hospital service on a scale not possible anywhere else,
certainly on this side of the Iron Curtain'. 42
 The Plan was certainly wide-ranging and
optimistic. It contained estimates, definite for the first five years and provisional
thereafter, for most aspects of the hospital service: bed totals, numbers of new
hospitals or redeveloped old sites that would be necessary to meet needs, and the staff
required.43
 The Plan contained three new elements: the length of the time-horizon, the
size of the programme, and the detail with which central government outlined its
objectives.
This project, extraordinary for the Tory tribune and arch free-marketer, seems
at odds with the whole thrust of policy since 1951 . At first sight, it also seems
strange that the Treasury would agree to a programme that from the outset implied
increased public expenditure. There had indeed been initial opposition to announcing
capital allocations for years ahead from the Treasury, one official concluding that 'if
the idea is to be specific about building 15 years in the future, it is a provocation of
Nemesis'.45
 To some extent this paradox can be resolved by noting the propitious
appointment to key posts, almost at the same time, of three highly able and dynamic
administrators: Powell himself, Bruce Fraser, the new Permanent Secretary recruited
from the Treasury, and George Godber, the Chief Medical Officer. 46 These men were
able to persuade the Treasury of their case, Fraser being especially valuable in this
respect. However, that cannot explain why they latched onto 'planning', a decision
which had more deep-seated roots.
42 Webster, Services, II, pp. 106-7
Cmnd 1604, Hospital plan for England and Wales (Januaiy 1962), PP
.
 3-5, 274-5; Cmnd 1602, Hospital plan for
Scotland (January 1962), pp. 17-18,20-22,32
Shepherd, Powell, p. 222
PRO MH 137/40: Marre to Robertson, 'Hospital capital deveIopment, I January 1960
4' Heifer, Powell, p. 267
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One of the driving forces behind the Plan was the extent of the need for
investment. Nearly half the hospitals inherited by the NHS dated back to before 1891.
Many of these, laid out at a time when the main reason for going to hospital was to
die, were not suited to modern medicine. 47
 The government had been boosting
hospital capital spending since 1955, though slowly at first (see table VL3). By the
time they issued the Plan, they had brought yearly spending at 1951 prices up from
£11.3m in 1954/55 to £28.6m in 1961/62. This was a reaction to political pressure: the
Guillebaud Report forced the Government's hand, recommending as it did £30m a
year spending on hospital capital development. It was in reaction to Guillebaud that
the Treasury was persuaded to undertake the first limited 'forward look', to 1958/59,
and the £24m that they agreed to for that year. 48
 Of course, this hardly matched
Guillebaud's recommended target, and took three years even to get to that level.
If the large capital sums involved in the new forward programme were to be
spent wisely, the Ministry recognised RHBs' need for more stability. These were the
only organisations that possessed the data and experience to undertake large capital
projects. Initial long-term forecasting work done by the Oxford and Wessex RHBs, in
which the Ministry had taken a close interest, had been the first example of what
could be achieved with this type of planning.49 The Ministry therefore relied on RHB
evidence when compiling the Plan: they were asked in January 1961 to send in returns
of how they thought their services would look after ten years. Boards, however, were
given only until the end of May to reply.5°
47 Cmnd 1604, Plan, p. 1
PRO 1 227/1168: Richards memorandum to Treasury investment committee, 'Investment review 1956', 9
November 1956
° G. Godber, The Health Services (Athione Press, London, 1975), pp. 34-5
° PRO MH 119/15: MO!-! Hospital Memorandum, Hospital building, 17 January 1961
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Table VL3. Hospital capital spending, GB, 195 1/52-1963/64
GB spending, Em
	 At 1951 prices, Em
	 % increase
1951/52	 10.8	 10.8	 0.9
1952/53	 11.1	 10.5	 -2.9
1953/54	 10.1	 9.3	 -11
1954/55	 12.5	 11.3	 21.4
1955/56	 13.1	 11.5	 1.3
1956/57	 15	 12.6	 9.4
1957/58	 20.1	 16.3	 29.7
1958/59	 22.5	 17.7	 8.8
1959/60	 24	 18.8	 6.2
1960/61	 27.2	 21.1	 12.3
1961/62	 37.9	 28.6	 35.2
1962/63	 42.2	 30.7	 7.3
1963/64	 61.2	 43.9	 42.9
Sources: Cmnd. 1604, Hospital plan for England and Wales, pp. 1-2
Cmnd. 1602, Hospital plan for Scotland, p. 12
DHSS, Health and personal social services statistics 1972 (HMSO, London, 1973), table 2.3, p. 18
Scottish Office, Scottish health statistics 1970 (HMSO, Edinburgh, 1972), table 10.3, p. 144
However, many of the returns were so varied that some officials thought them
unusable. The variation in bed numbers, Fraser admitted, were a 'good deal greater
than can be justified by known local differences': 'it is not clear how far we are
justified in going in saying they are wrong'. 5 ' Another civil servant minuted:
The quality of [RHB] work and presentation varies enormously. At the one end, the
Oxford R}IB have presented a reasonably compact document form which it is possible to
see their present resources, need, the reason for the need, the proposals for satisf'ing it
and the result of what is proposed. At the other, the East Anglian Board have produced a
largely unargued list of schemes and made no allowance for other than major schemes in
the second part of the programme.52
This was not due purely to shortcomings on behalf of RHBs. The art of relating bed
needs to regional populations was still in its infancy, as the Scottish Plan admitted:
'assessments of bed need cannot be made in the abstract, and they are difficult to
defme with accuracy... very little accurate information has as yet been taken out and
analysed'
One reason for the uncertainty was the immediate political motivation for
planning. The Plan was not necessarily expansionist at all, for behind the increases in
51 PRO MH 134/40: Fraser to Powell, 16 June 1961
52 PRO MI-I 137/42: Gedling memorandum, 'Long term proposals', 8 June 1961
Cmnd 1602, Plan for Scotland, p. 13
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the capital programme lay a bargain with the Treasury to restrain overall expenditure.
Powell, as we have seen, had already shown himself assiduous in seeking savings in
the Cabinet debates of 1960-61. When the search for cuts took on a new urgency in
the economic crisis of 1961, he was quite willing to accept a cap of 2.5% on increases
in total spending. Capital development, that instrument of 'true economy', would
continue, but current spending would have to be controlled. 54 Selwyn Lloyd was left
free to include Health in his limit on public expenditure rises, announced on 25 July
196 Powell's shadow, Kenneth Robinson, highlighted the inevitable consequences
in 1963. A 'maintenance squeeze' would simply replace 'capital starvation', since the
hospital service would receive new investment, but at the 'price' of current
spending.56
The idea behind this deal was the hope that capital expenditure would help to
save money. Although of course a larger hospital service would raise total running
costs, current expenditure per patient or per operation might be reduced through the
encouragement of modern medicine and management. Clarke outlinedks to Fraser in
November 1960. 'It will be very important if we find that capital expenditure... is
reasonably "economic", i.e. if it makes possible savings of running costs', he wrote:
'If on the other hand, we find that the capital expenditure involves increases in
running costs, this will act as a brake'. 57 Powell originally sold the idea to Butler with
the hope they could establish 'real financial control over both current and capital
spending'. 58
 Indeed, this was one of the reasons Powell was so ready to accept the
Treasury's overall spending limits. When he held the first of his meetings with
chairmen of RHBs in December 1960, part of Powell's brief to them was to work out
how new building would affect the future current costs of the NHS.59
' PRO T 227/1380: Powell to Selwyn Lloyd, 17 July 1961, Selwyn Lloyd to Powell, 19 July 1961; Bavin to
Robertson, 'Estimates 1962/63', 15 October 1961
House of Commons debates, vol. 645, col. 224: Selwyn Lloyd statement, 25 July 1961
House of Commons debates, vol. 677, cols. 441-2, 444: Robinson, NHS debate, 8 May 1963
"PRO MH 137/41: Clarke to Fraser, Hospital building', 29 November 1960
PRO MH 13 4/40: Powell to Butler, 20 December 1960
PRO MH 90/83: MOW RHB Chairmen meeting, minutes, 20 December 1960
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The Ministry's growing knowledge of actual RI-TB practice was a vital part of
this search for economy. As the estimates of beds needed for declining diseases such
as TB fell, the Ministry became increasingly confident that there were savings to be
made.6° It had also been working for years to systemise and encourage hospital
costing, and in 1961 concluded that 'costing investigation is well established as a
matter of routine with the majority of hospital authorities'. 6t
 But there was a large gap
between knowing how much services cost, and judging whether they ought to cost
that much. The Plowden Report itself had recognised this, concluding that 'an
improvement in the method of... making purposeful "forward looks" depends on
whether it is possible to measure the services provided by different units and to
express both the services and the cost of providing them in quantitative terms'. 62 Nor
did new information solve dilemmas as to whether some services should be developed
rather than others.
Increasing confidence, though not quite at the pitch reached at Education and
Housing, was being placed in 'scientific' techniques, especially as expressed in
industrialised building. The Ministry established its own Architects Branch, imitating
that at Education, in 1958.63 Civil servants worked with the DSIR's Building
Research Station on cost norms, hospital design and engineering systems. TM The BRS
circulated hospitals, conducting a survey as to how capital investment affected
running costs. The implication was clearly that they expected more modern plant to
allow more efficient use of resources. 65 The most potent expression of this ideology of
rationalisation was the Ministry's Building Notes, which were issued during 1961, as
60 D. Allen, Hospital planning: the development of the 1962 hospital plan (Pitman Medical, London, 1979), p. 54;
J. Alisop, 'Health: from seamless service to patchwork quilt', in D. Gladstone (ed.), British social welfare: past,
present andfirure (UCL Press, London, 1995), pp. 99-100, 105-6
61 PRO MH 13 7/67: MOH memorandum, Summaiy of action taken by hospital authorities on the Hospital Costing
Returns for year ended 31st March, 1961', (?1961); PRO T 227/1546: Hollens to Boys, 10 June 1%0
62 Cmnd 1432, Control, pp. 11-12
63 Webster, Services, H, p. 99
PRO MH 133/23 1: Tatton-Brown to Lea, 5 October 1959, BRS note, Hospital work at BRS', October 1959, Lea
to Tatton-Brown, 10 February 1960, MOW BRS meeting, minutes, 28 March 1960
65 PRO MH 123/232: Stone to HMC Chairmen, enclosing questionnaire, 31 December 1960
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work on the Plan progressed. 66
 Alongside work with the DSIR, the Ministry also
worked on cost targets for different buildings, comparing RHBs' performance with
that of Education, the armed services, and housing.67
Such work was by its very nature permissive. It did not direct change, but
rather set limits based on the habits hospitals had already formed. This placed
Whitehall at the mercy of events beyond its control. Even as central government put
out its requests for figures, in the winter of 1960-61, the Ministry was forced into
conflict with the Treasury over hospitals' estimates of rising current costs, which it
put at 9% a year. Clarke fulminated against their techniques, asking whether some of
the Hospital Management Committees had 'any really positive financial management
and control.' 68
 His anger was understandable. The Ministry was appealing to rising
building costs and wages to simply raise the limits in its draft Building Notes: hardly
the 'control of public expenditure' Clarke or Plowden had in mind. 69
 It was not just
technical judgements about costs that were affected by continuing uncertainty.
Calculating how new building would affect running costs was only at a theoretical
stage in l961-62.° The promises and claims being made at the time about savings
thus seem rash, at the very least.
This had short-term consequences for the whole programme, since the current
cost savings that had been hoped for were not achieved. Fraser had to inform Clarke
of this in the summer of 1963, fearful of the 'arbitrary beastliness' that would be
involved in trying to get within his allocated total. The Ministry was also hamstrung
when it searched for savings elsewhere in the programme, for it could not control the
local authority health and welfare budget, or directly influence running costs. Not
e.g. MOH, Hospital building note 4: accommodation for nursing staff (HMSO, London, September 1961);
MOH, Hospital building note 12: outpatient department (HMSO, London, December 1961)
67 PRO T 227/1741: Treasury memorandum to Gedling, 'Cost target - nurses homes', 16 September 1960,
Robinson to Douglas, 18 October 1960; Cmnd. 1602, Plan for Scotland, pp. 40-2
PRO T 227/1546: Clarke to Fraser, 'Hospital building costs', 31 January 1961
PRO T 227/1746: Aldridge to Douglas, 'Drail building note no. 2', 3 March 1961
70 PRO MH 123/232: Tatton-Brown to Amery, 25 April 1962; PRO MH 133/233: MOH divisional memorandum
22, 'Progression of building schemes', August 1962
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surprisingly, given the whole point of the exercise, Clarke was 'not sympathetic' to
changing their 1964/65 PESC allocations from the projected totals. 7 ' Accordingly, the
Treasury offered £4m more (nearly all the Ministry had wanted) for hospital running
costs in that year, but only provided hospital capital projects were reined back. 72
 This
was but the first of many delays to the Plan, which began to look hopelessly
optimistic.
As a means of gaining more resources for hospital building, and stimulating
the first profound thoughts about the future of the hospitals since 1948, the Hospital
Plan was a remarkable document. Unfortunately, it was inadequate as it stood. One
internal MOH memorandum is indeed quite frank about the 'absence of yardsticks for
measuring either what standard of service is reasonable or what quantity of resources
can reasonably be employed to provide any particular standard'. In this situation, it
was an understatement to admit that 'examination of the Estimates will not be an easy
task'. 73
 The Plan, although it contained a number of highly educated guesses, was still
guesswork, relying on incomplete technical work; and also on incomplete and
inadequate information.
' PRO T 227/1380: Fraser to Powell, 'Hospital running costs', 25 June 1963, Fraser/ Clarke meeting, minutes, 28
June 1963
PRO T 227/1380: Boyd-Carpenter to Powell, 30 July 1963, Powell to Boyd-Carpenter, 1 August 1963
PRO MH 137/46: MOH memorandum, 'Hospital running costs: handling of "forward look" estimates', April
1962
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'People who need care': local authority health and welfare plans, 1962-64.
There was also growing political pressure to increase spending on local health and
welfare services, for the late 1 950s and early 1 960s saw government's first advocacy
of 'care in the community'. This was partly a by-product of the hospital building
programme and the preoccupation with reducing hospital running costs, for if more of
the long-term sick and mentally ill could be moved out of hospital beds, those running
costs could be further reduced. Indeed, Health Ministers were not slow to recommend
local health and welfare plans as 'on economic as well as social grounds... the best -
and indeed, in the long run - the only method of containing hospital costs'. 74 Even
though more beds were planned for the mentally ill and geriatric patients in the
Hospital Plan, the hope was that much faster turnover rates in general hospitals, with
faster discharge, would allow their more efficient use.
Expert opinion outside government, however, had much more explicitly
expansionist aims for community care. The Younghusband Report, named after the
chair of the official Working Party that issued it, Eileen Younghusband, was crucial
here, since it recommended a large expansion in the number of social workers.
Younghusband had played a major role in putting social work 'on the map', both in
establishing the first social work course at the LSE and through the Family Welfare
Association.75
 Her report included the first comprehensive survey of such work,
conducting five field studies and taking evidence from 79 organisations. 76 She
recommended a two-tier profession, with graduates in specialist fields (such as
psychiatric social work) in general charge of case-loads, and holders of two-year
Social Work certificates dealing with lower-level physical care in the community. But
to train 5,500 of these general purpose social workers, with an existing workforce of
only 257, as Younghusband recommended, constituted a revolution that might cost
PRO T 227/1334: Walker-Smith to Boyle, 14 April 1960
K. Jones, Eileen Younghusband (Bedford Square Press, London, 1984), pp. 49-50, 56-7; J. Lewis, The voluntary
sector, the state and social work in Britain (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 1995), pp. 101, 1035, 111
76 ibid, pp. 73-4
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£4m a year, a large part of a relatively small budget. 77
 However, given that this would
be 'useful and popular' in Powell's words, the Government agreed the expansion.78
The Government was also confronted with the problem of an ageing
population, which would need increasing amounts of residential care. Indeed,
forecasts made in the early 1 960s were of a 26% rise in the number of over-65s
between 1960 and 1975. This would entail a rise in the small percentage of total
health spending going to welfare homes for the old (8% in 1960), as well as
increasing bed demands in hospitals for diseases associated with old age. 79
 By 1960-
61, the lists of the elderly waiting to get into such homes, and of capital projects
refused by government, were growing. When the Ministry began to consider the
savings that could be made through more residential care, in terms of hospital beds
vacated, the programme was allowed significantly to grow.8°
More spending on facilities for the mentally ill was also being demanded. The
Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental Illness, which reported in May
1957 recommended 'no more restriction of liberty or legal formality than is applied to
people who need care because of other types of illness'. 81
 New drugs and
psychological counselling techniques fostered confidence in treatment outside
residential institutions. 82
 The process of running down the resident population of the
mentally ill in NHS institutions had been going on since the mid-fifties (see table
V14). This, however, presented a problem for the Government, for the 'residential
hostels and homes.., training, occupational and social centres' which the Royal
PRO CAB 134/1982: Powell, Noble memorandum to Home Affairs Committee, 'Social workers and health
visitors', 15 July 1960; PRO CAB 134/1980: Home Affairs Committee, minutes, 22 July 1960
PRO MH 130/245: Powell to Butler, 21 July 1961, 22 September 1961; House of Commons debates, vol. 649,
cols. 1686-7, 1690-1: Second Reading debate, Health Visitors and Social Workers Training Bill, 24 November
1961
Paige & Jones, Welfare, table 1, p. 4, table 4, p. 13, table 13, p. 62
° PRO T 227/1168: Workman to Thorley, 31 August 1956; PRO 1227/1170: Boys to Rossiter, 8 January 1960
Cmnd 169, Report of the Royal Commission on the law relating to mental illness and mental deficiency (May
1957), pp. 3-4
$2 Helen Jones, Health and society in twentieth century Britain (Longmans, London, 1994), pp. 1423
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Commission thought should be provided by local authorities as a statutory duty would
be expensive. Out-patient care, and co-ordination between local authorities and
hospitals, would also have to be improved.83
Table VL4. Mental illness, resident population of NHS hospitals, GB, 1951-64
Resident population
1955	 146.9
1956	 145.6
1957	 143.2
1958	 142.8
1959	 139.1
1960	 136.2
1961	 135.4
1962	 133.8
1963	 127.6
1964	 128.7
Source: Paige & Jones, Welfare, table 15, p. 78
The Mental Health Bill of 1959 did not impose more statutory duties on local
authorities, since this would might incur unforeseen expenditure and would breach the
recently established principle of general grants for current spending. 8" The
Government preferred to secure new facilities for the mentally ill and mentally
handicapped through administrative means, and Circular 9/59, issued in May 1959,
outlined the range of new provision that was expected of councils. Later in 1959, local
authorities were asked to provide MOH with details of the services they would
provide. 85
 Some progress had already been made. Walker-Smith was able to cite
increasing expenditure on mental health in the debates on the Mental Health Bill: it
had risen from £2.3m in 1954/55 to £4.lm in 1958/59.86 This caused great strain on
local authority fmances, with the health and welfare component of the new block
grants outstripping the growth of other sectors.87
' Cmnd 169, Report, p. 19
' PRO 1227/1168: Thorneycroft to Walker-Smith, 23 December 1957
PRO MH 119/13: Circular 9/59, 4 May 1959; PRO MH 134/12: CCAJ MOH meeting, minutes, 17 November
1959, Dacey letter to County Councils, 2 December 1959
House of Commons debates, vol. 598, cols. 7 19-20: Walker-Smith, Mental Health Bill Second Reading debate,
26 January 1959
' K. Young & N. Rao, Local government in Britain since 1945 (Blackwell, Oxford, 1997), p. 132
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The new emphasis on these services caused tensions at the highest level of
government in 1959-60, as MOH took submissions from councils for building plans
from September 195988 The extent of need, after years of restrictions, was shown by
the scale of local authority bids, which totalled £23m, of which MOH was able to
provide just under £14m for 1960/61 approvals, most of the money actually being
spent in 196 1/62.89 The argument with the Treasury that led to this increase had two
consequences for local authority planning. The first was that the Treasury conceded
that MOH could spend at least the amount they had in 196 1/62 in 1962/63 and
1963/64, and agreed to applications up to half of this total for health and welfare
projects two years ahead. 9° It was also at this time that Treasury officials, hoping to
achieve more control over this sector of public spending, suggested it be re-defmed as
a 'major' programme, and thus brought under the five-year structure of PESC. MOH
would therefore have to ask councils for projections over that period.9'
Local authority associations had been arguing for a longer planning horizon
since the Royal Commission on Mental Health had reported.92
 Consultation was
begun in Circular 2/62, issued alongside the Hospital Plan, for officials had to fmd out
how well-founded were their assumptions on in-patient care, welfare homes for the
elderly, maternity beds, and mental health provision. The Circular called for two five-
year plans, along the lines of the Hospital Plan, covering not only loan approvals for
capital work but also staff numbers and running costs, along with building projects
ranked in order of priority. 93
 The White Paper detailing the returns was, therefore,
based on local plans and knowledge.
88 PRO MH 119/13: Circular 25/59, 15 September 1959
T 227/1336: Embling, MOH, to Bryars, Treasury, 'Local health and welfare services', 13 June 1961
9°PRO T227/1335: Robertson to Bavin, 30 March 1961
91 PRO MH 137/140: Emery to Williams and Dodds, 8 October 1959, Treasury to Departments, Public sector
investment', 29 October 1959; PRO T 227/1170: Boys to Bourton, 'Local health and welfare investment', 5
February 1960; PRO MH 137/40: Bourton to Emery, 9 February 1960
e.g. PRO MI-I 80/85: Dacey to Hedley, 'Mental illness: report of the Royal Commission', Report of CCA sub-
committee on the subject, 6 November 1957
PRO MH 119/13: Circular 2/62,23 February 1962
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Table VL5. LHA capital expenditure, selected categories, 1959-64, England and Wales
(current prices, £m)
1959/60	 1960/61	 1961/62	 1962/63	 1963/64
Residential accommodation	 5.5	 8.27	 9.03	 9.48	 9.98
Mental health
	
1.33	 2.75	 4.12	 2.5	 5.19
Ambulances	 0.72	 1.01	 0.74	 0.73	 0.81
Health centres and clinics	 1.04	 2.22	 1.46	 1.57	 2.41
Nurse arid midwife accommodation	 0.2	 0.25	 0.18	 0.25	 0.29
Other	 0.098	 0.068	 0.23	 0.15	 0.29
Total (incL other categories)	 9.03	 14.61	 16.03	 15.18	 19.32
Sources: MOH reports, 1961, table S, p. 233, 1963, table 35, p. 102, 1964, table 40, p. 112
Large increases in the numbers of health visitors, home helps, nurses and
residential accommodation for the elderly, as well as psychiatric and other social
workers, were proposed in the returns. Places in homes for the elderly in England and
Wales would rise from 90,448 to 132,923 by 1972, which, given replacement of old
buildings as well as building new ones, might cost over £1 OOm. Numbers of social
workers were to increase from 2,943 to 4,879, and home helps from 25,478 to 37,083.
Overall, training centres and hostels costing nearly £46m were to be built. 94 Even this
did not fulfil the hopes of some in the Ministry. One again, there were large
differences in the quality of provision proposed, which were not adequately explained
by the different numbers of elderly or sick in the locality. It had no means, however,
of understanding why this should be so, nor of forcing councils to act. The White
Paper urged councils to step up their rate of growth, which was 'not fast enough', but
they were in no sense required to do this. 95 In Fraser's words, the local authority
'plan' was 'a signpost rather than a map'.96
Cmnd 1973, Health and welfare: the development of community care (April 1963), tables 1(a), 1(c), II, IV, pp.
366-7
ibid, pp. 5, 7-8, 14-2 1, 24
PRO MH 134/40: Fraser to Powell, 12 April 1961
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Table VL6. LI-IA current expenditure, selected categories, England and Wales, 1950/51 and
1959/60 to 1963/64 (current prices, £m)
1950/51 1959/60 1960/61	 1961/62 1962/63 1963/64
Health centers	 0.05	 0.07	 0.07	 0.10	 0.12	 0.12
Mothers and children
	
8.58	 9.45	 9.34	 10.28	 10.78	 11.61
Health visitors	 2.43	 4.29	 4.44	 4.89	 5.18	 5.72
Home nurses	 3.83	 7.82	 7.88	 8.47	 8.83	 9.94
Domestic help	 3.12	 8.86	 9.49	 10.83	 11.32	 12.72
Mental health
	 1.59	 4.09	 4.96	 6.32	 7.94	 9.28
Total (incL other categories) 	 34.28	 63.70	 66.68	 75.67	 80.17	 88.32
Sources: MON reports, 1961, table S, p. 233, 1963, table 35, p. 102, 1964, table 40, p. 112
Table VI. 7. LHA total expenditure, selected categories, Scotland, 1959/60-1963/64 (current
prices, £000s)
1959/60	 1960/61	 1961/62	 1962/63	 1963/64
Health centres	 11	 14	 15	 34	 23
Mothers and children	 847	 798	 834	 943	 960
Health visitors	 552	 537	 583	 629	 727
Home nurses	 1,070	 1,028	 1,080	 1,151	 1,298
Ambulances	 1,089	 1,286	 1,331	 1,356	 1,501
Mental health
	 210	 249	 291	 313	 359
Total (incL other categories) 	 4,149	 4,193	 4,463	 4,890	 5,070
Sources: SHHD reports, 1962, p. 38, 1963, p. 32, 1964, p. 37; Scottish health statistics, 1970, tables 10.5, 10.8, pp.
145-6, 1973, table 10.8, p. 167
Table VI.8. Local authority health and welfare services, 1967: projection and reality, England
and Wales (staff nos. are whole-time equivalents)
Service	 CmntL 1973 plan Reality Difference from plan
Health visitors	 6,698	 5,549	 -17.2%
Home nurses	 32,250	 31,989	 -0.8%
Home helps	 8,854	 8,572	 -3.2%
Midwives	 6,232	 5,118	 -17.9%
Social workers	 4,295	 4,909	 +14.3%
Residential places, 65+s
	 117,621	 118,194	 +0.5%
'Mentally subnormal', training places, <16s
	 21,828	 18,545	 -15.0%
'Mentally subnormal', training places, >16s
	
22,847	 20,702	 -9.4%
Sources: Cmnd. 1973, Health and welfare, tables I (a)-(c), pp. 366-7; Cmnd. 3702, MON report 1967, tables 39,
43-5, 48, pp. 124-5, 129, tables 47, 51, 53, pp. 129, 132, 137
The problem was that central government did not have perfect knowledge of
local needs. The Ministry was confident that the actual numbers of handicapped and
mentally ill could be predicted. It was much less sure of the need for ambulance
stations, hostels for the mentally ill, and home care for the elderly: demand for these
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was dependent on the uncertain course of change in the hospital service. 97
 In the case
of mental health provision, it was clear that there was really no way of judging the
impact of new treatments that could help sufferers live longer. 98
 'It is doubtful', one
paper on this problem concluded, 'whether even at the end of ten years' experience of
planning any standard pattern... will have emerged'. Patient numbers per head of
population appear to have been reached simply by taking the average provision over
the whole country.99
 It was clear that 'further research and study [was]... required on
a large number of points', which had not even begun by the time the White Paper was
actually issued.'°°
Preparations for a five-year programme did stimulate spending on these
services. By summer 1962 spending on local health and welfare was forecast to rise
from £107.5m to £132.5m per annum between 1961/62 and 1965/66. Large increases
in most types of service are evident in tables Vi5 - Vi 7101 This did not mean,
however, that the targets envisaged in the White Paper had been met. In fact, current
spending, increasing at 4% per annum, was rising at only half the rate foreseen for
England and Wales in Cmnd. 1973. The results of this are clear from table Vi 8. As
for capital expenditure, the White Paper had projected over £30m per annum; in fact,
even though notional spending went up to over £20m, local authorities tended to lag
behind the theoretical allocation.' 02
 Local authority 'planning' had instilled a longer-
term view of capital projects, and a better sense of priorities: but as for its actual
scope and quality, including its relationship to the hospital service, the situation was
just as uncertain as ever.
PRO MH 134/40: Dodds to Russell-Smith, 'White Paper on the future of the hospital service: local authority
aspecr, 9 February 1961, O'Brien to Rayner, 6 June 1961; Webster, Services, II, pp. 125-6
PRO MH 134/20: Draft White Paper, 'Local authority long term plans, mental health services', December 1962
PRO MH 134/20: MOH memorandum, 'Local authority long term plans: mental health services', (?August)
1962
'°° PRO MH 154/69: Russell-Smith to Fraser, 'Local authority health and welfare services', 9 May 1963
'°' PRO 1227/1380: Douglas to Carswell, 'PESC: Health Departments' forecasts to 1966/67', 11 May 1962
l02 Webster, Services, II, p. 127
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Labour 's NHS: Expenditure and provision.
As they promised, Labour did spend more on the NHS, and at a faster rate. 103
 The
average annual growth rate of resources was 2.46% between 1951 and 1964; under
Labour it was 5.67% (see charts VL3-VL4). In comparison with the other social
services - for instance education (see table IV. 5) and housing (see table V 2) the NHS
came closest to reaching its National Plan projections - though local health and
welfare spending was clearly markedly below target (see table V19). One reason for
this relative protection was the accelerating capital and current budget Labour
inherited, for RI-IBS, with the more certain financial environment, were pressing
ahead with expenditure more quickly than expected. On taking office Robinson had to
appeal for an extra £4-Sm a year from 1966/67, as well as an immediate £4m to meet
hospitals' 1964/65 overspending. Callaghan, under pressure from the rest of the
Cabinet, was forced to agree the former, though able to defer the latter decision.'°4
However, even though in early 1965 the Chancellor secured a Cabinet promise (in
Robinson's absence) of limiting all public expenditure plans to 4.5% annual growth,
he eventually had to concede an immediate £5m on hospitals, bringing the 1965/66
capital programme to £68m.'°5
The Ministry soon wanted more. Given that RHBs were going ahead faster
than they had thought possible, they also demanand secured) a rescheduling of the
programme, to bring forward £Sm of the spending apportioned to 1968/69 and
1969/70 to 1966/67 and 1967/68.106 However, MOH had to accept both the National
Plan's basic spending increase of 22.5% by 1970, and the capital standstills of July
103 For Labour's pledges e.g. Labour Party, Members one of another (Labour Party, London, 1959), passim; idem,
Let's go with Labour (October 1964), pp. 15-16
'° PRO 1227/1382: Robinson, Ross to Callaghan, 22 October 1964; PRO CAB 129/119: Callaghan memorandum
to Cabinet, 'Queen's speech: public expenditure, 28 October 1964; PRO CAB 128/39: Cabinet minutes, 28
October 1964
PRO CAB 128/39: Cabinet minutes, 28 January 1965; PRO T 227/1317: Callaghan to Robinson, 8 February
1965; PRO T 227/1382: Callaghan to Robinson, 9 February 1965, Robinson to Callaghan, 18 February 1965
106 PRO 1227/1317: Adams to Rampton, 'Hospital building programme', 13 May 1965
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1965 and 1966, though these latter limits did not apply to hospitals)° 7 Though MOH
did manage to secure nearly Lim extra for running costs in their 1966/67 programme,
by now forecast spending was so seriously out of line with the Ministry's demands
that Robinson wrote a special appeal to Callaghan.'° 8 In this he pointed to 'equipment
utterly inadequate for modern practice', 'public and professional criticism of the
services', the rising population and the fact that public spending had been rising more
slowly on the NHS than most other services. He also included an alarming new
Ministry estimate: £6bn would be needed to provide new, modern District General
Hospitals for the whole of Britain, entailing annual capital spending of £17O,r
double the present budget.'°9
Table VI.9. National Plan spending increass and reality, GB, 1964/65-69/70 (1965 prices)
L')
1964/65 1969/70p(anned 1969/70 real Projected % Real %
expenditure expenditure	 expenditure	 increase	 increase
Hospitals (current)
Hospitals (capital)
Executive Council services
Welfare foods
LHA health
LHA welfare
NHS total
657	 751
72	 115
314	 374
41	 45
125	 166
69	 100
1238	 1598
	
821.96	 14.31
	
104.67	 59.72
	
379.74	 19.11
	
32.46	 9.76
	
137.13	 32.80
	
79.52	 44.93
	
1583.87	 29.08
25.11
45.38
20.94
-20.84
9.70
15.24
27.94
Sources: Cmnd 2764, Plan, table 20.2, P. 185; DHSS, Health and personal social security statistics (HMSO,
1973), table 2.1, p.17
107 PRO T 227/2264: Robinson to Callaghan, 21 July 1965; PRO MH 119/19: MOE! Circular 20/65, 20 September
1965; PRO MH 119/21: Circular 4/66, 14 February 1966
'° PRO MH 166/339: Adams to Mottershead, Hospital revenue estimates 1966/67', 11 February 1966
109 PRO 1227/2818: Robinson to Callaghan, 22 June 1966
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Charts VL3, VJ.4. NHS spending, UK, 195 1-70
NHS spending, United Kingdom, 1951-70
Annual increases tolal MIS spending, 1951-70
Inn
Source: Webster, Services, II, pp. 802-3
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This was out of the question in 1966-67. Reductions to meet government
spending targets were much more likely, and Cabinet asked Robinson to re-assess
staffing needs, as a start. 0
 Part of the reason for the loss of patience inside the
Treasury was that the NHS current costs index, which the Government used to re-
value its spending projections year by year, showed no signs of slowing its gradual
climb. Capital spending was not bringing down current costs to the extent that they
had been promised. Robinson's promise to review staff needs, therefore, was only
the first stage of a new set of restraints. Following devaluation, Jenkins sought and
obtained programme cuts of £59m for 1968/69 and £57m for 1969/70. Although
hospitals' capital spending was safeguarded for political reasons, local authority
health and welfare was cut back, although only slightly at first. 112
 The Treasury
secured another LiOm in current spending reductions for 1968/69, though their
attempts to reduce capital spending further were frustrated.113
This was to be the limit of their success. Returning to the attack in July 1969,
Jenkins demanded a reduction in the 1970/71 civil programme of £160m; his
'medium' estimate of the contribution made by health and welfare was £44m.' 14 £9m
would come from delays in the number of hospital building starts. 115 Crossman, by
now Secretary of State for Social Services, put up a hard fight against cuts in the
hospital programme, and eventually won. Reductions for 1970/71 were whittled down
"°	 CAB 129/131: Callaghan memoranda to Cabinet, 'Public expenditure: areas of choice', 15, 21 June 1967,
'Public expenditure: proposed adjustments', 7 July 1967; PRO CAB 128/42: Cabinet minutes, 12,20 July 1967
' PRO T 227/2231: Baldwin to Anson, 14 July 1966, Anson to Aldridge, 18 July 1966; PRO T 227/2553: Brough
to Langdon, 'Hospital capital expenditure 1967/68', 13 October 1967
112 PRO CAB 129/135: Jenkins memorandum to Cabinet, 'Public expenditure, post-devaluation measures', 3
January 1968; PRO CAB 128/43: Cabinet minutes, 5 January 1968
h13 PRO CAB 134/3282: SSC minutes, 20 June, 4 July, 9 July 1968; PRO CAB 134/3201: SEP minutes, 15 July
1968
" PRO CAB 129/142: Jenkins memorandum to Cabinet, 'Public expenditure, distribution of reductions in
1970/7 1', 4 July 1969; PRO CAB 128/44: Cabinet minutes, 3 July 1969
" PRO CAB 129/143: Jenkins memorandum to Cabinet, 'Public expenditure 1970/71', 15 July 1969
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to only £19m, with no delays in hospital building at all." 6
 In March 1970 Crossman
told Jenkins that he would now instruct his officials to prepare 'realistic' PESC
estimates for 1972/73. He showed the Chancellor a long list of long-standing defects
and unlavourable comparisons with the rest of the industrialised world, and refused to
co-operate with that year's preliminary PESC exercise." 7
 The hospital programme at
least had escaped the worst of the cuts, and NHS spending was likely to continue
rising.
Table VI 10. Group practice loans and GPFC expenditure, GB, 1964-70 (Em, current prices)
1964/65	 1965/66	 1966/67	 196 7/68	 1968/69	 1969/70
GP loans	 0.776	 0.8 14
GPFC	 0.908	 1.645	 2.194	 1.412
Sources: Cmnd. 3326, Ministry of Health report for 1966 (July 1967), appendix 1, table 9, p. 86; Cmnd. 3702,
Ministry of Health report for 1967 (July 1968), appendix 1, table 9, p. 88; Cmnd. 4100, Annual report of the DHSS
for 1968 (July 1969), p. 4; Cmnd. 4462, Annual report of the DHSS for 1969 (September 1970), p. 7; Cmnd. 5035,
Annual report of the DHSS for 1971 (July 1972), p. 8; GPFC report for 1967/68 (December 1968), p. 20, GPFC
report for1969/70 (July 1970), p. 13
Quite apart from more spending, there was a reversal of Conservative health
centre policy, which Robinson promised when he wrote to GPs introducing himself as
Health Minister. 8
 GPs successfully insisted on the creation of a General Practice
Finance Corporation, agreed to by the Government in its first pay negotiations with
the BMA in early 1965. This would provide low-interest loans, guaranteed by the
Treasury, for the purchase of land and buildings. 119 The GPFC, which began
operating in 1967, represented a major step forward in funding the development of
group practice, as is clear from table VI. 10. 78% of doctors were in group practice by
1969.120
CAB 128/44: Cabinet minutes, 17, 24, 29 July 1969; cf. RCD, 29 July 1969: Crossman, Diary, 1977 edn.,
III, p. 600; Cmnd. 4234, Public expenditure 1968/69 to 1973/74 (December 1969), table 1.4, p. 16
" PRO PREM 13/3273: Jenkins to Crossman, 20 March 1970
PRO MH 119/19: Robinson to GPs, 1 January 1965
"9 Cmnd. 3326, MOH report 1966 (July 1967), pp. 8-9; PRO MH 119/23: Executive Council note, 'General
medical services: GPFC', April 1967; G. Forsyth, Doctors and state medicine: a study of the British Health
Service (2 edn., Pitman Medical, London, 1973), pp. 54-6
2O Forsyth, Doctors, p.208; Scottish health statistics 1971 (HMSO, Edinburgh, 1971), table 6.1, p. 75
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Table VI.ii. Health centre spending, GB, 1964-70 (tm, current prices)
1964/65	 1965/66	 1966/67	 1967/68	 1968/69	 1969/70
E&W	 130	 188	 216	 345	 835	 881
Scotland	 24	 29	 36	 53	 77	 96
GB	 154	 217	 252	 398	 902	 977
Sources: Digest of health statistics (HMSO, London, 1971), table 3.8, p. 13; Scottish health statistics, 1971, table
10.5, p. 145
Health centre building was delayed by the July 1965 'standstill', though
attachment of local authority staff to GPs was encouraged.' 2 ' The main breakthrough
came after the standstill, when Executive Councils were instructed to start paying the
local authorities accommodation and rates, lifting this burden from GPs. This was in
addition to the help that Robinson had promised doctors on ancillary staff.' 22 It was
also followed up with a Circular from the Ministry exhorting all concerned to build
more such centres.' 23
 This, along with more spending (see table Viii), achieved a
major expansion. By May 1970, even though only 131 were fully operational, 79
more were being built, and a further 74 had been approved. 124
 By 1970, even though
only four per cent of GPs worked in health centres, they were at last making
progress. 125
121 Webster, Services, II, p. 268
122 PRO MH 119/23: Executive Council note, 'General medical services: revised financial arrangements for
doctors practising at health centres', April 1967, Executive Council letter, 24 April 1967
123 PRO MH 119/23: Circular 7/67, 21 April 1967
124 Cmnd. 4462, DHSS ReportI969 (September 1970), p. 20
125 Forsyth, Doctors, p. 209
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'The greatest return': Labour 's review ofpriorities.
Labour was committed to a fundamental review of the Hospital Plan. However, the
sheer amount of building already authorised forced Robinson to admit that 'there is
little in practical terms that he can do at this stage to alter substantially the pattern of
projects envisaged under the Hospital Plan for the next few years'. 126
 Reform would
therefore be a piecemeal process, with Ministers deciding which projects to put off, to
stay within budget. The old barriers still stood in the way of revolutionary change: the
lack of information, uncertainty over future needs, and doubt whether RHBs would
co-operate without substantial extra investment. Although Robinson wanted new
investigations into bed needs, and study of services at every hospital to help decide on
need, there was neither the time, nor the machinery, to undertake such work.'27
During the 1964-65 review, several potentially useful policy-making
instruments were therefore jettisoned. One was a proposal to integrate local health and
welfare planning with the hospital programme, and invite the bodies responsible for
both to write joint submissions. Specific dates for each project were also
abandoned.' 28
 In the end, the weaker formula, 'schemes which it is hoped to start
within the period up to 1969/70', was adopted.' 29 Little change was also envisaged in
Scotland, the review for which was published on exactly the same, more cautious, five
year basis, noting that within two years of the 1962 Plans two Scottish RHBs had
been forced radically to alter their priorities.' 30 However, some important technical
work was done during the preparation of the revised plans. A number of RHBs - for
instance Oxford - took the opportunity to work out ways of prolonging the life of
some wards and hospitals. Since they would have to remain in service longer than
'	 MH 166/320: Robinson to France, 11 November 1964; France to Robinson, 13 January 1965
127 PRO MH 166/320: Gedling meeting with Robinson, minutes, 13 November 1964, Cornish to Gedling, 'Notes
for review of a hospital plan: standards of hospital provision', 30 November 1964
128 PRO MH 166/320: Gedling to Marre, 'Review of the hospital plan', 7 December 1964, Marre to France, 11
December 1964, Robinson meeting with officials, minutes, 29 January 1965
129 e.g. in Newcastle: Cmnd. 3000, Revision of the hospital plan for England and Wales (May 1966), p. 15
' 30 Cmnd. 2877, Review of the hosp ital plan for Scotland (February 1966), passim
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previously thought, this was unavoidable.' 3 ' The Ministry also tried further to refine
estimates of the current spending implications of investment.'32
As Robinson told Cabinet, the new plan was more 'realistic and flexible' than
the last, for instance not actually mentioning overall spending totals. Although the
number of totally new hospitals for 1966-76 was little different from those promised
for 1961-71 - the number had increased from 90 to 93 - many fewer extensions and
reconstructions (59 instead of 134) were promised.' 33 However, the philosophical
superstructure - large new District General Hospitals, long-term budgeting -
remained. The new 'plan' was much more like a review of priorities, and less like a
real break with the past, than Ministers pretended.'34
However, hospital planning did not simply end with the publication of revised
programmes. Ongoing control projects were just as important. One reason for this was
the setting up of a Health Programme Committee, with representatives from DEA,
Treasury and MOH, in June 1966.' This carried further DEA work on 'very long
term' demands for health, looking as far ahead as the year 2000.136 The HPC was
asked to 'keep under review.., the health and welfare services.., so... as to secure
from the resources available the greatest return'. 137 This often provided the forum for
set-piece battles between MOH and the Treasury. In particular, health officials
UI PRO MH 159/5: CHSC minutes, 11 January 1966
132	 MH 170/80: Moyes to Dobbin, Newcastle RHB, Review of the hospital plan: revenue consequences', 4
February 1966, Dobbin to Moyes, 'Review of the hospital plan: revenue consequences', 9 February 1966
'"PRO CAB 129/125: Robinson memorandum to Cabinet, 'Hospital building programme', 17 May 1966; PRO
PREM 13/2252: Robinson to Wilson, 'Hospital building', 11 May 1966
'' Cmnd 3000, Revision, pp. 2-5
'"PRO T 227/2398: Armstrong to France, 10 May 1966, France to Armstrong, 17 May 1966, Armstrong to
France, 17 June 1966
136 PRO EW 25/294: VLT Health sub-committee, minutes, 2 June 1966
'' PRO T 227/2398: Holmans to Anson, 'Health programme committee', 17 June 1966
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objected to input-output budgeting, arguing that it 'would not be appropriate to the
health service and... of no practical value in influencing decisions'.'38
Despite this, priority setting within the NHS had improved. For instance, other
HPC members forced MOH to produce estimates of the demand for medical work per
patient, broken down by specialties, which showed on the one hand how expensive
modem medicine was becoming, but on the other how much more quickly patients
could be discharged.' 39 Statistical analysis was conducted on the costs of demographic
change, as against qualitative improvements.' 40 Following criticism of the Ministry's
usual statistics, based on the number of 'beds', experimentation began with more
useful yardsticks, for instance a division of the medical specialties into categories,
which were then analysed by length of stay, cost per patient, and trends in numbers
treated.' 4 ' Some of this work had wide implications: one of the HPC's findings, that
the administrative structure of the NHS was inadequate for coping with such tasks,
was to become politically important.'42
The process of allocating capital spending was also strengthened. Up to 1967,
the Ministry asked for firm programmes from each RHB for the following year, along
with spending estimates for the next two years. RHBs' continued complaints that this
was not certain enough, and requests to be allowed to negotiate with central
government up to five years ahead, combined with the large size of this programme to
put a new system of control on the agenda. This was termed 'control by starts'.143
Instead of allocating annual budgets on the basis of work done every year, the
Ministry was now only to take account of the projects that were begun in that year.
This might seem a transfer of power from the Ministry to the Boards. But by making
e.g. PRO Mi-i 166/304: MOH memorandum, Health Programme Committee: note by the Treasury', 12 October
1966; PRO T 227/2398: Williams to Rampton, 14 October 1966, HPC, minutes, 17 October 1966
' PRO MH 166/304: MOH memorandum to HPC, 'Productivity in the hospital service', 28 October 1966
'°	 T 227/2398: Holmans to Rampton, 24 January 1967
'' PRO T 227/2399: Rampton memorandum to HPC, 'Hospitals: the need for information, May 1967
142 PRO T 227/2369: MOHI DEAl Treasury meeting, minutes, 12 October 1967
PRO 1 227/1382: Forthergill to Hodges. 'Control of NHS expenditure', 16 November 1964; PRO T 227/2231:
MOH/ Treasury meeting, minutes, 1 February 1966
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RHBs responsible for their spending, government was hoping to speed up the
completion of individual schemes, as Boards could use savings on other projects.
Lists of all projects over £75,000 were to be submitted, for four years ahead. RI-lBs
would have to be careful to plan yearly costs of each project, for once building
started, only the 'natural' rate of spending every year would be tolerated.'
PESC's costed options, and the Social Service Committee's supposed
oversight role in deciding between priorities, had less of an impact in this field. That
health escaped rather lightly was due to Robinson's blank refusal to conduct any
exercise in 'choice': 'the service must do its best to provide universally the
infrastructure for whatever procedures are medically feasible and desirable', he told
Stewart.' 45
 But the very fact that such ideas were aired demonstrates Labour's turn
away from universally promising 'more', and towards an attempt to assess the returns
to spending: in hospital building, for example, this was made more pressing by the
levelling-off of the programme in the late 1 960s (see chart VL 5). Even though the
results were small in terms of actual spending reductions, official studies were also
put in hand on manpower needs, and on comparative studies of spending in different
social spending areas.' 46 These were followed by the Treasury's own investigation
into priorities within health and welfare, which went on through 1969. It was
bolstered by a series of long-term forecasts on the demand for health care. 147
' PRO MR 119/23: Hospital Memorandum, Control of capital investment', September 1967
' PRO BN 72/129: Robinson to Stewart, 20 February 1968; PRO CAB 134/3282: Robinson memorandum to
SSC, 'Development of the social services: MOH services', 22 March 1968
146 PRO CAB 134/3282: Crossman memorandum to SSC, 'Development of the social services: areas of choice', 27
March 1968, SSC minutes, 30 March 1968
PRO T 227/2970: Widdup to Langdon, 'Policy choices in health and welfare', 10 January 1969, Treasury
meeting, 'Priorities in the NHS', minutes, 15 March 1969
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Chart VL5. Hospital capital expenditure, GB, 1964-70
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Sources: Digest of health statistics, table 2.2, p. 7, Scottish Health Statistics 1971, table 10.3, p. 144
Similar developments were apparent in local government. The revision of
community care pians the Government published in June 1966 was also more of a
'rolling forward' of existing plans than a full review. This had been promised in the
community care White Paper, and had in fact been launched in the last months of the
Conservative administration.' 48
 Although not strictly comparable, as they are for
slightly different periods, the figures in table VI. 12 demonstrate how little English and
Welsh LHAs' projections had altered since 1963. Although most of the programmes
were similar to those in Cmnd. 1973, the demand for staff, especially for social
workers, was still growing. The same problems of control also remained. Central
standards could not be settled without much more experience of planning, and much
more research; Ministry manpower could not cope with judging services in each and
every local area.149
148 PRO MH 119/19: Circular 14/65, 30 July 1964
'' PRO MH 156/75: MOH officials' meeting, minutes, 7 January 1966
299
Health
Table VLJ2. Selected LHA services, England and Wales, projections for early 1970s
Cmnd. 1973 target for 	 CmrnL 3022 target for
1972	 1970/71
Homes for the elderly (No. premises)	 2,784	 2,819
'Mentally subnormal' training centres 	 907	 892
Mentally ill workshops 	 103	 88
Mentally ill hostels	 211	 189
Health visitors (Whole-time equivalents)	 7,607	 7,936
Home helps	 37,083
	
39,091
Midwives	 6,509
	
6,352
Social workers	 4.879	 5,718
Sources: Cmnd. 1973, Health and welfare, tables I (a)-(c), II, pp. 366-7; Cmnd. 3022, Health and welfare:
community care plans in England and Wales, revision to 1975/76 (June 1966), tables I (a)-(c), II, pp. 412-13
On the other hand, detailed monitoring and control was strengthened. Armed
with new information about individual councils, MOH started 'follow-ups', working
with their Regional Officers and intervening when services seemed either too sparse
or The system was further refined after the publication of Cmnd.
3022, with the 'worst' ten councils in every region picked out as candidates for
investigation.' 5 ' There were other parallels with hospital planning. From 1968/69,
capital budgets were allotted on a similar basis to 'control by starts', with one 'firm'
year and the next three 'prospective' years' budgets relayed to councils every year.
This was intended to assist the separation of overall programme planning from the
detailed work of planning the next year's actual buildings.' 52 As in education, such
increased monitoring would be matched by more freedom for councils to spend more
on their priority sectors within an overall ceiling - though for now Crossman wanted
social work kept under direct Ministerial control, to encourage its expansion.'53
150 PRO MR 156/74: Dodds memorandum, 'First revision of the local authorities' plans for their health and welfare
services, 1 August 1964, Principal Regional Officer's submission, 'First revision of local health authorities' ten
year plan, Newcastle', 1 November 1964
PRO MH 156175: Marre to Boys, 16 May 1966, Manchester office to Thorn, 22 June 1966
152 PRO MH 119/23-4: Circulars 10/67, 19/68, 22 May 1967, 13 May 1968
153 PRO 1227/3118: Crossman to Crosland, 2 June 1970, Crosland to Crossman, 8 June 1970
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'Direct breach'? Labour, charges and pay beds.
Labour did carry out its pledges, at least initially, on prescription charges. One of
Robinson's very first acts on becoming Health Minister was to ask Callaghan for
authority to abolish these charges, costing about £22m a year for the whole of Britain,
while maintaining other charges for NHS services for the time being.'54
Consequently, Callaghan attempted to delay abolition, rather than oppose it
altogether, at least for that Parliamentary Session.' 55 Wilson and Brown promoted a
compromise solution that involved an immediate announcement that prescription
charges would be abolished with effect from 1 April 1965.156 However, following
more pressure from Robinson, this date was brought forward to 1 February.'57
Another element of Conservative 're-orientation' had been reversed. The contribution
of charges to the NHS dropped during the first few years of the Wilson Government
(see chart VI. 6).
As the economic situation worsened, Robinson was forced to fight an
increasingly desperate battle against the re-imposition of prescription charges. His
argument was that a measure 'unlikely to exceed £55m gross, a figure which
exemptions could reduce by a half or more' was not worth the political opprobrium it
entailed. 'The Opposition', he wrote, 'would welcome restoration of the prescription
charges... as striking a blow for the Tory concept of selectivity in social services....
Our own Party would not greet an increase in NHS contribution with any enthusiasm,
PRO T 227/2285: Robinson to Callaghan, 19 October 1964; PRO 1227/1382: Ross to Callaghan, 22 October
1964
PRO CAB 129/119: Callaghan memorandum to Cabinet, 'Queen's speech: public expenditure', 28 October
1964; PRO CAB 128/39: Cabinet minutes, 28 October 1964
156 PRO PREM 13/2805: Brown to Wilson, 12 November 1964; PRO 1227/2285: Petch to Painter, 'Prescription
charges', 10 November 1964, Callaghan to Robinson, 13 November 1964, Robinson to Callaghan, 16 November
1964
' 51 PR0 CAB 134/2534: Robinson, Ross memorandum to SSC, 'Abolition of prescription charges', 17 November
1964, SSC minutes, 19 November 1964; PRO T 227/2285: Callaghan to Robinson, 17 November 1964; House of
Commons debates, vol. 704, col. 581: Robinson statement, Prescription charges, 17 December 1964
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and have usually described it as a Poll Tax'.' 58
 The Chancellor did succeed in
reimposing the 2s 6d prescription charge, though on a more selective basis than the
Conservative scheme. Those on Supplementary Benefit were to be exempted, for
instance.159
Charges incensed Labour MPs, 150 of whom petitioned Wilson about the
'direct breach of repeated pledges'.' 6° At the 1968 Party Conference, a motion was
passed against the platform demanding the 'immediate withdrawal' of charging.'6'
Crossman felt similarly, especially after he had borne the brunt of his colleagues'
anger after inadvertently announcing a rise in lens and denture charges during a local
election campaign that Labour lost badly, part of the his 'bargain' with the DES to
release more money for education.' 62
 He made clear in the Commons, just after these
charges had been raised, that charges 'should not be made more than a small factor -
a useful adjunct, but only an adjunct, to the major source of finance'. He ruled out
including a new NHS tax. 163 Disillusion with charges was also due to the amount
actually raised: after exemptions, they yielded only £20m in their first full year. Even
at current prices, they only raised £40m in a full year at their 1969 levels (see chart
Via).'64
' PRO T 227/2654: Robinson memorandum, 'The nature of the alternatives', 18 December 1967
' PRO T 227/2654: Robinson to Jenkins, 2 January 1968; PRO CAB 129/135: Jenkins memorandum to Cabinet,
'Public expenditure, post-devaluation measures', 3 January 1968; PRO CAB 128/43: Cabinet minutes, 5 January,
11 January 1968
'° PRO PREM 13/2805: PLP petition, February 1968
161 Composite Resolution 45, Ayrshire CLP, 4 October 1968: Conference report (Labour Party, London, 1968), p.
306
162 PRO PREM 13/2809: Note for Wilson, 2 May 1969; House of Commons debates, vol. 783, cols. 42-3:
Crossman statement, 5 May 1969; RCD, 5-6 May 1969: Crossman, Diary, 1977 edn., III, pp. 475-7; see above,
chapt. IV
163 1-louse of Commons debates, vol. 786, cols. 263-4: Adjournment debate, NHS finance, Crossman speech, 1 July
1969
' Webster, Services, II, p. 203
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Chart VI. 6. NHS contributions and charges, UK, 1964-70 (current prices)
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Source: Webster, Services, II, appendix 3.6, p. 805
Labour did, however, act against NHS pay beds, even though Robinson's
officials quickly decided that banning them altogether was 'probably
impracticable'.' 65 There were, however, ways round this: one was slowly to reduce
the number of pay beds in NHS hospitals, while lifting the ceiling on how much
consultants could charge for these beds. This would not only make consultants more
amenable to change, but might reduce demand by raising the amount patients had to
pay. Robinson did just this, claiming that he had 'equalised the pressure' between
NHS and pay beds by matching supply to demand at the same level in each.'66
Unsurprisingly, the JCC resisted this, focusing on the proposals to lower the number
of pay beds - though they were happier at gaining the ability to charge whatever they
wished for their services. But by threatening to set the package in stone through
legislation, Robinson managed to force the JCC to climb down. He thereafter asked
165 PRO MH 150/144: MOH memorandum, 'Pay beds: changes of policy', November 1964
PRO MH 150/143: Hewitt to Aldridge, 'National charges for pay beds', 20 October 1964, Robinson and
Shirley Williams meeting with officials, minutes, 4 December 1964; PRO MH 150/144: France to Cashman, 'Pay
beds', 25 November 1964
14O
E
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RHBs to raise the occupancy rates of private beds, which were significantly lower
than those of NHS beds, in order to secure shorter waiting lists for non-paying
patients.'67
Legislation prepared on this sharpened the powers a Minister of Health had
over such matters, not only giving him discretion over the level of charges, but to take
into account in those charges the capital costs that the taxpayer had already invested,
and which were 'subsidising' private patients. Consultants were also no longer to be
routinely given the option on taking up posts of choosing a mix of part-time and full-
time service, since the former made private work so much easier. The administrative
divide between NHS and pay beds was also to be lowered, so that the latter could be
used for NHS patients should waiting lists reach intolerable levels.' 68
 This resulted in
a reduction in pay beds from 5,764 to 4,379 in England and Wales.' 69
 The JCC was
soon 'deluged with indignant protests' from consultants. 17° Some elements of
Labour's egalitarian ideology - its opposition to pay beds in the NHS, for instance -
remained important to the Party in government.
167 PRO MN 150/144: JCC to Winner, 'Pay beds', 3 March 1965, Robinson to Bowden, 15 June 1965, Bowden to
Robinson, 21 June 1965, Robinson to iCC, 26 July 1965; PRO MH 150/143: Robinson and France meeting with
officials, 'Future policy on pay beds', 14 May 1965
168 PRO MH 119/22: MOH Hospital Memorandum, 'Review of pay beds', April 1966; PRO MH 150/145: Hewitt
to Watson, Amendments desired to sections 4 and 5', 10 August 1965, Sellers to Robinson, 8 November 1965, 10
January 1966, Hewitt to Williamson, 'Pay beds', 19 January 1966
169 Cmnd 3702, MOH report 1967 (July 1968), p. 56
'° PRO MH 150/46: JCC to Yellowlees, 26 January 1968
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'Evil spirits '. scandal and reaction.
Throughout Labour's time in office, the Government slowly improved services for the
aged, young chronic sick, and mentally ill. Extant sample surveys of young chronic
sick provision, were broadened into a national investigation.' 7 ' RHBs were asked to
provide more specialist units, with a dedicated consultant in charge: pilot projects on
the integration of these wards into general hospitals, under the title 'Operation
Mainstream', were prepared.' 72
 Instructions on minimum standards for the size, form
and patterns of treatment in these wards followed.' 73
 On the mental health side, CHSC
and MOH followed up a June 1964 advisory Circular with instructions on expanding
the provision of training, holidays, and day care at home.' 74 Similar guidance was
issued on the care of the elderly, as well as more information gathered, this time
through the Government's Social Survey.' 75 However, these reforms were
overshadowed, and to a certain extent dictated, by a less positive development: a rash
of scandals that called the structure of the NHS itself into question.
These began on 10 November 1965, when a group of clergymen, peers,
academics and social workers wrote to 71.,t Times. 'We, the undersigned, have been
shocked by the treatment of geriatric patients in certain mental hospitals', they wrote,
'one of the evils being the practice of stripping them of their personal possessions. We
have now sufficient evidence to suggest that this is widespread'.' 76
 This letter, from
the group which became known as AEGIS - Aid for the Elderly in Government
PRO Mu 150/45: Survey of young chronic sick units, 2 September 1964, Working group report, December
1964; PRO MH 150/46: Standing Medical Advisory Committee, minutes, 9 January 1968
PRO MH 150/474: 'Mainstream' committee, minutes, 17 October, 6 November 1968
PRO MH 119/25: MOH Hospital Memorandum, 'Care of younger chronic sick patients in hospitals', 12 June
1968
174 PRO MH 150/166: CHSC Standing Medical Advisory Committee, minutes, 13 July 1965; PRO MH 119/19:
Hospital Memorandum, 'Improving the effectiveness of the hospital service for the mentally subnormal', 2
December 1965; PRO MH 119/21: Circular 7/66, 31 March 1966
PRO MH 119/19: Circular to RI-IBs, HMCs, Boards of Governors, local authorities, 'Care of the elderly in
hospitals and residential homes', 15 September 1965
176 J.P. Martin, Hospitals in trouble (Blackwell, Oxford, 1984), p. 3
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Institutions - called for action to end the ill-treatment of the old. Sans everything, the
book edited by Barbara Robb and based on this evidence, uncovered a grim world of
'rage and misery', 'inadequate buildings, bad organisation, over-crowding, shortage
of money and shortage of staff. Robb produced evidence from doctors and voluntary
bodies that, due to a shortage of beds, the elderly were living out their days in
inappropriate mental hospitals.'77
This caused the Ministry several intractable problems, for AEGIS would not
initially co-operate with investigations in order to protect its sources. The Ministry
was forced to set up an internal inquiry. Each Hospital Board named in Sans
everything was to appoint an independent body for this purpose, chaired by a QC, and
containing at least one nurse, one doctor and one layperson.' 78
 As the inquiry
proceeded, however, the Ministry became increasingly irritated at AEGIS's
behaviour, which may have influenced their eventual judgements. Internal Ministry
memoranda refer to 'Mrs Robb... making difficulties in various regions', and civil
servants prepared a list of how each separate investigation was being hampered by
AEGIS's refusal to reveal its sources.' 79 Three out of six inquiry Chairmen reckoned
that their work had been frustrated in this	 80
This irritation was reflected in the July 1968 White Paper, which was basically
a précis of the Committees' reports. On the allegations concerning abuse of elderly
residents in an Oxford geriatric unit, for instance, the Report evinced 'no doubt upon
the evidence which we accept that they have been disproved'. Although there was
evidence of 'occasional misconduct', due to staff shortages and the testing nature of
the job, there was no evidence that any systematic abuse had occurred. Conclusions
on other cases were sjmjlar.' 8 ' Publication proceeded without comment by Prime
B. Robb, Sans everything (AEGIS, Nelson, London, 1967), pp. 9, xiii-xiv
PRO MH 159/213: MOH press release, Care of the elderly, 9 August 1967
PRO MH 159/213: 'Sans everything enquiries', 1 November 1967
PRO MH 149/2 14: 'Sans everything enquiries: position', 10 November 1967
Cmnd. 3687, Findings and recommendations following enquiries into allegations concerning the care of
elderly patients in certain hospitals (July 1968), passim
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Minister or Cabinet.' 82
 However, this was followed by clumsy references by
Robinson in the Commons to 'totally unfounded or grossly exaggerated'
allegations.' 83
 This was unfortunate, for it was to become clear in the coming months
that, whatever the specific allegations, the NHS was failing long-stay patients.
This was due to the scandal at a mental hospital at Ely, near Cardiff, which
began when the News of the World published allegations about the staff of this
hospital in August 1967.184 The Ministry immediately set up a 'Sans everything type
of inquiry', but this new investigation was more effective than the last, because the
main witness, a Greek Cypriot nurse who had been forced out of the hospital, was not
anonymous. It was easier, therefore, to establish the truth.' 85
 Robinson appointed a
young Conservative lawyer, Geoffrey Howe, to head the inquiry. His report
condemned almost every aspect of the hospital. Management control was under-
developed, with no-one taking responsibility or putting government policy into effect;
the buildings were cut off and isolated from one another. The hospital was
overcrowded, under-nursed, and facilities for children's play and development were
'seriously deficient'. 'Lack of skill and some lack of sympathy' had been routinely
exhibited towards the patients, including locking them in solitary confinement.'86
Crossman realised that this was 'devastating.., far more disturbing' than Sans
everything: most of the allegations made by the News of the world were
substantiated.' 87
 Overruling his civil servants, he published the Report in full,
ensuring the maximum impact for the story.' 88
 Tam Dayell, his PPS at the DHSS,
thought he was motivated by guilt and anger. Crossman's mother had recently died in
182 PRO PREM 13/2803: Crossman to Wilson, 3 July 1968
183 House of Commons debates, vol. 768, col. 214: Robinson statement, 'Book, Sans everything, reports of
inquiries', 9 July 1968
Webster, Services, II, p. 231
185 PRO MH 159/221; Croft to Hedley, 'Complaint to News of the world about Ely hospital', 21 August 1967
Cmnd 3975, Report of the committee of inquiry into allegations of ill-treatment ofpatients and other
irregularities at the Ely Hospital, Cardj/f (March 1969), pp. 122-3, 125-32
187 PRO PREM 13/2803: Crossman to Wilson, 17 March 1969
188 RCD, 11-12 March 1969: Crossman, Diary, 1977 edo., III, pp. 409-10
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squalid conditions in a nursing home; and he had discovered that his second wife, Zia,
would never have been admitted to hospital (even though suffering from a terminal
illness) had the consultant not thought that Crossman would pay for a private bed.'89
Crossman's anger grew when he discovered that there were a quarter of a million of
these patients housed in old Public Assistance buildings, quite unsuited to modern
medicine.'90
Worse, investigation and complaint seemed to be positively discouraged. At a
dramatic meeting with his Chief Nursing Officer, medical advisors and political aides
at the DHSS, Crossman discovered that there had been a series of reports from the
Nursing Officer's regional staff, stretching back to 1953, condemning Ely. It had
recently been partially rebuilt, making some of the criticisms out of date, but the
reports revealed the management's attitude. 'There is only a sordid little yard for the
children to play in', one ran; none of the patients had their own lockers or clothes; one
male nurse used dirty water to wash the children's hands, for there were not enough
dedicated washbasins. The main structural problem was the inability to provide
specialist care for patients of different ages and needs, given the 'all-in' mentality of
the place. 191 'Appalling' practices were still in evidence in 1967.192
Crossman set up a Post-Ely Policy Working Party (PEP). This contained both
'outsiders and insiders', including Godber, Peter Townsend, and Howe himself, along
with Eileen Skellern, Superintendent of Nursing at the Royal Bethlem and Maudsley
Hospital and Dr Gerald O'Gormon from Borocourt Hospital, both at Crossman's
suggestion.' 93
 A series of new ideas flowed from PEP, especially on visiting and
' 1. Dayell, Dick Crossman (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1989), pp. 175-6; A. Howard, Crossman: the
pursuit ofpower (Jonathan Cape, London, 1990), pp. 294-5
190 RCD, 12 March 1969: Crossman, Diary, 1977 edn., Ill, p. 410
191 PRO MH 96/1 895: Board of Control reports on Ely, May 1953, March 1955
'	 MH 96/1894: Mackessack memorandum, Pre-arranged visit to Ely Hopsital', 27 June 967
PRO MI-I 96/23 18: Williams, PEP Secretary, memorandum, 'Post Ely Policy working party', April 1969; RCD,
11 April 1969: Crossman, Diary, 1977 edn., III, p. 436
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inspecting hospitals.' 94 Official working groups considered the establishment of a new
'professional consultative group', along with a 'Hospital Advisory Committee', which
would advise hospitals on best practice and planning services for long-stay and
incapacitated patients. This would be no new thing, the CNO, Dame Kathleen Raven
wrote, but could now be backed by political will. 'Where we have failed all along',
she argued, 'is that we have not brought pressure to bear on the Boards... [resulting
in]... isolation, frustration and finally complete lethargy'.' 95
 Another working party
considered a new system for making complaints.'96
The need for new ideas was shown by new information on the extent of the
problem: among Welsh hospitals, for instance, 57 hospitals required 'high priority
action' on bed spacing, 68 on patient privacy, 82 on toilets, and 61 on day space.'97
Given this, one innovation PEP eventually secured was a recommendation for
minimum standards, for instance on staffing levels per patient and space per bed.'98
Other ideas ran into trouble. Consultants were deeply worried at the idea of a Hospital
Advisory Service that might contain laymen such as management experts and
consumer representatives, and therefore in their view constitute a threat to
professional freedom. RHBs jibbed at the idea of an independent Inspectorate, since
its reports might contain lists of expensive demands. These views were the reason the
new HAS stayed advisory, separating policy from consultation.'99
'	 MH 96/2318: Williams memorandum, Re1ationships with other departmental working groups', April
1969
PRO MH 159/314: Raven to Hedley, 'Central professional consultative group, 18 March 1969
' e.g. PRO MH 159/3 14: Marre to Mottershead, 7 February 1969
PRO MH 96/2318: Welsh RHB, Survey of long stay hospitals in Wales: assessment of conditions in wards,
April 1969
'' PRO MH 150/492: DHSS memorandum to PEP, 'Proposed minimum standards for long-stay hospitals:
nursing', April 1969; PRO MH 96/2318: Farrant to Baker, 'Minimum standards for long-stay hospitals', 15 May
1969
' PRO MH 150/492: MOH memorandum to PEP, 'NHS hospital advisory service, proposed consultative group',
April 1969; Crossman/ RHB Chairmen meeting, minutes, 30 April 1969
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Nevertheless, new ideas did find their way into the Government's Green
Papers on NHS reorganisation: a 'health ombudsman' or commissioner was proposed,
an independent figure with powers to investigate cases that were not solved
satisfactorily at local level. 200
 Pressure for this grew throughout the Ely controversy.
The Parliamentary Council on Tribunals, the appeal body on public services set up by
the Conservatives in the 195 Os, criticised the conduct of the Sans everything inquiries
in its report for 1968, as not sufficiently independent.20 ' This proposal was still
outstanding when the Wilson government fell, since - to the anger of Howe and many
on PEP - DHSS officials insisted that this report be put out to further consultation on
a code of conduct to make any grounds for complaint clearer. 202 However, the DHSS
did manage to secure the reallocation of £3m to the long-stay institutions, despite the
continued resistance of RHB Chairmen jealous of their right to make such
decisions.203
Crossman's championing of the idea of an Advisory Service eventually
overcame opposition, and inspections began in February 1970.204 The DHSS also
reminded RHBs of their legal requirement to 'exercise general oversight of the
administration and standards of care in the hospital service in their regions, including
whatever arrangements for visiting they consider appropriate for this purpose'. 205 The
'evil spirits' Crossman divined within the NHS continued to be unleashed, in such
cause celebres as South Ockenden, where conditions at one medium security unit for
200 MOH, National Health Service: the administrative structure of the medical and related services in England and
Wales (HMSO, London, 1968), p. 24; SHHD, Administrative reorganisation of the Scottish health services
(HMSO, Edinburgh, 1968), pp. 22-3
201 Martin, Trouble, p. 5
202 PRO MF1 150/492: PEP, minutes, 29 July I %9, 9 October 1969; PRO MH 159/236: Working group on
complaints procedure, draft report, September 1969
203 PRO MH 150/492: Farrant to Somerville, 'Long-stay hospitals: reallocation of resources', 17 October 1969,
Williams memorandum to PEP, 'Interim measures to improve hospital services', 27 November 1969
204 Webster, Services, II, p. 236
205 PRO MH 119/26: DHSS Circular, 'Relationship between the Secretary of State, RHBs and HMCs', July 1969
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the mentally ill were revealed as brutal and degrading. 206
 But central government had
at least begun to monitor and enforce basic standards in such institutions.
206 RCD, 11 April 1969: Crossman, Diary, 1977 edn., III, p. 436, where he uses the phrase 'evil spirits' of South
Ockenden; Martin, Trouble, pp. 11-12, 19-2 1
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'Chain of command': a new structure for the NHS.
The BMA and Royal Colleges had been pressing for an end to tripartism since the
early 'sixties, and Labour politicians in Opposition concurred. They envisaged a
single tier of administration to aid planning and control. 207
 From the Labour Party's
rank-and-file, there was pressure for a 'democratic' service, that is, one run by local
government, or directly elected R}-IBs. 208
 Within the Treasury, yet another model for
NHS 'reform' took shape, stimulated by the Fulton Royal Commission into the Civil
Service. Concerned to extract value for money, the Treasury's attention fell first on
setting up an 'administrative board' along the lines of the nationalised industries. The
Ministry frustrated this, insisting that the proposal would subvert Parliamentary
responsibility.209
 However, it was clear that 'we were all agreed that the present
organisation was not satisfactory... power and responsibility were divorced, the
Ministry of Health was not fully in control and there was not a fully integrated chain
of command' 210
It was clear that a thorough investigation was required, and in October 1967
Ministers approved a full internal inquiry into the administration of the NHS. 21 ' The
situation was complex because the Government had already appointed an independent
inquiry into the personal social services under Frederic Seebohm, and a Royal
Commission on the structure of local government in England under Lord Redcliffe-
Maud. These parallel inquiries slowed progress, for NHS reform had to wait upon
recommendations on the shape of local government and social services. Not that
207 BMA, Review of the medical services in Great Britain (BMA, London, 1962), passim; LPA NEC sub-
committee files: Dunwoody memorandum to home policy sub-committee, 'Priorities for the NHS', February 1964
208 Composite Resolution 18, Sutton and Cheam CLP, 4 October 1966: Conference report (Labour Party, London,
1966), p. 182
209 PRO T 227/2369: Rampton to Petch, 'Fulton Committee and the NHS', 13 December 1966, France
memorandum to the Fulton Committee, 'A health service board', December 1966, France/ Helsby meeting,
minutes, 19 March 1967
210 PRO T 227/2369: Petch to Couzens, 'Organisalion of the health service', 30 March 1967
211 PRO CAB 134/3281: Robinson memorandum to SSC, 'Administrative structure of the medical and related
services in England and Wales, 13 October 1967; SSC minutes, 18 October 1967
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waiting for these reports made the situation much clearer. When Redcliffe-Maud
reported in June 1969, it contradicted the whole thrust of the Government's desire for
administrative centralisation: 'local government itself will be able to ensure co-
ordination of the health service with the personal social services'. 212
 The unitary
authorities recommended were also too large to serve as management units in the
NHS. The Seebohm Report further confused matters by recommending unified
'Social Services Departments' under LHAs in England and Wales, amalgamating
child care and all other forms of social welfare and handing over local government's
vestigial functions in the health field.213
The proposals that eventually emerged were therefore provisional, and not
intended as a definitive statement of government policy. 214
 The Government's first
Green Paper on the subject, issued in July 1968, proposed single 'Area Health
Authorities' for all health purposes. This was a radical simplification of the NHS,
designed to facilitate 'foresight and planning'. 40 or so AHAs would unite general
medical services with existing local authority health duties, for instance ambulances,
domestic midwifery, and health visiting. Local authority control was left as an option,
though only briefly mentioned and obviously undermined by the rest of the
document. 215
 A similar scheme was worked out for Scotland, though given the
speedier passage of social service reform there, as well as its higher NHS spending
per head, the administrative proposals here were a little more certain and the service
envisaged slightly more ambitious.216
This Green Paper, however, pleased no-one, least of all those NHS
administrators whose efforts were implicitly slighted by it: Executive Councils, for
instance, violently objected to the portrayal of the NHS as chaotic and under-
212 Cmnd 4040, Royal Commission on local government in England, vol. I, Report (June 1969), p. 356
213 Cmnd 3703, Report of the committee on the local authority and allied personal social service (July 1968), pp.
30-2, 51, 181-5
214 PRO CAB 129/138: Robinson memorandum to Cabinet, Administrative structure of the medical and related
services in England and Wales', 1 July 1968; PRO CAB 128/43: Cabinet minutes, 9 July 1968
215 MOH, National Health Service, pp. 10, 12-18, 21-2
216 SHHD, Administrative reorganisation, pp. 18-26
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administered. 217 Local government did not want any of its health and welfare
functions taken away, opposing the small number of AHAs as inevitably unresponsive
to local opinion. Specialist clinicians doubted whether AHAs could provide enough
facilities for medical education and specialist care; GPs were suspicious that the
increased executive strength of AHAs might eventually involve a set salary structure,
and a loss of independence. 218 More generally, there was a feeling among NHS
administrators and staff that single-tier AHAs would be too small to co-ordinate
regional services, such as advanced surgery or blood transfusion, and too big to allow
for proper local autonomy in day-to-day management.219
It did not take long, therefore, for the Government to realise that its plans for
• single-tier authorities were unrealistic. Crossman had never thought much of the first
Green Paper, and had done what he could to frustrate it: once he became head of the
merged DHSS in November 1968 work began on a second set of plans. 22° It was
evident from the start that this would mean at least one more tier of administration.22'
Crossman and Bea Serota, his Minister of State for Health, realised that those interest
groups discontented with Robinson's Green Paper had to be appeased, and responded
to calls for larger planning units by 'regionalising' the problem. Instead of AHAs
there would be 'unitary health authorities' at the level of the Redcliffe-Maud unitary
authorities, on which professionals, central government nominees, managers and local
councillors would sit. A local government take-over was to be finally ruled out, to win
over the doctors.222
217 PRO MH 166/55: Executive Councils Association submission on Green Paper, December 1968
218 PRO MH 166/56: Green Paper submissions, Rural District Councils Association to MOH, Royal College of
Obstetricians and gynaecologists, GPs' Association, 19 December 1968, 14 January, 16 January 1969
219 PRO MH 159/11: CHSC Report 1968, p. 9; Webster, The National Health Service: apolitical histoiy (OUP,
Oxford, 1998), pp. 95-6
° RCD, May 28, July 10 1968: Crossman, Diary, 1977 edn., III, pp. 86, 128
PRO MH 166/49: Long Term Study Group, minutes, 15 October 1968
'' PRO CAB 134/3288: Serota, Thomas memoranda to SSC, 'The future structure and content of the Health
Service', 2 October 1969, 'Future structure of the health service: application to Wales', 6 October 1969
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This proposal, which necessarily included a large local authority input into the
NHS, horrified the Treasury. It was the exact opposite of that strengthening of central
authority that they had set out to achieve. Dick Taverne, Minister of State at the
Treasury, told the Social Services Committee that this draft Green Paper represented
'the worst of both worlds... It would even be preferable to permit full local authority
control and financing of the service'. 223 Local councillors would have the power to
choose between projects, without taking responsibility for the budget. The Treasury
seemed to be placated when Crossman proposed that he would appoint a majority of
the members of the new authorities, though discussions were referred to further
bilateral talks on their exact shape and membership. 224 However, Crossman's plans
were about to change radically.
Crossman's special adviser Brian Abel-Smith initiated this change, telling his
Minister that 'everybody thought this scheme was terrible'. He submitted a plan for a
new two-tier solution. 80-90 AHAs (rather than the 40-50 of the first Green Paper)
would be co-terminous with the Maud unitary authorities, reminiscent of their
predecessors in 'Green Paper Mark I'. These would be one-third appointed, one-third
nominated by the professions, and one-third from local government. They would be
supplemented with another layer of administration - 'district management
subcommittees' - appointed by AHAs themselves. These would carry out the detailed
administration of the NHS. Though this blueprint would have done away with regions
altogether, after meeting with officials Crossman decided to keep Regions as
appointed 'councils', with limited co-ordinating powers. 225 This structure was in
outline that with which Crossman hoped to end the embarrassment of delay. 226 The
Treasury regarded it as over-complicated, and Diamond in Cabinet continued to
oppose the idea that two-thirds of AHA members would come from local authorities
PRO CAB 134/3285: SSC minutes, 9 October 1969
PRO CAB 134/3285: SSC minutes, 3 November 1969; PRO MH 166/10: Shirley Williams to Crossman, 4
November 1969
225 PRO MH 166/14 II: Abel-Smith memorandum, Green Paper', 10 December 1969; RCD, 9 December 1969:
Crossman, Diary, 1977 edn., III, p. 753
226 PRO CAB 134/3288: Crossman memorandum to SSC, 'NHS reorganisation', 31 December 1969
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and the professions. 227 However, these doubts were bested in Cabinet, when
Crossman made clear that the package was the minimum that would secure local
government co-operation.228
The final structure would therefore be as follows. AHAs would be set up on
the same boundaries as the Maud Unitary Authorities, with one third of the members
(and the chairman) appointed by the Secretary of State. These would be the main
'building blocks' of the NHS, responsible to the central department for policy and
levels of provision, though they would appoint district-level management committees.
Consultative Regional Health Councils would take responsibility for co-ordinating
some services, for example neurology and radiotherapy, as well as postgraduate
medical and general staff training, and blood transfusion. 229
 In Wales, the Welsh
Office itself would act as the RHC.23°
Local authority Social Service departments would operate personal welfare,
while councils would cede their health functions to the NHS. 23 ' In the end this was of
only academic interest, since Labour fell from power as its proposals were being
converted to a White Paper; but the thrust of policy is instructive. 232 For Labour was
227 PRO CAB 129/147: Diamond memorandum to Cabinet, 'Reorganisation of the NHS', 13 January 1970; RCD, 2
January 1970: Crossman, Diaiy, 1977 edn., III, p. 774
228 PRO CAB 128/45: Cabinet minutes, 15 January, 20 January 1970; RCD, 18, 20 January 1970: Crossman,
Diary, 1977 edn., HI, pp. 782, 785
DHSS, National Health Service: the Ji4rure structure of the National Health Service (HMSO, London, 1970),
pp. 8, 16, 23-4; House of Commons debates, vol. 798, cols. 997-9, 1005: NHS (future structure), Crossman speech,
23 March 1970
° Welsh Office, National Health Service: the reorganisation of the National Health Service in Wales (HMSO,
Cardiff, 1970), p. 17
J. Cooper, The creation of the British personal social services 1962-74 (Heinemann, London, 1983); Phoebe
Hall, Reforming the welfare: the politics of change in the personal social services (Heinemann, London, 1976), pp.
106-7
232 PRO MH 166/97: Bancroft to Dodds, 3 June 1970, Widdup to Dodds, 5 June 1970, Pearce to Dodds, 9 June
1970
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attempting what had proved beyond its grasp in 1948: a 'comprehensive' settlement,
centrally planned, but with a greater role for local government.
Labour abolished prescription charges, before economic crisis had forced their
return. They restricted the use of pay beds in NHS hospitals, accelerated the speed of
NHS expansion and attempted to build a more integrated planning system. But they
certainly fell short of their objectives, and found it much more difficult than expected
to review plans that had already been conveyed to administrative subaltems. Driven
by scandal, their reforms of long-stay provision would take decades to seem even
within sight of completion. But there remained a real difference from their
Conservative predecessors, who had taken the NHS in a more contributory, and more
decentralised, direction.
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CONCLUSION: GOVERNMENT, CHOICE AND HISTORY
The language of priorities is the religion of socialism.
-Aneurin Bevan'
Economic planning failed. This was not a matter of poor strategy or personal
mistakes, but was in fact caused by deep-seated practical and theoretical barriers to its
success. Chief among these, and particularly clear in the cases of regional planning
and incomes policy, was the problem of choice. Agreeing to plan was the easy part:
what to plan, how to plan, and the aims of planning, were much more difficult
questions to settle. This had been predicted in 1944 by the neo-liberal economist
Friedrich von Hayek in The road to serfdom: 'agreement will.., exist only on the
mechanism to be used. But it is a mechanism which can be used only for a common
end; and the question of the precise goal towards which all activity is to be directed
will arise as soon as the executive power has to translate the demand for a single plan
into a particular plan. Then it will appear that the agreement on the desirability of
planning is not supported by agreement on the ends the plan is to serve'. 2 Although
indicative planning did play a positive role in some other countries, this forecast was
borne out by Britain's experience in the 1960s. The very vagueness that initially made
planning attractive to different groups was at the root of its downfall.3
The planners throughout had different goals in mind. The TUC wanted faster
growth through more government intervention, while the CBI originally hoped for a
wide-ranging wage and price agreement that might help employers to control costs
and attack restrictive practices through regulated competition. They could therefore
never agree on a detailed programme. 4 Governments' priorities, which were often
those of short-term macro-economic management, were often in conflict with one, or
both, of their supposed economic partners - and the plans of NEDO and DEA. 5 The
A. Partington (ed.), The Oxford dictionary of quotations (OUP, Oxford, 1996), P. 68
2 F. von Hayek, The road to serfdom (Routledge, London, 1962 edn.), p.46
J. Jewkes, The new ordeal by planning (Macmillan, London, 1968), pp. 15, 18; see above, pp. 50-1
See above, pp. 39-48, 110-16
See above, e.g. pp. 52, 88-97
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uncertainty engendered by such disagreements, and the subsequent resort to a number
of planning 'paths', undermined the confidence that the exercise was supposed to
create. 6
 These problems were partly caused by the problem of distribution, for as
economists of all types realised, planning had to involve decisions as to which groups
would benefit from increased growth and prosperity. Michael Posner, Treasury
Economic Adviser in the late 1 960s and later Chief Economic Adviser, was no liberal
theorist in the Hayekian mould, believing that government could act to mould
common goals. But 'there is no natural consensus about what constitutes fair shares',
he wrote in 1973: 'no natural consensus that the "national interest" exists or should be
pre-eminent, no natural consensus about the direction which economic growth should
take or the uses to which its fruits should be put'.7
Planning for the welfare state had more success, because governments had
more control over this area. Some issues were clarified: for the first time, the long-
term impact of economic changes, novel technologies and new public demands on
welfare services was systematically considered. But even so, the problem of
knowledge remained. At the beginning of the decade, governments simply did not
know enough about the agencies for which they were paying to judge exactly the
resources needed by those services. By 1970, through public pressure and official
inquiry, they knew more. This helped to foster a more sensitive, consultative and
realistic approach. 8
 But governments still had to rely on their subalterns, for example
in the NHS and local authorities, to provide them with most of the information: and it
took a great deal of political pressure, such as Crossman's on mental illness, to find
out about particular subjects.9
The difficulty of uncertainty remained insoluble, for instance in the case of
demographic change, which appeared so impossible to accommodate in the 1960s:
with lower population forecasts emerging in the 1 970s, the problem then declined
6 i.E. Meade, The theory of indicative planning (MUP, Manchester, 1970), pp. 37-42
7 Middleton, Charlatans, p. 267
See above, e.g. pp. 172-4, 203-7, 220-1, 259-63, 308-11
See above, pp. 305-11
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somewhat in importance.'° Even figures concerning the short-term, such as those
regarding the balance of payments, were highly dubious and often unreliable." As an
inadequate framework for actual decisions, planning would remain simply one tool
among many: Other problems flowed from this. Despite a decade of tlying, public
expenditure had still not been properly brought under strategic control: although
Jenkins has carried real reductions, these seemed to have reached their limits by early
1970.12 Much more information was now available on how much public goods cost,
and about the relative costs and benefits of particular policies. The Treasury had
begun to inquire inside departments as to how they actually made decisions. But there
was still little evidence of real choice between policies at the centre, of which the
decision to raise NHS charges instead of reducing the education budget in 1969 was
one of the rare examples.'3
The problem of inheritance was crucial here, for as the economist Ely Devons
had observed while serving in the Ministry of Aircraft Production during the 1 940s,
there could not be one single planning effort that would transform any government
agency. The burden of inherited infrastructure, past decisions, and formulae based on
precedent were always too great.' 4
 The departmentalism of British Government was
one good example of past practices that prevented public expenditure restraint, and as
this thesis has shown, the real inheritance of dilapidation, squalor and need in the
public services was on a truly daunting scale.
Both these factors lay behind the failure of new methods of expenditure
control in the early 1 970s. Programme Analysis and Review (PAR) was seen as one
'° See above, pp. 168-70, 191-3, 219; A.F. Long, 'Planning, uncertainty and judgement: the case of population', in
K. Barnard & K. Lee (eds.), Conflicts in the National Health Service (Croom Helm, London, 1977), pp. 190-1,
196-8, 206; N.L. Tranter, British population in the twentieth century (Macmillan, London, 1996), pp. 118-21;
Meade, Indicative planning, p. 33
Middleton, 'Struggling with the impossible: Sterling, the balance of payments, and British economic policy
1949-72', in W.L. Young & A. Anion (eds.), The open economy (Kluwer Press, Amsterdam, forthcoming), pp. 5-9
12 See above, pp. 195-6, 256, 292-3
3 See above, p. 196
"E. Devons, Planning in practice: essays in aircraft planning in war time (CUP, Cambridge, 1950), pp. 17, 44
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of the most important of the innovations of the incoming Heath government, though it
had its roots in the Programme Committees and PPB work conducted in the 1960s.'5
PAR aimed to bring a number of specific programmes every year under close cost-
benefit analyses, as part of the PESC process. However, since most of the reports
were not 'action-orientated', and did not fit in with the time-scale of Ministers'
immediate choices and needs, PAR failed to gain a permanent foothold. 16 Also, since
the Treasury had to reach agreement every year with departments as to which
programmes would be reviewed in this way, individual Ministries nominated the
policy areas where they either already wanted a change of direction, or thought they
could easily fend it off. PAR was finally abolished when the Conservatives came to
power in 1979.17 This is not to say, however, that economic analysis declined in
importance, for cost-benefit analyses of specific infrastructure projects, later joined by
the widespread target setting and review machinery of the 1 980s and 1 990s, were
eventually to be some of the most important developments in British government.'8
The general move away from long-term planning of overall budgets, and
towards this more detailed micro-economic work, came to fruition only once cash
limits were placed on expenditure in 1975/76, a policy that had been considered and
rejected within the Treasury in 1968/69.19 These cash limits acted as an 'efficiency
partisan', forcing departments to bid for resources within an overall total - Plowden's
original aim in 1961 .Though only one element in the pressure for public expenditure
control, along with rising taxation and the intervention of the IMF, the developing
emphasis on choice and rationality of the later 1 960s began truly to bite on political
Heclo & Wildavsky, Private government, p. 268
' 6 A. Gray & W.I. Jenkins, Administrative politics in British government (Wheatsheaf, Sussex, 1985), P. 113; B.
Hogwood, From crisis to complacency? Shaping public policy in Britain (OUP, Oxford, 1987), pp. 133-4
' K. Theakston, 'The Heath Government, Whitehall and the civil service', in Ball & Seldon, Heath government,
pp. 92-3
P. Colvin, The economic ideal in British government (MUP, Manchester, 1985), pp. 3, 44-6, 53-6; Hennessy,
Whitehall, esp. 594-605
' K. Burk & A. Cairncross, 'Goodbye Great Britain': the 1976 JMF crisis (Yale UP, New Haven, 1991), pp. 15,
108, 125, 184-5; C. Thain & M. Wright, The Treasury and Whitehall: the planning and control ofpublic
expenditure 1976-93 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995), pp. 42-3, 47-8; see above, p. 143
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decisions. 2° Instead of avoiding choices through casting them far into the future, and
constantly spending more in cash terms to compensate for the RPE and background
inflation, governments would now have to adjust to reality.
Other elements of the planning moment came to look anachronistic.
Confidence in government-led development, and more widely in economic growth
and progress itself as achievable or even desirable aims, collapsed very quickly in the
late 1 960s and the 1 970s. The resurgence of liberal economics, taken along with tight
public expenditure limits from 1975/76 onwards, helped to undermine the idea of
omniscient government planning. 2 ' Spending on regional policy, for instance, was
greatly reduced in the 1980s, though incentives were used to aid individual projects in
the reduced Development Areas.22
Disappointment was also evident on the Left, where disillusionment with
utilitarian goals was widespread, fostered by a general awareness of some of the costs
of economic growth - traffic congestion and urban sprawl, for instance. 23 The new
environmental movement also emphasised 'limits to growth': the early 1970s saw the
publication of a number of studies predicting resource exhaustion and energy crisis,
which seemed to be borne out in the OPEC crises of that decade. 24 There was also a
sense of moral sterility: following the experience of the 1950s and 1960s, few thought
this would be solved by economic growth.25
One of the crucial elements examined in this work has been ideology. This
approach should help to avoid analytical approaches that are too narrowly focussed on
20 Self, Econocrats, p. 186
21 e.g. R. Cockett, Thinking the unthinkable: think tanks and the economic counter-revolution 1 931-83
(HarperCollins, London, 1994), chapter 7, pp. 243-86
R. Harris, 'Retreat from policy: the rationale and effectiveness of automatic capital grants', in idem & M. Hart
(eds.), Spatial policy in a divided nation (Regional Studies Association, London, 1993), pp. 64-6
E.J. Mishan, The costs of economic growth (Staples, London, 1967), p. 8
24 D.H. Meadows eta!, Limits to growth (Earth Island, London, 1972), passim, esp. pp. 48-55, 69-73, 183; E.F.
Schumacher, Small is beaut/'ul (Blond & Briggs, London, 1973), p. 23
23 e.g. Schumacher, Small, p. 33
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the state as a single, rational, independent actor on the one hand, and corporatist ideas
that cause us to see governments only as ciphers for interest group conflict on the
other. This work has demonstrated the limits to consensus, by examining some of the
relationships between social change, interest-group conflict and independent
government action. 26 It has shown that political parties, and not the functional interest
groups of political science, were often the vital component in policy-making.
Alongside the prevailing appeal to technocratic managerialism, traditional doctrinal
divisions between the parties remained. Conservative discontent over comprehensive
schooling, threats to the Green Belt, and over the egalitarian nature of the NHS,
placed real constraints on the Macmillan and Douglas-Home administrations.27
Labour Party pressure for a more 'selective' industrial policy was very important in
promoting the Wilson Government's move in that direction. 28 The variations of
different parties' policies while in government therefore also acted to restrain long-
term planning.
But there was also a more fundamental flaw in the ideology of planning, for
although long-term projections, more economic analysis, and better administration
were and are desirable and useful, in the 1 960s and early 1 970s these methods were
turned into an end in themselves. This was the key error. Government through
planning turned out to be an illusion, because forwarding the public good does not,
and cannot, reside in a single moment of panoptical technocratic decision. Nor can
good governance be embodied in a series of regular 'plans', however detailed,
frequent, or open to review, for it exists rather in constant judgement between social,
moral, economic, administrative and political priorities - a fact which Ministers were
just beginning to realise in the late 1960s. More information, reconstituted
administrative machinery, and increased consultation can only be adjuncts to such
decisions. In short, to govern is to choose.
As recommended in P. Hall, Governing the economy: the politics of stare intervention in Britain and France
(Polity, Cambridge, 1986), pp. 15-20. For 'state-centred' approaches, see T. Skocpol, 'Bringing the state back in:
strategies of analysis in current research', in idem, P.B. Evans & D. Rueschemeyer (eds.), Bringing the state back
in (CUP, Cambridge, 1985), esp. pp. 3-11; for 'social-centred' approaches, see above, pp. 20-3
27 See above, pp. 178-80, 227-30, 264-74
28 See above, pp. 120-2, 160-I
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